Inordertoconfutesoodiousadoctrine，itwasnecessarytoprove，thatantecedenttoalllaworpositiveinstitution，themindwasnaturallyendowedwithafaculty，bywhichitdistinguishedincertainactionsandaffections，thequalitiesofright，laudable，andvirtuous，andinothersthoseofwrong，blamable，andvicious。
　　Law，itwasjustlyobservedbyDrCudworth，16*couldnotbetheoriginalsourceofthosedistinctions；sinceuponthesuppositionofsuchalaw，itmusteitherberighttoobeyit，andwrongtodisobeyit，orindifferentwhetherweobeyedit，ordisobeyedit。Thatlawwhichitwasindifferentwhetherweobeyedordisobeyed，couldnot，itwasevident，bethesourceofthosedistinctions；neithercouldthatwhichitwasrighttoobeyandwrongtodisobey，sinceeventhisstillsupposedtheantecedentnotionsorideasofrightandwrong，andthatobediencetothelawwasconformabletotheideaofright，anddisobediencetothatofwrong。
　　Sincethemind，therefore，hadanotionofthosedistinctionsantecedenttoalllaw，itseemednecessarilytofollow，thatitderivedthisnotionfromreason，whichpointedoutthedifferencebetweenrightandwrong，inthesamemannerinwhichitdidthatbetweentruthandfalsehood:andthisconclusion，which，thoughtrueinsomerespects，isratherhastyinothers，wasmoreeasilyreceivedatatimewhentheabstractscienceofhumannaturewasbutinitsinfancy，andbeforethedistinctofficesandpowersofthedifferentfacultiesofthehumanmindhadbeencarefullyexaminedanddistinguishedfromoneanother。WhenthiscontroversywithMrHobbeswascarriedonwiththegreatestwarmthandkeenness，nootherfacultyhadbeenthoughtoffromwhichanysuchideascouldpossiblybesupposedtoarise。Itbecameatthistime，therefore，thepopulardoctrine，thattheessenceofvirtueandvicedidnotconsistintheconformityordisagreementofhumanactionswiththelawofasuperior，butintheirconformityordisagreementwithreason，whichwasthusconsideredastheoriginalsourceandprincipleofapprobationanddisapprobation。
　　Thatvirtueconsistsinconformitytoreason，istrueinsomerespects，andthisfacultymayveryjustlybeconsideredas，insomesense，thesourceandprincipleofapprobationanddisapprobation，andofallsolidjudgmentsconcerningrightandwrong。Itisbyreasonthatwediscoverthosegeneralrulesofjusticebywhichweoughttoregulateouractions:anditisbythesamefacultythatweformthosemorevagueandindeterminateideasofwhatisprudent，ofwhatisdecent，ofwhatisgenerousornoble，whichwecarryconstantlyaboutwithus，andaccordingtowhichweendeavour，aswellaswecan，tomodelthetenorofourconduct。Thegeneralmaximsofmoralityareformed，likeallothergeneralmaxims，fromexperienceandinduction。Weobserveinagreatvarietyofparticularcaseswhatpleasesordispleasesourmoralfaculties，whattheseapproveordisapproveof，and，byinductionfromthisexperience，weestablishthosegeneralrules。
　　Butinductionisalwaysregardedasoneoftheoperationsofreason。Fromreason，therefore，weareveryproperlysaidtoderiveallthosegeneralmaximsandideas。Itisbythese，however，thatweregulatethegreaterpartofourmoraljudgments，whichwouldbeextremelyuncertainandprecariousiftheydependedaltogetheruponwhatisliabletosomanyvariationsasimmediatesentimentandfeeling，whichthedifferentstatesofhealthandhumourarecapableofalteringsoessentially。Asourmostsolidjudgments，therefore，withregardtorightandwrong，areregulatedbymaximsandideasderivedfromaninductionofreason，virtuemayveryproperlybesaidtoconsistinaconformitytoreason，andsofarthisfacultymaybeconsideredasthesourceandprincipleofapprobationanddisapprobation。
　　Butthoughreasonisundoubtedlythesourceofthegeneralrulesofmorality，andofallthemoraljudgmentswhichweformbymeansofthem；itisaltogetherabsurdandunintelligibletosupposethatthefirstperceptionsofrightandwrongcanbederivedfromreason，eveninthoseparticularcasesupontheexperienceofwhichthegeneralrulesareformed。Thesefirstperceptions，aswellasallotherexperimentsuponwhichanygeneralrulesarefounded，cannotbetheobjectofreason，butofimmediatesenseandfeeling。Itisbyfindinginavastvarietyofinstancesthatonetenorofconductconstantlypleasesinacertainmanner，andthatanotherasconstantlydispleasesthemind，thatweformthegeneralrulesofmorality。Butreasoncannotrenderanyparticularobjecteitheragreeableordisagreeabletothemindforitsownsake。Reasonmayshowthatthisobjectisthemeansofobtainingsomeotherwhichisnaturallyeitherpleasingordispleasing，andinthismannermayrenderiteitheragreeableordisagreeableforthesakeofsomethingelse。Butnothingcanbeagreeableordisagreeableforitsownsake，whichisnotrenderedsuchbyimmediatesenseandfeeling。Ifvirtue，therefore，ineveryparticularinstance，necessarilypleasesforitsownsake，andifviceascertainlydispleasesthemind，itcannotbereason，butimmediatesenseandfeeling，which，inthismanner，reconcilesustotheone，andalienatesusfromtheother。
　　Pleasureandpainarethegreatobjectsofdesireandaversion:butthesearedistinguishednotbyreason，butbyimmediatesenseandfeeling。Ifvirtue，therefore，bedesirableforitsownsake，andifvicebe，inthesamemanner，theobjectofaversion，itcannotbereasonwhichoriginallydistinguishesthosedifferentqualities，butimmediatesenseandfeeling。
　　Asreason，however，inacertainsense，mayjustlybeconsideredastheprincipleofapprobationanddisapprobation，thesesentimentswere，throughinattention，longregardedasoriginallyflowingfromtheoperationsofthisfaculty。DrHutchesonhadthemeritofbeingthefirstwhodistinguishedwithanydegreeofprecisioninwhatrespectallmoraldistinctionsmaybesaidtoarisefromreason，andinwhatrespecttheyarefoundeduponimmediatesenseandfeeling。Inhisillustrationsuponthemoralsensehehasexplainedthissofully，and，inmyopinion，sounanswerably，that，ifanycontroversyisstillkeptupaboutthissubject，Icanimputeittonothing，buteithertoinattentiontowhatthatgentlemanhaswritten，ortoasuperstitiousattachmenttocertainformsofexpression，aweaknessnotveryuncommonamongthelearned，especiallyinsubjectssodeeplyinterestingasthepresent，inwhichamanofvirtueisoftenloathtoabandon，eventheproprietyofasinglephrasewhichhehasbeenaccustomedto。
　　OfthoseSystemswhichmakeSentimentthePrincipleofApprobationThosesystemswhichmakesentimenttheprincipleofapprobationmaybedividedintotwodifferentclasses。
　　I。Accordingtosometheprincipleofapprobationisfoundeduponasentimentofapeculiarnature，uponaparticularpowerofperceptionexertedbythemindattheviewofcertainactionsoraffections；someofwhichaffectingthisfacultyinanagreeableandothersinadisagreeablemanner，theformerarestampedwiththecharactersofright，laudable，andvirtuous；thelatterwiththoseofwrong，blamable，andvicious。Thissentimentbeingofapeculiarnaturedistinctfromeveryother，andtheeffectofaparticularpowerofperception，theygiveitaparticularname，andcallitamoralsense。
　　II。Accordingtoothers，inordertoaccountfortheprincipleofapprobation，thereisnooccasionforsupposinganynewpowerofperceptionwhichhadneverbeenheardofbefore:
　　Nature，theyimagine，actshere，asinallothercases，withthestrictestoeconomy，andproducesamultitudeofeffectsfromoneandthesamecause；andsympathy，apowerwhichhasalwaysbeentakennoticeof，andwithwhichthemindismanifestlyendowed，is，theythink，sufficienttoaccountforalltheeffectsascribedtothispeculiarfaculty。
　　I。DrHutcheson17*hadbeenatgreatpainstoprovethattheprincipleofapprobationwasnotfoundedonself-love。Hehaddemonstratedtoothatitcouldnotarisefromanyoperationofreason。Nothingremained，hethought，buttosupposeitafacultyofapeculiarkind，withwhichNaturehadendowedthehumanmind，inordertoproducethisoneparticularandimportanteffect。
　　Whenself-loveandreasonwerebothexcluded，itdidnotoccurtohimthattherewasanyotherknownfacultyofthemindwhichcouldinanyrespectanswerthispurpose。
　　Thisnewpowerofperceptionhecalledamoralsense，andsupposedittobesomewhatanalogoustotheexternalsenses。Asthebodiesaroundus，byaffectingtheseinacertainmanner，appeartopossessthedifferentqualitiesofsound，taste，odour，colour；sothevariousaffectionsofthehumanmind，bytouchingthisparticularfacultyinacertainmanner，appeartopossessthedifferentqualitiesofamiableandodious，ofvirtuousandvicious，ofrightandwrong。
　　Thevarioussensesorpowersofperception，18*fromwhichthehumanmindderivesallitssimpleideas，were，accordingtothissystem，oftwodifferentkinds，ofwhichtheonewerecalledthedirectorantecedent，theother，thereflexorconsequentsenses。Thedirectsenseswerethosefacultiesfromwhichthemindderivedtheperceptionofsuchspeciesofthingsasdidnotpresupposetheantecedentperceptionofanyother。Thussoundsandcolourswereobjectsofthedirectsenses。Tohearasoundortoseeacolourdoesnotpresupposetheantecedentperceptionofanyotherqualityorobject。Thereflexorconsequentsenses，ontheotherhand，werethosefacultiesfromwhichthemindderivedtheperceptionofsuchspeciesofthingsaspresupposedtheantecedentperceptionofsomeother。Thusharmonyandbeautywereobjectsofthereflexsenses。Inordertoperceivetheharmonyofasound，orthebeautyofacolour，wemustfirstperceivethesoundorthecolour。Themoralsensewasconsideredasafacultyofthiskind。Thatfaculty，whichMrLockecallsreflection，andfromwhichhederivedthesimpleideasofthedifferentpassionsandemotionsofthehumanmind，was，accordingtoDrHutcheson，adirectinternalsense。Thatfacultyagainbywhichweperceivedthebeautyordeformity，thevirtueorviceofthosedifferentpassionsandemotions，wasareflex，internalsense。
　　DrHutchesonendeavouredstillfurthertosupportthisdoctrine，byshewingthatitwasagreeabletotheanalogyofnature，andthatthemindwasendowedwithavarietyofotherreflexsensesexactlysimilartothemoralsense；suchasasenseofbeautyanddeformityinexternalobjects；apublicsense，bywhichwesympathizewiththehappinessormiseryofourfellow-creatures；asenseofshameandhonour，andasenseofridicule。
　　Butnotwithstandingallthepainswhichthisingeniousphilosopherhastakentoprovethattheprincipleofapprobationisfoundedinapeculiarpowerofperception，somewhatanalogoustotheexternalsenses，therearesomeconsequences，whichheacknowledgestofollowfromthisdoctrine，thatwill，perhaps，beregardedbymanyasasufficientconfutationofit。Thequalitiesheallows，19*whichbelongtotheobjectsofanysense，cannot，withoutthegreatestabsurdity，beascribedtothesenseitself。
　　Whoeverthoughtofcallingthesenseofseeingblackorwhite，thesenseofhearingloudorlow，orthesenseoftastingsweetorbitter？And，accordingtohim，itisequallyabsurdtocallourmoralfacultiesvirtuousorvicious，morallygoodorevil。
　　Thesequalitiesbelongtotheobjectsofthosefaculties，nottothefacultiesthemselves。Ifanyman，therefore，wassoabsurdlyconstitutedastoapproveofcrueltyandinjusticeasthehighestvirtues，andtodisapproveofequityandhumanityasthemostpitifulvices，suchaconstitutionofmindmightindeedberegardedasinconvenientbothtotheindividualandtothesociety，andlikewiseasstrange，surprising，andunnaturalinitself；butitcouldnot，withoutthegreatestabsurdity，bedenominatedviciousormorallyevil。