Unhappilythiszealwasneitherwellconducted,norwellseconded。Itwaszealwithoutsuccessinthefirstofthetwowarsthatfollowedtheyearonethousandsixhundredandeighty-eight;andzealwithoutknowledge,inbothofthem。Ienterintonodetailconcerningtheeventsofthesetwowars。
ThisonlyIobserveonthefirstofthem,thatthetreatiesofRyswicwerefarfromansweringtheendsproposedandtheengagementstakenbythefirstgrandalliance。ThepowerofFrance,withrespecttoextentofdominionsandstrengthofbarrier,wasnotreducedtothetermsofthePyreneantreaty,nonottothoseofthetreatyofNimeguen。Lorrainwasrestoredindeedwithveryconsiderablereserves,andtheplacestakenorusurpedontheothersideoftheRhine:butthenStrasburgwasyieldedupabsolutelytoFrancebytheemperor,andbytheempire。TheconcessionstoSpainweregreat,butsoweretheconquestsandtheencroachmentsmadeuponherbyFrance,sincethetreatyofNimeguen:andshegotlittleatRyswic,IbelievenothingmorethanshehadsavedatNimeguenbefore。Alltheseconcessions,however,aswellastheacknowledgmentofkingWilliam,andothersmadebyLouistheFourteenthafterhehadtakenAthandBarcelona,evenduringthecourseofthenegotiations,comparedwiththelossesandrepeateddefeatsofthealliesandtheillstateoftheconfederacy,surprisedthegeneralityofmankind,whohadnotbeenaccustomedtosomuchmoderationandgenerosityonthepartofthisprince。ButthepretensionsofthehouseofBourbonontheSpanishsuccessionremainedthesame。Nothinghadbeendonetoweakenthem;nothingwaspreparedtoopposethem:andtheopeningofthissuccessionwasvisiblyathand;forCharlestheSecondhadbeeninimmediatedangerofdyingaboutthistime。Hisdeathcouldnotbearemoteevent:andallthegoodqueen’sendeavorstobegotwithchildhadprovedineffectual。Theleaguedissolved,alltheforcesoftheconfederatesdispersed,andmanydisbanded;Francecontinuingarmed,herforcesbyseaandlandincreasedandheldinreadinesstoactonalsides,itwasplainthattheconfederateshadfailedinthefirstobjectofthegrandalliance,thatofreducingthepowerofFrance;
bysucceedinginwhichalonetheycouldhavebeenabletokeepthesecondagreement,thatofsecuringthesuccessionofSpaintothehouseofAustria。
Afterthepeace,whatremainedtobedone;inthewholenatureofthingsthereremainedbutthree。ToabandonallcareoftheSpanishsuccessionwasone;tocompoundwithFranceuponthissuccessionwasanother;andtoprepare,likeher,duringtheintervalofpeace,tomakeanadvantageouswarwheneverCharlestheSecondshoulddie,wasathird。NowthefirstofthesewastoleaveSpain,and,inleavingSpain,toleaveallEuropeinsomesortatthemercyofFrance;sincewhateverdispositiontheSpaniardsshouldmakeoftheircrown,theywerequiteunabletosupportitagainstFrance;sincetheemperorcoulddolittlewithouthisallies;andsinceBavaria,thethirdpretender,coulddostillless,andmightfind,insuchacase,hisaccountperhapsbetterintreatingwiththehouseofBourbonthanwiththatofAustria。
Moreneedsnotbesaidonthishead;butontheothertwo,whichIshallconsidertogether,severalfactsarepropertobementioned,andseveralreflectionsnecessarytobemade。
Wemighthavecounter-worked,nodoubt,intheirownmethodsofpolicy,thecouncilsofFrance,whomadepeacetodissolvetheconfederacy,andgreatconcessions,withverysuspiciousgenerosity,togaintheSpaniards:wemighthavewaited,likethem,thatisinarms,thedeathofCharlestheSecond,andhavefortifiedinthemeantimethedispositionsoftheking,thecourtandpeopleofSpain,againstthepretensionsofFrance:wemighthavemadethepeace,whichwasmadesometimeafterthat,betweentheemperorandtheTurks,andhaveobligedtheformeratanyratetohavesecuredthepeaceofHungary,andtohaveprepared,bytheseandotherexpedients,forthewarthatwouldinevitablybreakoutonthedeathofthekingofSpain。
Butallsuchmeasureswererenderedimpracticable,bytheemperorchiefly。
Experiencehadshown,thatthepowerswhoengagedinalliancewithhimmustexpecttotakethewholeburdenofhiscauseuponthemselves;andthatHungarywouldmaintainaperpetualdiversioninfavorofFrance,sincehecouldnotresolvetolightenthetyrannicalyokehehadestablishedinthatcountryandinTransylvania,norhisministerstopartwiththeimmenseconfiscationstheyhadappropriatedtothemselves。Pastexperienceshowedthis:andtheexperiencethatfollowedconfirmeditveryfatally。Butfurther;therewasnotonlylittleassistancetobeexpectedfromhimbythosewhoshouldengageinhisquarrel:hedidthemhurtofanotherkind,anddeprivedthemofmanyadvantagesbyfalsemeasuresofpolicyandunskilfulnegotiations。WhilstthedeathofCharlestheSecondwasexpectedalmostdaily,thecourtofViennaseemedtohaveforgotthecourtofMadrid,andallthepretensionsonthatcrown。WhentheCountd’Harrachwassentthither,theimperialcouncilsdidsomethingworse。ThekingofSpainwasreadytodeclarethearchdukeCharleshissuccessor;hewasdesiroustohavethisyoungprincesentintoSpain:
thebentofthepeoplewasinfavorofAustria,orithadbeenso,andmighthavebeeneasilyturnedthesamewayagain:atcourtnocabalwasyetformedinfavorofBourbon,andaveryweakintriguewasonfootinfavoroftheelectoralprinceofBavaria。NotonlyCharlesmighthavebeenonthespotreadytoreapthesuccession,butaGermanarmymighthavebeentheretodefendit;forthecourtofMadridinsistedonhavingtwelvethousandofthesetroops,and,ratherthannothavethem,offeredtocontributetothepaymentofthemprivately。becauseitwouldhavebeentoounpopularamongtheSpaniards,andtooprejudicialtotheAustrianinterest,tohavehaditknownthattheemperordeclinedthepaymentofabodyofhisowntroopsthatweredemandedtosecurethemonarchytohisson。Theseproposalswerehalfrefused,andhalfevaded:andinreturntotheofferofthecrownofSpaintothearchduke,theimperialcouncilsaskedthegovernmentofMilanforhim。TheythoughtitapointofdeeppolicytosecuretheItalianprovinces,andtoleavetoEnglandandHollandthecareoftheLowCountries,ofSpain,andtheIndies。BydecliningtheseproposalsthehouseofAustriarenouncedinsomesortthewholesuccession:atleastshegaveEnglandandHollandreasons,whateverengagementsthesepowershadtaken,torefusethehardertaskofputtingherintopossessionbyforce;whenshemight,andwouldnot,procuretotheEnglishandDutch,andherotherallies,theeasiertaskofdefendingherinthispossession。
Isaidthatthemeasuresmentionedaboutwererenderedimpracticable,bytheemperorchiefly,becausetheywererenderedsolikewisebyothercircumstancesatthesameconjuncture。AprincipaloneIshallmention,anditshallbedrawnfromthestateofourowncountry,andthedispositionofourpeople——
LetustakethisupfromkingWilliam’saccessiontoourcrown。DuringthewholeprogressthatLouistheFourteenthmadetowardssuchexorbitantpower,asgavehimwell-groundedhopesofacquiringatlasttohisfamilytheSpanishmonarchy,EnglandhadbeeneitheranidlespectatorofallthatpassedontheContinent,orafaintanduncertainallyagainstFrance,orawarmandsureallyonherside,orapartialmediatorbetweenherandthepowersconfederatedintheircommondefence。Therevolutionproducedasgreatachangeinourforeignconduct,asinourdomesticestablishment:andournationengagedwithgreatspiritinthewarofonethousandsixhundredandeighty-eight。Butthenthisspiritwasrash,presumptuous,andignorant,illconductedathome,andillsecondedabroad:allwhichhasbeentouchedalready。WehadwagednolongwarsontheContinent,norbeenverydeeplyconcernedinforeignconfederacies,sincethefourteenthandfifteenthcenturies。
ThehistoryofEdwardtheThird,however,andofthefirsttwelveorfifteenyearsofHenrytheSixthmighthavetaughtussomegeneralbutusefullessons,drawnfromremotetimes,butapplicabletothepresent。SomighttheexampleofHenrytheEighth,whosquanderedawaygreatsumsfortheprofitoftalkingatown,orthehonorofhavinganemperorinhispay;andwhodividedafterwardsbytreatythekingdomofFrancebetweenhimselfandCharlestheFifth,withsuccesssolittleanswerabletosuchanundertaking,thatitishardtobelievehisimperialandEnglishmajestywerebothinearnest。Iftheywereso,theywereboththebubblesoftheirpresumption。ButitseemsmorelikelythatHenrytheEighthwasbubbledonthisoccasionbythegreathopesthatCharlesheldouttoflatterhisvanity:ashehadbeenbubbledbyhisfather-in-lawFerdinand,atthebeginningofhisreign,inthewarofNavarre。Butthesereflectionswerenotmade,norhadweenoughconsideredtheexampleofElizabeththelastofourprinceswhohadmadeanyconsiderablefigureabroad,andfromwhomwemighthavelearnedtoactwithvigor,buttoengagewithcaution,andalwaystoproportionourassistanceaccordingtoourabilities,andtherealnecessitiesofourallies。ThefrontiersofFrancewerenowsofortified,hercommerceandhernavalforceweresoincreased,herarmiesweregrownsonumerous,hertroopsweresodisciplined,soinuredtowar,andsoanimatedbyalongcourseofsuccessfulcampaigns,thattheywholookedonthesituationofEuropecouldnotfailtoseehowdifficulttheenterpriseofreducingherpowerwasbecome。difficultasitwas,wewereobliged,oneveryaccountandbyreasonsofallkinds,toengageinit:butthenweshouldhaveengagedwithmoreforecast,andhaveconductedourselvesinthemanagementofit,notwithlessalacrityandspirit,butwithmoreorder,moreeconomy,andabetterapplicationofourefforts。Buttheywhogovernedweregladtoengageasatanyrate;andweenteredonthisgreatschemeofaction,asournationistooapttodo,hurriedonbytherulingpassionoftheday。Ihavebeentoldbyseveral,whowereonthestageoftheworldatthistime,thatthegeneralityofourpeoplebelieved,andwereencouragedtobelieve,thewarcouldnotbelong,ifthekingwasvigorouslysupported:andthereisahumdrumspeechofaspeakerofthehouseofcommons,Ithink,whohumblydesiredhismajestytotakethisopportunityofreconqueringhisancientduchyofAquitain。Weweresoonawakenedfromthesegaudydreams。InsevenoreightyearsnoimpressionhadbeenmadeonFrance,thatwasbesiegedasitwereoneveryside:andafterrepeateddefeatsintheLowCountries,wherekingWilliamlaidtheprincipalstressofthewar,hissoletriumphwastheretakingNamur,thathadbeentakenbytheFrenchafewyearsbefore。Unsustainedbysuccessabroad,wearenottowonderthatthespiritflaggedathome;
northatthediscontentsofthosewhowereaversetotheestablishedgovernment,unitingwiththefargreaternumberofthosewhodislikedtheadministration,inflamedthegeneraldiscontentsofthenation,oppressedwithtaxes,pillagedbyusurers,plunderedatsea,anddisappointedatland。Aswerunintoextremesalways,somewouldhavecontinuedthiswaratanyrate,evenatthesamerate,butitwasnotpossibletheyshouldprevailinsuchasituationofaffairs,andsuchadispositionofminds——Theywhonotbythewar,andmadeimmensefortunesbythenecessitiesofthepublic,werenotsonumerousnorsopowerful,astheyhavebeensince。Themoneyedinterestwasnotyetarivalabletocopewiththelandedinterest,eitherinthenationorinparliament。Thegreatcorporationsthathadbeenerectedmoretoservetheturnofparty,thanforanyrealnationaluse,aimedindeedeventhenatthestrengthandinfluencewhichtheyhavesinceacquiredinthelegislature;
buttheyhadnotmadethesameprogressbypromotingnationalcorruption,astheyandthecourthavemadesince。Inshort,theotherextremeprevailed。
Thegeneralityofpeoplegrewasfondofgettingoutofthewar,astheyhadbeenofenteringintoit:andthusfarperhaps,consideringhowithadbeenconducted,theywerenotmuchtobeblamed。Butthiswasnotall;forwhenkingWilliamhadmadethepeace,ourmartialspiritbecameatoncesopacific,thatweseemedresolvedtomeddlenomoreintheaffairsofthecontinent,atleasttoemployourarmsnomoreinthequarrelsthatmightarisethere:andaccordinglywereducedourtroopsinEnglandtoseventhousandmen。
Ihavesometimesconsidered,inreflectingonthesepassages,whatIshouldhavedone,ifIhadsatinparliamentatthattime;andhavebeenforcedtomyownself,thatIshouldhavevotedfordisbandingthearmythen,asIvotedinthefollowingparliamentforcensuringthepartitiontreaties。
Iamforcedtoownthis,becauseIrememberhowimperfectmynotionswereofthesituationofEuropeinthatextraordinarycrisis,andhowmuchIsawthetrueinterestofmyowncountryinahalf-light。But,mylord,Iownitwithsomeshame;becauseintruthnothingcouldbemoreabsurdthantheconductweheld。What!becausewehadnotreducedthepowerofFrancebythewar,norexcludedthehouseofBourbonfromtheSpanishsuccession,norcompoundedwithheruponitbythepeace;andbecausethehouseofAustriahadnothelpedherselfnorputitintoourpowertohelpherwithmoreadvantageandbetterprospectofsuccess——werewetoleavethatwholesuccessionopentotheinvasionsofFrance,andtosuffereventhecontingencytosubsist,ofseeingthosemonarchiesunited?What!becauseitwasbecomeextravagant,afterthetrialssolatelymade,tothinkourselvesanylongerengagedbytreaty,orobligedbygoodpolicy,toputthehouseofAustriainpossessionofthewholeSpanishmonarchy,andtodefendherinthispossessionbyforceofarms,werewetoleavethewholeatthemercyofFrance?Ifwewerenottodoso,ifwewerenottodooneofthethreethingsthatIsaidaboveremainedtobedone,andiftheemperorputitoutofourpowertodoanotherofthemwithadvantage;werewetoputitstillmoreoutofourpower,andtowaitunarmedforthedeathofthekingofSpain?Inawe,ifwehadnottheprospectofdisputingwithFrance,sosuccessfullyaswemighthavehadit,theSpanishsuccession,wheneveritshouldbeopen;werewenotonlytoshowbydisarming,thatwewouldnotdisputeitatall,buttocensurelikewisethesecondofthethreethingsmentionedabove,andwhichkingWilliamputinpractice,thecompoundingwithFrance,topreventifpossibleawar,inwhichwewereaversetoengage?