Hecametobesuchafterwards;butatthetimespokenof,hecouldnottakesogreatapartuponhim。Nootherprinceorgeneralwasequaltoit:
andtheconsequencesofthisdefectappearedalmostineveryoperation。Francewassurroundedbyamultitudeofenemies,allintenttodemolishherpower。
But,likethebuildersofBabel,theyspokedifferentlanguages:andasthosecouldnotbuild,thesecouldnotdemolish,forwantofunderstandingoneanother。Franceimprovedthisadvantagebyherarms,andmorebyhernegotiations。
Nimeguenwas,afterCologne,thesceneofthese。Englandwasthemediatingpower,andIknownotwhetherourCharlestheSeconddidnotserveherpurposesmoreusefullyinthelatter,andunderthecharacterofmediator,thanhedidorcouldhavedonebyjoininghisarmstohers,andactingasherally,TheDutchwereinducedtosignatreatywithhim,thatbroketheconfederacy,andgavegreatadvantagetoFrance:forthepurportofitwastoobligeSpaintomakepeaceonaplantobeproposedtothem,andnomentionwasmadeinitoftheotheralliesthatIremember。TheDutchweregladtogetoutofanexpensivewar。FrancepromisedtorestoreMaestrichttothem,andMaestrichtwastheonlyplacethatremainedunrecoveredofalltheyhadlost。TheydroppedSpainatNimeguen,astheyhaddroppedFranceatMunster;butmanycircumstancesconcurredtogiveamuchworsegracetotheirabandoningofSpain,thantotheirabandoningofFrance。Ineednotspecifythem。ThisonlyIwouldobserve:
whentheymadeaseparatepeaceatMunster,theyleftanallywhowasinconditiontocarryonthewaralonewithadvantage,andtheypresumedtoimposenotermsuponhim:whentheymadeaseparatepeaceatNimeguen,theyabandonedanallywhowasinnoconditiontocarryonthewaralone,andwhowasreducedtoacceptwhatevertermsthecommonenemyprescribed。Intheirgreatdistressinonethousandsixhundredandseventy-three,theyengagedtorestoreMaestrichttotheSpaniardsassoonasitshouldberetaken:
itwasnotretaken,andtheyaccepteditforthemselvesasthepriceoftheseparatepeacetheymadewithFrance,TheDutchhadengagedfarther,tomakeneitherpeacenortrucewiththekingofFrance,tillthatprinceconsentedtorestoretoSpainallhehadconqueredsincethePyreneantreaty。Butfarfromkeepingthispromiseinanytolerabledegree,LouistheFourteenthacquired,bytheplanimposedonSpainatNimeguen,besidesthecountyofBurgundy,somanyothercountriesandtownsonthesideofthetenSpanishprovinces,thatthese,addedtotheplaceshekeptofthosewhichhadbeenyieldedtohimbythetreatyofAixlaChapelleforsomeoflittleconsequenceherestored
putintohishandstheprincipalstrengthofthatbarrier,againstwhichwegoadedourselvesalmosttodeathinthelastgreatwar;andmadegoodthesayingoftheMarshalofSchomberg,thattoattackthisbarrierwastotakethebeastbyhishorns。IknowverywellwhatmaybesaidtoexcusetheDutch。Theemperorwasmoreintenttotyrannisehissubjectsononeside,thantodefendthemontheother。HeattemptedlittleagainstFrance,andthelittlehedidattemptwasill-ordered,andworseexecuted。TheassistanceoftheprincesofGermanywasoftenuncertain,andalwaysexpensive。SpainwasalreadyindebtedtoHollandforgreatsums;greaterstillmustbeadvancestoherifthewarcontinued:andexperienceshowedthatFrancewasable,andwouldcontinue,toprevailagainstherpresentenemies。Thetripleleaguehadstoppedherprogress,andobligedhertoabandonthecountyofBurgundy;
butSwedenwasnowengagedinthewaronthesideofFrance,asEnglandhadbeeninthebeginningofit:andEnglandwasnowprivatelyfavorabletoherinterests,asSwedenhadbeeninthebeginningofit。Thewholetenprovinceswouldhavebeensubduedinthecourseofafewcampaignsmore:anditwasbetterforSpainandtheDutchtoo,thatpartshouldbesavedbyacceptingasortofcomposition,thanthewholeberiskedbyrefusingit。ThismightbeallegedtoexcusetheconductoftheStatesGeneral,inimposinghardtermsonSpain;inmakingnonefortheirotherallies;andinsigningalone:
bywhichstepstheygaveFranceanopportunitythatsheimprovedwithgreatdexterityofmanagement,theopportunityoftreatingwiththeconfederatesonebyone,andofbeatingthembydetailinthecabinet,ifImaysosay,asshehadoftendoneinthefield。Ishallnotcomparethesereasons,whichwerebuttoowellfoundedinfact,andmustappearplausibleatleast,withotherconsiderationsthatmightbe,andwereatthetime,insistedupon。
Iconfinemyselftoafewobservations,whicheveryknowingandimpartialmanmustadmit。Yourlordshipwillobserve,first,thatthefatalprincipleofcompoundingwithLouistheFourteenth,fromthetimethathispretensions,hispower,andtheusehemadeofit,begantothreatenEurope,prevailedstillmoreatNimeguenthanithadprevailedatAix:sothatalthoughhedidnotobtaintothefullallheattempted,yetthedominionsofFrancewerebycommonconsent,oneverytreaty,moreandmoreextended;herbarriersonallsidesweremoreandmorestrengthened;thoseofherneighborsweremoreandmoreweakened;andthatpower,whichwastoassertoneday,againsttherestofEurope,thepretendedrightsofthehouseofBourbontotheSpanishmonarchy,wasmoreandmoreestablished,andrenderedtrulyformidableinsuchhandsatleast,duringthecourseofthefirsteighteenyearsoftheperiod。Yourlordshipwillpleasetoobserve,inthesecondplace,thattheextremeweaknessofonebranchofAustria,andthemiserableconductofboth;
thepovertyofsomeoftheprincesoftheempire,andthedisunion,andtospeakplainly,themercenarypolicyofallofthem;inshort,theconfinedviews,thefalsenotions,and,tospeakasplainlyofmyownasofothernations,theiniquityofthecouncilsofEngland,notonlyhinderedthegrowthofthispowerfrombeingstoppedintime,butnurseditupintostrengthalmostinsuperablebyanyfutureconfederacy。Athirdobservationisthis:
IftheexcusesmadefortheconductoftheDutchatNimeguenarenotsufficient,theytoomustcomeinfortheirshareinthiscondemnation,evenafterthedeathoftheDeWits;astheyweretobecondemnedmostjustly,duringtheadministration,forabettingandfavoringFrance。Iftheseexcuses,groundedontheirinabilitytopursueanylongerawar,theprincipalprofitofwhichwastoaccruetotheirconfederates,forthatwasthecaseaftertheyearonethousandsixhundredandseventy-three,oronethousandsixhundredandseventy-four,andtheprincipalburdenofwhichwasthrownonthembytheirconfederates;ifthesearesufficient,theyshouldnothaveacted,fordecency’ssakeaswellasoutofgoodpolicy,theparttheydidactinonethousandsevenhundredandeleven,andonethousandsevenhundredandtwelve,towardsthelatequeen,whohadcomplaintsofthesamekind,inamuchhigherdegreeandwithcircumstancesmuchmoreaggravating,tomakeofthem,oftheemperor,andofalltheprincesofGermany;andwhowasfarfromtreatingthemandtheirotherallies,atthattime,astheytreatedSpainandtheirotheralliesinonethousandsixhundredandseventy-eight。ImmediatelyaftertheDutchhadmadetheirpeace,thatofSpainwassignedwithFrance。Theemperor’streatywiththiscrownandthatofSwedenwasconcludedinthefollowingyear:andLouistheFourteenthbeingnowatlibertytoassisthisallywhilsthehadtiedupthepowerswithwhomhehadtreatedfromassistingtheirs,hesoonforcedthekingofDenmarkindtheelectorofBrandenburgtorestorealltheyhadtakenfromtheSwedes,andtoconcludethepeaceofthenorth。
Inallthesetreatieshegavethelaw,andhewasnowatthehighestpointofhisgrandeur。Hecontinuedatthispointforseveralyears,andinthisheightofhispowerhepreparedthosealliancesagainstit,undertheweightofwhichhewasatlastwellnighoppressed;andmighthavebeenreducedaslowasthegeneralinterestofEuroperequired,ifsomeofthecauses,whichworkednow,hadnotcontinuedtoworkinhisfavor,andifhisenemieshadnotproved,intheirturnoffortune,asinsatiableasprosperityhadrenderedhim。
Afterhehadmadepeacewithallthepowerswithwhomhehadbeeninwar,hecontinuedtovexbothSpainandtheempire,andtoextendhisconquestsintheLowCountries,andontheRhine,bothbythepenandthesword。HeerectedthechambersofMetzandofBrisach,wherehisownsubjectswereprosecutors,witnesses,andjudgesallatonce。Uponthedecisionsofthesetribunals,heseizedintohisownhands,underthenotionofdependenciesandthepretenceofreunions,whatevertownsordistrictsofcountrytemptedhisambition,orsuitedhisconveniency。andadded,bytheseandbyothermeans,inthemidstofpeace,moreterritoriestothosethelatetreatieshadyieldedtohim,thanhecouldhavegotbycontinuingthewar。Heactedafterwards,inthesupportofallthis,withoutanyboundsorlimits。HisglorywasareasonforattackingHollandinonethousandsixhundredandseventy-two,andhisconveniencyareasonformanyoftheattackshemadeonothersafterwards。HetookLuxemburgbyforce;hestoleStrasburg;heboughtCasal:and,whilsthewaitedtheopportunityofacquiringtohisfamilythecrownofSpain,hewasnotwithoutthoughts,norhopesperhaps,ofbringingintoittheimperialcrownlikewise。Someofthecrueltiesheexercisedintheempiremaybeascribedtohisdisappointmentinthisview:Isaysomeofthem,becauseinthewarthatendedbythetreatyofNimeguen,hehadalreadyexercisedmany。ThoughtheFrenchwritersendeavortoslideoverthem,topalliatethem,andtoimputethemparticularlytotheEnglishthatwereintheirservice;foreventhisoneoftheirwritershasthefronttoadvance:letthesecruelties,unheardofamongcivilisednations,mustbegrantedtohavebeenorderedbythecounsels,andexecutedbythearmsofFrance,inthePalatinate,andinotherparts。
IfLouistheFourteenthcouldhavecontentedhimselfwiththeacquisitionsthatwereconfirmedtohimbythetreatiesofonethousandsixhundredandseventy-eight,andonethousandsixhundredandseventy-nine,andwiththeauthorityandreputationwhichhethengained;itisplainthathewouldhavepreventedthealliancesthatwereafterwardsformedagainsthim,andthathemighthaveregainedhiscreditamongsttheprincesoftheempire,wherehehadonefamilyalliancebythemarriageofhisbrothertothedaughteroftheelectorPalatine,andanotherbythatofhissoiltothesisteroftheelectorofBavaria;whereSwedenwascloselyattachedtohim,andwherethesameprinciplesofprivateinterestwouldhavesoonattachedothersasclosely。Hemighthaveremainednotonlytheprincipal,butthedirectingpowerofEurope,andhaveheldthisrankwithallthegloryimaginable,tillthedeathofthekingofSpain,orsomeotherobjectofgreatambition,haddeterminedhimtoactanotherpart。Butinsteadofthis,hecontinuedtovexandprovokeallthosewhowere,unhappilyforthem,hisneighbors,and,thatinmanyinstances,fortrifles。Allexampleofthiskindoccurstome。
OnthedeathoftheDukeofDeuxPonts,heseizedthatlittleinconsiderableduchy,withoutanyregardtotheindisputablerightofthekingofSweden,totheservicesthatcrownhadrenderedhim,ortothewanthemighthaveofthatalliancehereafter。Theconsequencewas,thatSwedenenteredwiththeemperor,thekingofSpain,theelectorofBavaria,andtheStatesGeneral,intotheallianceofguaranty,asitwascalled,abouttheyearonethousandsixhundredandeighty-three,andintothefamousleagueofAugsburg,inonethousandsixhundredandeighty-six。
SinceIhavementionedthisleague,andsincewemaydatefromitamoregeneral,andmoreconcertedoppositiontoFrance,thantherehadbeenbefore;
givemeleavetorecallsomeofthereflectionsthathavepresentedthemselvestomymind,inconsideringwhatIhaveread,andwhatIhaveheardrelated,concerningthepassagesofthattime。Theywillbeofusetoformourjudgmentconcerninglaterpassages。IfthekingofFrancebecameanobjectofaversiononaccountofanyinvasionshemade,anydeviationsfrompublicfaith,anybarbaritiesexercisedwherehisarmsprevailed,orthepersecutionofhisprotestantsubjects;theemperordeservedtobesuchanobject,atleastasmuchashe,onthesameaccounts。Theemperorwassotoobutwiththisdifferencerelativelytothepoliticalsystemofthewest:theAustrianambitionandbigotryexertedthemselvesindistantcountries,whoseinterestswerenotconsideredasapartofthissystem;forotherwisetherewouldhavebeenasmuchreasonforassistingthepeopleofHungaryandofTransylvaniaagainsttheemperor,astherehadbeenformerlyforassistingthepeopleofthesevenunitedprovincesagainstSpain,orastherehadbeenlatelyforassistingthemagainstFrance;buttheambitionandbigotryofLouistheFourteenthwereexertedintheLowCountries,ontheRhine,inItaly,andinSpain,intheverymidstifthissystem,ifImaysayso,andwithsuccessthatcouldnotfailtosubvertitintime。ThepowerofthehouseofAustria,thathadbeenfearedtoolong,wasfearednolonger:andthatofthehouseofBourbon,byhavingbeenfearedtoolate,wasnowgrownterrible。TheemperorwassointentontheestablishmentofhisabsolutepowerinHungary,thatheexposedtheempire