Thesimplepowerofthenationallegislatureistoprescribeauniformruleofnaturalization，andtheexerciseofthispowerexhaustsit，sofarasrespectstheindividual。Theconstitutionthentakeshimup，and，amongotherfights，extendstohimthecapacityofsuinginthecourtsoftheUnitedStates，preciselyunderthesamecircumstances，underwhichanativemightsue。Heisdistinguishableinnothingfromanativecitizen，exceptsofarastheconstitutionmakesthedistinction。Thelawmakesnone。Thereis，then，noresemblancebetweentheactincorporatingthebank，andthegeneralnaturalizationlaw。Uponthebestconsideration，wehavebeenabletobestowonthissubject，weareofopinion，thattheclauseintheactofincorporation，enablingthebanktosueinthecourtsoftheUnitedStates，isconsistentwiththeconstitution，andtobeobeyedinallcourts。"
　　Sec。1650。CasesmayalsoariseunderlawsoftheUnitedStatesbyimplication，aswellasbyexpressenactment；so，thatdueredressmaybeadministeredbythejudicialpoweroftheUnitedStates。Itisnotunusualforalegislativeacttoinvolveconsequences，whicharenotexpressed。Anofficer，forexample，isorderedtoarrestanindividual。Itisnotnecessary，norisitusual，tosay，thatheshallnotbepunishedforobeyingthisorder。Hissecurityisimpliedintheorderitself。Itisnounusualthingforanactofcongresstoimply，withoutexpressing，thisveryexemptionfromstatecontrol。Thecollectorsoftherevenue，thecarriersofthemail，themint[*3：518]
　　establishment，andallthoseinstitutions，whicharepublicintheirnature，areexamplesinpoint。Ithasneverbeendoubted，thatall，whoareemployedinthem，areprotected，whileinthelineoftheirduty；andyetthisprotectionisnotexpressedinanyactofcongress。Itisincidentalto，andisimpliedin，theseveralacts，bywhichthoseinstitutionsarecreated；andissecuredtotheindividuals，employedinthem，bythejudicialpoweralone；thatis，thejudicialpoweristheinstrumentemployedbythegovernmentinadministeringthissecurity。
　　Sec。1651。Ithasalsobeenasked，andmayagainbeasked，whythewords，"casesinequity，"arefoundinthisclause？Whatequitablecausescangrowoutoftheconstitution，laws，andtreatiesoftheUnitedStates？
　　TothisthegeneralansweroftheFederalistseemsatonceclearandsatisfactory。
　　"Thereishardlyasubjectoflitigationbetweenindividuals，whichmaynotinvolvethoseingredientsoffraud，accident，trust，orhardship，whichwouldrenderthematteranobjectofequitable，ratherthanoflegaljurisdiction，asthedistinctionisknownandestablishedinseveralofthestates。Itisthepeculiarprovince，forinstance，ofacourtofequity，torelieveagainstwhatarecalledhardbargains：thesearecontracts，inwhich，thoughtheremayhavebeennodirectfraudordeceit，sufficienttoinvalidatetheminacourtoflaw；yettheremayhavebeensomeundue，andunconscionableadvantagetakenofthenecessities，ormisfortunesofoneoftheparties，whicha[*3：519]courtofequitywouldnottolerate。Insuchcases，whereforeignerswereconcernedoneitherside，itwouldbeimpossibleforthefederaljudicatoriestodojustice，withoutanequitable，aswellasalegaljurisdiction。Agreementstoconveylands，claimedunderthegrantsofdifferentstates，mayaffordanotherexampleofthenecessityofanequitablejurisdictioninthefederalcourts。Thisreasoningmaynotbesopalpableinthosestates，wheretheformalandtechnicaldistinctionbetweentawandEquityisnotmaintained，asinthisstate，whereitisexemplifiedbyeveryday’spractice。"
　　Sec。1652。Thenextclause，extendsthejudicialpower"toallcasesaffectingambassadors，otherpublicministers，andconsuls。"Theproprietyofthisdelegationofpowertothenationaljudiciarywillscarcelybequestionedbyanypersons，whohavedulyreflecteduponthesubject。Therearevariousgradesofpublicministers，fromambassadorswhichisthehighestgrade，downtocommonresidentministers，whoserank，anddiplomaticprecedence，andauthority，arewellknown，andwellascertainedinthelawandusagesofnations。*Butwhatevermaybetheirrelativerankandgrade，publicministersofeveryclassaretheimmediaterepresentativesoftheirsovereigns。Assuchrepresentatives，theyowenosubjectiontoanylaws，butthoseoftheirown[*3：520]country，anymorethan。theirsovereign；andtheiractionsarenotgenerallydeemedsubjecttothecontroloftheprivatelawofthatstate，whereintheyareappointedtoreside。
　　He，thatissubjecttothecoercionoflaws，isnecessarilydependentonthatpower，bywhomthoselawsweremade。Butpublicministersought，inordertoperformtheirdutiestotheirownsovereign，tobeindependentofeverypower，exceptthatbywhichtheyaresent；and，ofconsequence，oughtnottobesubjecttothemeremunicipallawofthatnation，whereintheyaretoexercisetheirfunctions。**Therights，thepowers，theduties，[*3：521]andtheprivilegesofpublicministersare，therefore，tobedetermined，notbyanymunicipalconstitutions，butbythelawofnatureandnations，whichisequallyobligatoryuponallsovereigns，andallstates。Whattheserights，powers，duties，andprivilegesare，areinquiriesproperlybelongingtoatreatiseonthelawofnations，andneednotbediscussedhere。***
　　Butitisobvious，thateveryquestion，inwhichtheserights，powers，duties，andprivilegesareinvolved，issointimatelyconnectedwiththepublicpeace，andpolicy，anddiplomacyofthenation，andtouchesthedignityandinterestofthesovereignsoftheministersconcernedsodeeply，thatitwouldbeunsafe，thattheyshouldbesubmittedtoanyother，than，thehighestjudicatureofthenation。*[*3：519]Threeclassesareusuallydistinguishedindiplomacy；1。
　　Ambassadors，whoarethehighestorder，whoareconsideredaspersonallyrepresentingtheirsovereigns；2。EnvoysExtraordinary，andministersplenipotentiary；
　　3。Ministersresident，andministerschargesd’affaires。Merecommonchargesd’affaires，aredeemedofstilllowerrank。**[*3：520]InthecaseoftheSchoonerExchangev。M’Faddon，theSupremeCourtstatedthegroundsoftheimmunityofforeignministers，inaveryclearmanner，leavingtheimportantquestion，whetherthatimmunitycanbeforfeitedbymisconduct，opentofuturedecision。"Asecondcase，"saysMr。ChiefJusticeMarshall，indeliveringtheopinionofthecourt，"standingonthesameprincipleswiththefirst，istheimmunity，whichallcivilizednationsallowtoforeignministers。Whatevermaybetheprinciple，onwhichhisimmunityisestablished，whetherweconsiderhim，asintheplaceofthesovereignherepresents，orbyapoliticalfictionsupposehimtobeextraterritorial，and，therefore，inpointoflaw，notwithinthejurisdictionofthesovereign，atwhosecourtheresides；still，theimmunityitselfisgrantedbythegoverningpowerofthenation，towhichtheministerisdeputed。Thisfictionofexterritorialitycouldnotbeerected，andsupportedagainstthewillofthesovereignoftheterritory。Heissupposedtoassenttoit。
　　"Thisconsentisnotexpressed。Itistrue，that，insomecountries，andinthis，amongothers，aspeciallawisenactedfor。thecase。Butthelawobviouslyproceedsontheideaofprescribingthepunishmentofanactpreviouslyunlawful，notofgrantingtoaforeignministeraprivilege，whichhewouldnototherwisepossess。
　　"Theassentofthesovereigntotheveryimportantandextensiveexemptionsfromterritorialjurisdiction，whichareadmittedtoattachtoforeignministers，isimpliedfromtheconsiderations，that，withoutsuchexemption，everysovereignwouldhazardhisowndignitybyemployingapublicministerabroad。Hisministerwouldowetemporaryandlocalallegiancetoaforeignprince，andwouldbelesscompetenttothe[*3：521]objectsofhismission。
　　Asovereign，committingtheinterestsofhisnationwithaforeignpowertothecareofaperson，whomhehasselectedforthatpurpose，cannotintendtosubjecthisministerinanydegreetothatpower；and，therefore，aconsenttoreceivehimimpliesaconsent，thatheshallpossessthoseprivileges，whichhisprincipalintendedheshouldretain—privilegeswhichareessentialtothedignityofhissovereign，andtothedutiesheisboundtoperform。
　　"Inwhatcasesaminister，byinfractingthelawsofthecountry，inwhichheresides，maysubjecthimselftootherpunishment，thanwillbeinflictedbyhisownsovereign，isaninquiryforeigntothepresentpurpose。
　　Ifhiscrimesbesuch，astorenderhimamenabletothelocaljurisdiction，itmustbe，becausetheyforfeittheprivilegesannexedtohischaracter；
　　andtheminister，byviolatingtheconditions，underwhichhewasreceived，astherepresentativeofaforeignsovereign，hassurrenderedtheimmunitiesgrantedonthoseconditions；or，accordingtothetruemeaningoftheoriginalassent，hasceasedtobeentitledtothem。"***Vatteldiscussesthesubjectoftherights，privileges，andimmunitiesofforeignambassadorsverymuchatlarge，inhisTreatiseontheLawofNations。[*3：522]Sec。1653。Itismostfit，thatthisjudicatureshould，inthefirstinstance，haveoriginaljurisdictionofsuchcases，sothat，ifitshouldnotbeexclusive，itmightatleastbedirectlyresortedto，whenthedelaysofaprocrastinatedcontroversyininferiortribunalsmightendangertherepose，ortheinterestsofthegovernment。I。tiswellknown，thatanarrestoftheRussianambassadorinacivilsuitinEngland，inthereignofQueenAnne，waswellnighbringingthetwocountriesintoopenhostilities；andwasstonedforonlybymeasures，whichhavebeendeemed，byherownwriters，humiliating。Onthatoccasion，anactofparliamentwaspassed，whichmadeithighlypenaltoarrestanyambassador，orhisdomesticservants，ortoseizeordistrainhisgoods；andthisact，elegantlyengrossedandilluminated，accompaniedbyaletterfromthequeen，wassentbyanambassadorextraordinary，topropitiatetheoffendedczar。Andastatutetothelikeeffectexistsinthecriminalcodeestablishedbythefirstcongress，undertheconstitutionoftheUnitedStates。
　　Sec。1654。Consuls，indeed，havenotinstrictnessadiplomaticcharacter。
　　Theyaredeemed，asmerecommercialagents；andthereforepartakeoftheordinarycharacterofsuchagents；andaresubjecttothemunicipallawsofthecountries，wherethey[*3：523]reside。Yet，astheyarethepublicagentsofthenation，towhichtheybelong，andareoftenentrustedwiththeperformanceofverydelicatefunctionsofstate，andastheymightbegreatlyembarrassedbybeingsubjecttotheordinaryjurisdictionofinferiortribunals，stateandnational，itwasthoughthighlyexpedienttoextendtheoriginaljurisdictionoftheSupremeCourttothemalso。
　　Theproprietyofvestingjurisdiction，insuchcases，insomeofthenationalcourtsseemshardlytohavebeenquestionedbythemostzealousopponentsoftheconstitution。*Andincasesagainstambassadors，andotherforeignministers，andconsuls，thejurisdictionhasbeendeemedexclusive。*Undertheconfederationnopowerexistedinthenationalgovernment，topunishanypersonfortheviolationoftherightsofambassadors，andotherforeignministers，andconsuls。Congress，inNovember，1781，recommendedtothelegislaturesofthestates，topasslawspunishinginfractionsofthelawofNations，committedbyviolatingsafeconducts，orpassportsgrantedbycongress；byactsofhostilityagainstpersonsinamitywiththeUnitedStates；byinfractionsoftheimmunitiesofambassadors；byinfractionsoftreaties，orconventions；andtoerectatribunal，ortovestone，alreadyexisting，withpowertodecideonoffencesagainstthelawofnations；andtoauthorizesuitsfordamagesbythepartyinjured，andforcompensationtotheUnitedStates，fordamagessustainedbythem，fromaninjurydonetoaforeignpowerbyacitizen。This，likeotherrecommendations，wassilentlydisregarded，oropenlyrefused。[*3：524]Sec。1655。Ithasbeenmadeaquestion，whetherthisclause，extendingjurisdictiontoallcasesaffectingambassadors，ministers，andconsuls，includescasesofindictmentsfoundagainstpersonsforofferingviolencetothem；contrarytothestatuteoftheUnitedStates，punishingsuchoffence。
　　Andithasbeenheld，thatitdoesnot。Suchindictmentsaremerepublicprosecutions，towhichtheUnitedStatesandtheoffenderonlyareparties，andwhichareconductedbytheUnitedStates，forthepurposeofvindicatingtheirownlaws，andthelawofnations。Theyarestrictly，therefore，casesaffectingtheUnitedStates；andtheministerhimself，whohasbeeninjuredbytheoffence，hasnoconcernintheeventoftheprosecution，orthecostsattendingit。Indeed，itseemsdifficulttoconceive，howtherecanbeacaseaffectinganambassador，inthesenseoftheconstitution，unlessheisapartytothesuitonrecord，orisdirectlyaffected，andboundbythejudgment。
　　Sec。1656。Thelanguageoftheconstitutionisperhapsbroadenoughtocovercases，whereheisnotaparty；butmayyetbeaffectedininterest。
　　Thispeculiarityinthelanguagehasbeentakennoticeof，inarecentcase，bytheSupremeCourt。"Ifasuit[*3：525]bebroughtagainstaforeignminister，"SaidMr。ChiefJusticeMarshall，indeliveringtheopinionofthecourt"theSupremeCourtalonehasoriginaljurisdiction，andthisisshownontherecord。But，supposeasuittobebrought，whichaffectstheinterestofaforeignminister，orbywhichthepersonofhissecretary，orofhisservant，isarrested。Theministerdoesnot，bythemerearrestofhissecretary，orhisservant，becomeapartytothissuit；buttheactualdefendantpleadstothejurisdictionofthecourt，andassertshisprivilege。Ifthesuitaffectsaforeignminister，itmustbedismissed，notbecauseheisapartytoit，butbecauseitaffectshim。Thelanguageoftheconstitutioninthetwocasesisdifferent。Thiscourtcantakecognizanceofallcases，’affecting’foreignministers；and，therefore，jurisdictiondoesnotdependon。thepartynamedintherecord。Butthislanguagechanges，whentheenumerationproceedstostates。Whythischange？
　　Theanswerisobvious。Inthecaseofforeignministers，itwasintended，forreasons，whichallcomprehend，togivethenationalcourtsjurisdictionoverallcases，bywhichtheywereinanymanneraffected。Inthecaseofstates，whoseimmediate，orremoteinterestsweremixedupwithamultitudeofcases，andwhomightbeaffectedinanalmostinfinitevarietyofways，itwasintendedtogivejurisdictioninthosecasesonly，towhichtheywereactualparties。"
　　Sec。1657。Thenextclauseextendsthejudicialpower"toallcasesofadmiraltyandmaritimejurisdiction。"
　　Sec。1658。Theproprietyofthisdelegationofpowerseemstohavebeenlittlequestionedatthetimeofadoptingtheconstitution。"Themostbigotted[*3：526]idolizersofstateauthority，"saidtheFederalist，"havenotthusfarshownadispositiontodenythenationaljudiciarythecognizanceofmaritimecauses。Thesesogenerallydependonthelawofnations，andsocommonlyaffecttherightsofforeigners，thattheyfallwithintheconsiderations，whicharerelativetothepublicpeace。"ThesubjectisdismissedwithanequallybriefnoticebyMr。ChiefJusticeJay，inthecaseofChisholmv。Georgia，inthepassagealreadycited。Itdemands，however，amoreenlargedexamination，whichwillclearlydemonstrateitsutilityandimportance，asapartofthenationalpower。
　　Sec。1659。IthasbeenremarkedbytheFederalist，inanotherplace，thatthejurisdictionofthecourtofadmiralty，aswellasofothercourts，isasourceoffrequentandintricatediscussions，sufficientlydenotingtheindeterminatelimits，bywhichitiscircumscribed。ThisremarkisequallytreeinrespecttoEnglandandAmerica；tothehighcourtofadmiraltysittingintheparentcountry；andtothevice—admiraltycourtssittinginthecolonies。Atdifferentperiods，thejurisdictionhasbeenexercisedtoaverydifferentextent；andinthecolonialcourtsitseemstohavehadboundariesdifferentfromthoseprescribedtoitinEngland。IthasbeenexercisedtoalargerextentinIreland，thaninEngland；anddowntothisverydayithasamostcomprehensivereachinScotland。Thejurisdictionclaimedbythecourtsofadmiralty，asproperlybelongingtothem，extendstoallactsand[*3：527]tortsdoneuponthehighseas，andwithintheebbandflowofthesea，andtoallmaritimecontracts，thatis，toallcontractstouchingtrade，navigation，orbusinessuponthesea，orthewatersoftheseawithintheebbandflowofthetide。Somepartofthisjurisdictionhasbeenmatterofheatedcontroversybetweenthecourtsofcommonlaw，andthehighcourtofadmiraltyinEngland，withalternatesuccessanddefeat。Butmuchofithasbeengraduallyyieldedtothelatter，inconsiderationofitspublicconvenience，ifnotofitsparamountnecessity。
　　Itisnotourdesigntogointoaconsiderationofthesevexedquestions，ortoattemptanygeneraloutlineofthedisputedboundaries。Itwillbesufficientinthisplacetopresentabriefviewofthat，whichisadmitted，andisindisputable。**Mr。Sergeant，inhisintroductiontothesecondeditionofhisveryvaluableworkonConstitutionalLaw，seemstosuppose，thattheadmiraltycommissionofthegovernorofNewHampshire，referredtoinDeLoviov。
　　Boit，mightbeanextensionoftheordinarycommissionsofthecolonialadmiraltyjudges，Itisbelieved，thatheismistakeninthissupposition。
　　InStokes’sHistoryoftheColoniesthereisacommissionsimilarinitsmainclauses；andMr。Stokessays，thatitwastheusualformofthecommissions。Sec。1660。Theadmiraltyandmaritimejurisdiction，andtheword，"maritime，"
　　wasdoubtlessaddedtoguardagainstanynarrowinterpretationoftheprecedingword，"admiralty，"conferredbytheconstitution，embracestwogreatclassesofcases；onedependentuponlocality，andtheotheruponthenatureofthecontract。Thefirstrespectsactsorinjuriesdoneuponthehighsea，whereallnationsclaima[*3：528]commonrightandcommonjurisdiction；
　　oracts，orinjuriesdoneuponthecoastofthesea；or，atfarthest，actsandinjuriesdonewithintheebbandflowofthetide。Thesecondrespectscontracts，claims，andservicespurelymaritime，andtouchingrightsanddutiesappertainingtocommerceandnavigation。Theformerisagaindivisibleintotwogreatbranches，oneembracingcaptures，andquestionsofprizearisingjurebelli；theotherembracingacts，torts，andinjuriesstrictlyofcivilcognizance，independentofbelligerentoperations。
　　Sec。1661。Bythelawofnationsthecognizanceofallcaptures，jurebelli，or，asitismorefamiliarlyphrased，ofallquestionsofprize，andtheirincidents，belongsexclusivelytothecourtsofthecountry，towhichthecaptorsbelong，andfromwhomtheyderivetheirauthoritytomakethecapture。Noneutralnationhasanyrighttoinquireinto，ortodecideupon，thevalidityofsuchcapture，eventhoughitshouldconcernpropertybelongingtoitsowncitizensorsubjects，unlessitsownsovereignorterritorialrightsareviolated；butthesoleandexclusivejurisdictionbelongstothecourtsofthecapturingbelligerent。Andthisjurisdiction，bythecommonconsentofnations，isvestedexclusivelyincourtsofadmiralty，possessinganoriginal，orappellatejurisdiction。Thecourtsofcommonlawareboundtoabstainfromanydecisionofquestionsofthissort，whethertheyarisedirectlyorindirectlyinjudgment。Theremedyforillegalactsofcaptureisbytheinstitutionofproperprizeproceedingsintheprizecourtsofthecaptors。Ifjusticebetheredenied，thenationitself[*3：529]
　　becomesresponsibletothepartiesaggrieved；andifeveryremedyisrefused，itthenbecomesasubjectfortheconsiderationofthenation，towhichthepartiesaggrievedbelong，whichmayvindicatetheirrights，eitherbyapeacefulappealtonegotiation，oraresorttoarms。
　　Sec。1662。Itisobviousupontheslightestconsideration，thatcognizanceofallquestionsofprize，madeundertheauthorityoftheUnitedStates，oughttobelongexclusivelytothenationalcourts。How，otherwise，canthelegalityofthecapturesbesatisfactorilyascertained，ordeliberatelyvindicated？Itseemsnotonlyanatural，butanecessaryappendagetothepowerofwar，andnegotiationwithforeignnations。Itwouldotherwisefollow，thatthepeaceofthewholenationmightbeputathazardatanytimebythemisconductofoneofitsmembers。Itcouldneitherrestoreuponanillegalcapture；norinmanycasesaffordanyadequateredressforthewrong；norpunishtheaggressor。Itwouldbepowerlessandpalsied。
　　Itcouldnotperform，orcompeltheperformanceofthedutiesrequiredbythelawofnations。Itwouldbeasovereignwithoutanysolidattributeofsovereignty；andmoveinvinculisonlytobetrayitsimbecility。Evenundertheconfederation，thepowertodecideuponquestionsofcaptureandprizewasexclusivelyconferredinthelastresortuponthenationalcourtofappeals。Butlikeallotherpowersconferredbythatinstrument，itwastotallydisregarded，whereveritinterferedwithstatepolicy，orwithextensivepopularinterests。Wehaveseen，thatthesentencesofthe[*3：530]nationalprizecourtofappealsweretreated，asmerenullities；
　　andwereincapableofbeingenforced，untilaftertheestablishmentofthepresentconstitution。Thesamereasoning，whichconductsustotheconclusion，thatthenationalcourtsoughttohavejurisdictionofthisclassofadmiraltycases，conductsusequallytotheconclusion，that，tobeeffectualfortheadministrationofinternationaljustice，itoughttobeexclusive。Andaccordinglyithasbeenconstantlyheld，thatthisjurisdictionisexclusiveinthecourtsoftheUnitedStates。
　　Sec。1663。Theotherbranchofadmiraltyjurisdiction，dependentuponlocality，respectscivilacts，torts，andinjuriesdoneonthesea，orincertaincasesonwatersofthesea，wherethetideebbsandflows，withoutamyclaimofexercisingtherightsofwar。Sucharecasesofassaults，andotherpersonalinjuries；casesofcollision，orrunningofshipsagainsteachother；casesofspoliationanddamage，astheyaretechnicallycalled，
　　suchasillegalseizures，ordepredationsuponproperty；casesofillegaldispossession，orwithholdingpossessionfromtheownersofships，commonlycalledpossessorysuits；casesofseizuresundermunicipalauthorityforsupposedbreachesofrevenue，orotherprohibitorylaws；andcasesofsalvageformeritoriousservicesperformedinsavingproperty，whetherderelict，orwrecked，orcaptured，orotherwiseinimminenthazardfromextraordinaryperils。
　　[*3：531]Sec。1664。Itisobvious，thatthisclassofcaseshas，ormayhave，anintimaterelationtotherightsanddutiesofforeignersinnavigationandmaritimecommerce。Itmaymateriallyaffectourintercoursewithforeignstates；andraisemanyquestionsofinternationallaw，notmerelytouchingprivateclaims，butnationalsovereignty，andnationalreciprocity。Thus，forinstance，ifacollisionshouldtakeplaceatseabetweenanAmericanandaforeignship，manyimportantquestionsofpubliclawmightbeconnectedwithitsjustdecision；foritisobvious，thatitcouldnotbegovernedbythemeremunicipallawofeithercountry。So，ifacaseofrecapture，orothersalvageserviceperformedtoaforeignship，shouldoccur，itmustbedecidedbythegeneralprinciplesofmaritimelaw，andthedoctrinesofnationalreciprocity。Wherearecaptureismadeofafriendlyshipfromthehandsofitsenemy，thegeneraldoctrinenowestablishedis，torestoreituponsalvage，iftheforeigncountry，towhichitbelongs，adoptsareciprocalrule；ortocondemnittotherecaptors，ifthelikeruleisadoptedintheforeigncountry。Andinothercasesofsalvagethedoctrinesofinternationalandmaritimelawcomeintofullactivity，ratherthanthoseofanymeremunicipalcode。Thereis，therefore，apeculiarfitnessin[*3：532]appropriatingthisclassofcasestothenationaltribunals；sincetheywillbemorelikelytobetheredecideduponlargeandcomprehensiveprinciples，andtoreceiveamoreuniformadjudication；andthustobecomemore。satisfactorytoforeigners。
　　Sec。1665。Theremainingclassrespectscontracts，claims，andservicespurelymaritime。Amongthesearetheclaimsofmaterialmenandothersforrepairsandoutfitsofshipsbelongingtoforeignnations，ortootherstates；bottomrybondsformonieslenttoshipsinforeignportstorelievetheirdistresses，andenablethemtocompletetheirvoyages；surveysofvesselsdamagedbyperilsoftheseas；pilotageonthehighseas；andsuitsformarinerswages。These，indeed，oftenariseinthecourseofthecommerceandnavigationoftheUnitedStates；andseememphaticallytobelong，asincidents，tothepowertoregulatecommerce。Buttheymayalsoaffectthecommerceandnavigationofforeignnations。Repairsmaybedone，andsuppliesfurnishedtoforeignships；moneymaybelentonforeignbottoms；
　　pilotageandmariners’wagesmaybecomedueinvoyagesinforeignemployment；
　　andinsuchcasesthegeneralmaritimelawenablesthecourtsofadmiraltytoadministerawholesomeandpromptjustice。Indeed，inmanyofthesecases，asthecourtsofadmiraltyentertainsuits[*3：533]inrem，aswellasinpersonam，theyareoftentheonlycourts，inwhichaneffectualredresscanbeafforded，especiallywhenitisdesirabletoenforceaspecificmaritimelien。
　　Sec。1666。Sothatwesee，thattheadmiraltyjurisdictionnaturallyconnectsitself，ontheonehand，withourdiplomaticrelationsanddutiestoforeignnations，andtheirsubjects；and，ontheotherhand，withthegreatinterestsofnavigationandcommerce，foreignanddomestic。*Thereis，then，apeculiarwisdomingivingtothenationalgovernmentajurisdictionofthissort，whichcannotbewielded，exceptforthegeneralgood；andwhichmultipliesthesecuritiesforthepublicpeaceabroad，andgivestocommerceandnavigationthemostencouragingsupportathome。Itmaybeadded，that，inmanyofthecasesincludedintheselatterclasses，thesamereasonsdonotexist，asincasesofprize，foranexclusivejurisdiction；
　　and，therefore，wheneverthecommonlawiscompetenttogivearemedyinthestatecourts，theymayretaintheiraccustomedconcurrentjurisdictionintheadministrationofit。***"Theadmiraltyjurisdiction，"saidtheSupremeCourtinacelebratedcase，"embracesallquestionsofprizeandsalvage，inthecorrectadjudicationofwhichforeignnationsaredeeplyinterested。Itembracesalsomaritimetorts，contracts，andoffences，inwhichtheprinciplesofthelawandcomityofnationsoftenformanessentialinquiry。Allthesecases，then，enterintothenationalpolicy，affectthenationalrights，andmaycompromitthenationalsovereignty。"Martinv。Hunter。**Mr。ChancellorKentandMr。Rawleseemtothink，thattheadmiraltyjurisdiction，givenbytheconstitution，isinallcasesnecessarily[*3：534]
　　exclusive。Butitisbelieved，thatthisopinionisfoundedinamistake。
　　Itisexclusiveinallmattersofprize，forthereason，thatatthecommonlawthisjurisdictionisvestedinthecourtsofadmiralty，totheexclusionofthe。courtsofcommonlaw。Butincases，wherethejurisdictionofthecourtsofcommonlawandtheadmiraltyareconcurrent，asincasesofpossessorysuits，mariners，wages，andmarinetorts，thereisnothingintheconstitution，necessarilyleadingtotheconclusion，thatthejurisdictionwasintendedtobeexclusive；andthereisaslittleground，upongeneralreasoning，tocontendforit。Thereasonableinterpretationoftheconstitutionwouldseemtobe，thatitconferredonthenationaljudiciarytheadmiraltyandmaritimejurisdiction，exactlyaccordingtothenatureandextentandmodifications，inwhichitexistedinthejurisprudenceofthecommonlaw。
　　Wherethejurisdictionwasexclusive，itremainedso；whereitwasconcurrent，itremainedso。Hence，thestatescouldhavenorighttocreatecourtsofadmiralty，assuch，ortoconferontheirowncourts，thecognizanceofsuchcases，aswereexclusivelycognizableinadmiraltycourts。Butthestatesmightwellretainandexercisethejurisdictionincases，ofwhichthecognizancewaspreviouslyconcurrentinthecourtsofcommonlaw。Thislatterclassofcasescanbenomoredeemedcasesofadmiraltyandmaritimejurisdiction，thancasesofcommonlawjurisdiction。Thejudiciaryact，of1789，ch。20，Sec。9，hasmanifestlyproceededuponthissupposition；
　　for，whileithasconferredontheDistrictCourts，"exclusiveoriginalcognizanceofallcivilcausesofadmiraltyandmaritimejurisdiction，"
　　ithas，atthesametime，saved"tothesuitors，inallcases，therightofacommonlawremedy，wherethecommonlawiscompetenttogiveit。"
　　Weshall，hereafter，haveoccasiontoconsidermoreatlarge，inwhatcasesthereisaconcurrentjurisdictioninthenationalandstatecourts。Sec。1667。Wehavebeenthusfarconsideringtheadmiraltyandmaritimejurisdictionincivilcasesonly。Butitalsoembracesallpublicoffences，committedonthehighseas，andincreeks，havens，basins，andbayswithintheebbandflowofthetide，atleastinsuchasareoutofthebodyofanycountyofastate。Intheseplacesthejurisdictionofthecourtsofadmiraltyoveroffencesisexclusive；forthatofthecourtsofcommonlawislimitedtosuchoffences，asarecommittedwithinthebodyofsomecounty。Andontheseacoast，thereisanalternate，ordivided[*3：535]
　　jurisdictionofthecourtsofcommonlaw，andadmiralty，inplacesbetweenhighandlowwatermark；theformerhavingjurisdictionwhen，andasfatasthelidsisout，andthelatterwhen，andasfarasthetideisin，usqueadfilumaquae，ortohighwatermark。Thiscriminaljurisdictionoftheadmiraltyisthereforeexclusivelyvestedinthenationalgovernment；
　　andmaybeexercisedoversuchcrimesandoffences，ascongressmay，fromtimetotime，delegatetothecognisanceofthenationalcourts。Theproprietyofvestingthiscriminaljurisdictioninthenationalgovernmentdependsuponthesamereasoning，andisestablishedbythesamegeneralconsiderations，ashavebeenalreadysuggestedinregardtocivilcases。Itisessentiallyconnectedwiththedueregulation，andprotectionofourcommerceandnavigationonthehighseas，andwithourrightsanddutiesinregardtoforeignnations，andtheirsubjects，intheexerciseofcommonsovereigntyontheocean。
　　Thestates，assuch，arenotknowninourintercoursewithforeignnations，andnotrecognisedascommonsovereignsontheocean。Andiftheywerepermittedtoexercisecriminalorciviljurisdictionthereon，therewouldbeendlessembarrassments，arisingfromthe[*3：536]conflictoftheirlaws，andthemostseriousdangersofperpetualcontroversieswithforeignnations。Inshort，thepeaceoftheUnionwouldbeconstantlyputathazardbyacts，overwhichithadnocontrol；andbyassertionsofright，whichitmightwhollydisclaim。**Ithasbeenmadeaquestion，whethertheadmiraltyjurisdictioncanbeexercisedwithintheterritoriesoftheUnitedStatesbythejudgesoftheterritorialcourts，appointedundertheterritorialgovernments，astheyareappointedforalimitedtermonly，andnotduringgoodbehaviour。
　　Thedecisionhasbeeninfavourofthejurisdiction，upontheground，alreadysuggested，thatcongresshavetheexclusivepowertoregulatesuchterritories，astheymaychoose；andtheymayconferontheterritorialgovernmentsuchlegislativepowers，istheymaychoose。Thecourtsappointedinsuchterritories，arenotconstitutionalcourts，inwhichthejudicialpowersconferredbyconstitutiononthegeneralgovernmentcanbedeposited。Theyaremerelylegislativecourts；andthejurisdiction，withwhichtheyareinvested，isnotapartofthejudicialpower，definedinthethirdarticleoftheconstitution。Sec。1668。Thenextclauseextendsthejudicialpower"tocontroversies，towhichtheUnitedStatesshallbeaparty。"*Itscarcelyseemspossibletoraisea[*3：537]reasonabledoubt，astotheproprietyofgivingtothenationalcourtsjurisdictionofcases，inwhichtheUnitedStatesareaparty。Itwouldbeaperfectnoveltyinthehistoryofnationaljurisprudence，aswellasofpubliclaw，thatasovereignhadnoauthoritytosueinhisowncourts。UnlessthispowerweregiventotheUnitedStates，theenforcementofalltheirrights，powers，contracts，andprivilegesintheirsovereigncapacity，wouldbeatthemercyofthestates。Theymustbeenforced，ifatall，inthestatetribunals。Andtherewouldnotonlynotbeanycompulsorypoweroverthosecourtstoperformsuchfunctions；buttherewouldnotbeanymeansofproducinguniformityintheirdecisions。Asovereignwithoutthemeansofenforcingcivilrights，orcompellingtheperformance，eithercivillyorcriminally，ofpublicdutiesonthepartofthecitizens，wouldbeamostextraordinaryanomaly。ItwouldprostratetheUnionatthefeetofthestates。Itwouldcompelthenationalgovernmenttobecomeasupplicantforjusticebeforethejudicatureofthose，whowerebyotherpartsoftheconstitutionplacedinsubordinationtoit。***[*3：536]Mr。Tucker，distinguishesbetweentheword"cases，"usedintheprecedingclauses，andtheword"controversies"hereused。Theformerhedeemstoincludeallsuits，criminalaswellascivil。Thelatter，asincludingsuchonly，asareofacivilnature。Ashereapplied，controversies"seem"sayshe"particularlyappropriatedtosuchdisputes，asmightarisebetweentheUnitedStates，andanyoneormorestates，respectingterritorialorfiscalmatters；orbetweentheUnitedStatesandtheirdebtors，contractors，andagents。Thisconstructionisconfirmedbytheapplicationofthewordintheensuingclauses，whereitevidentlyreferstodisputesofacivilnatureonly，such，forexample，asmayarisebetweentwoormorestates，orbetweencitizensofdifferentstates，orbetweenastateandthecitizensofanotherstate，etc。"Mr。JusticeIredell，inhisopinioninChisholmv。Georgia，givesthesameconstructiontotheword"controversies，"
　　confiningittosuchasareofacivilnature。
　　Intheoriginaldraftoftheconstitution，thisclause，"controversiestowhichtheUnitedStatesshallbeaparty，"wasomitted。Itwas[*3：537]
　　addedafterwardswithoutanyapparentobjection。**Mr。Sergeant，inhisIntroductiontohisworkonConstitutionalLaw，hasabundantlyshownthemischiefofsuchawantofpowerundertheconfederation。Sec。1669。Itisobservable，thatthelanguageuseddoesnotconferuponanycourtcognizanceofallcontroversies，towhichtheUnitedStatesshallbeaparty，soastojustifyasuittobebroughtagainsttheUnitedStateswithouttheconsentofcongress。And[*3：538]thelanguagewasdoubtlessthusguardedlyintroduced，forthepurposeofavoidinganysuchconclusion。
　　Itisaknownmaxim，justifiedbythegeneralsenseandpracticeofmankind，andrecognizedinthelawofnations，thatitisinherentinthenatureofsovereigntynottobeamesnabletothesuitofanyprivateperson，withoutitsownconsent。Thisexemptionisanattributeofsovereignty，belongingtoeverystateintheUnion；andwasdesignedlyretainedbythenationalgovernment。*Theinconvenienceofsubjectingthegovernmenttoperpetualsuits，asamatterofright，atthewillofanycitizen，foranyrealorsupposedclaimorgrievance，wasdeemedfargreater，thananypositiveinjury，thatcouldbesustainedbyanycitizenbythedelayorrefusalofjustice。Indeed，itwaspresumed，thatitneverwouldbetheinterestorinclinationofawisegovernmenttowithholdjusticefromanycitizen。
　　Andthedifficultiesofguardingitselfagainstfraudulentclaims，andembarrassingandstalecontroversies，werebelievedfartooutweighanymeretheoreticaladvantages，tobederivedfromanyattempttoprovideasystemfortheadministrationofuniversaljustice。*Mr。Lockestrenuouslycontendsforthisexemptionofthesovereignfromjudicialamesnability；andinthis，hedoesbutfollowoutthedoctrinesofPuffendorf，andotherwritersonthelawofnations。Sec。1670。Itmaybeasked，then，whetherthecitizensoftheUnitedStatesarewhollydestituteofremedy，incasethenationalgovernmentshouldinvadetheirrights，eitherbyprivateinjusticeandinjuries，orbypublicoppression？Tothisitmaybeanswered，thatinageneralsense，thereisaremedyinbothcases。In[*3：539]regardtopublicoppressions，thewholestructureofthegovernmentissoorganized，astoaffordthemeansofredress，byenablingthepeopletoremovepublicfunctionaries，whoabusetheirtrust，andtosubstituteothersmorefaithful，andmorehonest，intheirstead。Iftheoppressionbeintheexerciseofpowersclearlyconstitutional，andthepeoplerefusetointerfereinthismanner，thenindeed，thepartymustsubmittothewrong，asbeyondthereachofallhumanpower；forhowcanthepeoplethemselves，intheircollectivecapacity，becompelledtodojustice，andtovindicatetherightsofthose，whoaresubjectedtotheirsovereigncontrol？Iftheoppressionbeintheexerciseofunconstitutionalpowers，thenthefunctionaries，whowieldthem，areamesnablefortheirinjuriousactstothejudicialtribunalsofthecountry，atthesuitoftheoppressed。
　　Sec。1671。Astoprivateinjusticeandinjuries，theymayregardeithertherightsofproperty，ortherightsofcontract；forthenationalgovernmentisperseincapableofanymerelypersonalwrong，suchasanassaultandbattery，orotherpersonalviolence。Inregardtoproperty，theremedyforinjuriesliesagainsttheimmediateperpetrators，whomaybesued，andcannotshelterthemselvesunderanyimaginedimmunityofthegovernmentfromdueresponsibility。If，therefore，anyagentofthegovernmentshallunjustlyinvadethepropertyofacitizenundercolourofapublicauthority，hemust，likeeveryotherviolatorofthelaws，[*3：540]respondindamages。
　　Cases，indeed，mayoccur，inwhichhemaynotalwayshaveanadequateredress，withoutsomelegislationbycongress。Asforexample，inplacescededtotheUnitedStates，andoverwhichtheyhaveanexclusivejurisdiction，ifhisrealestateistakenwithout，oragainstlawfulauthority。Herehemustrelyonthejusticeofcongress，oroftheexecutivedepartmentThegreatestdifficultyarisesinregardtothecontractsofthenationalgovernment；forastheycannotbesuedwithouttheirownconsent，andastheiragentsarenotresponsibleuponanysuchcontracts，whenlawfullymade，theonlyredress，whichcanbeobtained，mustbebytheinstrumentalityofcongress，eitherinprovidingastheymayforsuitsinthecommoncourtsofjusticetoestablishsuchclaimsbyagenerallaw，orbyaspecialactforthereliefoftheparticularparty。Ineachcase，however，theredressdepends，solelyuponthelegislativedepartment，andcannotbeadministered，exceptthroughitsfavour。Theremedyisbyanappealtothejustice。ofthenationinthatforum，andnotinanycourtofjustice，asmatterofright。
　　Sec。1672。Ithasbeensometimesthought，thatthisisaseriousdefectintheorganizationofthejudicialdepartmentofthenationalgovernment。
　　Itisnot，however，anobjectiontotheconstitutionitself；butitlies，ifatall，againstcongress，fornothavingprovided，asitisclearlywithintheirconstitutionalauthoritytodo，anadequateremedyforallprivategrievancesofthissort，inthecourtsoftheUnitedStates。Inthisrespect，thereisamarkedcontrastbetweentheactualrightandpracticeofredressinthenationalgovernment，aswellasinmostofthestategovernments，andtherightandpracticemaintainedundertheBritishconstitution。
　　InEngland，ifanypersonhas，inpointof[*3：541]property，ajustdemandupontheking，hemaypetitionhiminhiscourtofchancerybywhatiscalledapetitionofrightwherethechancellorwilladministerright，theoreticallyasamatterofgrace，andnotuponcompulsion；butinfact，asamatterofconstitutionalduty。Nosuchjudicialproceedingisrecognised，asexistinginanystateofthisUnion，asmatterofconstitutionalright，toenforceanyclaim，ordebtagainstastate。Inthefewcases，inwhichitexists，itismatteroflegislativeenactment。*Congresshaveneveryetacteduponthesubject，soastogivejudicialredressforanynonfulfilmentofcontractsbythenationalgovernment。Casesofthemostcruelhardship，andintolerabledelayhavealreadyoccurred，inwhichmeritoriouscreditorshavebeenreducedtogrievoussuffering，andsometimestoabsoluteruin，bythetardinessofajustice，whichhasbeenyieldedonlyafterthehumblesupplicationsofmanyyearsbeforethelegislature。Onecanscarcelyrefrainfromunitinginthesuggestionofalearnedcommentator，thatinthisregardtheconstitutions，bothofthenationalandstategovernments，standinneedofsomereform，toquickenthelegislativeactionintheadministrationofjustice；and，that[*3：542]somemodeoughttobeprovided，bywhichapecuniaryrightagainstastate，oragainsttheUnitedStates，mightbeascertained，andestablishedbythejudicialsentenceofsomecourt；
　　andwhensoascertainedandestablished，thepaymentmightbeenforcedfromthenationaltreasurybyanabsoluteappropriation。Surely，itcanaffordnopleasantsourceofreflectiontoanAmericancitizen，proudofhisrightsandprivileges，thatinamonarchythejudiciaryisclothedwithamplepowerstogiveredresstothehumblestsubjectinamatterofprivatecontract，orpropertyagainstthecrown；and，thatinarepublicthereisanutterdenialofjustice，insuchcases，toanycitizenthroughtheinstrumentalityofanyjudicialprocess。Hemaycomplain；buthecannotcompelahearing。Therepublicenjoysadespoticsovereigntytoact，orrefuse，asitmayplease；andisplacedbeyondthereachoflaw。Themonarchbowstothelaw，andiscompelledtoyieldhisprerogativeatthefootstoolofjustice。***[*3：541]AsuitagainstthestatehasbeenallowedinVirginiaandMaryland，andsomeotherstatesbystatute。Butitisintimated，that，evenwhenjudgmenthaspassedinfavouroftheclaimant，hehassometimesreceivednosubstantialbenefitfromthejudgment，fromtheomissionofthelegislaturetoprovidesuitablefunds，ortomakesuitableappropriationstodischargethedebt。**[*3：542]Mr。ChiefJusticeJay，inhisopinioninthegreatcaseofChisholm’sExecutorsv。Georgia，takesadistinctionbetweenthecaseofthesuabilityofastate，andthesuabilityoftheUnitedStates，byacitizenundertheconstitution，affirmingtheformer，anddenyingthelatter。Hisreasonisthusstated。"Inallcasesofactionsagainststates，orindividualcitizens，thenationalcourtsaresupportedinalltheirlegalandconstitutionalproceedingsandjudgments，bythearmoftheexecutivepowersoftheUnitedStates。ButincasesofactionsagainsttheUnitedStates，thereisnopower，whichthecourtscancalltotheiraid。Fromthisdistinction，importantconclusionserededucible；andtheyplacethecaseofastate，andtheeaseoftheUnitedStates，inaverydifferentview。"InthecaseofMacbeathv。Haldimand，LordMansfieldseemedtointimategreatdoubts，whether，apetitionofrightwouldlieinEnglandinanycase，exceptofaprivatedebtduefromthecrown；andnotfordebtscontractedundertheauthorityofparliament。Beforetherevolution，hesaid，"allthepublicsuppliesweregiventotheking，who，in[*3：543]hisindividualcapacitycontractedforallexpenses。Healonehadthedispositionofthepublicmoney。Butsincethattime，thesupplieshadbeenappropriatedbyparliamenttoparticularpurposes；andnow，whoeveradvancesmoneyforthepublicservice，truststothefaithofparliament。"Sec。1673。Thenextclauseextendsthejudicialpower"tocontroversiesbetweentwoormorestates；betweenastateandthecitizensofanotherstate；betweencitizensofdifferentstates，claiminglandsundergrantsofdifferentstates；andbetweenastateorthecitizensthereof，andforeignstates，citizens，orsubjects。"Ofthese，wewillspeakintheirorder。
　　And，first，"controversiesbetweentwoormorestates。"*ThispowerseemstobeessentialtothepreservationofthepeaceoftheUnion。"History"
　　saystheFederalist，givesusahorridpictureofthedissensionsandprivatewars，whichdistractedanddesolatedGermany，priortotheinstitutionoftheimperialchamberbyMaximilian，towardsthecloseofthefifteenthcentury；andinformsusatthesametimeofthevastinfluenceofthatinstitution，inappeasingthedisorders，andestablishingthetranquillityoftheempire。ThiswasacourtinvestedwithauthoritytodecidefinallyalldifferencesamongthemembersoftheGermanicbody。"Butweneednotgoforillustrationstothehistoryofothercountries。Ourownhaspresented，inpasttimes，abundantproofsoftheirritatingeffects[*3：544]resultingfromterritorialdisputes，andinterferingclaimsofboundarybetweenthestates。Andthereareyetcontroversiesofthissort，whichhavebroughtonaborderwarfare，atoncedangeroustopublicrepose，andincompatiblewiththepublicinterests。*[*3：543]Inthefirstdraftoftheconstitution，thewordsweretocontroversies"betweentwoormorestates，exceptsuchasshallregardterritoryorjurisdiction。"Theexceptionwassubsequentlyabandoned。[*3：544]Sec。1674。Undertheconfederation，authoritywasgiventothenationalgovernment，tohearanddetermine，inthemannerpointedoutinthearticle，inthelastresort，onappeal，alldisputesanddifferencesbetweentwoormorestatesconcerningboundary，jurisdiction，oranyothercausewhatsoever。Beforetheadoptionofthisinstrument，aswellasafterwards，veryirritatingandvexatiouscontroversiesexistedbetweenseveralofthestates，inrespecttosoil，jurisdiction，andboundary；andthreatenedthemostseriouspublicmischiefs。Someofthesecontroversieswereheardanddeterminedbythecourtofcommissioners，appointedbycongress。But，notwithstandingtheseadjudications，theconflictwasmaintainedinsomecases，untilaftertheestablishmentofthepresentconstitution。
　　Sec。1675。Beforetherevolution，controversiesbetweenthecolonies，concerningtheextentoftheirrightsofsoil，territory，jurisdiction，andboundary，undertheirrespectivecharters，wereheardanddeterminedbefore[*3：545]thekingincouncil，whoexercisedoriginaljurisdictiontherein，upontheprinciplesofFeudalsovereignty。Thisjurisdictionwasoftenpracticallyasserted，asinthecaseorthedisputebetweenMassachusettsandNewHampshire，decidedbytheprivycouncil，in1679；andinthecaseofthedisputebetweenNewHampshireandNewYork，in1764。LordHardwickerecognisedthisappellatejurisdictioninthemostdeliberatemanner，inthegreatcaseofPennv。LordBaltimore。Thesamenecessity，whichgaverisetoitinourcolonialstate，mustcontinuetooperatethroughallfuturetime。Sometribunal，exercisingsuchauthority，isessentialtopreventanappealtothesword，andadissolutionofthegovernment。Thatitoughttobeestablishedunderthenational，ratherthanunderthestate，government；or，tospeakmoreproperly，thatitcanbesafelyestablishedundertheformeronly，wouldseemtobeapositionself—evident，andrequiringnoreasoningtosupportit。Itmayjustlybepresumed，thatunderthenationalgovernmentinallcontroversiesofthissort，thedecisionwillbeimpartiallymadeaccordingtotheprinciplesofjustice；andalltheusualandmosteffectualprecautionsaretakentosecurethisimpartiality，byconfidingittothehighestjudicialtribunal。
　　Sec。1676。Next；"controversiesbetweenastateand"thecitizensofanotherstate。""Thereareother[*3：546]sources，"saystheFederalist，"besidesinterferingclaimsofboundary，fromwhichbickeringsandanimositiesmayspringupamongthemembersoftheUnion。Tosomeofthesewehavebeenwitnessesinthecourseofourpastexperience。Itwillbereadilyconjectured，thatIalludetothefraudulentlaws，whichhavebeenpassedintoomanyofthestates。Andthoughtheproposedconstitutionestablishesparticularguardsagainsttherepetitionofthoseinstances，whichhavehithertomadetheirappearance；yetitiswarrantabletoapprehend，thatthespirit，whichproducedthem，willassumenewshapes，thatcouldnotbeforeseen，norspecificallyprovidedagainst。Whateverpracticesmayhaveatendencytodistracttheharmonyofthestatesareproperobjectsoffederalsuperintendenceandcontrol。ItmaybeesteemedthebasisoftheUnion，that’thecitizensofeachstateshallbeentitledtoalltheprivilegesandimmunitiesofcitizensoftheseveralstates。’Andifitbeajustprinciple，thateverygovernmentoughttopossessthemeansofexecutingitsownprovisionsbyitsownauthority，itwillfollow，that，inordertotheinviolablemaintenanceofthatequalityofprivilegesandimmunities，towhichthecitizensoftheUnionwillbeentitled，thenationaljudiciaryoughttopresideinallcases，inwhichonestate，oritscitizens，areopposedtoanotherstate，oritscitizens。Tosecurethefulleffectofsofundamentalaprovisionagainstallevasionandsubterfuge，itisnecessary，thatitsconstructionshouldbecommittedtothattribunal，which，havingnolocalattachments，willbelikelytobeimpartialbetweenthedifferentstatesandtheircitizens，andwhich，owingitsofficialexistencetotheUnion，[*3：547]willneverbelikelytofeelanybiasinauspicioustotheprinciples，onwhichitisfounded。"Itisadded，"Thereasonablenessoftheagencyofthenationalcourtsincases，inwhichthestatetribunalscannotbesupposedtobeimpartial，speaksforit。
　　Nomanoughtcertainlytobeajudgeinhisowncause，orinanycause，inrespecttowhichhehastheleastinterestorbias。Thisprinciplehasnoinconsiderableweightindesignatingthefederalcourts，asthepropertribunalsforthedeterminationofcontroversiesbetweendifferentstatesandtheircitizens。"
　　Sec。1677。Andhereamostimportantquestionofaconstitutionalnaturewasformerlylitigated；andthatis，whetherthejurisdictiongivenbytheconstitutionincases，inwhichastateisaparty，extendedtosuitsbroughtagainstastate，aswellasbyit，orwasexclusivelyconfinedtothelatter。Itisobvious，that，ifasuitcouldbebroughtbyanycitizenofonestateagainstanotherstateuponanycontract，ormatterofproperty，thestatewouldbeconstantlysubjectedtojudicialaction，toenforceprivaterightsagainstitinitssovereigncapacity。Accordinglyataveryearlyperiodnumeroussuitswerebroughtagainststatesbytheircreditorstoenforcethepaymentofdebts，orotherclaims。Thequestionwas，made，andmostelaboratelyconsideredinthecelebratedcaseofChisholmv。Georgia；
　　andthemajorityoftheSupremeCourtheld，thatthejudicialpowerundertheconstitutionappliedequallytosuitsbroughtby，andagainstastate。
　　Thelearnedjudges，onthat[*3：548]occasion，deliveredseriatimopinions，containingthegroundsoftheirrespectiveopinions。Itisnotmyintentiontogooverthesegrounds，thoughtheyarestatedwithgreatabilityandlegal。learning，andexhibitaverythoroughmasteryofthewholesubject。*
　　Thedecisioncreatedgeneralalarmamongthestates；andanamendmentwasproposed，andratifiedbythestates，bywhichthepowerwasentirelytakenaway，sofarasitregardssuitsbroughtagainstastate。Itisinthefollowingwords："ThejudicialpoweroftheUnitedStatesshallnotbeconstruedtoextendtoanysuitinlaw，orequity，commencedorprosecutedagainstoneoftheUnitedStatesbycitizensofanotherstate，orbycitizens，orsubjectsofanyforeignstate。"Thisamendmentwasconstruedtoincludesuitsthenpending，aswellassuitstobecommencedthereafter；andaccordinglyallthesuitsthenpendingweredismissed，withoutanyfurtheradjudication。***Althoughthecontroversyisnowended，theopinionsdeserveamostattentiveperusal，fromtheirveryableexpositionofmanyconstitutionalprinciples。Itisremarkable，thattheFederalistNo。81，seemstohavetakentheoppositegroundfromtiremajorityofthejudges，holding，thatthestateswerenotsuable，butmightthemselvessueunderthisclauseoftheconstitution。*Iconfessitseemstomedifficulttoreconcilethispositionwiththereasoningonthesamesubjectintheprecedingnumber，80，apartofwhichisquotedinthetextSec。1676。Mr。JusticeIredell，whodissentedfromtheotherjudgesoftheSupremeCourt，inChisholmv。
　　Georgia，puthisopinionmainlyontheground，thatitwasasuitforadebt，forwhichnoactionlay，atleastcompulsively，atthecommonlawagainstthecrown，butatmost，onlyapetitionofright；andinAmerica，whoevercontractswithastatetruststothegoodfaithofthestate。**ThehistoryandreasonsofthisamendmentaresuccinctlystatedbyMr。ChiefJusticeMarshall，inCohensv。Virginia。[*3：549]Sec。1678。Sincethisamendmenthasbeenmade，aquestionofequalimportancehasarisen；andthatis，whethertheamendmentappliestooriginalsuitsonlybroughtagainstastate，leavingtheappellatejurisdictionoftheSupremeCourtinitsfullvigouroverallconstitutionalquestions，arisingintheprogressofanysuitbroughtbyastateinanystatecourtagainstanyprivatecitizenoralien。Butthisquestionwillmoreproperlycomeunderreview，whenweareconsideringthenatureandextentoftheappellatejurisdictionoftheSupremeCourt。Atpresent，itisonlynecessarytostate，thatithasbeensolemnlyadjudged，thattheamendment。appliesonlytooriginalsuitsagainstastate；anddoesnottouchtheappellatejurisdictionoftheSupremeCourttoreexamine，onanappealorwritoferror，ajudgmentordecreerenderedinanystatecourt，inasuitbroughtoriginallybyastateagainstanyprivateperson。
　　Sec。1679。Anotherinquirysuggestedbytheoriginalclause，aswellasbytheamendment，is，whenastateisproperlytobedeemedapartytoasuit，soastoavailitselfof，ortoexemptitselffrom，theoperationofthejurisdictionconferredbytheconstitution。Tosuchaninquiry，theproperansweris，thatastate，inthesenseoftheconstitution，isapartyonly，whenitisontherecordassuch；anditsues，orissuedinitspoliticalcapacity。Itisnotsufficient，thatitmayhaveaninterestinasuitbetweenotherpersons，orthatitsrights，powers，privileges，orduties，comethereinincidentallyinquestion。Itmustbeintermsaplaintiffordefendant，sothatthejudgment，ordecreemaybebindinguponit，asitisincommonsuitsbindinguponpartiesandprivies。Thepointarosein[*3：550]anearlystateofthegovernment，Inasuitbetweenprivatepersons，whereonepartyassertedthelandincontroversytobeinConnecticutandtheotherinNewYork；andthecourtheld，thatneitherstatecouldbeconsideredasaparty。Ithasbeenagaindiscussedinsomelatecases；andthedoctrinenowfirmlyestablishedis，thatastateisnotapartyinthesenseoftheconstitution，unlessitappearsontherecord，assuch，eitherasplaintiffordefendant。Itis。notsufficient，thatitmayhaveaninterestinthecause，orthatthepartiesbeforethecourtaresuedforactsdone，asagentsofthestate。*Inshort，theveryimmunityofastatefrom[*3：551]beingmadeaparty，constitutes，ormayconstitute，asolidground，whythesuitshouldbemaintainedagainstotherparties，whoactashaagents，orclaimunderitstitle；thoughotherwise，astheprincipal，itmightbefit；thatthestateshouldbemadeapartyuponthecommonprinciplesofacourtofequity。*[*3：550]ThereasoningofMr。ChiefJusticeMarshallinOsbornv。
　　BankofUnitedStatesonthispointisveryfullandsatisfactory，anddeservestobecitedatlarge。Itisonlynecessarytopremise，thatthesuitwanabillinequitybroughtbytheBankoftheUnitedStateagainstOsbornandothers，asstateofficers，foraninjunctionandotherrelief，theyhavingleviedataxofonehundredthousanddollarsoncertainpropertyofthebank，underastatelawofthestateofOhio。"Weproceednow，"
　　saidtheChiefJustice，"tothe6thpointmadebytheappellants，whichis，thatifanycaseismadeinthebillproperfortheinterferenceofcourtofchanceryitisagainstthestateofOhio，inwhichcasethecircuitcourtcouldnotexercisejurisdiction。
　　"Thebillisbrought，itissaid，forthepurposeofprotectingthebankintheexerciseofafranchise，grantedbyalawoftileUnitedStates，whichfranchisefilestateofOhioassertsarighttoinvade，andisabouttoinvade。Itpraystheaidofthecourttorestraintheofficerofthestatefromexecutingthelaw。Itis，then，acontroversybetweenthebankandthestateofOhio。Theinterestofthestateisdirectandimmediate，notconsequential。Theprocessofthecourt，thoughnotdirectedagainstthestatebyname，actsdirectlyuponit，byrestrainingitsofficers。
　　Theprocess，therefore，issubstantially，thoughnotinform。againstthelate，andtilecourtoughtnottoproceedwithoutmakingthesuiteaparty。
　　Ifthiscannotbedone，thecourtcannottakejurisdictionofthecause。
　　"Thefullpressureofthisargumentisfelt，andthedifficultiesitpresentsareacknowledged。Thedirectinterestofthestateinthesuit，as[*3：551]brought，isadmitted；and，haditbeeninthepowerofthebanktomakeitaparty，perhapsnodecreeoughttohavebeenpronouncedinthecause，untilthestatewasbeforethecourt。Butthiswasnotinthepowerofthebank。Theeleventhamendmentoftheconstitutionhasexemptedastatefromthesuitsofcitizensofotherstates，oraliens；andtheverydifficultquestionistobedecided，whether，insuchacasethecourtmayactupontheagentsemployedbythestate，andonthepropertyintheirhands。
　　"Beforewetrythisquestionbytheconstitution，ittonynotbetimemisapplied，ifwepauseforamoment，andreflectontherelativesituationoftheUnionwithitsmembersshouldtheobjectionprevail。
　　"Adenialofjurisdictionforbidsallinquiryintothenatureofthecase。Itappliestocasesperfectlyclearinthemselves；tocases，wherethegovernmentisintheexerciseofitsbestestablishedandmostessentialpowers，aswellastothose，whichmaybedeemedquestionable。Itasserts，thattheagentsofastate，allegingtheauthorityofalawvoidinitself，becauserepugnanttotheconstitution，mayarresttheexecutionofanylawoftheUnitedStates。Itmaintains，that，ifastateshallimposeafineorpenaltyonanypersonemployedintheexecutionofanylawoftheUnitedStates，itmaylevythatfineorpenaltybyaministerialofficer，withoutthesanctionevenofitsowncourts；andthattheindividual，thoughheperceivestheapproachingdanger，canobtainnoprotectionfromthejudicialdepartmentofthegovernment。Thecarrierofthemail，thecollectoroftherevenue，themarshalofadistrict，therecruitingofficer，tonyallbeinhibited，underruinouspenalties，fromtheperformanceoftheirrespectiveduties；thewarrantofaministerialofficermayauthorizethecollectionofthesepenalties；andthepersonthusobstructedintheperformanceofhisduty，mayindeedresorttohisactionfordamages，aftertheinflictionoftheinjury，butcannotavailhimselfofthepreventivejusticeofthenationtoprotecthimintheperformanceofhisduties。EachmemberoftheUnioniscapable，atitswill，of[*3：552]attackingthenation，ofarrestingitsprogressateverystep，ofactingvigorouslyandeffectuallyintheexecutionofitsdesigns，whilethenationstandsnaked，strippedofitsdefensivearmour，andincapableofshieldingitsagent，orexecutingitslaws，otherwisethanbyproceedingswhicheretotakeplacealterthemischiefinperpetratedandwhichmustoftenbeineffectual，fromtheinabilityoftheagentstomakecompensation。
　　"Thesearesaidtobeextremecases；butthecaseatbar，haditbeenputbywayofillustrationinargument，mighthavebeentermedanextremecase；and，ifapenaltyonarevenueoffcarforperforminghisduty，bemoreobviouslywrongthanapenaltyonthebank，itisadifferenceindegree，notinprinciple。Publicsentimentwouldbemoreshockedbytheinflictionofapenaltyonapublicofficerfortimeperformanceofhisduty，thanbytheinflictionofthispenaltyonabank，which，whilecarryingonthefiscaloperationsofthegovernment，isalsotransactingitsownbusiness。But，inbothcases，theofficerlevyingthepenaltyactsunderavoidauthority，andthepowertorestrainhimisdeniedaspositivelyintheone，asintheother。
　　"Thedistinctionbetweenanyextremecase，andthatwhichhasactuallyoccurred，if，indeed，anydifferenceofprinciplecanbesupposedtoexistbetweenthem，disappears，whenconsideringthequestionofjurisdiction；
　　for，ifthecourtsoftheUnitedStatescannotrightfullyprotecttheagents，whoexecuteeverylawauthorizedbytheconstitution，fromthedirectactionofstateagentsinthecollectionofpenalties，theycannotrightfullyprotectthose，whoexecuteanylaw。
　　"Thequestion，then，is，whethertheconstitutionoftimeUnitedStateshasprovidedatribunal，whichcultpeacefullyandrightfullyprotectthose，whoareemployedincarrying，intoexecutionthelawsoftheUnion，fromtheattemptsofaparticularstatetoresisttheexecutionofthoselaws。
　　"ThestateofOhiodeniestileexistenceofthispower；andcontends，thatnopreventiveproceedingswhatever，orproceedingsagainsttheveryproperty，whichmayhavebeenseizedbytimeagentofastate，canbesustainedagainstsuchagent，becausetheywouldbesubstantiallyagainstthestateitself，inviolationofthe11thamendmentoftheconstitution。
　　"ThatthecourtsoftheUnioncannotentertainasuitbroughtagainstastatebyanalien，orthecitizenofanotherStatesisnottobe[*3：553]
　　controverted。Isasuit，broughtagainstanindividual，foranycausewhatever，asuitagainstastate，inthesenseoftheconstitution？
　　"The11thamendmentisthelimitationofapowersupposedtobegrantedintheoriginalinstrument；andtounderstandaccuratelytheextentofthelimitation，itseemspropertodefinethepowerthatislimited。Thewordsoftheconstitution，sofarastheyrespectthisquestion，are，’Thejudicialpowershallextendtocontroversiesbetweentwoormorestates，betweenastateendcitizensofanotherstate，andbetweenastateandforeignstates，citizens，orsubjects。’Asubsequentclausedistributesthepowerpreviouslygranted，andassignstotheSupremeCourtoriginaljurisdictioninthosecases，inwhich’astateshallbeaparty。’Thewordsofthe11thamendmentare，’ThejudicialpoweroftheUnitedStatesshallnotbeconstruedtoextendtoanysuitinlaworequity，commencedorprosecutedagainstoneoftheUnitedStates，bycitizensofanotherstate，orbycitizensorsubjectsofaforeignstate。’
　　"ThebankoftheUnitedStatescontends，thatinallcases，inwhichjurisdictiondependsonthecharacteroftheparty，referenceismadetothepartyontherecord，nottoone，whomaybeinterested，butisnotshownbytherecordtobeaparty。Theappellantsadmit，that。thejurisdictionofthecourtisnotoustedbyanyincidentalorconsequentialinterest，whichastatemayhaveinthedecisiontobemade，butistobeconsideredasaparty，wherethedecisionactsdirectlyandimmediatelyuponthestate，throughitsofficers。
　　"IfthisquestionweretobedeterminedontheauthorityofEnglishdecisions，itisbelieved，thatnocasecanbeadduced，whereanypersonhasbeenconsideredasaparty，whoisnotmadesointherecord。Butthecourtwillnotreviewthosedecisions，becauseitisthoughtaquestiongrowingoutoftheconstitutionoftheUnitedStates，requiresratheranattentiveconsiderationofthewordsofthatinstrument，thanofthedecisionsofanalogousquestionsbythecourtsofanyothercountry。
　　"Dotheprovisions，then，oftheAmericanconstitution，respectingcontroversies，towhichastatemaybeaparty，extend，onafairconstructionofthatinstrument，tocasesinwhichthestateisnotapartyontherecord？Thefirstintheenumeration，isacontroversybetweentwoormorestates。
　　Therearenotmanyquestions，inwhichastatewould[*3：554]besupposedtotakeadeeperormoreimmediateinterest，thaninthose，whichdecideontheextentofherterritory。Yettheconstitution，notconsideringthestateasapartytosuchcontroversies，ifnotplaintiffordefendantontherecord，hasexpresslygivenjurisdictioninthosebetweencitizensclaiminglandsundergrantsofdifferentstates。Ifeachstate，inconsequenceoftheinfluenceofadecisiononherboundary，hadbeenconsidered，bytheframersoftheconstitution，asapartytothatcontroversy，theexpressgrantofjurisdictionwouldhavebeenuseless。Thegrantofitcertainlyproves，thattireconstitutiondoesnotconsiderthestateasapartyinsuchacase。Jurisdictionisexpresslygranted，inthosecasesonly，wherecitizensofthesamestateclaimlandsundergrantsofdifferentstates。