Theexecutivepower，pursuantofwhathasbeenalreadysaid，oughttohaveashareinthelegislaturebythepowerofrejecting，otherwiseitwouldsoonbestrippedofitsprerogative。Butshouldthelegislativepowerusurpashareoftheexecutive，thelatterwouldbeequallyundone。
　　Iftheprinceweretohaveapartinthelegislaturebythepowerofresolving，libertywouldbelost。Butasitisnecessaryheshouldhaveashareinthelegislatureforthesupportofhisownprerogative，thissharemustconsistinthepowerofrejecting。
　　ThechangeofgovernmentatRomewasowingtothis，thatneitherthesenate，whohadonepartoftheexecutivepower，northemagistrates，whowereentrustedwiththeother，hadtherightofrejecting，whichwasentirelylodgedinthepeople。
　　Herethenisthefundamentalconstitutionofthegovernmentwearetreatingof。Thelegislativebodybeingcomposedoftwoparts，theycheckoneanotherbythemutualprivilegeofrejecting。Theyarebothrestrainedbytheexecutivepower，astheexecutiveisbythelegislative。
　　Thesethreepowersshouldnaturallyformastateofreposeorinaction。
　　Butasthereisanecessityformovementinthecourseofhumanaffairs，theyareforcedtomove，butstillinconcert。
　　Astheexecutivepowerhasnootherpartinthelegislativethantheprivilegeofrejecting，itcanhavenoshareinthepublicdebates。Itisnotevennecessarythatitshouldpropose，becauseasitmayalwaysdisapproveoftheresolutionsthatshallbetaken，itmaylikewiserejectthedecisionsonthoseproposalswhichweremadeagainstitswill。
　　Insomeancientcommonwealths，wherepublicdebateswerecarriedonbythepeopleinabody，itwasnaturalfortheexecutivepowertoproposeanddebateinconjunctionwiththepeople，otherwisetheirresolutionsmusthavebeenattendedwithastrangeconfusion。
　　Weretheexecutivepowertodeterminetheraisingofpublicmoney，otherwisethanbygivingitsconsent，libertywouldbeatanend；
　　becauseitwouldbecomelegislativeinthemostimportantpointoflegislation。
　　Ifthelegislativepowerwastosettlethesubsidies，notfromyeartoyear，butforever，itwouldruntheriskoflosingitsliberty，becausetheexecutivepowerwouldbenolongerdependent；andwhenonceitwaspossessedofsuchaperpetualright，itwouldbeamatterofindifferencewhetherithelditofitselforofanother。Thesamemaybesaidifitshouldcometoaresolutionofentrusting，notanannual，butaperpetualcommandofthefleetsandarmiestotheexecutivepower。
　　Topreventtheexecutivepowerfrombeingabletooppress，itisrequisitethatthearmieswithwhichitisentrustedshouldconsistofthepeople，andhavethesamespiritasthepeople，aswasthecaseatRometillthetimeofMarius。Toobtainthisend，thereareonlytwoways，eitherthatthepersonsemployedinthearmyshouldhavesufficientpropertytoanswerfortheirconducttotheirfellow—subjects，andbeenlistedonlyforayear，aswascustomaryatRome：orifthereshouldbeastandingarmy，composedchieflyofthemostdespicablepartofthenation，thelegislativepowershouldhavearighttodisbandthemassoonasitpleased；thesoldiersshouldliveincommonwiththerestofthepeople；andnoseparatecamp，barracks，orfortressshouldbesuffered。
　　Whenonceanarmyisestablished，itoughtnottodependimmediatelyonthelegislative，butontheexecutive，power；andthisfromtheverynatureofthething，itsbusinessconsistingmoreinactionthanindeliberation。
　　Itisnaturalformankindtosetahighervalueuponcouragethantimidity，onactivitythanprudence，onstrengththancounsel。Hencethearmywilleverdespiseasenate，andrespecttheirownofficers。Theywillnaturallyslighttheorderssentthembyabodyofmenwhomtheylookuponascowards，andthereforeunworthytocommandthem。Sothatassoonasthetroopsdependentirelyonthelegislativebody，itbecomesamilitarygovernment；andifthecontraryhaseverhappened，ithasbeenowingtosomeextraordinarycircumstances。Itisbecausethearmywasalwayskeptdivided；itisbecauseitwascomposedofseveralbodiesthatdependedeachonaparticularprovince；itisbecausethecapitaltownswerestrongplaces，defendedbytheirnaturalsituation，andnotgarrisonedwithregulartroops。Holland，forinstance，isstillsaferthanVenice；shemightdrownorstarvetherevoltedtroops；forastheyarenotquarteredintownscapableoffurnishingthemwithnecessarysubsistence，thissubsistenceisofcourseprecarious。
　　InperusingtheadmirabletreatiseofTacitusOntheMannersoftheGermans，[13]wefinditisfromthatnationtheEnglishhaveborrowedtheideaoftheirpoliticalgovernment。Thisbeautifulsystemwasinventedfirstinthewoods。
　　Asallhumanthingshaveanend，thestatewearespeakingofwillloseitsliberty，willperish。HavenotRome，Sparta，andCarthageperished？
　　Itwillperishwhenthelegislativepowershallbemorecorruptthantheexecutive。
　　ItisnotmybusinesstoexaminewhethertheEnglishactuallyenjoythislibertyornot。Sufficientitisformypurposetoobservethatitisestablishedbytheirlaws；andIinquirenofurther。
　　NeitherdoIpretendbythistoundervalueothergovernments，nortosaythatthisextremepoliticallibertyoughttogiveuneasinesstothosewhohaveonlyamoderateshareofit。HowshouldIhaveanysuchdesign，Iwhothinkthateventhehighestrefinementofreasonisnotalwaysdesirable，andthatmankindgenerallyfindtheiraccountbetterinmediumsthaninextremes？
　　Harrington，inhisOceana，hasalsoinquiredintotheutmostdegreeoflibertytowhichtheconstitutionofastatemaybecarried。Butofhimindeeditmaybesaidthatforwantofknowingthenatureofreallibertyhebusiedhimselfinpursuitofanimaginaryone；andthathebuiltaChalcedon，thoughhehadaByzantiumbeforehiseyes。
　　7。OftheMonarchiesweareacquaintedwith。Themonarchiesweareacquaintedwithhavenot，likethatwehavebeenspeakingof，libertyfortheirdirectview：theonlyaimisthegloryofthesubject，ofthestate，andofthesovereign。Buthencethereresultsaspiritofliberty，whichinthosestatesiscapableofachievingasgreatthings，andofcontributingasmuchperhapstohappinessaslibertyitself。
　　Herethethreepowersarenotdistributedandfoundedonthemodeloftheconstitutionabove—mentioned；theyhaveeachaparticulardistribution，accordingtowhichtheybordermoreorlessonpoliticalliberty；andiftheydidnotborderuponit，monarchywoulddegenerateintodespoticgovernment。
　　8。WhytheAncientshadnotaclearIdeaofMonarchy。Theancientshadnonotionofagovernmentfoundedonabodyofnobles，andmuchlessonalegislativebodycomposedoftherepresentativesofthepeople。TherepublicsofGreeceandItalywerecitiesthathadeachtheirownformofgovernment，andconvenedtheirsubjectswithintheirwalls。BeforeRomehadswallowedupalltheotherrepublics，therewasscarcelyanywhereakingtobefound，no，notinItaly，Gaul，Spain，orGermany；
　　theywereallpettystatesorrepublics。EvenAfricaitselfwassubjecttoagreatcommonwealth：andAsiaMinorwasoccupiedbyGreekcolonies。
　　Therewas，therefore，noinstanceofdeputiesoftownsorassembliesofthestates；onemusthavegoneasfarasPersiatofindamonarchy。
　　Iamnotignorantthattherewereconfederaterepublics；inwhichseveraltownssentdeputiestoanassembly。ButIaffirmtherewasnomonarchyonthatmodel。
　　Thefirstplan，therefore，ofthemonarchiesweareacquaintedwithwasthusformed。TheGermannationsthatconqueredtheRomanempirewerecertainlyafreepeople。OfthiswemaybeconvincedonlybyreadingTacitusOntheMannersoftheGermans。Theconquerorsspreadthemselvesoverallthecountry；livingmostlyinthefields，andverylittleintowns。WhentheywereinGermany，thewholenationwasabletoassemble。
　　Thistheycouldnolongerdowhendispersedthroughtheconqueredprovinces。Andyetasitwasnecessarythatthenationshoulddeliberateonpublicaffairs，pursuanttotheirusualmethodbeforetheconquest，theyhadrecoursetorepresentatives。SuchistheoriginoftheGothicgovernmentamongstus。Atfirstitwasmixedwitharistocracyandmonarchy——amixtureattendedwiththisinconvenience，thatthecommonpeoplewerebondmen。Thecustomafterwardssucceededofgrantinglettersofenfranchisement，andwassoonfollowedbysoperfectaharmonybetweenthecivillibertyofthepeople，theprivilegesofthenobilityandclergy，andtheprince’sprerogative，thatIreallythinkthereneverwasintheworldagovernmentsowelltemperedasthatofeachpartofEurope，solongasitlasted。Surprisingthatthecorruptionofthegovernmentofaconqueringnationshouldhavegivenbirthtothebestspeciesofconstitutionthatcouldpossiblybeimaginedbyman！
　　9。Aristotle’sMannerofThinking。Aristotleisgreatlypuzzledintreatingofmonarchy。[14]Hemakesfivespecies；andhedoesnotdistinguishthembytheformofconstitution，butbythingsmerelyaccidental，asthevirtuesandvicesoftheprince；orbythingsextrinsic，suchastyrannyusurpedorinherited。
　　AmongthenumberofmonarchiesheranksthePersianempireandthekingdomofSparta。Butisitnotevidentthattheonewasadespoticstateandtheotherarepublic？
　　Theancients，whowerestrangerstothedistributionofthethreepowersinthegovernmentofasingleperson，couldneverformajustideaofmonarchy。
　　10。WhatotherPoliticiansthought。Totempermonarchy，Arybas，kingofEpirus，[15]foundnootherremedythanarepublic。TheMolossi，notknowinghowtolimitthesamepower，madetwokings，[16]bywhichmeansthestatewasweakenedmorethantheprerogative；theywantedrivals，andtheycreatedenemies。
　　TwokingsweretolerablenowherebutatSparta；heretheydidnotform，butwereonlyapartoftheconstitution。
　　11。OftheKingsoftheheroicTimesofGreece。IntheheroictimesofGreece，akindofmonarchyarosethatwasnotoflongduration。[17]
　　Thosewhohadbeeninventorsofarts，whohadfoughtintheircountry’scause，whohadestablishedsocieties，ordistributedlandsamongthepeople，obtainedtheregalpower，andtransmittedittotheirchildren。
　　Theywerekings，priests，andjudges。ThiswasoneofthefivespeciesofmonarchymentionedbyAristotle；[18]andtheonlyonethatcangiveusanyideaofthemonarchicalconstitution。Buttheplanofthisconstitutionisoppositetothatofourmodernmonarchies。
　　Thethreepowersweretheredistributedinsuchamannerthatthepeoplewerethelegislature，[19]andthekinghadtheexecutivetogetherwiththejudiciarypower；whereasinmodernmonarchiestheprinceisinvestedwiththeexecutiveandlegislativepowers，oratleastwithpartofthelegislative，butdoesnotactinajudiciarycapacity。
　　Inthegovernmentofthekingsoftheheroictimes，thethreepowerswereill—distributed。Hencethosemonarchiescouldnotlongsubsist。Forassoonasthepeoplegotthelegislativepowerintotheirhands，theymight，astheyeverywheredid，upontheveryleastcaprice，subverttheregalauthority。
　　Amongafreepeoplepossessedofthelegislativepower，andenclosedwithinwalls，whereeverythingtendingtowardsoppressionappearsstillmoreodious，itisthemasterpieceoflegislationtoknowwheretoplaceproperlythejudiciarypower。Butitcouldnotbeinworsehandsthaninthoseofthepersontowhomtheexecutivepowerhadbeenalreadycommitted。Fromthatveryinstantthemonarchbecameterrible。Butatthesametimeashehadnoshareinthelegislature，hecouldmakenodefenceagainstit，thushispowerwasinonesensetoogreat，inanothertoolittle。
　　Theyhadnotasyetdiscoveredthatthetruefunctionofaprincewastoappointjudges，andnottositasjudgehimself。Theoppositepolicyrenderedthegovernmentofasinglepersoninsupportable。Henceallthesekingswerebanished。TheGreekshadnonotionoftheproperdistributionofthethreepowersinthegovernmentofoneperson；theycouldseeitonlyinthatofmany；andthiskindofconstitutiontheydistinguishedbythenameofPolity。[20]
　　12。OftheGovernmentoftheKingsofRome，andinwhatMannerthethreePowersweretheredistributed。ThegovernmentofthekingsofRomehadsomerelationtothatofthekingsoftheheroictimesofGreece。Itssubversion，likethelatter’s，wasowingtoitsgeneraldefect，thoughinitsownparticularnatureitwasexceedinglygood。
　　Inordertogiveanadequateideaofthisgovernment，Ishalldistinguishthatofthefirstfivekings，thatofServiusTullius，andthatofTarquin。
　　Thecrownwaselective，andunderthefirstfivekingsthesenatehadthegreatestshareintheelection。
　　Upontheking’sdeceasethesenateexaminedwhethertheyshouldcontinuetheestablishedformofgovernment。Iftheythoughtpropertocontinueit，theynamedamagistrate[21]takenfromtheirownbody，whochoseaking；thesenateweretoapproveoftheelection，thepeopletoconfirmit，andtheaugurstodeclaretheapprobationofthegods。Ifanyofthesethreeconditionswaswanting，theywereobligedtoproceedtoanotherelection。
　　Theconstitutionwasamixtureofmonarchy，aristocracy，anddemocracy；
　　andsuchwastheharmonyofpowerthattherewasnoinstanceofjealousyordisputeinthefirstreigns。Thekingcommandedthearmies，andhadthedirectionofthesacrifices：hehadthepowerofdetermining[22]
　　civilandcriminal[23]causes；hecalledthesenatetogether，convenedthepeople，laidsomeaffairsbeforethelatter，andregulatedtherestwiththesenate。[24]
　　Theauthorityofthesenatewasverygreat。Thekingsoftentimespitcheduponsenatorswithwhomtheysatinjudgment；andtheyneverlaidanyaffairbeforethepeopletillithadbeenpreviouslydebated[25]inthataugustassembly。
　　Thepeoplehadtherightofchoosing[26]magistrates，ofconsentingtothenewlaws，and，withtheking’spermission，ofmakingwarandpeace；
　　buttheyhadnotthejudicialpower。WhenTulliusHostiliusreferredthetrialofHoratiustothepeople，hehadhisparticularreasons，whichmaybeseeninDionysiusHalicarnassus。[27]
　　Theconstitutionalteredunder[28]ServiusTullius。Thesenatehadnoshareinhiselection；hecausedhimselftobeproclaimedbythepeople；
　　heresignedthepowerofhearingcivilcauses，[29]reservingnonetohimselfbutthoseofacriminalnature；helaidallaffairsdirectlybeforethepeople，easedthemofthetaxes，andimposedthewholeburdenonthepatricians。Henceinproportionasheweakenedtheregaltogetherwiththesenatorialpower，heaugmentedthatoftheplebeians。[30]
　　Tarquinwouldneitherbechosenbythesenatenorbythepeople；heconsideredServiusTulliusasausurper，andseizedthecrownashishereditaryright。Hedestroyedmostofthesenators；thosewhoremainedheneverconsulted；nordidheevensomuchassummonthemtoassistathisdecisions。[31]Thushispowerincreased：buttheodiumofthatpowerreceivedanewaddition，byusurpingalsotheauthorityofthepeople，againstwhoseconsentheenactedseverallaws。Thethreepowerswerebythesemeansre—unitedinhisperson；butthepeopleatacriticalminuterecollectedthattheywerelegislators，andtherewasanendofTarquin。
　　13。GeneralReflectionsontheStateofRomeaftertheExpulsionofitsKings。ItisimpossibletobetiredofsoagreeableasubjectasancientRome：thusstrangersatpresentleavethemodernpalacesofthatcelebratedcapitaltovisittheruins；andthustheeye，afterrecreatingitselfwiththeviewofflowerymeads，ispleasedwiththewildprospectofrocksandmountains。
　　Thepatricianfamilieswereatalltimespossessedofgreatprivileges。
　　Thesedistinctions，whichwereconsiderableunderthekings，becamemuchmoreimportantaftertheirexpulsion。Hencearosethejealousyoftheplebeians，whowantedtoreducethem。Theconteststruckattheconstitution，withoutweakeningthegovernment；foritwasveryindifferentastowhatfamilywerethemagistrates，providedthemagistracypreserveditsauthority。
　　Anelectivemonarchy，likethatofRome，necessarilysupposesapowerfularistocraticbodytosupportit，withoutwhichitchangesimmediatelyintotyrannyorintoapopularstate。Butapopularstatehasnoneedofthisdistinctionoffamiliestomaintainitself。Tothisitwasowingthatthepatricians，whowereanecessarypartoftheconstitutionundertheregalgovernment，becameasuperfluousbranchundertheconsuls；thepeoplecouldsuppressthemwithouthurtingthemselves，andchangetheconstitutionwithoutcorruptingit。
　　AfterServiusTulliushadreducedthepatricians，itwasnaturalthatRomeshouldfallfromtheregalhandsintothoseofthepeople。Butthepeoplehadnooccasiontobeafraidofrelapsingunderaregalpowerbyreducingthepatricians。
　　Astatemayalterintwodifferentways，eitherbytheamendmentorbythecorruptionoftheconstitution。Ifithaspreserveditsprinciplesandtheconstitutionchanges，thisisowingtoitsamendment；ifuponchangingtheconstitutionitsprinciplesarelost，thisisbecauseithasbeencorrupted。
　　ThegovernmentofRome，aftertheexpulsionofthekings，shouldnaturallyhavebeenademocracy。Thepeoplehadalreadythelegislativepowerintheirhands；itwastheirunanimousconsentthathadexpelledtheTarquins；andiftheyhadnotcontinuedsteadytothoseprinciples，theTarquinsmighteasilyhavebeenrestored。Topretendthattheirdesigninexpellingthemwastorenderthemselvesslavestoafewfamiliesisquiteabsurd。ThesituationthereforeofthingsrequiredthatRomeshouldhaveformedademocracy，andyetthisdidnothappen。
　　Therewasanecessitythatthepoweroftheprincipalfamiliesshouldbetempered，andthatthelawsshouldhaveabiastodemocracy。
　　Theprosperityofstatesisfrequentlygreaterintheinsensibletransitionfromoneconstitutiontoanotherthanineitherofthoseconstitutions。Thenitisthatallthespringsofgovernmentareuponthestretch，thatthecitizensasserttheirclaims，thatfriendshipsorenmitiesareformedamongstthejarringparties，andthatthereisanobleemulationbetweenthosewhodefendtheancientandthosewhoarestrenuousinpromotingthenewconstitution。
　　14。InwhatMannertheDistributionofthethreePowersbegantochangeaftertheExpulsionoftheKings。TherewerefourthingsthatgreatlyprejudicedthelibertyofRome。Thepatricianshadengrossedtothemselvesallpublicemploymentswhatever；anexorbitantpowerwasannexedtotheconsulate；thepeoplewereofteninsulted；and，infine，theyhadscarcelyanyinfluenceatallleftinthepublicsuffrages。
　　Thesefourabuseswereredressedbythepeople。
　　1st。Itwasregulatedthattheplebeiansmightaspiretosomemagistracies；andbydegreestheywererenderedcapableofthemall，exceptthatofInter—rex。
　　2nd。Theconsulatewasdissolvedintoseveralothermagistracies；[32]
　　pr？torswerecreated，onwhomthepowerwasconferredoftryingprivatecauses；qu？stors[33]werenominatedfordeterminingthoseofacriminalnature；？dileswereestablishedfortheciviladministration；
　　treasurers[34]weremadeforthemanagementofthepublicmoney；and，infine，bythecreationofcensorstheconsulsweredivestedofthatpartofthelegislativepowerwhichregulatesthemoralsofthecitizensandthetransientpolityofthedifferentbodiesofthestate。Thechiefprivilegesleftthemweretopresideinthegreatmeetings[35]ofthepeople，toassemblethesenate，andtocommandthearmies。
　　3rd。Thesacredlawsappointedtribunes，whohadapowerofcheckingtheencroachmentsofthepatricians，andpreventednotonlyprivatebutlikewisepublicinjuries。
　　Infine，theplebeiansincreasedtheirinfluenceinthegeneralassemblies。ThepeopleofRomeweredividedinthreedifferentmanners——bycenturies，bycuri？，andbytribes；andwhenevertheygavetheirvotes，theywereconvenedinoneofthosethreeways。
　　Inthefirstthepatricians，theleadingmen，therichandthesenate，whichwasverynearlythesamething，hadalmostthewholeauthority；inthesecondtheyhadless；andlessstillinthethird。
　　ThedivisionintocenturieswasadivisionratherofestatesandfortunesthanofpersonsThewholepeopleweredistributedintoahundredandninety—threecenturies，[36]whichhadeachasinglevote。
　　Thepatriciansandleadingmencomposedthefirstninety—eightcenturies；andtheotherninety—fiveconsistedoftheremainderofthecitizens。Inthisdivisionthereforethepatriciansweremastersofthesuffrages。
　　Inthedivisionintocuri？，[37]thepatricianshadnotthesameadvantages；some，however，theyhad，foritwasnecessarytoconsulttheaugurs，whowereunderthedirectionofthepatricians；andnoproposalcouldbemadetheretothepeopleunlessithadbeenpreviouslylaidbeforethesenate，andapprovedofbyasenatus—consultum。But，inthedivisionintotribestheyhadnothingtodoeitherwiththeaugursorwiththedecreesofthesenate；andthepatricianswereexcluded。
　　Nowthepeopleendeavouredconstantlytohavethosemeetingsbycuri？
　　whichhadbeencustomarybycenturies，andbytribes，thosetheyusedtohavebeforebycuri？；bywhichmeansthedirectionofpublicaffairssoondevolvedfromthepatricianstotheplebeians。
　　Thuswhentheplebeiansobtainedthepoweroftryingthepatricians——apowerwhichcommencedintheaffairofCoriolanus，[38]theyinsisteduponassemblingbytribes，[39]andnotbycenturies；andwhenthenewmagistracies[40]oftribunesand？dileswereestablishedinfavourofthepeople，thelatterobtainedthattheyshouldmeetbycuri？inordertonominatethem；andaftertheirpowerwasquitesettled，theygained[41]sofartheirpointastoassemblebytribestoproceedtothisnomination。
　　15。InwhatMannerRome，intheflourishingStateofthatRepublic，suddenlylostitsLiberty。Intheheatofthecontestsbetweenthepatriciansandtheplebeians，thelatterinsisteduponhavingfixedlaws，totheendthatthepublicjudgmentsshouldnolongerbetheeffectofcapriciouswillorarbitrarypower。Thesenate，afteragreatdealofresistance，acquiesced；anddecemvirswerenominatedtocomposethoselaws。Itwasthoughtpropertograntthemanextraordinarypower，becausetheyweretogivelawstopartieswhoseviewsandinterestitwasalmostimpossibletounite。Thenominationofallmagistrateswassuspended；andthedecemvirswerechoseninthecomitiasoleadministratorsoftherepublic。Thustheyfoundthemselvesinvestedwiththeconsularandthetribunitionpower。Byonetheyhadtheprivilegeofassemblingthesenate，bytheotherthatofconveningthepeople；buttheyassembledneithersenatenorpeople。Tenmenonlyoftherepublichadthewholelegislative，thewholeexecutive，andthewholejudiciarypower。RomesawherselfenslavedbyascruelatyrannyasthatofTarquin。WhenTarquintrampledonthelibertyofthatcity，shewasseizedwithindignationatthepowerhehadusurped；whenthedecemvirsexercisedeveryactofoppression，shewasastonishedattheextraordinarypowershehadgranted。
　　Whatastrangesystemoftyranny——atyrannycarriedonbymenwhohadobtainedthepoliticalandmilitarypower，merelyfromtheirknowledgeincivilaffairs，andwhoatthatveryjuncturestoodinneedofthecourageofthosecitizenstoprotectthemabroadwhosotamelysubmittedtodomesticoppression！
　　ThespectacleofVirginia’sdeath，whomherfatherimmolatedtochastityandliberty，putanendtothepowerofthedecemvirs。Everymanbecamefree，becauseeverymanhadbeeninjured；eachshowedhimselfacitizenbecauseeachhadatieoftheparent。Thesenateandthepeopleresumedalibertywhichhadbeencommittedtoridiculoustyrants。
　　NopeopleweresoeasilymovedbypublicspectaclesastheRomans。ThatoftheempurpledbodyofLucretiaputanendtotheregalgovernment。
　　Thedebtorwhoappearedintheforumcoveredwithwoundscausedanalterationintherepublic。ThedecemvirsowedtheirexpulsiontothetragedyofVirginia。TocondemnManlius，itwasnecessarytokeepthepeoplefromseeingtheCapitol。C？sar’sbloodygarmentflungRomeagainintoslavery。
　　16。OfthelegislativePowerintheRomanRepublic。Therewerenorightstocontestunderthedecemvirs：butupontherestorationofliberty，jealousiesrevived；andsolongasthepatricianshadanyprivilegesleft，theyweresuretobestrippedofthembytheplebeians。
　　Themischiefwouldnothavebeensogreathadtheplebeiansbeensatisfiedwiththissuccess；buttheyalsoinjuredthepatriciansascitizens。Whenthepeopleassembledbycuri？orcenturies，theywerecomposedofsenators，patricians，andplebeians；intheirdisputestheplebeiansgainedthispoint，[42]thattheyalonewithoutpatriciansorsenateshouldenactthelawscalledPlebiscita；andtheassembliesinwhichtheyweremadehadthenameofcomitiabytribes。Thustherewerecasesinwhichthepatricians[43]hadnoshareinthelegislativepower，but[44]weresubjecttothelegislationofanotherbodyofthestate。
　　Thiswastheextravaganceofliberty。Thepeople，toestablishademocracy，actedagainsttheveryprinciplesofthatgovernment。Onewouldhaveimaginedthatsoexorbitantapowermusthavedestroyedtheauthorityofthesenate。ButRomehadadmirableinstitutions。Twoofthesewereespeciallyremarkable：onebywhichthelegislativepowerofthepeoplewasestablished，andtheotherbywhichitwaslimited。