processwereactuallydross。
　　When，however，ithasoncebeenseenthatinAustin’ssystem
　　thedeterminationofSovereigntyoughttoprecedethe
　　determinationofLaw，whenitisonceunderstoodthatthe
　　AustinianconceptionofSovereigntyhasbeenreachedthrough
　　mentallyunitingallformsofgovernmentinagroupbyconceiving
　　themasstrippedofeveryattributeexceptcoerciveforce，and
　　whenitissteadilyborneinmindthatthedeductionsfroman
　　abstractprincipleareneverfromthenatureofthecase
　　completelyexemplifiedinfacts，notonly，asitseemstome，do
　　thechiefdifficultiesfeltbythestudentofAustindisappear，
　　butsomeoftheassertionsmadebyhimatwhichthebeginneris
　　mostapttostumblehaverathertheairofself-evident
　　propositions。Idaresayyouaresufficientlyacquaintedwithhis
　　treatisetomakeitenoughformetomentionsomeofthese
　　propositions，withouttheamplificationswhicharenecessaryfor
　　theirperfectlyaccuratestatement。Jurisprudenceisthescience
　　ofPositiveLaw。PositiveLawsareCommands，addressedby
　　SovereignstotheirSubjects，imposingaDuty，orconditionof
　　obligedness，orobligation，onthoseSubjects，andthreateninga
　　Sanction，orPenalty，intheeventofdisobediencetothe
　　Command。ARightisthefacultyorpowerconferredbythe
　　Sovereignoncertainmembersofthecommunitytodrawdownthe
　　sanctiononafellow-subjectviolatingaDuty。Nowallthese
　　conceptionsofLaw，Right，DutyandPunishmentdependuponthe
　　primaryconceptionofSovereignty，justasthelowerlinksofa
　　chainhangingdowndependuponthehighestlink。ButSovereignty，
　　forthepurposesofAustin’ssystem，hasnoattributebutforce，
　　andconsequentlytheviewheretakenof’law’’obligation’and
　　’right’isaviewofthemregardedexclusivelyasproductsof
　　coerciveforce。The’sanction’thusbecomestheprimaryandmost
　　importantmemberoftheseriesofnotionsandgivesitscolourto
　　alltheothers。Probablynobodyeverfoundadifficultyin
　　allowingthatlawshavethecharactergiventothembyAustin，so
　　farassuchlawshaveproceededfromformalLegislatures。But
　　manypersons，andamongthemsomemenofpowerfulmind，have
　　struggledagainstthepositionthatthegreatmassoflegalrules
　　whichhaveneverbeenprescribedbytheorganofState，
　　conventionallyknownastheLegislature，arecommandsofthe
　　Sovereign。Thecustomarylawofallcountrieswhichhavenot
　　includedtheirlawinCodes，andspeciallytheEnglishCommon
　　law，haveoftenhadanoriginclaimedforthemindependentlyof
　　theSovereign，andtheorieshavebeenpropoundedonthesubject
　　whichAustinscoutsasmysteriousandunintelligible。Thewayin
　　whichHobbesandhebringsuchbodiesofrulesastheCommonlaw
　　undertheirsystemisbyinsistingonamaximwhichisofvital
　　importancetoit——’WhatevertheSovereignpermits，he
　　commands。’UntilcustomsareenforcedbyCourtsofJustice，they
　　aremerely’positivemorality，’rulesenforcedbyopinion，but，
　　assoonasCourtsofJusticeenforcethem，theybecomecommands
　　oftheSovereign，conveyedthroughtheJudgeswhoarehis
　　delegatesordeputies。Itisabetteranswertothistheorythan
　　Austinwouldperhapshaveadmittedthatitisfoundedonamere
　　artificeofspeech，andthatitassumesCourtsofJusticetoact
　　inawayandfrommotivesofwhichtheyarequiteunconscious。
　　But，whenitisclearlycomprehendedthat，inthissystem，there
　　arenoassociationswiththeSovereignbutforceorpower，the
　　positionthatwhatSovereignspermittheycommandbecomesmore
　　easilyintelligible。Theycommandbecause，beingbythe
　　assumptionpossessedofuncontrollableforce，theycouldinnovate
　　withoutlimitatanymoment。TheCommonlawconsistsoftheir
　　commandsbecausetheycanrepealoralterorre-stateitat
　　pleasure。Thetheoryisperfectlydefensibleasatheory，butits
　　practicalvalueandthedegreeinwhichitapproximatestotruth
　　differgreatlyindifferentagesandcountries。Therehavebeen
　　independentpoliticalcommunities，andindeedtherewouldstill
　　provetobesomeofthemiftheworldwerethoroughlysearched，
　　inwhichtheSovereign，thoughpossessedofirresistiblepower，
　　neverdreamsofinnovation，andbelievesthepersonsorgroups，
　　bywhomlawsaredeclaredandapplied，tobeasmuchpartofthe
　　necessaryconstitutionofsocietyasheishimself。Therehave
　　againbeenindependentpoliticalsocietiesinwhichtheSovereign
　　hasenjoyedirresistiblecoercivepowerandhascarried
　　innovationtothefarthestpoint；butinwhicheverysingle
　　associationconnectedwithlawwouldhaveviolencedonetoitif
　　lawswereregardedashiscommands。TheTyrantofaGreekcity
　　oftensatisfiedeveryoneofAustin’stestsofSovereignty；yet
　　itwaspartoftheaccepteddefinitionofaTyrantthat’he
　　subvertedthelaws。’Letitbeunderstoodthatitisquite
　　possibletomakethetheoryfitinwithsuchcases，butthe
　　processisamerestrainingoflanguage。Itiscarriedonby
　　takingwordsandpropositionsaltogetheroutofthesphereofthe
　　ideashabituallyassociatedwiththem。
　　BeforeproceedingtospeakatsomelengthinmynextLecture
　　ofthesehistoricallimitationsonthepracticalvalueof
　　Austin’stheories，letmerepeatmyopinionthatifthemethodof
　　discussionwhichseemstomecorrecthadbeenfollowedinhis
　　treatise，andiftheexaminationofSovereigntyhadprecededthe
　　examinationoftheconceptionsdependentonit，aconsiderable
　　numberofthestatementswhichhehasmaderespectingthese
　　latterconceptionswouldhaveappearednotmerelyinnocentbut
　　self-evident。Lawishereregardedasregulatedforce，simply
　　becauseforceistheoneelementwhichhasbeenallowedtoenter
　　intotheprimarynotionuponwhichalltheothersdepend。Theone
　　doctrineofthisschoolofjuristswhichisrepugnanttolawyers
　　wouldloseitsairofparadoxifanassumptionweremadewhich，
　　initselftheoreticallyunobjectionable，manifestlyapproximates
　　topracticaltruthasthecourseofhistoryproceeds——the
　　assumptionthatwhattheSovereignmightalter，butdoesnot
　　alter，hecommands。Thesamearrangementwouldhaveafurther
　　advantage，asitseemstome，throughthemodificationsitwould
　　necessitateinAustin’smannerofdiscussingMorality，thoughthe
　　subjectisnotonewhichcanbeheretreatedwithcompleteness。
　　Thepositionatwhichmanyreadershavestumbled——Idonot
　　affecttodomorethanstateitinpopularlanguage——isthat
　　thesanctionofmoralrules，assuch，isthedisapprobationwhich
　　one’sfellow-menmanifestattheirviolation。Itissometimes
　　construedtomeanthattheonlymotiveforobeyingmoralrulesis
　　thefearofsuchdisapprobation。SuchaconstructionofAustin’s
　　languageisanentiremisconceptionofhismeaning；but，ifthe
　　orderofdiscussionwhichIadvocatehadbeenfollowed，Idonot
　　thinkitcouldeverpossiblyoccurtoanymind。Letussuppose
　　AustintohavecompletedhisanalysisofSovereigntyandofthe
　　conceptionsimmediatelydependentonit，law，legalright，and
　　legalobligation。Hewouldthenhavetoexaminethatgreatmass
　　ofrules，whichmeninfactobey，whichhavesomeofthe
　　characteristicsoflaws，butwhicharenotassuchimposedby
　　Sovereignsonsubjects，andwhicharenotassuchenforcedby
　　thesanctionsuppliedbySovereignpower。Itwouldbe，ofcourse，
　　incumbentonthephilosophicaljuristtoexaminetheserules，
　　becauseSovereignsbeingbyhishypothesishumansuperiorsare，
　　ashumanbeings，subjecttothem。Austinhas，infact，examined
　　themfromthispointofviewinsomeofhismostinteresting
　　passages。WhileinsistingthatSovereigntyisfromthenatureof
　　thecaseincapableoflegallimitation，hefullyadmitsthat
　　Sovereignsarerestrainedfromissuingsomecommandsand
　　determinedtoissueothersbyruleswhich，thoughtheyarenot
　　laws，areofextremecogency。TheCrownandParliamentofGreat
　　BritainareinhisviewSovereign——asovereignaristocracy，as
　　hewouldcallit——but，thoughthisaristocracycouldfor
　　purposesofargumentdoanythingitpleased，itwouldbeout
　　ragingallexperiencetoassertthatitdoesthis。Thatgreat
　　bodyofruleswhichisembodiedinconstitutionalmaximskeepsit
　　fromdoingsomethings；thatgreatbodyofruleswhichin
　　ordinaryusagearecalledmoralkeepsitfromdoingothers。What
　　commoncharacteristicshasthisaggregateofruleswhichoperate
　　onmenandonSovereigns，likeothermen？Austin，asyouknow，
　　namesit’positivemorality’，andsaysthatitssanctionis
　　opinion，orthedisapprovalofthebulkofthecommunity
　　followingonitsviolation。Properlyunderstood，thislastisan
　　obviouslytrueproposition，forwhatismeantisthatpublic
　　disapprobationistheonesanctionwhichalltheseruleshavein
　　common。TherulewhichkeepstheCrownandParliamentfrom
　　declaringmurderlegal，andtherulewhichkeepsthemfrom
　　allowingtheQueentogovernwithoutMinisters，areconnected
　　togetherthroughthepenaltyattendantonabreachofthem，which
　　isthestrongdisapprobationofamajorityofEnglishmen；andit
　　istheirhavingasanctionofsomekindwhichprincipally
　　connectsbothruleswithlawsproper。But，thoughfearofopinion
　　beamotiveforobediencetobothrules，itdoesnotatall
　　followthatthesolemotiveforobediencetobothrulesisfear
　　ofopinion。Thisfearwouldbeallowedbymostpeopletobethe
　　chief，ifnottheexclusive，motiveforobedienceto
　　constitutionalrules；butsuchanadmissioninvolvesnonecessary
　　assertionwhateverastothecompletesanctionofmoralrules。
　　ThetruthisthatAustin’ssystemisconsistentwithanyethical
　　theory；and，ifAustinseemstoassertthecontrary，Ithinkthe
　　causeistobesoughtinhisfirmconvictionofthetruthofhis
　　ownethicalcreed，which，Ineednotsay，wasUtilitarianismin
　　itsearliershapeIdonot，indeed，foramomentintendtodeny
　　thatthecarefulstudyofAustinwouldprobablymodifythe
　　student’sviewofmorals。Thediscussionofethics，likemany
　　others，isconductedamidmuchobscurityofthought，andthereis
　　nospecificmoresovereignfordispellingsuchobscuritythanthe
　　associationofthecardinaltermswhichenterintoourenquiry
　　withabsolutelyconsistentmeanings，andtheemploymentofthe
　　termswiththesemeaningsasatestforthedetectionof
　　equivocalphraseology。Itistheoneinestimableserviceofthe
　　AnalyticalSchooltojurisprudenceandmoralsthatitfurnishes
　　themwitharigidlyconsistentterminology。Butthereisnotthe
　　faintestreasonforthinkingthattheintelligentand
　　appreciativestudentofthesystemmustnecessarilybean
　　utilitarian。
　　IshallstatehereafterwhatIbelievetobethetruepoint
　　ofcontactbetweenAustin’ssystemandtheutilitarian
　　philosophy。Meantime，devotiontothisphilosophy，coupledwith
　　whatIholdtobeafaultyarrangement，hasproducedthemost
　　seriousblemishinthe’ProvinceofJurisprudenceDetermined。’
　　The2nd，3rd，and4thLecturesareoccupiedwithanattemptto
　　identifythelawofGodandthelawofNaturesofarasthese
　　lastwordscanbeallowedtohaveanymeaningwiththerules
　　requiredbythetheoryofutility。Thelecturescontainmany
　　just，interesting，andvaluableobservations；butthe
　　identification，whichistheirobject，isquitegratuitousand
　　valuelessforanypurpose。Written，Idoubtnot，inthehonest
　　beliefthattheywouldhelptoobviateorremoveprejudices，they
　　haveattractedtoAustin’ssystemawholecloudofprejudices
　　bothfromthetheologicalandfromthephilosophicalside。If，
　　however，followingtheorderIhavesuggested，Austin，after
　　concludingtheexaminationofthenatureofSovereigntyandof
　　positivelaw，hadenteredonanenquiryintothenatureofthe
　　lawsofGod，itmusthavetakentheformofaninvestigationof