Noonecanhesitatetodeclare，thatinthestates，wherethejudgesholdtheirofficesduringgood。behaviour，justiceisadministeredwithwisdom，moderation，andfirmness；andthatthepublicconfidencehasreposeduponthejudicialdepartment，inthemostcriticaltimes，withunabatedrespect。
　　Ifthesamecanbesaidinregardtootherstates，wherethejudgesenjoyalesspermanenttenureofoffice，itwillnotanswerthereasoning，unlessitcanalsobeshown，thatthejudgeshaveneverbeenremovedforpoliticalcauses，whollydistinctfromtheirownmerit；andyethaveoftendeliberatelyplacedthemselvesinoppositiontothepopularopinion。**Itaffordsmeverygreatsatisfactiontobeabletocitetheopinionsoftwoeminentcommentatorsonthissubject，who，differinginmanyotherviewsofconstitutionallaw，concurinupholdingthenecessityofanindependentjudiciaryinarepublic。Mr。ChancellorKent，inhisCommentaries，says：
　　"Inmonarchicalgovernments，theindependenceofthejudiciaryisessentialtoguardtherightsofthesubjectfromtheinjusticeofthecrown；butinrepublicsitisequallysalutary，inprotectingtheconstitutionand[*3：480]lawsfromtheencroachmentsandthetyrannyoffaction。Laws，howeverwholesomeornecessary，arefrequentlytheobjectortemporaryaversion，andsometimesofpopularresistance。Itisrequisite，thatthecourtsofjusticeshouldbeableatalltimes，topresentadeterminedcountenanceagainstalllicentiousacts；and，togivethemthefirmnesstodoit，thejudgesoughttobeconfidentofthesecurityoftheirstations。
　　Norisanindependentjudiciarylessuseful，asacheckuponthelegislativepower。whichissometimesdisposed，fromtheforceofpassion，orthetemptationsofinterest，tomakeasacrificeofconstitutionalrights；anditisawiseandnecessaryprincipleofourgovernment，aswillbeshownhereafterinthecourseoftheselectures，thatlegislativeactsaresubjecttotheseverescrutinyandimpartialinterpretationofthecourtsofjustice，whoareboundtoregardtheconstitution，astheparamountlaw，andthehighestevidenceofthewillofthepeople。"
　　Mr。Tucker，inhisCommentaries，makesthefollowingremarks：
　　"TheAmericanconstitutionsappeartobethefirst，inwhichthisabsoluteindependenceoftimjudiciaryhagformedoneofthefundamentalprinciplesofthegovernment。DoctorRatherforthconsidersthejudiciary，asabranchonlyoftheexecutiveauthority；andsuch，instrictness，perhaps，itisinothercountries，itsprovincebeingtoadvisetheexecutive，ratherthantoactindependentlyofit。""But，intheUnitedStatesofAmerica，thejudicialpowerisadistinct，separate，independent，andcoordinatebranchofthegovernment；expresslyrecognizedassuchinourstatebillofrights，andconstitution。anddemonstrablyso，likewise，bythefederalconstitution，fromwhichthecourtsoftheUnitedStatesderivealltheirpowers，inlikemanner，asthelegislativeandexecutivedepartmentsderive。
　　theirs。Theobligation，whichtheconstitutionimposesuponthejudiciarydepartment，tosupporttheconstitutionoftheUnitedStates，wouldbenugatory，ifitweredependentuponeitheroftheotherbranchesofthegovernment，orinanymannersubjecttotheircontrol，sincesuchcontrolmightoperatetothedestruction，insteadofthesupport，oftheconstitution。
　　Norcanitescapeobservation，thattorequiresuchanoathonthepartofthejudges，ontheonehand，andyetsupposethemhoundbyactsofthelegislature，whichmayviolatetheconstitution，whichtheyhavesworntosupport。carrieswithitsuchadegreeofimpiety，aswellasabsurdity，asnoman，whopaysanyregardtotheobligationsofanoath，canbesupposed，eithertocontendfor，ortodefend。
　　"Thisabsoluteindependenceofthejudiciary，bothoftheexecutiveandthelegislativedepartments，whichIcontendistobefound，both[*3：481]
　　intheletter，andspiritofourconstitutions，isnotlessnecessarytothelibertyandsecurityofthecitizen，andhisproperty，inarepublicangovernment，thaninamonarchy。If，inthelatter，thewilloftheprincemaybeconsidered，aslikelytoinfluencetheconductofjudgescreatedoccasionally，andholdingtheirofficesonlyduringhispleasure，moreespeciallyineases，whereacriminalprosecutionmaybecarriedonbyhisorders，andsupportedbyhisinfluence；inarepublic，ontheotherhand，theviolenceandmalignityofpartyspirit，aswellinthelegislature，asintheexecutive，requiresnotlesstheinterventionof，calm，temperate，upright，andindependentjudiciary，topreventthatviolenceandmalignityfromexertingitself’tocrushindustandashes’allopponentstoitstyrannicaladministration，orambitiousprojects。Suchanindependencecanneverbeperfectlyattained，butbyaconstitutionaltenureofoffice，equallyindependentofthefrownsandsmilesoftheotherbranchesofthegovernment。Judgesought，notonlytobeincapableofholdinganyotherofficeatthesametime，butevenofappointmenttoanybutajudicialoffice。Forthehopeoffavourisalwaysmorealluring，andgenerallymoredangerous，thanthefearofoffending。InEngland，accordingtotheprinciplesofthecommonlaw，ajudgecannotholdanyotheroffice；andaccordingtothepracticethereformorethanacentury，noinstancecan，Ibelieve，beshown，whereajudgehasbeenappointedtoanyother，thanajudicialoffice，unlessitbethehonorarypostofprivycounsellor，towhichnoemolumentisattached。AndeventhishonorarydistinctionisSeldomconferred，butuponthechiefjusticeoftheking’sbench，ifIhavebeenrightlyinformed。Tothiscause，notlessthantotiletenureoftheirofficesduringgoodbehaviour，mayweascribethatpreeminentintegrity，whichamidstsurroundingcorruption，beamswithgenuinelustrefromtheEnglishcourtsofjudicature，asfromthesunthroughsurroundingcloudsandmists。
　　Toemulateboththeirwisdomandintegrityisanambition，worthyofthegreatestcharactersinanycountry。
　　"Ifweconsiderthenatureofthejudicialauthority，andthemanner，inwhichitoperates，weshalldiscover，thatitcannot，ofitselfoppressanyindividual；fortheexecutiveauthoritymustlenditsaidineveryinstance，whereoppressioncanensuefromitsdecisions：whilst，onthecontrary，itsdecisionsinfavourofthecitizenarecarriedintoinstantaneouseffect，bydeliveringhimfromthecustodyandrestraintoftheexecutiveofficer，themoment，thatanacquittalispronounced。Andhereinconsistsoneofthegreatexcellenciesofourconstitution：thatnoindividualcanbeoppressed，whilstthisbranchofthegovernmentremainsindependent，anduncorrupted：itbeinganecessarycheck[*3：482]upontheencroachments，orusurpationsofpower，byeitheroftheother。"
　　"Thatabsoluteindependenceofthejudiciary，forwhichwecontend，isnot，then，incompatiblewiththestrictestresponsibility；forajudgeisnomoreexemptfromit，than。anyotherservantofthepeople，accordingtothetrueprinciplesoftheconstitution；butsuchanindependenceoftheothercoordinatebranchesofthegovernment，asseemsabsolutelynecessarytosecuretothemthefreeexerciseoftheirconstitutionalfunctions，withoutthehopeofpleasing，orthefearofoffending。And，asfromthenaturalfeeblenessofthejudiciary，itisincontinualjeopardyofbeingoverpowered，awed，orinfluencedbyitscoordinatebranches，whohavethecustodyofthepurseandswordoftheconfederacy；andasnothingcancontributesomuchtoitsfirmnessandindependence，aspermanencyinoffice，thisquality，therefore，maybejustlyregarded，asanindispensableingredientinitsconstitution；andingreatmeasure，asthecitadelofthepublicjustice，andthepublicsecurity。"
　　Thereisalsoaverytemperate，and，atthesametime，averysatisfactoryelucidationofthesamesubject，inMr。Rawle’sworkontheConstitution。
　　Itwouldbecheerfullyextracted，ifthisnotehadnotalreadybeenextendedtoaninconvenientlength。[*3：480]Sec。1615。Theconsiderationsabovestatedleadtotheconclusion，thatinrepublicsthereare，inreality，strongerreasonsforanindependenttenureofoffice[*3：481]bythejudges，atenureduringgoodbehaviour，thaninamonarchy。Indeed，arepublicwithalimitedconstitution，andyetwithoutajudiciarysufficiently[*3：482]independenttocheckusurpation，toprotectpublicliberty，andtoenforceprivaterights，wouldbeasvisionaryandabsurd，asasocietyorganizedwithoutanyrestraintsoflaw。Itwouldbecomeademocracywithunlimitedpowers，exercisingthroughitsrulersauniversaldespoticsovereignty。Theverytheoryofabalancedrepublicofrestrictedpowerspresupposessomeorganizedmeanstocontrol，andresist，anyexcessesofauthority。Thepeoplemay，iftheyplease，submitallpowertotheirrulersforthetimebeing；but，then，thegovernmentshouldreceiveitstrueappellationandcharacter。Itwouldbeagovernmentoftyrants，elective，itistrue，butstilltyrants；anditwouldbecomethemorefierce，vindictive，andsanguinary，becauseitwouldperpetuallygeneratefactionsinitsownbosom，whocouldsucceedonlybytheruinoftheirenemies。
　　Itwouldbealternatelycharacterized，asareignofterror，andareignofimbecility。Itwouldbeas[*3：483]corrupt，asitwouldbedangerous。
　　Itwouldformanothermodelofthatprofligateandbloodydemocracy，which，atonetime，intheFrenchrevolution，darkenedbyitsdeedsthefortunesofFrance，andlefttomankindtheappallinglesson，thatvirtue，andreligion，genius，andlearning，theauthorityofwisdom，andtheappealsofinnocence，areunheardandunfeltinthefrenzyofpopularexcitement；and，thattheworstcrimesmaybesanctioned，andthemostdesolatingprinciplesinculcated，underthebanners，andinthenameofliberty。Inhumangovernments，therearebuttwocontrollingpowers；thepowerofarms，andthepoweroflaws。
　　Ifthelatterarenotenforcedbyajudiciaryaboveallfear，andaboveallreproach，theformermustprevail；andthusleadtothetriumphofmilitaryovercivilinstitutions。Theframersoftheconstitution，withprofoundwisdom，laidthecornerstoneofournationalrepublicinthepermanentindependenceofthejudicialestablishment。Uponthispoint。
　　theirvotewasunanimous。Theyadoptedtheresultsofanenlightenedexperience。
　　Theywerenotseducedbythedreamsofhumanperfectionintothebelief，thatallpowermightbesafelylefttotheuncheckedoperationoftheprivateambition，orpersonalvirtueofrulers。Nor，ontheotherhand，weretheysolosttoajustestimateofhumanconcerns，asnottofeel，thatconfidencemustbereposedsomewhere；ifeitherefficiency，orsafetyaretobeconsultedintheplanofgovernment。Havingprovidedamplyforthelegislativeandexecutiveauthorities，theyestablishedabalance—wheel，which，byitsindependentstructure，shouldadjusttheirregularities，andchecktheexcessesoftheoccasionalmovementsofthesystem。
　　[*3：484]Sec。1616。Intheconventionapropositionwasofferedtomakethejudgesremoveablebythepresident，upontheapplicationofthesenateandhouseofrepresentatives；butitreceivedthesupportofasinglestateonly。
　　Sec。1617。Thispropositiondoubtlessoweditsorigintotheclauseintheactofparliament，makingitlawfulforthekingtoremovethejudgesontheaddressofbothhousesofparliament，notwithstandingthetenureoftheirofficesduringgoodbehaviour，establishedbythesameact。Butamoment’sreflectionwillteachus，thatthereisnojustanalogyinthecases。Theobjectoftheactofparliamentwastosecurethejudgesfromremovalatthemerepleasureofthecrown；butnottorenderthemindependentoftheactionofparliament。BythetheoryoftheBritishconstitution，everyactofparliamentissupremeandomnipotent。Itmaychangethesuccessiontothecrown；andeventheveryfundamentalsoftheconstitution。Itwouldhavebeenabsurd，therefore，tohaveexemptedthejudgesalonefromthegeneraljurisdictionofthissupremeauthorityintherealm。Theclausewasnotintroducedintotheact，forthepurposeofconferringthepoweronparliament，foritcouldnotbetakenaway，orrestricted；butsimplytorecognizeit，asaqualificationofthetenureofoffice；sothatthejudgesshouldhavenorighttocomplainofanybreachofanimpliedcontractwiththem，andthecrownshouldnotbedeprivedofthemeanstoremoveanunfitjudge，wheneverparliamentshouldintheirdiscretionsignifytheirassent。Besides；inEnglandthejudgesarenot，andcannotbe，calleduponto[*3：485]decideanyconstitutionalquestions；andthereforetherewasnonecessitytoplacethem，andindeedtherewouldhavebeenanimproprietyinplacingthem，evenifithadbeenpossible，whichitclearlywasnot
　　inasituation，inwhichtheywouldnothavebeenunderthecontrolofparliament。
　　Sec。1618。FardifferentisthesituationofthepeopleoftheUnitedStates。Theyhavechosentoestablishaconstitutionofgovernment，withlimitedpowersandprerogatives，overwhichneithertheexecutive，northelegislature，haveanypower，eitherofalterationorcontrol。Itistoallthedepartmentsequallyasupreme，fundamental，unchangeablelaw，whichallmustobey，andnoneareatlibertytodisregard。Themainsecurity，reliedontocheckanyirregular，orunconstitutionalmeasure，eitheroftheexecutive，orthelegislativedepartment，wasaswehaveseenthejudiciary。Tohavemadethejudges，therefore，removable，atthepleasureofthepresidentandcongress，wouldhavebeenavirtualsurrendertothemofthecustodyandappointmentoftheguardiansoftheconstitution。Itwouldhavebeenplacingthekeysofthecitadelinthepossessionofthose，againstwhoseassaultsthepeopleweremoststrenuouslyendeavouringtoguardthemselves。Itwouldbeholdingoutatemptationtothepresidentandcongress，whenevertheywereresistedinanyoftheirmeasures，tosecureaperfectirresponsibilitybyremovingthosejudgesfromoffice，whoshoulddaretoopposetheirwill。Inshort，ineveryviolentpoliticalcommotionorchange，thejudgeswouldberemovedfromoffice，exactlyasthelordchancellorinEnglandnowis，inorder，thataperfectharmonymightbeestablishedbetweentheoperationsofallthedepartmentsofgovernment。
　　Suchapowerwouldhave[*3：486]beenasignalproofofasolicitudetoerectdefencesroundtheconstitution，forthesolepurposeofsurrenderingthemintothepossessionofthose，whoseactstheywereintendedtoguardagainst。Undersuchcircumstances，itmightwellhavebeenasked，wherecouldresortbehadtoredressgrievances，ortooverthrowusurpations？
　　Quiscustodietoustodes？
　　Sec。1619。Apropositionofamoreimposingnaturewastoauthorizearemovalofjudgesforinabilitytodischargethedutiesoftheiroffices。
　　Butallconsideratepersonswillreadilyperceive，thatsuchaprovisionwouldeithernotbepractisedupon，orwouldbemoreliabletoabuse，thancalculatedtoansweranygoodpurpose。Themensurationofthefacultiesofthemindhasnoplaceinthecatalogueofanyknownartorscience。
　　Anattempttofixtheboundarybetweentheregionofabilityandinabilitywouldmuchoftenergiverisetopersonal，orpartyattachmentsandhostilities，thanadvancetheinterestsofjustice，orthepublicgood。Andinstancesofabsoluteimbecilitywouldbetooraretojustifytheintroductionofsodangerousaprovision。
　　Sec。1620。Inordertoavoidinvestigationsofthissort，whichmustforeverbevagueandunsatisfactory，somepersonshavebeendisposedtothink，thatalimitationofageshouldbeassumedasacriterionofinability；
　　sothatthereshouldbeaconstitutionalremovalfromoffice，whenthejudgeshouldattainacertainage。Someofthestateconstitutionshaveadoptedsuchalimitation。Thus，inNewYork，sixtyyearsofageisadisqualificationfortheofficeofjudge；andinsomeotherstatestheperiodisprolongedtoseventy。Thevalueofthese[*3：487]provisionshasnever，asyet，beensatisfactorilyestablishedbytheexperienceofanystate。Thattheyhaveworkedmischievouslyinsomecasesismatterofpublicnotoriety。TheFederalisthasremarked，inreferencetothelimitationinNewYork，*"therearefewatpresent，whodonotdisapproveofthisprovision。Thereisnostation，inwhichitislessproper，thanthatofajudge。Thedeliberatingandcomparingfacultiesgenerallypreservetheirstrengthmuchbeyondthatperiodinmen，whosurviveit。Andwhen，inadditiontothiscircumstance，weconsiderhowfewthereare，whooutlivetheseasonofintellectualvigour，andhowimprobableitis，thatanyconsiderableportionofthebench，whethermoreorlessnumerous，shouldbeinsuchasituationatthesametime，weshallbereadytoconclude，thatlimitationsofthissorthavelittletorecommendthem。Ina[*3：488]republic，wherefortunesarenotaffluent，andpensionsnotexpedient，thedismissionofmenfromstations，inwhichtheyhaveservedtheircountrylongandusefully，andonwhichtheydependforsubsistence，andfromwhichitwillbetoolatetoresorttoanyotheroccupationforalivelihood，oughttohavesomebetterapologytohumanity，thanistobefoundintheimaginarydangerofasuperannuatedbench。"*[*3：487]ThelimitationofNewYorkstruckfromitsbenchoneofthegreatestnames，thateveradornedit，inthefullpossessionofhisextraordinarypowers。IrefertoMr。ChancellorKent，towhomthejurisprudenceofNewYorkowesadebtofgratitude，thatcanneverberepaid。HeisatoncethecompeerofHardwickeandMansfield。Sincehisremovalfromthebench，hehascomposedhisadmirableCommentaries，awork，whichwillsurvive，asanhonortothecountry，longafteralltheperishablefabricsofourdayshallbeburiedinoblivion。Ifhehadnotthussecuredanenviablefamesincehisretirement，thepublicmighthavehadcausetoregret，thatNewYorkshouldhavechosentodisfranchiseherbestcitizensatthetime，whentheirservicesweremostimportant，andtheirjudgmentsmostmature。
　　Eventheageofseventywouldhaveexcludedfrompublicservicesomeofthegreatestmindswhichhavebelongedtoourcountry。Ateighty，saidMr。Jefferson，Franklinwastheornamentofhumannature。Ateighty，LordMansfieldstillpossessedinvigorhisalmostunrivalledpowers。IfseventyhadbeenthelimitationintheconstitutionoftheUnitedStates，thenationwouldhavelostsevenyearsofasbrilliantjudiciallabors，ushaveeveradornedtheannalsofthejurisprudenceofanycountry。
　　Whilethepresentworkwaspassingthroughthepress，asecondeditionhasbeenpublishedbythelearnedauthor；andithasbeengreatlyimprovedbyhissevere，gate，andaccuratejudgment。[*3：488]Sec。1621。Itisobservable，thattheconstitutionhasdeclared，thatthejudgesoftheinferiorcourts，aswellasoftheSupremeCourt，oftheUnitedStates，shallholdtheirofficesduringgoodbehaviour。InthisrespectthereisamarkedcontrastbetweentheEnglishgovernmentandourown。InEnglandthetenureisexclusivelyconfinedtothejudgesofthesuperiorcourts，anddoesnotaswehavealreadyseenevenembraceallofthese。Infact，agreatportionofallthecivilandcriminalbusinessofthewholekingdomisperformedbypersonsdelegated，prohacvice，forthispurposeundercommissionsissuedperiodicallyforasinglecircuit。
　　Itistrue，thatitis，andforalongperiodhasbeen，ordinarilyadministeredbythejudgesofthecourtsofKing’sBench，CommonPleas，andExchequer；
　　butitisnotsomerelyvirtuteofficii，butunderspecialcommissionsinvestingthemfromtimetotimewiththisauthorityinconjunctionwithotherpersonsnamedinthecommission。Sucharethecommissionsofoyerandterminer，ofassize，ofgaoldelivery，andofnisiprius，underwhichallcivilandcriminaltrialsofmattersoffactarehadatthecircuits，andinthemetropolis。Bythe[*3：489]constitutionoftheUnitedStatesallcriminalandciviljurisdictionmustbeexclusivelyconfidedtojudgesholdingtheirofficeduringgoodbehaviour；andthoughcongressmayfromtimetotimedistributethejurisdictionamongsuchinferiorcourts，asitmaycreatefromtimetotime，andwithdrawitattheirpleasure，itisnotcompetentforthemtoconferitupontemporaryjudges，ortoconfideitbyspecialcommission。EveniftheEnglishsystembewelladaptedtothewantsofthenation，andsecureawiseandbeneficentadministrationofjusticeintherealm，asitdoubtlessdoes；stillitisobvious，that，inourpopulargovernment，itwouldbequitetoogreatapower，totrustthewholeadministrationofcivilandcriminaljusticetocommissioners，appointedatthepleasureofthepresident。TotheconstitutionoftheUnitedStates，andtothose，whoenjoyitsadvantages，nojudgesareknown，butsuch，asholdtheirofficesduringgoodbehaviour。**Mr。Tuckerhasspokenwithatrulynationalprideandfeelingonthesubjectofthenationaljudiciary，incomparingitwiththatofEngland。
　　"Whateverthenhasbeensaid，"sayshe，"byBaronMontesquieu，DeLolme，orJudgeBlackstone，oranyotherwriter，onthesecurityderivedtothesubjectfromtheindependenceofthejudiciaryofGreatBritain，willapplyatleastasforciblytothatoftheUnitedStates。Wemaygostillfurther。
　　InEnglandthejudiciarymaybeoverwhelmedbyacombinationbetweentheexecutiveandthelegislature。InAmerica，accordingtothetruetheoryofourconstitution，itisrenderedabsolutelyindependentof，andsuperiortotheattemptsofboth，tocontrol，orcrushit：First，bythetenureofoffice，whichisduringgoodbehaviour；thesewordsbyalongtrainofdecisionsinEngland，evenasfarback，asthereignofEdwardtheThird
　　inallcommissionsandgrants，publicorprivate，importinganoffice，orestate，forthelifeofthegrantee，determinableonlybyhisdeath，orbreachofgoodbehaviour。Secondly，bytheindependenceofthejudges，inrespecttotheirsalaries，whichcannotbediminished。Thirdly，bytheletteroftheconstitution，whichdefinesandlimitsthepowersoftheseveralcoordinatebranchesofthegovernment；andthespiritofit，whichforbidsanyattemptonthepartofeithertosubvertthe[*3：490]constitutionalindependenceoftheothers。Lastly，bythatuncontrollableauthorityinalleasesoflitigation，criminalorcivil，whichfromtheverynatureofthingsisexclusivelyvestedinthisdepartment，andextendstoeverysupposablecase，whichcanaffectthelife，liberty，orpropertyofthecitizensofAmerica，undertheauthorityofthefederalconstitution，andlaws，exceptinthecaseofanimpeachment。"Sec。1622。Thenextclauseoftheconstitutiondeclares，thatthejudgesofthesupremeandinferiorcourts"shall，atstatedtimes，receivefortheirservicesacompensation，whichshallnotbediminishedduringtheircontinuanceinoffice。"Withoutthisprovisiontheother，astothetenureofoffice，wouldhavebeenutterlynugatory，andindeedameremockery。
　　TheFederalisthasherealsospokeninlanguagesodirectandconvincing，thatitsupersedesallotherargument。
　　Sec。1623，"Nexttopermanencyinoffice，nothingcancontributemoretotheindependenceofthejudges，thanafixedprovisionfortheirsupport。
　　Theremarkmadeinrelationtothepresidentisequallyapplicablehere。
　　Inthegeneralcourseofhumannature，apoweroveraman’ssubsistenceamountstoapoweroverhiswill。Andwecanneverhopetoseerealizedinpracticethecompleteseparationofthejudicialfromthelegislativepower，inanysystem，whichleavestheformerdependentforpecuniaryresourceontheoccasionalgrantsofthelatter。Theenlightenedfriendstogoodgovernmentineverystatehaveseencausetolamentthewantofpreciseandexplicitprecautionsinthestateconstitutionsonthishead。Someoftheseindeedhavedeclared，thatpermanentsalariesshouldbeestablishedforthejudges；buttheexperimenthasinsomeinstancesshown，thatsuchexpressionsarenotsufficientlydefinitetoprecludelegislativeevasions。
　　Somethingstillmorepositiveandunequivocalhasbeen[*3：491]evincedtoberequisite。Theplanoftheconventionaccordinglyhasprovided，thatthejudgesoftheUnitedStates"shallatstatedtimesreceivefortheirservicesacompensation，whichshallnotbediminishedduringtheircontinuanceinoffice。"
　　Sec。1624。"This，allcircumstancesconsidered，isthemosteligibleprovision，thatcouldhavebeendevised。Itwillreadilybeunderstood，thatthefluctuationsinthevalueofmoney，andinthestateofsociety，renderedafixedrateofcompensationintheconstitutioninadmissible。
　　Whatmightbeextravaganttoday，mightinhalfacenturybecomepenuriousandinadequate。Itwasthereforenecessarytoleaveittothediscretionofthelegislaturetovaryitsprovisionsinconformitytothevariationsincircumstances；yetundersuchrestrictionsastoputitoutofthepowerofthatbodytochangetheconditionoftheindividualfortheworse。A
　　manmaythenbesureofthegrounduponwhichhestands；andcanneverbedeterredfromhisdutybytheapprehensionofbeingplacedinalesseligiblesituation。Theclause，whichhasbeenquoted，combinesbothadvantages。
　　Thesalariesofjudicialofficesmayfromtimetotimebealtered，asoccasionshallrequire；yetsoasnevertolessentheallowance，withwhichanyparticularjudgecomesintooffice，inrespecttohim。Itwillbeobserved，thatadifferencehasbeenmadebytheconventionbetweenthecompensationofthepresidentandofthejudges。Thatoftheformercanneitherbeincreased，nordiminished。Thatofthelattercanonlynotbediminished。Thisprobablyarosefromthedifferenceinthedurationoftherespectiveoffices。Asthepresidentistobeelectedfornomorethanfouryears，itcanrarelyhappen，thatanadequatesalary，fixedatthecommencementofthatperiod，willnot[*3：492]continuetobesuchtoitsend。Butwithregardtothejudges，who，iftheybehaveproperly，willbesecuredintheirplacesforlife，itmaywellhappen，especiallyintheearlystagesofthegovernment，thatastipend，whichwouldbeverysufficientattheirfirstappointment，wouldbecometoosmallintheprogressoftheirservice。
　　Sec。1625。"Thisprovisionforthesupportofthejudgesbearseverymarkofprudenceandefficacy；anditmaybesafelyaffirmed，thattogetherWiththepermanenttenureoftheiroffices，itaffordsabetterprospectoftheirindependence，thanisdiscoverableintheconstitutionsofanyofthestates，inregardtotheirownjudges。Theprecautionsfortheirresponsibilityarecomprisedinthearticlerespectingimpeachments。Theyareliabletobeimpeachedformaleconductbythehouseofrepresentatives，andtriedbythesenate；and，ifconvicted，maybedismissedfromoffice，anddisqualifiedforholdinganyother。Thisistheonlyprovisiononthepoint，whichisconsistentwiththenecessaryindependenceofthejudicialcharacter；andistheonlyone，whichwefindinourownconstitution，inrespecttoourownjudges。"**Mr。ChancellorKenthaswrittenafewbriefbutpregnantsentencesonthissubject；andhehaspraisedtheconstitutionoftheUnitedStates，asinthisrespectanimprovementuponallpreviouslyexistingconstitutions，inthis，orinanyothercountry。Inhissecondedition，hehasinsomemannerlimitedthegeneralityofexpressionofthefirst，bystating，thatbytheEnglishactofsettlement，itwasdeclared，thatthesalariesofthejudgesshouldbeascertainedandestablished；andbythestatute，thesalariesofthejudgeswereabsolutelysecuredtothem，duringthecontinuanceoftheircommissions。StillthereremainsastrikingdifferenceinfavouroftheAmericanconstitution，inasmuchasinEnglandthecompensation，aswellasthetenureofoffice，iswithin[*3：493]thereachoftherepealingpowerofparliament；butinthenationalgovernmentitconstitutesapartofthesupremefundamentallaw，unalterable，exceptbyanamendmentoftheconstitution。Sec。1626。Mr。JusticeWilsonalsohas，withmanifestsatisfaction，referredtotheprovision，asgivingadecidedsuperioritytothenationaljudgesoverthoseofEngland。"Thelaws，"sayshe，"inEngland，respectingtheindependencyofthejudges，havebeenconstrued，asconfinedtothoseinthesuperiorcourts。IntheUnitedStates，thisindependencyextendstojudgesincourtsinferior，aswellassupreme。Thisindependencyreachesequallytheirsalaries，andtheircommissions。InEngland，thejudgesofthesuperiorcourtsdonotnow，astheydidformerly，holdtheircommissionsandtheirsalariesatthepleasureofthecrown；buttheystillholdthematthepleasureoftheparliament：thejudicialsubsists，andmaybeblowntoannihilation，bythebreathofthelegislativedepartment。IntheUnitedStates，thejudgesstanduponthesurebasisoftheconstitution：thejudicialdepartmentisindependentofthedepartmentoflegislature。Noactofcongresscanshaketheircommissions，orreducetheirsalaries。’Thejudges，bothofthesupremeandinferiorcourts，shallholdtheirofficesduringgoodbehaviour，andshall，atstatedtimes，receivefortheirservicesacompensation，whichshallnotbediminished，duringtheircontinuanceinoffice。’ItisnotlawfulforthepresidentoftheUnitedStatestoremovethemontheaddressofthetwohousesofcongress。Theymayberemoved，however，astheyoughttobe，onconvictionofhighcrimesandmisdemeanours。ThejudgesoftheUnitedStatesstandonamuchmoreindependentfooting，thanthatonwhichthejudgesofEnglandstand，with[*3：494]withregardtojurisdiction，aswellaswithregardtocommissionsandsalaries。Inmanycases，thejurisdictionofthejudgesoftheUnitedStatesisascertained，andsecuredbytheconstitution。Astothese，thepowerofthejudicialiscoordinatewiththatofthelegislativedepartment。Astotheothercases，bythenecessaryresultoftheconstitution，theauthorityoftheformerisparamounttotheauthorityofthelatter。"
　　Sec。1627。Itwouldbeamatterofgeneralcongratulation，ifthislanguagehadbeencompletelyborneoutbytheperusal，ofourjuridicalannals。
　　But，unfortunately，ameasurewasadoptedin1802undertheauspicesofpresidentJefferson，which，ifitsconstitutionalitycanbesuccessfullyvindicated，prostratesinthedusttheindependenceofallinferiorjudges，bothastothetenureoftheiroffice，andtheircompensationforservices，andleavestheconstitutionamiserableandvaindelusion。Intheyear1801，congresspassedanactreorganizingthejudiciary，andauthorizingtheappointmentofsixteennewjudges，withsuitablesalaries，toholdthecircuitcourtsoftheUnitedStates，inthedifferentcircuitscreatedbytheact，Underthisactthecircuitjudgesreceivedtheirappointments，andperformedthedutiesoftheiroffices，untiltheyear1802，whenthecourts，establishedbytheact，wereabolishedbyageneralrepealofitbycongress，withoutintheslightestmannerprovidingforthepaymentofthesalariesofthejudges，orforanycontinuationoftheiroffices。
　　Theresultofthisact，therefore，is[*3：495]sofarasitisaprecedent，
　　that，notwithstandingtheconstitutionaltenureofofficeofthejudgesoftheinferiorcourtsisduringgoodbehaviour，congressmay，atanytime，byamereactoflegislation，deprivethemoftheirofficesatpleasure，andwithittakeawaytheirwholetitletotheirsalaries。Howthiscanbereconciledwiththeterms，ortheintentoftheconstitution，ismore，thananyingenuityofargumenthasever，asyet，beenabletodemonstrate。*
　　Thesystemfell，becauseitwasunpopularwiththose，whoweretheninpossessionofpower；andthevictimshavehithertoremainedwithoutanyindemnityfromthejusticeofthegovernment。*Theactgaverisetooneofthemostanimateddebates，tobefoundintheannalsofcongress；andwasresistedbyapowerofargumentandeloquence，whichhasneverbeensurpassed。Thesedebateswerecollected，andprintedinavolumeatAlbanyin1802；andareworthyofthe*mostdeliberateperusalofeveryconstitutionallawyer。Theactmaybeasserted，withoutfearofcontradiction，tohavebeenagainsttheopinionofagreatmajorityofalltheablestlawyersatthetime；andprobablynow，whenthepassionsofthedayhavesubsided，lawlawyerswillbefoundtomaintaintheconstitutionalityoftheact。Noonecandoubttheperfectauthorityofcongresstoremodeltheircourtsortoconfer，orwithdrawtheirjurisdictionattheirpleasure。Butthequestionis，whethertheycandeprivethemofthetenureoftheiroffice，andtheirsalaries，aftertheyhaveoncebecomeconstitutionallyvestedinthem。Sec。1628。Uponthissubjectalearnedcommentatorhasspokenwithamanlinessandfreedom，worthyofhimselfandofhiscountry。Tothose，whoarealivetothejustinterpretationoftheconstitution；those，who，ontheoneside，areanxioustoguarditagainstusurpationsofpower，injurioustothestates；andthose，who，ontheotherside，areequallyanxiousto[*3：496]
　　preventaprostrationofanyofitsgreatdepartmentstotheauthorityoftheothers；thelanguagecanneverbeunseasonable，eitherforadmonitionorinstruction，towarnusofthefacility，withwhichpublicopinionmaybepersuadedtoyieldupsomeofthebarriersoftheconstitutionundertemporaryinfluences，andtoteachusthedutyofanunsleepingvigilancetoprotectthatbranch，which，thoughweakinitspowers，isyettheguardianoftherightsandlibertiesofthepeople。"Itwassupposed，"saysthelearnedauthor，"thattherecouldnotbeadoubt，thatthosetribunals，inwhichjusticeistobedispensed，accordingtotheconstitutionandlawsoftheconfederacy；inwhichlife，liberty，andpropertyaretobedecidedupon；inwhichquestionsmightariseastotheconstitutionalpowersoftheexecutive，ortheconstitutionalobligationofanactofthelegislature；
　　andinthedecisionofwhichthejudgesmightfindthemselvesconstrainedbyduty，andbytheiroaths，topronounceagainsttheauthorityofeither，shouldbestableandpermanent；andnotdependentuponthewilloftheexecutiveorlegislature，orboth，fortheirexistence。Thatwithoutthisdegreeofpermanence，thetenureofofficeduringgoodbehaviourcouldnotsecuretothatdepartmentthenecessaryfirmnesstomeetunshakeneveryquestion，andtodecide，asjusticeandtheconstitutionshoulddictate，withoutregardtoconsequences。Theseconsiderationsinducedanopinion，which，itwaspresumed，wasgeneral，ifnotuniversal，thatthepowervestedincongresstoerect，fromtimetotime，tribunalsinferiortothesupremecourt，didnotauthorizethem，atpleasure，todemolishthem。Beingbuiltupontherockoftheconstitution，theirfoundationsweresupposedtopartakeofits[*3：497]permanency，andtobeequallyincapableofbeingshakenbytheotherbranchesofthegovernment。Butadifferentconstructionoftheconstitutionhaslatelyprevailed。Ithasbeendetermined，thatapowertoordainandestablishfromtimetotime，carrieswithitadiscretionarypowertodiscontinue，ordemolish。Thatalthoughthetenureofofficebeduringgoodbehaviour，thisdoesnotpreventtheseparationoftheofficefromtheofficer，byputtingdowntheoffice；butonlysecurestotheofficerhisstation，uponthetermsofgoodbehaviour，solongastheofficeitselfremains。Painfulindeedistheremark，thatthisinterpretationseemscalculatedtosubvertoneofthefundamentalpillarsoffreegovernments，andtohavelaidthefoundationofoneofthemostdangerouspoliticalschisms，thathaseverhappenedintheUnitedStatesofAmerica。"**Whetherjusticesofthepeace，appointedundertheauthorityoftheUnitedStates，areinferiorcourts，withinthesenseoftheconstitution，hasbeeninformertimesamatterofsomecontroversy，buthasneverbeendecidedbytheSupremeCourt。TheyeredoubtlessofficersofthegovernmentoftheUnitedStates；buttheirdutiesarepartlyjudicial，andpartlyexecutiveorministerial。*Intheserespectstheyhavebeensupposedtobelikecommissionersofexcise，ofbankruptcy，commissionerstotakedepositions，andcommissionersundertreaties。Andithasbeensaid，thattheconstitution，inspeakingofcourtsandjudges，meansthose，whoexercisealltheregularandpermanentduties，whichbelongtoacourtintheordinarypopularsignificationoftheterms。
　　AtpresentthecourtsoftheUnitedStates，organizedundertheconstitution，consistofdistrictcourts，oneofwhichatleastisestablishedineverystateintheUnion，ofcircuitcourts，andofaSupremeCourt，thelatterbeingcomposedofsevenjudges。Thejudiciaryactof1789，ch。20；andthejudiciaryactof1802，ch。31，arethose，whichmakethegeneralprovisionsfortheestablishmentsofthesecourts，andfortheirjurisdiction，originalandappellate。Mr。ChancellorKenthasgivenabriefbutaccurateaccountoftheexaminationofthecourtsoftheUnitedStates。[*3：498]Sec。1629。Itisalmostunnecessarytoadd，that，althoughtheconstitutionhas，withsosedulousacare，endeavouredtoguardthejudicialdepartmentfromtheoverwhelminginfluenceorpoweroftheothercoordinatedepartmentsofthegovernment，ithasnotconferreduponthemanyinviolability，orirresponsibilityforanabuseoftheirauthority。Onthecontraryforanycorruptviolationoromissionofthehightrustsconfidedtothejudges，theyareliabletobeimpeached，aswehavealreadyseen，anduponconviction，removedfromoffice。Thus，ontheonehand，apureandindependentadministrationofpublicjusticeisamplyprovidedfor；and，ontheotherhand，anurgentresponsibilitysecuredforfidelitytothepeople。
　　Sec。1630。Thejudgesoftheinferiorcourts，spokenofintheconstitution，donotincludethejudgesofcourtsappointedintheterritoriesoftheUnitedStatesundertheauthority，giventocongress，toregulatetheterritoriesoftheUnitedStates。Thecourtsoftheterritoriesarenotconstitutionalcourts，inwhichthejudicialpowerconferredbytheconstitutiononthegeneralgovernment，canbedeposited。Theyarelegislativecourts，createdinvirtueofthegeneralsovereignty，whichexistsinthenationalgovernmentoveritsterritories。Thejurisdiction，withwhichtheyareinvested，isnotapartofthejudicialpower，whichisdefinedinthethirdarticleoftheconstitution；butarisesfromthesamegeneralsovereignty。Inlegislatingforthem，congressexercisesthecombinedpowersofthegeneral，andofastategovernment。Congressmay，therefore，rightfullylimitthetenureofofficeofthejudgesoftheterritorialcourts，aswellastheirjurisdiction；
　　andit[*3：499]hasbeenaccordinglylimitedtoashortperiodofyears。
　　Sec。1631。Thesecondsectionofthethirdarticlecontainsanexpositionofthejurisdictionappertainingtothe，judicialpowerofthenationalgovernment。Thefirstclauseisasfollows："Thejudicialpowershallextendtoallcasesinlawandequityarisingunderthisconstitution，thelawsoftheUnitedStates，andtreatiesmade，orwhichshallbemade，undertheirauthority；toallcasesaffectingambassadors，otherpublicministers，andconsuls；toallcasesofadmiraltyandmaritimejurisdiction；tocontroversies，towhichtheUnitedStatesshallbeaparty；tocontroversiesbetweentwoormorestates；betweenastateandcitizensofanotherstate；betweencitizensofdifferentstates；betweencitizensofthesamestate，claiminglandsundergrantsofdifferentstates；andbetweenastate，orthecitizensthereof，andforeignstates，citizens，orsubjects。"**IthasbeenverycorrectlyremarkedbyMr。JusticeIredell，that"thejudicialpoweroftheUnitedStatesisofapeculiarkind。Itis，indeed，commensuratewiththeordinarylegislativeandexecutivepowersofthegeneralgovernment，andthepowers，whichconcerntreaties。Butitalsogoesfurther。Whencertainpartiesareconcerned，althoughthesubjectincontroversydoesnotrelatetoanyspecialobjectsofauthorityofthegeneralgovernment，whereintheseparatesovereigntiesoftheseparatestatesareblendedinonecommonmassofsupremacy；yetthegeneralgovernmenthasajudicialauthorityinregardtosuchsubjectsofcontroversy；andthelegislatureoftheUnitedStatesmaypassalllawsnecessarytogivesuchjudicialauthorityitspropereffect。"Chisholmv。Georgia。Sec。1632。Suchisthejudicialpower，whichtheconstitutionhasdeemedessential，inordertofollowoutoneofitsgreatobjectsstatedinthepreamble，"toestablishjustice。"Mr。ChiefJusticeJay，inhisvery[*3：500]
　　ableopinion，inChisholmv。TheStateofGeorgia，hasdrawnupasummaryofthemoregeneralreasoning，onwhicheachofthesedelegationsofpowerisfounded。"Itmaybeasked，"saidhe，"whatistheprecisesenseandlatitude，inwhichthewords’toestablishjustice，’ashereused，aretobeunderstood？Theanswertothisquestionwillresultfromtheprovisionsmadeintheconstitutiononthishead。Theyarespecifiedinthesecondsectionofthethirdarticle，whereitisordained，thatthejudicialpoweroftheUnitedStatesshallextendtotendescriptionsofcases，viz。1。
　　Toallcasesarisingunderthisconstitution；becausethemeaning，construction，andoperationofacompactoughtalwaystobeascertainedbyalltheparties，notbyauthorityderivedonlyfromoneofthem。2。ToallcasesarisingunderthelawsoftheUnitedStates；because，assuchlaws，constitutionallymade，areobligatoryoneachstate，themeasureofobligationandobedienceoughtnottobedecidedandfixedbytheparty，fromwhomtheyaredue，butbyatribunalderivingauthorityfromboththeparties。3。Toallcasesarisingundertreatiesmadebytheirauthority；because，astreatiesarecompactsmadeby，andobligatoryon，thewholenation，theiroperationoughtnottobeaffected，orregulatedbythelocallaws，orcourtsofapartofthenation。4。Toallcasesaffectingambassadors，orotherpublicministers，andconsuls；because，astheseareofficersofforeignnations，whomthisnationareboundtoprotect，andtreataccordingtothelawsofnations，casesaffectingthemoughtonlytobecognizablebynationalauthority。5。Toallcasesofadmiraltyandmaritimejurisdiction；because，astheseasarethejointproperty[*3：501]ofnations，whoserightandprivilegesrelativethereto，areregulatedbythelawofnationsandtreaties，suchcasesnecessarilybelongtonationaljurisdiction。6。Tocontroversies，towhichtheUnitedStatesshallbeaparty；becauseincases，inwhichthewholepeopleareinterested，itwouldnotbeequal，orwise，toletanyonestatedecide，andmeasureoutthejusticeduetoothers。7。Tocontroversiesbetweentwoormorestates；becausedomestictranquillityrequires，thatthecontentionsofstatesshouldbepeaceablyterminatedbyacommonjudicatory；and，because，inafreecountry，justiceoughtnottodependonthewillofeitherofthelitigants。8。Tocontroversiesbetweenastateandcitizensofanotherstate；because，incaseastatethatis，allthecitizensofithasdemandsagainstsomecitizensofanotherstate，itisbetter，thatsheshouldprosecutetheirdemandsinanationalcourt，thaninacourtofthestate，towhichthosecitizensbelong；thedangerofirritationandcrimination，arisingfromapprehensionsandsuspicionsofpartiality，beingtherebyobviated。Because，incases，wheresomecitizensofonestatehavedemandsagainstallthecitizensofanotherstate，thecauseoflibertyandtherightsofmenforbid，thatthelattershouldbethesolejudgesofthejusticeduetothelatter；
　　andtruerepublicangovernmentrequires，thatfreeandequalcitizensshouldhavefree，fair，andequaljustice。9。Tocontroversiesbetweencitizensofthesamestate，claiminglandsundergrantsofdifferentstates；because，astherightsofthetwostatestograntthelandaredrawnintoquestion，neitherofthetwostatesoughttodecidethecontroversy。10。Tocontroversiesbetweenastate，orthecitizensthereof，andforeignstates，citizens，orsubjects；because，as[*3：502]everynationisresponsiblefortheconductofitscitizenstowardsothernations，allquestionstouchingthejusticeduetoforeignnations，orpeople，oughttobeascertainedby，anddependon，nationalauthority。EventhiscursoryviewofthejudicialpowersoftheUnitedStatesleavesthemindstronglyimpressedwiththeimportanceofthemtothepreservationofthetranquillity，theequalsovereignty，andtheequalrightsofthepeople。"
　　Sec。1633。Thisopinioncontainsaclear，and，asfarasitgoes，anexactoutline；butitwillbenecessarytoexamineseparatelyeveryportionofthejurisdictionheregiven，inorderthatamorefullandcomprehensiveunderstandingofallthereasons，onwhichitisfounded，maybeattained。
　　AndIammuchmistaken，ifsuchanexaminationwillnotdisplayinamorestrikinglighttheprofoundwisdomandpolicy，withwhichthispartoftheconstitutionwasframed。
　　Sec。1634。Andfirst，thejudicialpowerextendstoallcasesinlawandequity，arisingundertheconstitution，thelaws，andthetreatiesoftheUnitedStates。*Andbycasesinthisclausewearetounderstandcriminal，aswellascivilcases。*Inthefirstdraftoftheconstitutiontheclausewas，"thejurisdictionoftheSupremeCourtshallextendtoallcasesarisingunderthelawspassedbythelegislatureoftheUnitedStates；"theotherwords，"theconstitution，"
　　and"treaties，"wereafterwardsaddedwithoutanyapparentobjection。Sec。1635。Theproprietyofthedelegationofjurisdiction，in"casesarisingundertheconstitution，"restsontheobviousconsideration，thatthereoughtalwaystobesomeconstitutionalmethodofgivingeffectto[*3：503]
　　constitutionalprovisions。What，forinstance，wouldavailrestrictionsontheauthorityofthestatelegislatures，withoutsomeconstitutionalmodeofenforcingtheobservanceofthem？*Thestatesarebythe[*3：504]
　　constitutionprohibitedfromdoingavarietyofthings；someofwhichareincompatiblewiththeinterestsoftheUnion；otherswithitspeaceandsafety；otherswiththeprinciplesofgoodgovernment，"Theimpositionofdutiesonimportedarticles，thedeclarationofwar，andtheemissionofpapermoney，areexamplesofeachkind。Nomanofsensewillbelieve，thatsuchprohibitionswouldbescrupulouslyregarded，withoutsomeeffectualpowerinthegovernmenttorestrain，orcorrecttheinfractionsofthem。
　　Thepowermustbeeitheradirectnegativeonthestatelaws，oranauthorityinthenationalcourtstooverrulesuch，asshallmanifestlybeincontraventiontotheconstitution。Thelattercoursewasthoughtbytheconventiontobepreferabletotheformer；anditis，withoutquestion，byfarthemostacceptabletothestates。***[*3：503]Mr。Madison，intheVirginiaResolutionsandReport，January，1800，says，that"casesarisingundertheconstitution，"inthesenseofthisclause，areoftwodescriptions。Oneofthesecomprehendsthecasesgrowingoutoftherestrictionsonthelegislativepowerofthestates，suchasemittingbillsofcredit，makinganythingbutgoldandsilveratenderinpaymentofdebts。"Shouldthisprohibitionbeviolated，"sayshe，"andasuitbetweencitizensofthesamestalebetheconsequence，thiswouldbeacasearisingundertheconstitutionbeforethejudicialpoweroftheUnitedStates。Aseconddescriptioncomprehendssuitsbetweencitizensandforeigners，orcitizensofdifferentstates，tobedecidedaccordingtothestateorforeignlaws；butsubmittedbytheconstitutiontothejudicialpoweroftheUnitedStates；thejudicialpowerbeing，inseveralinstances，extendedbeyondthelegislativepoweroftheUnitedStates。"Mr。Tucker，inhisCommentariesusesthefollowinglanguage："Thejudicialpowerofthefederalgovernmentextendstoallcasesinlawandequityarisingundertheconstitution。Now，thepowersgrantedtothefederalgovernment，orprohibitedtothestates，beingallenumerated，thecasesarisingundertheconstitutioncanonlybesuch，asariseoutofsomeenumeratedpowerdelegatedtothefederalgovernment，orprohibitedtothoseoftheseveralstates。Thesegeneralwordsincludewhatiscomprehendedinthenextclause，viz。casesarisingunderthelawsoftheUnitedStates。But，ascontradistinguishedfromthatclause，itcomprehendssomecasesafterwardsenumerated；forexample，controversiesbetweentwoormorestates；betweenastateandforeignstates；betweencitizensofthesamestateclaiminglandsundergrantsofdifferentstates；allwhichmayariseundertheconstitution，andnotunderanylawoftheUnitedStates。Manyothercasesmightbeenumerated，whichwouldfallstrictlyunderthisclause，andnoother。As，ifscitizenofonestateshouldbedeniedtheprivilegesofacitizeninanother；so，ifapersonheldtoserviceorlabourinonestate，shouldescapeintoanotherandobtainprotectionthere，asafreeman；so，ifastateshouldcoinmoney，anddeclarethesametobealegaltenderinpaymentofdebt，thevalidityofsuchatender，ifmade，wouldfailwithinthemeaningofthisclause。Soalso，ifastateshould，withouttheconsentofcongress，layanydutyupongoodsimported，thequestion，astothevalidityofsuchanact，ifdisputed，wouldcomewithinthemeaningofthisclauseandnotofanyother。[*3：504]Inallthesecasesequitablecircumstancesmayarise，thecognizanceofwhich，aswellassuch，aswerestrictlylegal，wouldbelongtothefederaljudiciary，invirtueofthisclause。"**ThereasonablenessofthisextentofthejudicialpowerisverymuchconsideredbyMr。ChiefJusticeMarshall，indeliveringtheopinionofthecourt，inCohensv。Virginia，fromwhichsomeextractswillbemade，inconsideringtheappellatejurisdictionoftheSupremeCourt，inafuturepage。Sec。1636。Thesamereasoningapplieswithequalforceto"casesarisingunderthelawsoftheUnitedStates。"Infact，thenecessityofuniformityintheinterpretationoftheselawswouldofitselfsettleeverydoubt，thatcouldberaisedonthesubject。"Thirteenindependent：courtsoffinaljurisdictionsaystheFederalistoverthesamecausesisa[*3：505]Hydraingovernment，fromwhichnothingbutcontradictionandconfusioncanproceed。"**IntheConvention，whichframedtheconstitution，thefollowingresolutionwasunanimouslyadopted。"Thatthejurisdictionofthenationaljudiciaryshallextendtocasesarisingunderlawspassedbythegenerallegislature，andtosuchotherquestions，asinvolvethenationalpeaceandharmony。"Sec。1637。Thereisstillmorecogency，ifitbepossible，inthereasoning，asappliedto"casesarisingundertreatiesmade，orwhichshallbemade，undertheauthorityoftheUnitedStates。"Withoutthispower，therewouldbeperpetualdangerofcollision，andevenofwar，withforeignpowers，andanutterincapacitytofulfiltheordinaryobligationsoftreaties。*
　　Thewantofthispowerwasaswehaveseenamostmischievousdefectintheconfederation；andsubjectedthecountry，notonlytoviolationsofitsplightedfaith，buttothegross，andalmostproverbialimputationofpunicinsincerity。*TheremarksofTheFederalist，No。80，onthissubjectwillbefoundveryinstructive，andshouldbeperusedbyeveryconstitutionallawyer。Sec。1638。But，indeed，thewholeargumentonthissubjecthasbeenalreadyexhaustedintheprecedingpartoftheseCommentaries，andthereforeitmaybedismissedwithoutfartherillustrations，althoughmanyhumiliatingproofsaretobefoundintherecordsoftheconfederation。**Thisclausewasopposedwithgreatearnestnessinsomeofthestateconventions，andparticularlyinthatofVirginia，asalarminganddangeroustotherightsand[*3：506]libertiesofthestates，sinceitwouldbringeverythingwithinthevortexofthenationaljurisdiction。Itwasdefendedwithgreatabilityandconclusivenessofreasoning，asindispensabletotheexistenceofthenationalgovernment，andperfectlyconsistentwiththesafetyandprerogativesofthestates。Sec。1639。Itisobservable，thatthelanguageis，that"thejudicialpowershallextendtoallcasesinlawandequity，"arisingundertheconstitution，laws，andtreatiesoftheUnitedStates。Whatistobeunderstoodby"casesinlawandequity，"inthisclause？Plainly，casesatthecommonlaw，ascontradistinguishedfromcasesinequity，accordingtotheknowndistinctioninthejurisprudenceofEngland，whichourancestorsbroughtwiththemupontheiremigration，andwithwhichalltheAmericanstateswerefamiliarlyacquainted。Here，then，atleast，theconstitutionoftheUnitedStatesappealsto，andadopts，thecommonlawtotheextentofmakingitaruleinthepursuitofremedialjusticeinthecourtsoftheUnion。*Iftheremedymustbeinlaw，orinequity，accordingtothecourseofproceedingsatthecommonlaw，incasesarisingundertheconstitution，laws，andtreaties，oftheUnitedStates，itwouldseemirresistibly[*3：507]tofollow，thattheprinciplesofdecision，bywhichtheseremediesmustbeadministered，mustbederivedfromthesamesource。Hitherto，suchhasbeentheuniforminterpretationandmodeofadministeringjusticeincivilcases，inthecourtsoftheUnitedStatesinthisclassofcases。*[*3：506]Itisacuriousfact，thatwhiletheadoptionofthecommonlaw，asthebasisofthenationaljurisprudence，hasbeen，inlatertimes，thesubjectofsuchdeeppoliticalalarmwithsomestatesmen，thenon—existenceofit，assuchabasis，wasoriginallypressedbysomeoftheablestopponentsoftheconstitution，asaprincipaldefect。Mr。GeorgeMasonofVirginiaurgedthatthewantofaclauseintheconstitution，securingtothepeopletheenjoymentofthecommonlaw，wasafataldefect。YetthewholeargumentinthecelebratedResolutionsofVirginiaofJanuary，1800，supposes，thattheadoptionofitwouldhavebeenamostmischievousprovision。[*3：507]Sec。1640。Anotherinquirymaybe，whatconstitutesacase，withinthemeaningofthisclause。Itisclear，thatthejudicialdepartmentisauthorizedtoexercisejurisdictiontothefullextentoftheconstitution，laws，andtreatiesoftheUnitedStates，wheneveranyquestionrespecting，themshallassumesuchaform，thatthejudicialpoweriscapableofactinguponit。Whenithasassumedsuchaform，itthenbecomesacase；andthen，andnottillthen，thejudicialpowerattachestoit。Acase，then，inthesenseofthisclauseoftheconstitution，arises，whensomesubject，touchingtheconstitution，laws，ortreatiesoftheUnitedStates，issubmittedtothecourtsbyaparty，whoassertshisrightsintheformprescribedbylaw。Inotherwords，acaseisasuitinlaworequity，institutedaccordingtotheregularcourseofjudicialproceedings；and，whenitinvolvesanyquestionarisingundertheconstitution，laws，ortreatiesoftheUnitedStates，itiswithinthejudicialpowerconfidedtotheUnion。
　　[*3：508]Sec。1641。Casesarisingundertheconstitution，ascontradistinguishedfromthose，arisingunderthelawsoftheUnitedStates，aresuchasarisefromthepowersconferred，orprivilegesgranted，orrightsclaimed，orprotectionsecured，orprohibitionscontainedintheconstitutionitself，independentofanyparticularstatuteenactment。Manycasesofthissortmayeasilybeenumerated。Thus，ifacitizenofonestateshouldbedeniedtheprivilegesofacitizeninanotherstate；ifastateshouldcoinmoney，ormakepapermoneyatender；ifaperson，triedforacrimeagainsttheUnitedStates，shouldbedeniedatrialbyjury，oratrialinthestate，wherethecrimeischargedtobecommitted；ifaperson，heldtolabour，orserviceinonestate，underthelawsthereof，shouldescapeintoanother，andthereshouldbearefusalto。deliverhimuptotheparty，towhomsuchserviceorlabourmaybedue；inthese，andmanyothercases，thequestion，tobejudiciallydecided，wouldbeacasearisingundertheconstitution。
　　Ontheotherhand，casesarisingunderthelawsoftheUnitedStatesaresuch，asgrowoutofthelegislationofcongress，withinthescopeoftheirconstitutionalauthority，whethertheyconstitutetheright，orprivilege，orclaim，orprotection，ordefence，oftheparty，inwholeorinpart，bywhomtheyareasserted。Thesamereasoningappliestocasesarisingundertreaties。Indeed，wherever，ina[*3：509]judicialproceeding，anyquestionarises，touchingthevalidityofatreaty，orstatute，orauthority，exercisedundertheUnitedStates，ortouchingtheconstructionofanyclauseoftheconstitution，oranystatute，ortreatyoftheUnitedStates；
　　ortouchingthevalidityofanystatute，orauthorityexercisedunderanystate，onthegroundofrepugnancytotheconstitution，laws，ortreaties，oftheUnitedStates，ithasbeeninvariablyheldtobeacase，towhichthejudicialpoweroftheUnitedStatesextends。
　　Sec。1642。Ithassometimesbeensuggested，thatacase，tobewithinthepurviewofthisclause，mustbeone，inwhichapartycomesintocourttodemandsomethingconferredonhimbytheconstitution，oralaw，oratreaty，oftheUnitedStates。Butthisconstructionisclearlytoonarrow。
　　Acaseinlaworequityconsistsoftherightoftheoneparty，aswellasoftheother，andmaytrulybesaidtoariseundertheconstitution，oralaw，oratreaty，oftheUnitedStates，wheneveritscorrectdecisiondependsontheconstructionofeither。Thisismanifestlytheconstructiongiventotheclausebycongress，bythe25thsectionoftheJudiciaryAct，whichwasalmostcontemporaneouswiththeconstitution，andthereisnoreasontodoubtitssolidityorcorrectness。Indeed，themainobjectofthisclausewouldbedefeatedbyanynarrowerconstruction；sincethepowerwasconferredforthepurpose，inanespecialmanner，of[*3：510]
　　producingauniformityofconstructionoftheconstitution，laws，andtreatiesoftheUnitedStates。
　　Sec。1643。ThissubjectwasagooddealdiscussedinarecentcasebeforetheSupremeCourt，whereoneoftheleadingquestionswas，whethercongresscouldconstitutionallyconferuponthebankoftheUnitedStates，asithasdonebytheseventhsectionofitscharter，3generalauthoritytosue，andbesuedinthecircuitcourtsoftheUnitedStates。Itwascontended，thattheycouldnot，becauseseveralquestionsmightariseinsuchsuits，whichmightdependuponthegeneralprinciplesoflaw，andnotuponanyactofcongress。Itwasheld，thatcongressdidconstitutionallypossessthepower，andhadrightfullyconferreditinthatcharter。
　　Sec。1644。Thereasoning，onwhichthisdecisionwasfounded，cannotbebetterexpressed，thanintheverylanguage，inwhichitwasdeliveredbyMr。ChiefJusticeMarshall。"Thequestion，"saidhe，"iswhetheritthecasearisesunderalawoftheUnitedStates。Theappellantscontend，thatitdoesnot，becauseseveralquestionsmayariseinit，whichdependonthegeneralprinciplesofthelaw，notonanyactofcongress。Ifthisweresufficienttowithdrawacasefromthejurisdictionofthefederalcourts，almosteverycase，althoughinvolvingtheconstructionofalaw，wouldbewithdrawn；andaclauseintheconstitution，relatingtoasubjectofvitalimportancetothegovernment，andexpressedinthemostcomprehensiveterms，wouldbeconstruedtomeanalmostnothing。Thereisscarcelyanycase，everypartofwhichdependsontheconstitution，laws，ortreatiesoftheUnited[*3：511]States。Thequestions，whetherthefact，allegedasthefoundationoftheaction，berealorfictitious；whethertheconductoftheplaintiffhasbeensuchastoentitlehimtomaintainhisaction；
　　whetherhisrightisbarred；whetherhehasreceivedsatisfaction，orhas，inanymanner，releasedhisclaims；arequestions，someorall，ofwhichmayoccurinalmosteverycase；andiftheirexistencebesufficienttoarrestthejurisdictionofthecourt，words，whichseemintendedtobeasextensive，astheconstitution，laws，andtreatiesoftheUnion，whichseemdesignedtogivethecourtsofthegovernmenttheconstructionofallitsacts，sofarastheyaffecttherightsofindividuals，wouldbereducedtoalmostnothing。"
　　Sec。1645。Afteradvertingtothefact，thatthereisnothingintheconstitutiontopreventcongressgivingtoinferiourcourtsoriginaljurisdictionincases，towhichtheappellatepoweroftheSupremeCourtmayextend，heproceeds："Weperceive，then，noground，onwhichthepropositioncanbemaintained，thatcongressisincapableofgivingthecircuitcourtsoriginaljurisdiction，inanycase，towhichtheappellatejurisdictionextends。Weask，then，ifitcanbesufficienttoexcludethisjurisdiction，thatthecaseinvolvesquestionsdependingongeneralprinciples？Acausemaydependonseveralquestionsoffactandlaw。SomeofthesemaydependontheconstructionofalawoftheUnitedStates；othersonprinciplesunconnectedwiththatlaw。Ifitbeasufficientfoundationforjurisdiction，thatthetitleorright，setupbytheparty，maybedefeatedbyoneconstructionoftheconstitutionorlawoftheUnited[*3：512]States，andsustainedbytheoppositeconstruction，providedthefactsnecessarytosupporttheactionbemadeout，thenalltheotherquestionsmustbedecided，asincidentaltothis，whichgivesthatjurisdiction。Thoseotherquestionscannotarresttheproceedings。Underthisconstruction，thejudicialpoweroftheUnionextendseffectivelyandbeneficiallytothatmostimportantclassofcases，whichdependonthecharacterofthecause。Ontheoppositeconstruction，thejudicialpowernevercanbeextendedtoawholecase，asexpressedbytheconstitution；buttothosepartsofcasesonly，whichpresenttheparticularquestioninvolvingtheconstructionoftheconstitutionorthelaw。Wesayitnevercanbeextendedtothewholecase；because，ifthecircumstance，thatotherpointsareinvolvedinit，shalldisablecongressfromauthorizingthecourtsoftheUniontotakejurisdictionoftheoriginalcause，itequallydisablescongressfromauthorizingthosecourtstotakejurisdictionofthewholecause，onanappeal；andthusitwillberestrictedtoasinglequestioninthatcause。Andwordsobviouslyintendedtosecuretothose，whoclaimrightsundertheconstitution，laws，ortreaties，oftheUnitedStates，atrialinthefederalcourts，willberestrictedtotheinsecureremedyofanappealuponaninsulatedpoint，afterithasreceivedthatshape，whichmaybegiventoitbyanothertribunal，intowhichheisforcedagainsthiswill。Wethink，then，thatwhenaquestion，towhichthejudicialpoweroftheUnionisextendedbytheconstitution，formsaningredientoftheoriginalcause，itisinthepowerofcongresstogivethecircuitcourtsjurisdictionofthatcause，althoughotherquestionsoffactoroflawmaybeinvolvedinit。"
　　[*3：513]Sec。1646。"Thecaseofthebankis，wethink，averystrongcaseofthisdescription。Thecharterofincorporationnotonlycreatesit，butgivesiteveryfaculty，whichitpossesses。Thepowertoacquirerightsofanydescription，totransactbusinessofanydescription，tomakecontractsofanydescription，tosueonthosecontracts，isgivenandmeasuredbyitscharter；andthatcharterisalawoftheUnitedStates。
　　Thisbeingcanacquirenoright，makenocontract，bringnosuit，whichisnotauthorizedbyalawoftheUnitedStates。Itisnotonlyitselfthemerecreatureofalaw，butallitsactions，andallitsrightsaredependentonthesamelaw。Canabeing，thusconstituted，haveacase，whichdoesnotariseliterally，aswellassubstantially，underthelaw？
　　Takethecaseofacontract，whichisputasthestrongestagainstthebank。Whenabanksues，thefirstquestion，whichpresentsitself，andwhichliesatthefoundationofthecause，is，hasthislegalentityarighttosue？Hasitarighttocome，notintothiscourtparticularly，butintoanycourt？ThisdependsonalawoftheUnitedStates。Thenextquestionis，hasthisbeingarighttomakethisparticularcontract？Ifthisquestionbedecidedinthenegative，thecauseisdeterminedagainsttheplaintiff；andthisquestion，too，dependsentirelyonalawoftheUnitedStates。Theseareimportantquestions，andtheyexistineverypossiblecase。Therighttosue，ifdecidedonce，isdecidedforever；butthepowerofcongresswasexercisedantecedentlytothefirstdecisiononthatright；
　　andifitwasconstitutionalthen，itcannotceasetobeso，becausetheparticularquestionisdecided。Itmayberevivedatthewilloftheparty，andmostprobablywouldberenewed，werethetribunaltobechanged。Butthe[*3：514]question，respectingtherighttomakeaparticularcontract，ortoacquireaparticularproperty，ortosueonaccountofaparticularinjury，belongstoeveryparticularcase，andmayberenewedineverycase。
　　Thequestionformsanoriginalingredientineverycause：Whetheritbeinfactreliedon，ornot，inthedefence，itisstillapartofthecause，andmaybereliedon。Therightoftheplaintifftosuecannotdependonthedefence，whichthedefendantmaychoosetosetup。Hisrighttosueisanteriortothatdefence，andmustdependonthestateofthings，whentheactionisbrought。Thequestions，whichthecaseinvolves，then，mustdetermineitscharacter，whetherthosequestionsbemadeinthecauseornot。Theappellantssay，thatthecasearisesonthecontract；butthevalidityofthecontractdependsonalawoftheUnitedStates，andtheplaintiffiscompelled，ineverycase，toshowitsvalidity。Thecasearisesemphaticallyunderthelaw。Theactofcongressisitsfoundation。Thecontractcouldneverhavebeenmade，butundertheauthorityofthatact。
　　Theactitselfisthefirstingredientinthecase，isitsorigin，isthat，fromwhicheveryotherpartarises。Thatotherquestionsmayalsoarise，astheexecutionofthecontract，oritsperformance，cannotchangethecase，orgiveitanyotherorigin，thanthecharterofincorporation。Theactionstilloriginatesin，andissustainedby，thatcharter。
　　Sec。1647。"Theclause，givingthebank。arighttosueinthecircuitcourtsoftheUnitedStates，standsonthesame。principlewiththeactsauthorizingofficersoftheUnitedStates，whosueintheirownnames，tosueinthecourtsoftheUnitedStates。Thepostmastergeneral，forexample，cannotsue[*3：515]underthatpartoftheconstitution，whichgivesjurisdictiontothefederalcourts，inconsequenceofthecharacteroftheparty，norisheauthorizedtosuebythejudiciaryact。HecomesintothecourtsoftheUnionundertheauthorityofanactofcongress，theconstitutionalityofwhichcanonlybesustainedbytheadmission，thathissuitisacasearisingunderalawoftheUnitedStates。Ifitbesaid，thatitissuchacase，becausealawoftheUnitedStatesauthorizesthecontract，andauthorizesthesuit，thesamereasonsexistwithrespecttoasuitbroughtbythebank。That，too，issuchacase；becausethatsuit，too，isitselfauthorized，andisbroughtonacontractauthorizedbyalawoftheUnitedStates。Itdependsabsolutelyonthatlaw，andcannotexistamomentwithoutitsauthority。
　　Sec。1648。"Ifitbesaid，thatasuitbroughtbythebankmaydependinfactaltogetheronquestions，unconnectedwithanylawoftheUnitedStates，itisequallytruewithrespecttosuitsbroughtbythepostmastergeneral。Thepleainbarmaybepayment，ifthesuitbebroughtonabond，ornonassumpsit，ifitbebroughtonanopenaccount，andnootherquestionmayarise，thanwhatrespectsthecompletedischargeofthedemand。Yettheconstitutionalityoftheact，authorizingthepostmastergeneraltosueinthecourtsoftheUnitedStates，hasneverbeendrawnintoquestion。
　　Itissustainedsinglybyanactofcongress，standingonthatconstructionoftheconstitution，whichassertstherightofthelegislaturetogiveoriginaljurisdictiontothecircuitcourts，incasesarisingunderalawoftheUnitedStates。Theclauseinthepatentlaw，authorizingsuitsinthecircuitcourts，stands，we[*3：516]think，onthesameprinciple。SuchasuitisacasearisingunderalawoftheUnitedStates。Yetthedefendantmaynot，atthetrial，questionthevalidityofthepatent，ormakeanypoint，whichrequirestheconstructionofanactofcongress。Hemayresthisdefenceexclusivelyonthefact，thathehasnotviolatedtherightoftheplaintiff。Thatthisfactbecomesthesolequestionmadeinthecause，cannotoustthejurisdictionofthecourt，orestablishtheposition：
　　thatthecasedoesnotariseunderalawoftheUnitedStates。
　　Sec。1649。"Itissaid，thatacleardistinctionexistsbetweenthepartyandthecause；thatthepartymayoriginateunderalaw，withwhichthecausehasnoconnection；andthatcongressmay，withthesamepropriety，giveanaturalizedcitizen，whoisthemerecreatureofalaw，arighttosueinthecourtsoftheUnitedStates，asgivethatrighttothebank。
　　Thisdistinctionisnotdenied；and，iftheactofcongresswasasimpleactofincorporation，andcontainednothingmore，itmightbeentitledtogreatconsideration。Buttheactdoesnotstopwithincorporatingthebank。Itproceedstobestowuponthebeingithasmade，allthefacultiesandcapacities，whichthatbeingpossesses。Everyactofthebankgrowsoutofthislaw，andistestedbyit。Tousethelanguageoftheconstitution，everyactofthebankarisesoutofthislaw。Anaturalizedcitizenisindeedmadeacitizenunderanactofcongress，buttheactdoesnotproceedtogive，toregulate，ortoprescribehiscapacities。Hebecomesamemberofthesociety，possessingalltherightsofanativecitizen，andstanding，intheviewoftheconstitution，onthefootingofanative。Theconstitutiondoesnotauthorize[*3：517]congresstoenlargeorabridgethoserights。