首页 >出版文学> Letters on the Study and Use of History>第20章
  doublytodesolationandruinforthesakeofit。HeleftthefrontieralmostquitedefencelessonthesideoftheRhine,againsttheinroadsandravagesofFrance:andbyshowingnomercytotheHungarians,norkeepinganyfaithwiththem,heforcedthatmiserablepeopleintoallianceswiththeTurks,whoinvadedtheempire,andbesiegedVienna。Eventhiseventhadnoeffectuponhim。Yourlordshipwillfind,thatSobieski,kingofPoland,whohadforcedtheTurkstoraisethesiege,andhadfixedtheimperialcrownthattotteredonhishead,couldnotprevailonhimtotakethosemeasuresbywhichaloneitwaspossibletocovertheempire,tosecurethekingofSpain,andtoreducethatpowerwhowasprobablyonedaytodisputewithhimthisprince’ssuccession。Tekeliandthemalcontentsmadesuchdemandsasnonebutatyrantcouldrefuse,thepreservationoftheirancientprivileges,libertyofconvenience,theconvocationofafreedietorparliament,andothersoflessimportance。Allwasinvain。Thewarcontinuedwiththem,andwiththeTurk,andFrancewasleftatlibertytopushherenterprises,almostwithoutopposition,againstGermanyandtheLowCountries。Thedistressinbothwassogreat,thattheStatesGeneralsawnootherexpedientforstoppingtheprogressoftheFrencharms,thanacessationofhostilities,oratruceoftwentyyears;whichtheynegotiated,andwhichwasacceptedbytheemperorandthekingofSpain,onthetermsthatLouistheFourteenththoughtfittooffer。Bythesetermshewastoremaininfullandquietpossessionofallhehadacquiredsincetheyearsonethousandsixhundredandseventy-eight,andonethousandsixhundredandseventy-nine;amongwhichacquisitionsthatofLuxemburgandthatofStrasburgwerecomprehended。TheconditionsofthistruceweresoadvantageoustoFrance,thatallherintrigueswereemployedtoobtainadefinitivetreatyofpeaceuponthesameconditions。Butthiswasneithertheinterestnortheintentionoftheothercontractingpowers。
  TheimperialarmshadbeenverysuccessfulagainsttheTurks。Thissuccess,aswellasthetroublesthatfolloweduponitintheOttomanarmies,andatthePorte,gavereasonableexpectationofconcludingapeaceonthatside:
  and,thispeaceconcluded,theemperor,andtheempire,andthekingofSpainwouldhavebeeninamuchbetterposturetotreatwithFrance。Withtheseviews,thatwerewiseandjust,theleagueofAugsburgwasmadebetweentheemperor,thekingsofSpainandSwedenasprincesoftheempire,andtheothercirclesandprinces。Thisleaguewaspurelydefensive。Anexpressarticledeclaredittobeso:andasithadnootherregard,itwasnotonlyconformabletothelawsandconstitutionsoftheempire,andtothepracticeofallnations,buteventothetermsoftheactoftrucesolatelyconcluded。Thispretence,therefore,forbreakingthetruce,seizingtheelectorateofCologne,invadingthePalatinate,besiegingPhilipsburg,andcarryingunexpectedandundeclaredwarintotheempirecouldnotbesupported:norisitpossibletoreadthereasonspublishedbyFranceatthistime,anddrawnfromherfearsoftheimperialpower,withoutlaughter。Aslittlepretencewastheretocomplain,thattheemperorrefusedtoconvertatoncethetruceintoadefinitivetreaty;
  sinceifhehaddoneso,hewouldhaveconfirmedinalump,andwithoutanydiscussion,allthearbitrarydecreesofthosechambers,orcourts,thatFrancehaderectedtocoverherusurpation;andwouldhavegivenupalmostasixthpartoftheprovincesoftheempire,thatFranceonewayorotherhadpossessedherselfof。ThepretensionsoftheDuchessofOrleansonthesuccessionofherfather,andherbrother,whichweredisputedbythethenelectorPalatine,andweretobedeterminedbythelawsandcustomsoftheempire,affordedaslittlepretenceforbeginningthiswar,asanyoftheformerallegations。TheexclusionoftheCardinalofFursteilburg,whohadbeenelectedtothearchbishopricofCologne,wascapableofbeingaggravated:
  buteveninthiscasehismostChristianmajestyopposedhisjudgmentandhisauthorityagainstthejudgmentandauthorityofthatholyfather,whoseeldestsonhewasproudtobecalled。Inshort,thetruereasonwhyLouistheFourteenthbeganthatcruelwarwiththeempiretwoyearsafterhehadconcludedacessationofhostilitiesfortwentywasthis:heresolvedtokeepwhathehadgot;and,therefore,heresolvedtoencouragetheTurkstocontinuethewar。Hedidthiseffectually,byinvadingGermanyattheveryinstantwhentheSultanwassuingforpeace。Notwithstandingthis,theTurkswereintreatyagainthefollowingyear:andgoodpolicyshouldhaveobligedtheemperor,sincehecouldnothopetocarryonthiswarandthatagainstFrance,atthesametime,withvigorandeffect,toconcludeapeacewiththeleastdangerousenemyofthetwo。ThedecisionofhisdisputeswithFrancecouldnotbedeferred,hisdesignsagainsttheHungarianswereinpartaccomplished,forhissonwasdeclaredking,andthesettlementofthatcrowninhisfamilywasmade;andtherestofthese,aswellasthosethatheformedagainsttheTurks,mightbedeferred。ButthecouncilsofViennajudgeddifferently,andinsistedevenatthiscriticalmomentonthemostexorbitantterms;onsomeofsuchanature,thattheTurksshowedmorehumanityandabettersenseofreligioninrefusing,thantheyinaskingthem。ThusthewarwentoninHungary,andprovedaconstantdiversioninfavorofFrance,duringthewholecourseofthatwhichLouistheFourteenthbeganattime;
  forthetreatyofCarlowitzwasposteriortothatofRyswic。Theempire,Spain,England,andHollandengagedinthewarwithFrance:andonthemtheemperorlefttheburdenofit。Intheshortwarofonethousandsixhundredandsixty-seven,hewasnotsomuchasaparty,andinsteadofassistingthekingofSpain,whichitmustbeowned,hewasinnogoodconditionofdoing,hebargainedfordividingthatprince’ssuccession,asIhaveobservedabove。Inthewarofonethousandsixhundredandseventy-twohemadesomefeebleefforts。Inthisofonethousandsixhundredandeighty-eighthedidstillless:andinthewarwhichbrokeoutatthebeginningofthepresentcenturyhedidnothing,atleastafterthefirstcampaigninItaly,andaftertheengagementsthatEnglandandHollandtookbythegrandalliance。Inaword,fromthetimethatanoppositiontoFrancebecameacommoncauseinEurope,thehouseofAustriahasbeenacloguponitinmanyinstances,andofconsiderableassistancetoitinnone。TheaccessionofEnglandtothiscause,whichwasbroughtaboutbytherevolutionofonethousandsixhundredandeighty-eight,mighthavemadeamends,andmorethanamends,onewouldthink,forthisdefect,andhavethrownsuperiorityofpowerandofsuccessonthesideoftheconfederates,withwhomshetookpartagainstFrance。
  This,Isay,mightbeimagined,withoutover-ratingthepowerofEngland,orundervaluingthatofFrance;anditwasimaginedatthattime。Howitprovedotherwiseintheevent;howFrancecametriumphantoutofthewarthatendedbythetreatyofRyswic,andthoughshegaveupagreatdeal,yetpreservedthegreatestandthebestpartofherconquestsandacquisitionsmadesincethetreatiesofWestphalia,andthePyrenees;howsheacquired,bythegiftofSpain,thatwholemonarchyforoneofherprinces,thoughshehadnoreasontoexpecttheleastpartofitwithoutawaratonetime,northegreatlotofitevenbyawaratanytime;inshort,howshewoundupadvantageouslytheambitioussystemshehadbeenfiftyyearsinweaving;
  howsheconcludedawar,inwhichshewasdefeatedoneveryside,andwhollyexhausted,withlittlediminutionoftheprovincesandbarriersacquiredtoFrance,andwiththequietpossessionofSpainandtheIndiestoaprinceofthehouseofBourbon:allthis,mylord,willbethesubjectofyourresearches,whenyoucomedowntothelatterpartofthelastperiodofmodernhistory。
  TheSameSubjectContinuedfromtheYearOneThousandSixHundredandEighty-EightYourlordshipwillfind,thattheobjectsproposedbytheallianceofonethousandsixhundredandeighty-nine,betweentheemperorandtheStates,towhichEnglandacceded,andwhichwasthefoundationofthewholeconfederacythenformed,werenolessthantorestoreallthingstothetermsoftheWestphalianandPyreneantreaties,bythewar;andtopreservetheminthatstate,afterthewar,byadefensiveallianceandguatantyofthesameconfederatepowersagainstFrance。Theparticularaswellasgeneralmeaningofthisengagementwasplainenough:andifithadnotbeenso,thesenseofitwouldhavebeensufficientlydetermined,bythatseparatearticle,inwhichEnglandandHollandobligedthemselvestoassistthe“houseofAustria,intakingandkeepingpossessionoftheSpanishmonarchy,wheneverthecaseshouldhappenofthedeathofCharlestheSecond,withoutlawfulheirs。“Thisengagementwasdouble,andtherebyrelativetothewholepoliticalsystemofEurope,alikeaffectedbythepowerandpretensionsofFrance。HithertothepowerofFrancehadbeenaloneregarded,andherpretensionsseemedtohavebeenforgot;ortowhatpurposeshouldtheyhavebeenremembered,whilstEuropewassounhappilyconstituted,thatthestatesatwhoseexpensesheincreasedherpower,andtheirfriendsandallies,thoughtthattheydidenoughuponeveryoccasioniftheymadesometolerablecompositionwithher?Theywhowerenotincircumstancesto,refuseconfirmingpresent,werelittlelikelytotakeeffectualmeasuresagainstfutureusurpations。Butnow,asthealarmwasgreaterthanever,bytheoutragesthatFrancehadcommitted,andtheintriguesshehadcarriedon;bythelittleregardshehadshowntopublicfaith。andbytheairsofauthorityshehadassumedtwentyyearstogether:
  sowasthespiritagainstherraisedtoanhigherpitch,andthemeansofreducingherpower,oratleastofcheckingit,wereincreased。Theprincesandstateswhohadneglectedorfavoredthegrowthofthispower,whichallofthemhaddoneintheirturns,sawtheirerror;sawthenecessityofrepairingit,andsawthatunlesstheycouldcheckthepowerofFrance,byunitingapowersuperiortohers,itwouldbeimpossibletohinderherfromsucceedinginhergreatdesignsontheSpanishsuccession。ThecourtofEnglandhadsubmitted,notmanyyearsbefore,toabetherusurpations,andthekingofEnglandhadstoopedtobeherpensioner。Butthecrimewasnotnational。
  Onthecontrary,thenationhadcriedoutloudlyagainstit,evenwhilstitwascommitting:andasevertheabdicationofkingJames,andtheelevationoftheprinceofOrangetothethroneofEnglandhappened,thenationengagedwithallimaginablezealinthecommoncauseofEurope,toreducetheexorbitantpowerofFrance,topreventherfutureandtorevengeherpastattempts;
  forevenaspiritofrevengeprevailed,andthewarwasawarofangeraswellasofinterest。