Yetsurelyifwesawanymanshoutingwithadmirationandapplauseatabarbarousandunmeritedexecution，whichsomeinsolenttyranthadordered，weshouldnotthinkwewereguiltyofanygreatabsurdityindenominatingthisbehaviourviciousandmorallyevilinthehighestdegree，thoughitexpressednothingbutdepravedmoralfaculties，oranabsurdapprobationofthishorridaction，asofwhatwasnoble，magnanimous，andgreat。Ourheart，Iimagine，atthesightofsuchaspectator，wouldforgetforawhileitssympathywiththesufferer，andfeelnothingbuthorroranddetestation，atthethoughtofsoexecrableawretch。
　　Weshouldabominatehimevenmorethanthetyrantwhomightbegoadedonbythestrongpassionsofjealousy，fear，andresentment，anduponthataccountbemoreexcusable。Butthesentimentsofthespectatorwouldappearaltogetherwithoutcauseormotive，andthereforemostperfectlyandcompletelydetestable。Thereisnoperversionofsentimentoraffectionwhichourheartwouldbemoreaversetoenterinto，orwhichitwouldrejectwithgreaterhatredandindignationthanoneofthiskind；andsofarfromregardingsuchaconstitutionofmindasbeingmerelysomethingstrangeorinconvenient，andnotinanyrespectviciousormorallyevil，weshouldratherconsideritastheverylastandmostdreadfulstageofmoraldepravity。
　　Correctmoralsentiments，onthecontrary，naturallyappearinsomedegreelaudableandmorallygood。Theman，whosecensureandapplauseareuponalloccasionssuitedwiththegreatestaccuracytothevalueorunworthinessoftheobject，seemstodeserveadegreeevenofmoralapprobation。Weadmirethedelicateprecisionofhismoralsentiments:theyleadourownjudgments，and，uponaccountoftheiruncommonandsurprisingjustness，theyevenexciteourwonderandapplause。Wecannotindeedbealwayssurethattheconductofsuchapersonwouldbeinanyrespectcorrespondenttotheprecisionandaccuracyofhisjudgmentsconcerningtheconductofothers。Virtuerequireshabitandresolutionofmind，aswellasdelicacyofsentiment；andunfortunatelytheformerqualitiesaresometimeswanting，wherethelatterisinthegreatestperfection。Thisdispositionofmind，however，thoughitmaysometimesbeattendedwithimperfections，isincompatiblewithanythingthatisgrosslycriminal，andisthehappiestfoundationuponwhichthesuperstructureofperfectvirtuecanbebuilt。Therearemanymenwhomeanverywell，andseriouslypurposetodowhattheythinktheirduty，whonotwithstandingaredisagreeableonaccountofthecoarsenessoftheirmoralsentiments。
　　Itmaybesaid，perhaps，thatthoughtheprincipleofapprobationisnotfoundeduponanypowerofperceptionthatisinanyrespectanalogoustotheexternalsenses，itmaystillbefoundeduponapeculiarsentimentwhichanswersthisoneparticularpurposeandnoother。Approbationanddisapprobation，itmaybepretended，arecertainfeelingsoremotionswhichariseinthemindupontheviewofdifferentcharactersandactions；
　　andasresentmentmightbecalledasenseofinjuries，orgratitudeasenseofbenefits，sothesemayveryproperlyreceivethenameofasenseofrightandwrong，orofamoralsense。
　　Butthisaccountofthings，thoughitmaynotbeliabletothesameobjectionswiththeforegoing，isexposedtootherswhichareequallyunanswerable。
　　Firstofall，whatevervariationsanyparticularemotionmayundergo，itstillpreservesthegeneralfeatureswhichdistinguishittobeanemotionofsuchakind，andthesegeneralfeaturesarealwaysmorestrikingandremarkablethananyvariationwhichitmayundergoinparticularcases。Thusangerisanemotionofaparticularkind:andaccordinglyitsgeneralfeaturesarealwaysmoredistinguishablethanallthevariationsitundergoesinparticularcases。Angeragainstamanis，nodoubt，somewhatdifferentfromangeragainstawoman，andthatagainfromangeragainstachild。Ineachofthosethreecases，thegeneralpassionofangerreceivesadifferentmodificationfromtheparticularcharacterofitsobject，asmayeasilybeobservedbytheattentive。Butstillthegeneralfeaturesofthepassionpredominateinallthesecases。Todistinguishthese，requiresnoniceobservation:averydelicateattention，onthecontrary，isnecessarytodiscovertheirvariations:everybodytakesnoticeoftheformer；scarceanybodyobservesthelatter。
　　Ifapprobationanddisapprobation，therefore，were，likegratitudeandresentment，emotionsofaparticularkind，distinctfromeveryother，weshouldexpectthatinallthevariationswhicheitherofthemmightundergo，itwouldstillretainthegeneralfeatureswhichmarkittobeanemotionofsuchaparticularkind，clear，plain，andeasilydistinguishable。Butinfactithappensquiteotherwise。Ifweattendtowhatwereallyfeelwhenupondifferentoccasionsweeitherapproveordisapprove，weshallfindthatouremotioninonecaseisoftentotallydifferentfromthatinanother，andthatnocommonfeaturescanpossiblybediscoveredbetweenthem。Thustheapprobationwithwhichweviewatender，delicate，andhumanesentiment，isquitedifferentfromthatwithwhichwearestruckbyonethatappearsgreat，daring，andmagnanimous。Ourapprobationofbothmay，upondifferentoccasions，beperfectandentire；butwearesoftenedbytheone，andweareelevatedbytheother，andthereisnosortofresemblancebetweentheemotionswhichtheyexciteinus。ButaccordingtothatsystemwhichIhavebeenendeavouringtoestablish，thismustnecessarilybethecase。Astheemotionsofthepersonwhomweapproveof，are，inthosetwocases，quiteoppositetooneanother，andasourapprobationarisesfromsympathywiththoseoppositeemotions，whatwefeelupontheoneoccasion，canhavenosortofresemblancetowhatwefeelupontheother。Butthiscouldnothappenifapprobationconsistedinapeculiaremotionwhichhadnothingincommonwiththesentimentsweapprovedof，butwhicharoseattheviewofthosesentiments，likeanyotherpassionattheviewofitsproperobject。Thesamethingholdstruewithregardtodisapprobation。Ourhorrorforcrueltyhasnosortofresemblancetoourcontemptformean-spiritedness。Itisquiteadifferentspeciesofdiscordwhichwefeelattheviewofthosetwodifferentvices，betweenourownmindsandthoseofthepersonwhosesentimentsandbehaviourweconsider。
　　Secondly，Ihavealreadyobserved，thatnotonlythedifferentpassionsoraffectionsofthehumanmindwhichareapprovedordisapprovedof，appearmorallygoodorevil，butthatproperandimproperapprobationappear，toournaturalsentiments，tobestampedwiththesamecharacters。Iwouldask，therefore，howitis，that，accordingtothissystem，weapproveordisapproveofproperorimproperapprobation？Tothisquestionthereis，Iimagine，butonereasonableanswer，whichcanpossiblybegiven。Itmustbesaid，thatwhentheapprobationwithwhichourneighbourregardstheconductofathirdpersoncoincideswithourown，weapproveofhisapprobation，andconsideritas，insomemeasure，morallygood；andthat，onthecontrary，whenitdoesnotcoincidewithourownsentiments，wedisapproveofit，andconsideritas，insomemeasure，morallyevil。Itmustbeallowed，therefore，that，atleastinthisonecase，thecoincidenceoroppositionofsentiments，betweentheobserverandthepersonobserved，constitutesmoralapprobationordisapprobation。Andifitdoessointhisonecase，Iwouldask，whynotineveryother？Ortowhatpurposeimagineanewpowerofperceptioninordertoaccountforthosesentiments？
　　Againsteveryaccountoftheprincipleofapprobation，whichmakesitdependuponapeculiarsentiment，distinctfromeveryother，Iwouldobject；thatitisstrangethatthissentiment，whichProvidenceundoubtedlyintendedtobethegoverningprincipleofhumannature，shouldhithertohavebeensolittletakennoticeof，asnottohavegotanameinanylanguage。Thewordmoralsenseisofverylateformation，andcannotyetbeconsideredasmakingpartoftheEnglishtongue。Thewordapprobationhasbutwithinthesefewyearsbeenappropriatedtodenotepeculiarlyanythingofthiskind。Inproprietyoflanguageweapproveofwhateverisentirelytooursatisfaction，oftheformofabuilding，ofthecontrivanceofamachine，oftheflavourofadishofmeat。Thewordconsciencedoesnotimmediatelydenoteanymoralfacultybywhichweapproveordisapprove。Consciencesupposes，indeed，theexistenceofsomesuchfaculty，andproperlysignifiesourconsciousnessofhavingactedagreeablyorcontrarytoitsdirections。Whenlove，hatred，joy，sorrow，gratitude，resentment，withsomanyotherpassionswhichareallsupposedtobethesubjectsofthisprinciple，havemadethemselvesconsiderableenoughtogettitlestoknowthemby，isitnotsurprisingthatthesovereignofthemallshouldhithertohavebeensolittleheeded，that，afewphilosophersexcepted，nobodyhasyetthoughtitworthwhiletobestowanameuponit？
　　Whenweapproveofanycharacteroraction，thesentimentswhichwefeel，are，accordingtotheforegoingsystem，derivedfromfoursources，whichareinsomerespectsdifferentfromoneanother。First，wesympathizewiththemotivesoftheagent；
　　secondly，weenterintothegratitudeofthosewhoreceivethebenefitofhisactions；thirdly，weobservethathisconducthasbeenagreeabletothegeneralrulesbywhichthosetwosympathiesgenerallyact；and，lastofall，whenweconsidersuchactionsasmakingapartofasystemofbehaviourwhichtendstopromotethehappinesseitheroftheindividualorofthesociety，theyappeartoderiveabeautyfromthisutility，notunlikethatwhichweascribetoanywell-contrivedmachine。Afterdeducting，inanyoneparticularcase，allthatmustbeacknowledgedtoproceedfromsomeoneorotherofthesefourprinciples，Ishouldbegladtoknowwhatremains，andIshallfreelyallowthisoverplustobeascribedtoamoralsense，ortoanyotherpeculiarfaculty，providedanybodywillascertainpreciselywhatthisoverplusis。
　　Itmightbeexpected，perhaps，thatiftherewasanysuchpeculiarprinciple，suchasthismoralsenseissupposedtobe，weshouldfeelit，insomeparticularcases，separatedanddetachedfromeveryother，asweoftenfeeljoy，sorrow，hope，andfear，pureandunmixedwithanyotheremotion。Thishowever，Iimagine，cannotevenbepretended。Ihaveneverheardanyinstanceallegedinwhichthisprinciplecouldbesaidtoexertitselfaloneandunmixedwithsympathyorantipathy，withgratitudeorresentment，withtheperceptionoftheagreementordisagreementofanyactiontoanestablishedrule，orlastofallwiththatgeneraltasteforbeautyandorderwhichisexcitedbyinanimatedaswellasbyanimatedobjects。
　　II。Thereisanothersystemwhichattemptstoaccountfortheoriginofourmoralsentimentsfromsympathy，distinctfromthatwhichIhavebeenendeavouringtoestablish。Itisthatwhichplacesvirtueinutility，andaccountsforthepleasurewithwhichthespectatorsurveystheutilityofanyqualityfromsympathywiththehappinessofthosewhoareaffectedbyit。Thissympathyisdifferentbothfromthatbywhichweenterintothemotivesoftheagent，andfromthatbywhichwegoalongwiththegratitudeofthepersonswhoarebenefitedbyhisactions。Itisthesameprinciplewiththatbywhichweapproveofawell-contrivedmachine。Butnomachinecanbetheobjectofeitherofthosetwolastmentionedsympathies。Ihavealready，inthefourthpartofthisdiscourse，givensomeaccountofthissystem。
　　OftheMannerinwhichdifferentAuthorshavetreatedofthepracticalRulesofMoralityItwasobservedinthethirdpartofthisdiscourse，thattherulesofjusticearetheonlyrulesofmoralitywhicharepreciseandaccurate；thatthoseofalltheothervirtuesareloose，vague，andindeterminate；thatthefirstmaybecomparedtotherulesofgrammar；theotherstothosewhichcriticslaydownfortheattainmentofwhatissublimeandelegantincomposition，andwhichpresentusratherwithageneralideaoftheperfectionweoughttoaimat，thanaffordusanycertainandinfallibledirectionsforacquiringit。