Sec。1579。ThereasoningoftheFederalistonthispointissoclearandsatisfactory，andpresentsthewholeargumentinsocondensedaform，thatitsupersedesallfartherformaldiscussion。"Fromabody，whichhadevenapartialagencyinpassingbadlaws，wecouldrarelyexpectadispositiontotemperandmoderatethemintheapplication。Thesamespirit，whichhadoperatedinmakingthem，wouldbetooapttoinfluencetheirconstruction；
　　stilllesscoulditbeexpected，thatmen，whohadinfringedtheconstitution，inthecharacteroflegislators，wouldbedisposedtorepairthebreachinthatofjudges。Noristhisall。Everyreason，whichrecommendsthetenureofgoodbehaviourforjudicialoffices，militatesagainstplacingthejudiciarypower，inthelastresort，inabodycomposedofmenchosenforalimitedperiod。Thereisanabsurdityinreferringthedeterminationofcauses，inthefirstinstance，tojudgesofpermanentstanding；inthelast，tothoseofatemporaryandmutableconstitution。Andthereisastillgreaterabsurdityinsubjectingthedecisionsofmenselectedfortheknowledgeofthelaws，acquiredbylongandlaboriousstudy，totherevisionandcontrolofmen，who，forwantofthesameadvantage，cannotbutbedeficientinthatknowledge。Themembersofthelegislaturewillrarelybechosenwithaviewtothosequalifications，whichfitmenforthestationsofjudges；andas，onthisaccount，therewillbegreat[*3：445]
　　reasontoapprehendalltheillconsequencesofdefectiveinformation；
　　so，onaccountofthenaturalpropensityofsuchbodiestopartydivisions，therewillbenolessreasontofear，thatthepestilentialbreathoffactionmaypoisonthefountainsofjustice。Thehabitofbeingcontinuallymarshalledonoppositesides，willbetooapttostiflethevoicebothoflawandequity。
　　Sec。1580。"Theseconsiderationsteachustoapplaudthewisdomofthosestates，whohavecommittedthejudicialpower，inthelastresort，nottoapartofthelegislature，buttodistinctandindependentbodiesofmen。Contrarytothesuppositionofthose，whohaverepresentedtheplanoftheconvention，inthisrespect，asnovelandunprecedented，itisbutacopyoftheconstitutionsofNewHampshire，Massachusetts，Pennsylvania，Delaware，Maryland，Virginia，NorthCarolina，SouthCarolina，andGeorgia；
　　andthepreference，whichhasbeengiventothesemodels，ishighlytobecommended。**AtthepresenttimethesameschemeoforganizingthejudicialpowerexistssubstantiallyineverystateintheUnion，exceptinNewYork。Sec。1581。"Itisnottrue，inthesecondplace，thattheparliamentofGreatBritain，orthelegislaturesoftheparticularstates，canrectifytheexceptionabledecisionsoftheirrespectivecourts，inanyothersense，thanmightbedonebyafuturelegislatureoftheUnitedStates。Thetheory，neitheroftheBritishnorthestateconstitutions，authorizestherevisalofajudicialsentencebyalegislativeact。Noristhereanythingintheproposedconstitution，morethanineitherofthem，bywhichitisforbidden。Intheformer，asinthelatter，theimproprietyofthething，onthegeneralprinciplesoflawandreason，isthesoleobstacle。Alegislature，withoutexceedingitsprovince，cannot[*3：446]reverseadetermination，oncemade，inaparticularcase；though。itmayprescribeanewruleforfuturecases。Thisistheprinciple，anditapplies，inallitsconsequences，exactlyinthesamemannerandextenttothestategovernments，astothenationalgovernment，nowunderconsideration。Nottheleastdifferencecanbepointedoutinanyviewofthesubject。
　　Sec，1582。"Itmay，inthelastplace，beobserved，thatthesupposeddangerofjudiciaryencroachmentsonthelegislativeauthority，whichhasbeenuponmanyoccasionsreiterated，is，inreality，aphantom。Particularmisconstructionsandcontraventionsofthewillofthelegislaturemaynowandthenhappen；buttheycanneverbesoextensive，astoamounttoaninconvenience，or，inanysensibledegree，toaffecttheorderofthepoliticalsystem。Thismaybeinferredwithcertaintyfromthegeneralnatureofthejudicialpower；fromtheobjects，towhichitrelates；fromthemanner，inwhichitisexercised；fromitscomparativeweakness；andfromitstotalincapacitytosupportitsusurpationsbyforce。Andtheinferenceisgreatlyfortifiedbytheconsiderationoftheimportantconstitutionalcheck，whichthepowerofinstitutingimpeachmentsinonepartofthelegislativebody，andofdetermininguponthemintheother，wouldgivetothatbodyuponthemembersofthejudicialdepartment。Thisisaloneacompletesecurity。
　　Therenevercanbedanger，thatthejudges，byaseriesofdeliberateusurpationsontheauthorityofthelegislature，wouldhazardtheunitedresentmentofthebodyintrustedwithit，whilethisbodywaspossessedofthemeansofpunishingtheirpresumption，bydegradingthemfromtheirstations。
　　Whilethisoughttoremoveallapprehensionsonthesubject，itaffords，atthesametime，acogentargument[*3：447]forconstitutingthesenateacourtforthetrialofimpeachments。"
　　Sec。1583。InregardtothepowerofconstitutinginferiorcourtsoftheUnion，itisevidentlycalculatedtoobviatethenecessityofhavingrecoursetotheSupremeCourtineverycaseoffederalcognizance。Itenablesthe’nationalgovernmenttoinstitute，orauthorize，ineachstateordistrictoftheUnitedStates，atribunalcompetenttothedeterminationofallmattersofnationaljurisdictionwithinitslimits。Oneoftwocoursesonlycouldbeopenforadoption；eithertocreateinferiorcourtsunderthenationalauthority，toreachallcasesfitforthenationaljurisdiction，whicheitherconstitutionally，orconveniently，couldnotbeoforiginalcognizanceintheSupremeCourt；ortoconfidejurisdictionofthesamecasestothestatecourts，witharightofappealtotheSupremeCourt。
　　Tothelattercoursesolidobjectionswerethoughttoapply，whichrendereditineligibleandunsatisfactory。Inthefirstplace，thejudgesofthestatecourtswouldbewhollyirresponsibletothenationalgovernmentfortheirconductintheadministrationofnationaljustice；so，thatthenationalgovernmentwould，ormightbe，whollydependentuponthegoodwill，orsounddiscretionofthestates，inregardtotheefficiency，promptitude，andability，withwhichthejudicialauthorityofthenationwasadministered。
　　Inthenextplace，theprevalencyofalocal，orsectionalspiritmightbefoundtodisqualifythestatetribunalsforasuitabledischargeofnationaljudicialfunctions；andtheverymodesofappointmentofsomeofthestatejudgesmightrenderthemimproperchannelsofthejudicialauthorityoftheUnion。[*3：448]Statejudges，holdingtheirofficesduringpleasure，orfromyeartoyear，orforothershortperiods，would，oratleastmight，betoolittleindependenttoberelieduponforaninflexibleexecutionofthenationallaws。Whatcouldbedone，wherethestateitselfshouldhappentobeinhostilitytothenationalgovernment，asmightwellbepresumedoccasionallytobethecase，fromlocalinterests，partyspirit，orpeculiarprejudices，ifthestatetribunalsweretobethesoledepositariesofthejudicialpowersoftheUnion，intheordinaryadministrationofcriminal，aswellasofciviljustice？Besides；ifthestatetribunalswerethusentrustedwiththeordinaryadministrationofthecriminalandciviljusticeoftheUnion，therewouldbeanecessityforleavingthedoorofappealaswidelyopen，aspossible。Inproportiontothegroundsofconfidencein，ordistrustofthesubordinatetribunals，oughttobethefacilityordifficultyofappeals。Anunrestrainedcourseofappealswouldbeasourceofmuchprivate，aswellaspublicinconvenience。Itwouldencouragelitigation，andleadtothemostoppressiveexpenses。Norshoulditbeomitted，thatthisverycourseofappealswouldnaturallyleadtogreatjealousies，irritations，andcollisionsbetweenthestatecourtsandtheSupremeCourt，notonlyfromdifferencesofopinions，butfromthatprideofcharacter，andconsciousnessofindependence，whichwouldbefeltbystatejudges，possessingtheconfidenceoftheirownstate，andirresponsibletotheUnion。**MrRawlehasremarked，that"thestatetribunalsarenopartofthegovernmentoftheUnitedStates。Torenderthegovernmentof。theUnitedStatesdependentonthem，wouldbeasolecismalmostasgreat，astoleaveoutanexecutivepowerentirely，andtocallonthestatesalonetoenforcethelawsortheUnion。"[*3：449]Sec。1584。Inconsideringthefirstclauseofthethirdsection，declaring，that"thejudicialpoweroftheUnitedStatesshallbevestedinoneSupremeCourt，andinsuchinferiorcourts，asthecongressmayfromtimetotimeordainandestablish，"wearenaturallyledtotheinquiry，whethercongresspossessanydiscretion，astothecreationofaSupremeCourtandinferiorcourts，inwhomtheconstitutionaljurisdictionistobevested。Thiswasatonetimematterofmuchdiscussion；andisvitaltotheexistenceofthejudicialdepartment。Ifcongresspossessanydiscretiononthissubject，itisobvious，thatthejudiciary，asacoordinatedepartmentofthegovernment，may，atthewillofcongress，beannihilated，orstrippedofallitsimportantjurisdiction；for，ifthediscretionexists，noonecansayinwhatmanner，oratwhattime，orunderwhatcircumstancesitmay，oroughttobeexercised。Thewholeargument，uponwhichsuchaninterpretationhasbeenattemptedtobemaintained，is，thatthelanguageoftheconstitution，"shallbevested，"isnotimperative，butsimplyindicatesthefuturetense。
　　ThisinterpretationhasbeenoverruledbytheSupremeCourt，uponsolemndeliberation。*"Thelanguageofthethirdarticle，"saythecourt，"throughoutismanifestlydesignedtobemandatoryuponthelegislature。Itsobligatoryforceissoimperative，thatcongresscouldnot，withoutaviolationofitsduty，haverefusedtocarryitintooperation。ThejudicialpoweroftheUnitedStatesshallbevestednotmaybevestedinoneSupremeCourt，andinsuchinferiorcourts，ascongress[*3：450]may，fromtimetotime，ordainandestablish。CouldcongresshavelawfullyrefusedtocreateaSupremeCourt，ortovestinittheconstitutionaljurisdiction？’Thejudges，bothofthesupremeandinferiorcourts，shallholdtheirofficesduringgoodbehaviour，andshall，atstatedtimes，receive，fortheirservices，acompensation，whichshallnotbediminishedduringtheircontinuanceinoffice。’Couldcongresscreateorlimitanyothertenureofthejudicialoffice？Couldtheyrefusetopay，atstatedtimes，thestipulatedsalary，ordiminishitduringthecontinuanceinoffice？Butoneanswercanbegiventothesequestions；itmustbeinthenegative。Theobjectoftheconstitutionwastoestablishthreegreatdepartmentsofgovernment；thelegislative，theexecutive，andthejudicialdepartment。Thefirstwastopasslaws，thesecondtoapproveandexecutethem，andthethirdtoexpoundandenforcethem。Withoutthelatter，itwouldbeimpossibletocarryintoeffectsomeoftheexpressprovisionsoftheconstitution。How，otherwise，couldcrimesagainsttheUnitedStatesbetriedandpunished？
　　Howcouldcausesbetweentwostatesbeheardanddetermined？Thejudicialpowermust，therefore，bevestedinsomecourtbycongress；andtosuppose，thatitwasnotanobligationbindingonthem，butmight，attheirpleasure，beomitted，ordeclined，istosuppose，that，underthesanctionoftheconstitution，theymightdefeattheconstitutionitself。Aconstruction，whichwouldleadtosucharesult，cannotbesound。*[*3：449]TheCommentator，inexaminingthestructureandjurisdictionofthejudicialdepartment，iscompelledbyasenseofofficialreservetoconfinehisremarkschieflytodoctrines，whicharesettled，orwhichhavebeendeemedincontrovertible，leavingotherstobediscussedbythose，whoareunrestrainedbysuchconsiderations。[*3：450]Sec。1585。"Thesameexpression，’shallbevested，’occursinotherpartsoftheconstitution，indefiningthepowersoftheothercoordinatebranchesofthegovernment。Thefirstarticledeclares，that’alllegislativepowershereingrantedshallbevestedinacongressoftheUnitedStates。’
　　Willitbecontended，thatthe[*3：451]legislativepowerisnotabsolutelyvested？thatthewordsmerelyrefertosomefutureact，andmeanonly，thatthelegislativepowermayhereafterbevested？Thesecondarticledeclares，that’theexecutivepowershallhevestedinapresidentoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica。’Couldcongressvestitinanyotherperson；
　　or，isittoawaittheirgoodpleasure，whetheritistovestatall？Itisapparent，thatsuchaconstruction，ineithercase，wouldbeutterlyinadmissible。Why，then，isitentitledtoabettersupportinreferencetothejudicialdepartment？
　　Sec。1586。If，then，itisadutyofcongresstovestthejudicialpoweroftheUnitedStates，itisadutytovestthewholejudicialpower。Thelanguage，ifimperative，astoonepart，isimperative，astoall。Ifitwereotherwise，thisanomalywouldexist，thatcongress。mightsuccessivelyrefusetovestthejurisdictioninanyoneclassofcasesenumeratedintheconstitution，andtherebydefeatthejurisdiction，astoall；fortheconstitutionhasnotsingledoutanyclass，onwhichcongressareboundtoactinpreferencetoothers。
　　Sec。1587。"Thenextconsiderationisastothecourts，inwhichthejudicialpowershallbevested。Itismanifest，thatasupremecourtmustbeestablished；butwhetheritbeequallyobligatorytoestablishinferiorcourts，isaquestionofsomedifficulty。Ifcongressmaylawfullyomittoestablishinferiorcourts，itmightfollow，that，insomeoftheenumeratedcases，thejudicialpowercouldnowhereexist。Thesupremecourtcanhaveoriginaljurisdictionintwoclassesofcasesonly，viz。incasesaffectingambassadors，otherpublicministersandconsuls，andincases，inwhichastateisaparty。CongresscannotvestanyportionofthejudicialpoweroftheUnitedStates，exceptincourtsordainedandestablishedbyitself；
　　andif，inanyofthe[*3：452]casesenumeratedintheconstitution，thestatecourtsdidnotthenpossessjurisdiction，theappellatejurisdictionofthesupremecourtadmittingthatitcouldactonstatecourtscouldnotreachthosecases；and，consequently，theinjunctionoftheconstitution，thatthejudicialpower’shallbevested，’wouldbedisobeyed。Itwouldseem，therefore，tofollow，thatcongressareboundtocreatesomeinferiorcourts，inwhichtovestallthatjurisdiction，which，undertheconstitution，isexclusivelyvestedintheUnitedStates，andofwhichtheSupremeCourtcannottakeoriginalcognizance。Theymightestablishoneormoreinferiorcourts；theymightparceloutthejurisdictionamongsuchcourts，fromtimetotime，attheirownpleasure。ButthewholejudicialpoweroftheUnitedStatesshouldbe，atalltimes，vestedeitherinanoriginalorappellateform，insomecourtscreatedunderitsauthority。
　　Sec。1588。"Thisconstructionwillbefortifiedbyanattentiveexaminationofthesecondsectionofthethirdarticle。Thewordsare’thejudicialpowershallextend，’etc。Muchminuteandelaboratecriticismhasbeenemployeduponthesewords。Ithasbeenargued，thattheyareequivalenttothewords’mayextend，’andthat’extend’meanstowidentonewcasesnotbeforewithinthescopeofthepower。Forthereasons，whichhavebeenalreadystated，weareofopinion，thatthewordsareusedinanimperativesense。Theyimportanabsolutegrantofjudicialpower。Theycannothavearelativesignificationapplicabletopowersalreadygranted；fortheAmericanpeoplehadnotmade。anypreviousgrant。Theconstitutionwasforanewgovernment，organizedwithnewsubstantivepowers，andnotameresupplementarychartertoagovernmentalreadyexisting。Theconfederationwasacompactbetweenstates；anditsstructureandpowerswere[*3：453]
　　whollyunlikethoseofthenationalgovernment。TheconstitutionwasanactofthepeopleoftheUnitedStatestosupersedetheconfederation，andnottobeingraftedonit，asastockthroughwhichitwastoreceivelifeandnourishment。
　　Sec。1589。"If，indeed，therelativesignificationcouldbefixedupontheterm’extend，’itwouldnotasweshallhereafterseesubservethepurposesoftheargument，insupportofwhichithasbeenadduced。Thisimperativesenseofthewords’shallextend，’isstrengthenedbythecontext。
　　Itisdeclared，that’inallcasesaffectingambassadors，&；，c，thesupremecourtshallhaveoriginaljurisdiction。’Couldcongresswithholdoriginaljurisdictioninthesecasesfromthesupremecourt？Theclauseproceeds—’inalltheothercasesbeforementionedthesupremecourtshallhaveappellatejurisdiction，bothastolawandfact，withsuchexceptions，andundersuchregulations，asthecongressshallmake。’Theveryexceptionhereshows，thattheframersoftheconstitutionusedthewordsinanimperativesense。Whatnecessitycouldthereexistforthisexception，iftheprecedingwordswerenotusedinthatsense？Withoutsuchexception，congresswould，bytheprecedingwords，havepossessedacompletepowertoregulatetheappellatejurisdiction，ifthelanguagewereonlyequivalenttothewords’mayhave’appellatejurisdiction。Itisapparent，then，thattheexceptionwasintendedasalimitationupontheprecedingwords，toenablecongresstoregulateandrestraintheappellatepower，asthepublicinterestsmight，fromtimetotime，require。
　　Sec。1590。"Otherclausesintheconstitutionmightbebroughtinaidofthisconstruction；butaminuteexaminationofthemcannotbenecessary，andwouldoccupytoomuchtime。Itwillbefound，that，whenevera[*3：454]
　　particularobjectistobeeffected，thelanguageoftheconstitutionisalwaysimperative，andcannotbedisregarded，withoutviolatingthefirstprinciplesofpublicduty。Ontheotherhand，thelegislativepowersaregiveninlanguagewhichimpliesdiscretion，asfromthenatureoflegislativepowersuchadiscretionmusteverbeexercised。"Weshallpresentlyseetheimportantbearing，whichthisreasoninghasupontheinterpretationofthatsectionoftheconstitution，whichconcernsthejurisdictionofthenationaltribunals。
　　Sec。1591。Theconstitutionhaswiselyestablished，thatthereshallbeoneSupremeCourt，withaviewtouniformityofdecisioninallcaseswhatsoever，belongingtothejudicialdepartment，whethertheyariseatthecommonlaworinequity，orwithintheadmiraltyandprizejurisdiction；
　　whethertheyrespectthedoctrinesofmeremunicipallaw，orconstitutionallaw，orthelawofnations。Itisobvious，that，iftherewereindependentsupremecourtsofcommonlaw，ofequity，andofadmiralty，adiversityofjudgmentmight，andalmostnecessarilywouldspringup，notonly，astothelimitsofthejurisdictionofeachtribunal；butastothefundamentaldoctrinesofmunicipal，constitutional，andpubliclaw。Theeffectofthisdiversitywouldbe，thatadifferentrulewould，ormightbepromulgatedonthemostinterestingsubjectsbytheseveraltribunals；andthusthecitizensbeinvolvedinendlessdoubts，notonlyastotheirprivaterights，butastotheirpublicduties。Theconstitutionitselfwouldormightspeakadifferentlanguageaccordingtothetribunal，whichwascalledupontointerpretit；andthusinterminabledisputesembarrasstheadministrationofjusticethroughoutthewholecountry。*Butthesamereasondidnot[*3：455]
　　applytotheinferiortribunals。Thesewere，therefore，leftentirelytothediscretionofcongress，astotheirnumber，theirjurisdiction，andtheirpowers。Experiencemight，andprobablywould，showgoodgroundsforvaryingandmodifyingthemfromtimetotime。Itwouldnotonlyhavebeenunwise，butexceedinglyinconvenient，tohavefixedthearrangementofthesecourtsintheconstitutionitself；sincecongresswouldhavebeendisabledtherebyfromadaptingthemfromtimetotimetotheexigenciesofthecountry。But，whatevermaybetheextent，towhichthepowerofcongressreaches，astotheestablishmentofinferiortribunals，itisclearfromwhathasbeenalreadystated，thatallthejurisdictioncontemplatedbythe[*3：456]constitutionmustbevestedinsomeofitscourts，eitherinanoriginal，oranappellateform。*[*3：454]Dr。Paley’sremarks，thoughgeneralintheircharacter，showastrikingcoincidenceofopinionbetweenthewisdomofthenew，andthe[*3：455]wisdomoftheoldworld。Speakingonthesubjectorthenecessityofonesupremeappellatetribunalhesays："But，lastly，ifseveralcourts，coordinatetoandindependentoreachother，subsisttogetherinthecountry，itseemsnecessary，thattheappealsfromallofthemshouldmeetandterminateinthesamejudicature；inorder，thatonesupremetribunal，bywhosefinalsentenceallothersarehoundandconcluded，maysuperintendandpresideovertherest。Thisconstitutionisnecessaryfortwopurposes；—topreserveauniformityinthedecisionsofinferiorcourts，andtomaintaintoeachtheproperlimitsoritsjurisdiction。Withoutacommonsuperior，differentcourtsmightestablishcontradictoryrulesoradjudication，andthecontradictionbefinalandwithoutremedy；thesamequestionmightreceiveoppositedeterminations，accordingasitwasbroughtbeforeonecourtoranother，andthedeterminationineachbeultimateandirreversible。Acommonappellantjurisdictionpreventsorputsanendtothisconfusion。Forwhenthejudgmentsuponappealsareconsistent，whichmaybeexpected，whileitisthesamecourt，whichisatlastresortedto，thedifferentcourts，fromwhichtheappealsarebroughtwillbereducedtoalikeconsistencywithoneanother。Moreover，ifquestionsarisebetweencourtsindependentoreachother，concerningtheextentandboundariesoftheirrespectivejurisdiction，aseachwillbedesirousorenlargingit，own，anauthority，whichbothacknowledge，canaloneadjustthecontroversy。Suchapower，therefore，mustresidesomewhere，losttherightsandreposeofthecountrybedistractedbytheendlessoppositionandmutualencroachmentsofitscourtsofjustice。"[*3：456]Sec。1592。Wenextcometotheconsiderationofthosesecurities，whichtheconstitutionhasprovidedforthedueindependenceandefficiencyorthejudicialdepartment。
　　Sec。1593。Themodeofappointmentofthejudgeshasnecessarilycomeunderreview，intheexaminationofthestructureandpowersoftheexecutivedepartment。Thepresidentisexpresslyauthorized，byandwiththeconsentofthesenate，toappointthejudgesoftheSupremeCourt。Theappointmentofthejudgesoftheinferiorcourts，isnotexpresslyprovidedfor；buthaseitherbeenlefttothediscretionofcongress，orsilentlybelongstothepresident，undertheclauseoftheconstitutionauthorizinghimtoappoint"allotherofficersoftheUnitedStates，whoseappointmentsarenothereinotherwiseprovidedfor。"*Intheconvention，apropositionatfirst。prevailed，fortheappointmentofthejudgesoftheSupremeCourtbythesenate，byadecidedmajority。Atalaterperiod，however，uponthereportofacommittee，theappointmentofthejudgesoftheSupremeCourt，wasgiventothepresident，subjecttotheadviceandconsentofthesenate，byaunanimousvote。Thereasonsforthechange，weredoubtlessthesameasthose，which[*3：457]ledtothevestingofotherhighappointmentsintheexecutivedepartment。***[*3：456]WhethertheJudgesoftheinferior。courtsoftheUnitedSlatesaresuchinferiorofficers，astheconstitutioncontemplatestobewithinthepowerofcongress，toprescribethemodeofappointmentofsoastovestitinthepresidentalone，orinthecourtsoflaw，orintheheadsofdepartments，isapoint，uponwhichnosolemnjudgmenthaseverbeenhad。Thepracticalconstructionhasuniformlybeen，thattheyarenotsuchinferiorofficers。Andnoactofcongressprescribesthemodeoftheirappointment。**[*3：457]Mr。ChancellorKenthassummedupthereasoning，infavourofanappointmentofhejudgesbytheexecutive，withhisusualstrength。
　　"Theadvantagesofthemodeofappointmentofpublicofficersbythepresidentandsenatehavebeenalreadyconsidered。Thismodeispeculiarlyfitandproper，inrespecttothejudiciarydepartment。Thejustandvigorousinvestigationandpunishmentofeveryspeciesoffraudandviolence，andtheexerciseofthepowerofcompellingeverymen，tothepunctualperformanceofhiscontracts，aregraveduties，notofthemostpopularcharacter，thoughthefaithfuldischargeofthem，willcertainlycommandthecalmapprobationofthejudiciousobserver。Thefittestmenwouldprobablyhavetoomuchreservednessofmanners，andseverityofmorals，tosecureanelectionrestingonuniversalsuffrage。Norcanthemodeofappointmentbyalargedeliberativeassemblybeentitledtounqualifiedapprobation。Therearetoomanyoccasions，andtoomuchtemptationforintrigue，partyprejudice，andlocalinterests，topermitsuchabodyofmentoact，inrespecttosuchappointments，withasufficientlysingleandsteadyregardforthegeneralwelfare。InancientRome，thepraetorwaschosenannuallybythepeople，butitwasinthecomitiabycenturies；andthechoicewasconfinedtopersonsbelongingtothepatricianorder，untilthecloseofthefourthcenturyofthecity，whentheofficewasrenderedaccessibletotheplebeians；
　　andwhentheybecamelicentious，saysMontesquieu，theofficebecamecorrupt。
　　Thepopularelectionsdidverywell，uheobserves。solongasthepeoplewerefree，andmagnanimous，andvirtuous，andthepublicwaswithoutcorruption。
　　Butallplansofgovernment，whichsupposethepeoplewillalwaysactwithwisdomandintegrity，areplainlyUtopian，andcontrarytouniformexperience。
　　Governmentmustbeframedforman，asheis，andnotforman，ashewouldbe，ifhewerefreefromvice。Withoutreferringtothosecasesinourowncountry，wherejudgeshavebeenannuallyelectedbyapopularassembly，wemaytakethelessinvidiouscaseofSweden。Duringthediets，whichprecededtherevolutionin1772，thestatesofthekingdomsometimesappointedcommissionerstoactasjudges。Thestrongestparty，saysCatteau，prevailedinthetrials，thatcamebeforethem；andpersonscondemnedbyonetribunalwereacquittedbyanother。"Sec。1594。Thenextconsiderationisthetenure，bywhichthejudgesholdtheiroffices。Itisdeclaredthat"thejudges，bothoftheSupremeand[*3：458]InferiorCourtsshallholdtheirofficesduringgoodbehaviour。"*
　　Uponthissubject，theFederalisthasspokenwithsomuchclearnessandforce，thatlittlecanbeaddedtoitsreasoning。"Thestandardofgoodbehaviour，forthecontinuanceinofficeofthejudicialmagistracy，iscertainlyoneofthemostvaluableofthemodernimprovementsinthepracticeofgovernment。Inamonarchy，itisanexcellentbarriertothedespotismoftheprince：inarepublic，itisanolessexcellentbarriertotheencroachmentsandoppressionsoftherepresentativebody。Anditisthebestexpedient，whichcanbedevisedinanygovernment，tosecureasteady，upright，andimpartialadministrationofthelaws。Whoeverattentivelyconsidersthedifferentdepartmentsofpower，mustperceive，thatinagovernment，inwhichtheyareseparatedfromeachother，thejudiciary，fromthenatureofitsfunctions，willalwaysbetheleastdangeroustothepoliticalrightsoftheconstitution；becauseitwillbeleastinacapacitytoannoy，orinjurethem。Theexecutivenotonlydispensesthehonours，butholdstheswordofthecommunity。Thelegislature，notonlycommandsthepurse，butprescribestherules，bywhichthedutiesandrightsofeverycitizenaretoberegulated。Thejudiciary，onthecontrary，hasnoinfluenceovereitherthesword，orthepurse；nodirectioneitherofthestrength，orofthewealthofthesociety；andcantakenoactiveresolutionwhatever。Itmaytrulybesaidtohaveneitherforce，norwill，butmerelyjudgment；andmustultimatelydependupontheaidoftheexecutivearm，fortheefficaciousexerciseevenofthisfaculty。*Fortheinterpretationofthemeaningofthewords，goodbehaviour，seethejudgmentofLordHolt，inHarcourtv。Fox。[*3：459]Sec。1595。"Thissimpleviewofthemattersuggestsseveralimportantconsequences。Itprovesincontestiblythatthejudiciaryis，beyondcomparison，theweakestofthethreedepartmentsofpower；thatitcanneverattackwithsuccesseitheroftheothertwo；andthatallpossiblecareisrequisitetoenableittodefenditselfagainsttheirattacks。Itequallyproves，that，thoughindividualoppressionmaynowandthenproceedfromthecourtsofjustice，thegenerallibertyofthepeoplecanneverbeendangeredfromthatquarter：Imean，solongasthejudiciaryremainstrulydistinctfromboththelegislatureandexecutive。—ForIagree，that’thereisnoliberty，ifthepowerofjudgingbenotseparatedfromthelegislativeandexecutivepowers。’Itproves，inthelastplace，thataslibertycanhavenothingtofearfromthejudiciaryalone，butwouldhaveeverythingtofearfromitsunionwitheitheroftheotherdepartments；that，asalltheeffectsofsuchanunionmustensuefromadependenceoftheformeronthelatter，notwithstandinganominalandapparentseparation；thatas，fromthenaturalfeeblenessofthejudiciary，itisincontinualjeopardyofbeingoverpowered，awed，orinfluencedbyitscoordinatebranches；that，asnothingcancontributesomuchtoitsfirmnessandindependence，aspermanencyinoffice，thisqualitymay，therefore，bejustlyregarded，asanindispensableingredientinitsconstitution；and，inagreatmeasure，asthecitadelofthepublicjusticeandthepublicsecurity。"
　　Sec。1596。"Ifthen，thecourtsofjusticearetobeconsidered，asthebulwarksofalimitedconstitutionagainstlegislativeencroachments；
　　thisconsiderationwillaffordastrongargumentforthepermanenttenureofjudicialoffices，sincenothingwillcontribute，somuch[*3：460]asthis，tothatindependentspiritinthejudges，whichmustbeessentialtothefaithfulperformanceofsoarduousaduty。Thisindependenceofthejudgesisequallyrequisitetoguardtheconstitutionandtherightsofindividualsfromtheeffectsofthoseillhumours，whichtheartsofdesigningmen，ortheinfluenceofparticularconjunctures，sometimesdisseminateamongthepeoplethemselves；andwhich，thoughtheyspeedilygiveplacetobetterinformation，andmoredeliberatereflection，haveatendency，inthemeantime，tooccasiondangerousinnovationsinthegovernment，andseriousoppressionsoftheminorpartyinthecommunity。Though，I
　　trust，thefriendsoftheproposedconstitutionwillneverconcurwithitsenemies，inquestioningthatfundamentalprincipleofrepublicangovernment，whichadmitsthefightofthepeopletoalterorabolishtheestablishedconstitution，whenevertheyfinditinconsistentwiththeirhappiness；
　　yetitisnottobeinferredfromthisprinciple，thattherepresentativesofthepeople，wheneveramomentaryinclinationhappenstolayholdofamajorityoftheirconstituents，incompatiblewiththeprovisionsintheexistingconstitution，would，onthataccount，bejustifiableinaviolationofthoseprovisions；orthatthecourtswouldbeunderagreaterobligationtoconniveatinfractionsinthisshape，thanwhentheyhadproceededwhollyfromthecabalsoftherepresentativebody。Untilthepeoplehave，bysomesolemnandauthoritativeact，annulledorchangedtheestablishedform，itisbindinguponthemselvescollectively，aswellasindividually；andnopresumption，orevenknowledgeoftheirsentiments，canwarranttheirrepresentativesinadeparturefromit，priortosuchanact。Butitiseasytosee，thatitwouldrequireanuncommonportionof[*3：461]fortitudeinthejudgestodotheirduty，asfaithfulguardiansoftheconstitution，wherelegislativeinvasionsofithavebeeninstigatedbythemajorvoiceofthecommunity。
　　Sec。1597。"Butitisnotwithaviewtoinfractionsoftheconstitutiononly，thattheindependenceofthejudgesmaybeanessentialsafeguardagainsttheeffectsofoccasionalillhumoursinthesociety。Thesesometimesextendnofurther，thantotheinjuryoftheprivaterightsofparticularclassesofcitizensbyunjustandpartiallaws。Here，also，thefirmnessofthejudicialmagistracyisofvastimportance，inmitigatingtheseverity，andconfiningtheoperationofsuchlaws。Itnotonlyservestomoderatetheimmediatemischiefsofthose，whichmayhavebeenpassed；butitoperatesasacheckuponthelegislativebodyinpassingthem；who，perceivingthatobstaclestothesuccessofaniniquitousintentionaretobeexpectedfromthescruplesofthecourts，areinamannercompelledbytheverymotivesoftheinjusticetheymeditate，toqualifytheirattempts。Thisisacircumstancecalculatedtohavemoreinfluenceuponthecharacterofourgovernments，thanbutfewmayimagine。Thebenefitsoftheintegrityandmoderationofthejudiciaryhavealreadybeenfeltinmorestatesthanone；andthoughtheymayhavedispleasedthose，whosesinisterexpectationstheymayhavedisappointed，theymusthavecommandedtheesteemandapplauseofallthevirtuousanddisinterested。Consideratemenofeverydescriptionoughttoprizewhateverwilltendtobegetorfortifythattemperinthecourts；asnomancanbesure，thathemaynotbetomorrowthevictimofaspiritofinjustice，bywhichhemaybeagainertoday。Andeverymanmustnowfeel，thattheinevitable[*3：462]tendencyofsuchaspiritistosapthefoundationsofpublicandprivateconfidence，andtointroduceinitssteaduniversaldistrustanddistress。
　　Sec。1598。"Thatinflexibleanduniformadherencetotherightsoftheconstitution，andofindividuals，whichweperceivetobeindispensableinthecourtsofjustice，cancertainlynotbeexpectedfromjudges，whoholdtheirofficesbyatemporarycommission。Periodicalappointments，howeverregulated，orbywhomsoevermade，would，insomewayorother，befataltotheirnecessaryindependence。Ifthepowerofmakingthemwascommittedeithertotheexecutiveorlegislature，therewouldbedangerofanimpropercomplaisancetothebranch，whichpossessedit；iftoboth，therewouldbeanunwillingnesstohazardthedispleasureofeither；iftothepeople，ortopersonschosenbythemforthespecialpurpose，therewouldbetoogreatadispositiontoconsultpopularitytojustifyareliance，thatnothingwouldbeconsulted，buttheconstitutionandthelaws。
　　Sec。1599。"Thereisyetafurtherandaweightyreasonforthepermanencyofjudicialoffices，whichisdeduciblefromthenatureofthequalificationstheyrequire。Ithasbeenfrequentlyremarkedwithgreatpropriety，thatavoluminouscodeoflawsisoneoftheinconveniencesnecessarilyconnectedwiththeadvantagesofafreegovernment。Toavoidanarbitrarydiscretioninthecourts，itisindispensable，thattheyshouldbebounddownbystrictrulesandprecedents，whichservetodefine，andpointouttheirdutyineveryparticularcase，thatcomesbeforethem。Anditwillreadilybeconceived，fromthevarietyorcontroversies，whichgrowoutofthefollyandwickednessofmankind，thattherecordsofthoseprecedentsmustunavoidably[*3：463]
　　swelltoaveryconsiderablebulk，andmustdemandlongandlaboriousstudy，toacquireacompetentknowledgeofthem。Henceitis，thattherecanbebutfewmeninthesociety，whowillhavesufficientskillinthelawstoqualifythemforthestationsofjudges。Andmakingtheproperdeductionsfortheordinarydepravityofhumannature，thenumbermustbestillsmallerofthose，whounitetherequisiteintegritywiththerequisiteknowledge。
　　Theseconsiderationsappriseus，thatthegovernmentcanhavenogreatoptionbetweenfitcharacters；andthatatemporarydurationinoffice，whichwouldnaturallydiscouragesuchcharactersfromquittingalucrativelineofpracticetoacceptaseatonthebench，wouldhaveatendencytothrowtheadministrationofjusticeintohands，lessable，andlesswellqualifiedtoconductitwithutilityanddignity。Inthepresentcircumstancesofthiscountry，andinthose，inwhichitislikelytobeforalongtimetocome，thedisadvantagesonthisscorewouldbegreater，thantheymayatfirstsightappear；butitmustbeconfessed，thattheyarefarinferiortothose，whichpresentthemselvesundertheotheraspectsofthesubject。
　　Sec。1600。"Uponthewhole，therecanbenoroomtodoubt，thattheconventionactedwiselyincopyingfromthemodelsofthoseconstitutions，whichhaveestablishedgoodbehaviour，asthetenureofjudicialofficesinpointofduration；andthat，sofarfrombeingblameableonthisaccount，theirplanwouldhavebeeninexcusablydefective，ifithadwantedthisimportantfeatureofgoodgovernmentTheexperienceofGreatBritainaffordsanillustriouscommentontheexcellenceoftheinstitution。"
　　Sec。1601。Theseremarkswillderiveadditional[*3：464]strengthandconfirmation，fromanearersurveyofthejudicialbranchofforeigngovernments，aswellasoftheseveralstatescomposingtheUnion。InEngland，thekingisconsidered，asthefountainofjustice；notindeedastheauthor，butasthedistributerofit；andhepossessestheexclusiveprerogativeoferectingcourtsofjudicature，andappointingthejudges。Indeed，inearlytimes，thekingsofEnglandofteninpersonheardanddecidedcausesbetweenpartyandparty。Butastheconstitutionofgovernmentbecamemoresettled，thewholejudicialpowerwasdelegatedtothejudgesoftheseveralcourtsofjustice；andanyattempt，onthepartoftheking，nowtoexerciseitinperson，Wouldbedeemedanusurpation。Anciently，theEnglishjudgesheldtheirofficesaccordingtothetenureoftheircommissions，asprescribedbythecrown，whichwasgenerallyduringthepleasureofthecrown，asisthetenureofofficeoftheLordChancellor，thejudgesofthecourtsofadmiralty，andothers，downtothepresentday。InthetimeofLordCoke，theBaronsoftheExchequerheldtheirofficesduringgoodbehaviour，whilethejudgesoftheothercourtsofcommonlawheldthemonlyduringpleasure。Andithasbeensaid，that，atthetimeoftherestorationofCharlestheSecond，thecommissionsofthejudgeswereduringgoodbehaviour。
　　Still，however，itwasatthe[*3：465]pleasureofthecrown，toprescribewhattenureofofficeitmightchoose，untilaftertherevolutionof1688；
　　andtherecanbenodoubt，thatamonarchsoprofligateasCharlestheSecond，wouldavailhimselfoftheprerogative，asoftenasitsuitedhispolitical，orotherobjects。
　　Sec。1602。Itiscertain，thatthispowerofthecrownmusthaveproducedaninfluenceupontheadministration，dangeroustoprivaterights，andsubversiveofthepubliclibertiesofthesubjects。Inpoliticalaccusations，inanespecialmanner，itmustoftenhaveproducedthemostdisgracefulcomplianceswiththewishesofthecrown；andthemosthumiliatingsurrendersoftherightsoftheaccused。*TheStatuteprovided，thatthecommissionsofthejudgesofthecourtsofcommonlawshouldnotbeasformerlydurantebeneplacito，butshouldbequamdinbenesegesserint，andtheirsalariesbeascertained，andestablished。Theyweremaderemoveable，however，bytheking，upontheaddressofbothhousesofparliament；andtheirofficesexpiredbythedemiseoftheking。AfterwardsbyastatuteenactedinthereignofGeorgetheThird，attheearnestrecommendationoftheking，anobleimprovementwasmadeinthelaw，bywhichthejudgesaretoholdtheirofficesduringgoodbehaviour，notwithstandinganydemiseofthecrown；andtheirfullsalariesaresecuredtothem，duringthecontinuanceoftheircommissions。Uponthatoccasion，themonarchmadeadeclaration，worthyofperpetual[*3：466]remembrance，that"helookedupontheindependenceanduprightnessofthejudges，asessentialtotheimpartialadministrationofjustice；asoneofthebestsecuritiesoftherightsandlibertiesofhissubjects；andasmostconducivetothehonourofthecrown。"Indeed，sincetheindependenceofthejudgeshasbeensecuredbythispermanentdurationofoffice，theadministrationofjusticehas，withasingleexception，flowedoninEngland，withanuninterrupted，andpure，andunstainedcurrent。
　　Itisduetotheenlightenedtribunalsofthatnationtodeclare，thattheirlearning，integrity，andimpartiality，havecommandedthereverenceandrespect，aswellofAmerica，asEurope。**ThejudgesoftheoldparliamentsofFrancethejudicialtribunalsofthatcountrywere，beforetherevolution，appointedbythecrown；buttheyheldtheirofficesforlife；andthistenureofofficegavethemsubstantialindependence。Appointedbythemonarch，theywereconsideredasnearlyoutofhispower。Themostdeterminedexertionsofthatauthorityagainstthemonlyshowedtheirradicalindependence。
　　Theycomposedpermanentbodiespolitic，constitutedtoresistarbitraryinnovation；andfromthatcorporateconstitution，andfrommostoftheirpowerstheywerewellcalculatedtoaffordbothcertaintyandstabilitytothelaws。Theyhadbeenasafeasylumtosecuretheirlaws，inalltherevolutionsofhumanopinion。Theyhadsavedthatsacreddepositofthe[*3：467]countryduringthereignsofarbitraryprinces，andthestrugglesofarbitraryfactions。Theykeptalivethememoryandrecordoftheconstitution。
　　Theywerethegreatsecuritytoprivateproperty，whichmightbesaidwhenpersonallibertyhadnoexistence，tobeaswellguardedinFrance，asinanyothercountry。****[*3：465]TheStateTrialsbeforetheyear1688exhibitthemostgrossandpainfulillustrationsoftheseremarks。Subserviencytothecrownwassogeneralinstateprosecutions，thatitceasedalmosttoattractpublicindignation。**[*3：466]DeLolmehasdweltonthissubject，withabundantsatisfaction。
　　TheEulogyofEmerigonhasbeenoftenquoted，andindeedisastrue，asitisstriking。***[*3：467]ThisistheverylanguageofMr。BurkeinhisReflectionsontheFrenchRevolution。Sec。1603。Theimportanceofapermanenttenureofoffice，tosecuretheindependence，integrity，andimpartialityofjudges，wasearlyunderstoodinFrance。LouistheEleventh，in1467，madeamemorabledeclaration，thatthejudgesoughtnottobedeposed，ordeprivedoftheiroffices，butforaforfeiturepreviouslyadjudged，andjudiciallydeclaredbyacompetenttribunal。Thesamedeclarationwasoftenconfirmedbyhissuccessors；andafterthefirstexcessesoftheFrenchrevolutionwerepassed，thesameprincipleobtainedapublicsanction。Andithasnowbecomeincorporated，asafundamentalprinciple，intothepresentcharterofFrance，thatthejudgesappointedbythecrownshallbeirremoveable。OtherEuropeannationshavefollowedthesameexample；anditishighlyprobable，thatastheprinciplesoffreegovernmentsprevail，thenecessityofthusestablishingtheindependenceofthejudiciarywillbegenerallyfelt，andfirmlyprovidedfor。**Dr。Paley’sremarksonthissubjectarenottheleastvaluableofhisexcellentwritings。"Thenextsecurityfortheimpartialadministrationofjustice，especiallyindecisions，towhichgovernmentisaparty，istheindependencyofthejudges。Asprotectionagainsteveryillegalattackupontherightsofthesubjectbytheservantsofthecrownistobesoughtforfromthesetribunals，thejudgesofthelandbecomenotunfrequentlythearbitratorsbetweenthekingandthepeople；on[*3：468]whichaccounttheyoughttobeindependentofeither；or，whatisthesamething，equallydependentuponboth：thatis，iftheybeappointedbytheone，theyshouldberemovableonlybytheother。Thiswasthepolicy，whichdictatedthememorableimprovementinourconstitution，bywhichthejudges，whobeforetherevolutionheldtheirofficesduringthepleasureoftheking，cannowbedeprivedofthemonlybyanaddressfrombothhousesofparliament；
　　asthemostregular，solemn，andauthenticway，bywhichthedissatisfactionofthepeoplecanbeexpressed。Tomakethisindependencyofthejudgescomplete，thepublicsalariesoftheirofficeoughtnotonlytobecertainbothinamountandcontinuance，butsoliberal，astosecuretheirintegrityfromthetemptationofsecretbribes；whichliberalitywillanswer，also，thefurtherpurposeofpreservingtheirjurisdictionfromcontempt，andtheircharactersfromsuspicion；aswellasofrenderingtheofficeworthyoftheambitionofmenofeminenceintheirprocession。"Sec。1604。Ithassometimesbeensuggested，that，thoughinmonarchialgovernmentstheindependenceofthejudiciaryisessential，toguardtherightsofthesubjectsfromtheinjusticeandoppressionofthecrown；
　　yetthatthesamereasonsdonotapplytoarepublic，wherethepopularwillissufficientlyknown，andoughtalwaystobeobeyed。Alittleconsiderationofthesubjectwillsatisfyus，that，sofarfromthisbeingtrue，thereasonsinfavouroftheindependenceofthejudiciaryapplywithaugmentedforcetorepublics；andespeciallytosuchaspossessawrittenconstitutionwithdefinedpowers，andlimitedrights。
　　Sec。1605。Inthefirstplace，factionsandpartiesarequiteascommon，andquiteasviolentinrepublics，asinmonarchies；andthesamesafeguardsareasindispensableintheone，asintheother，againsttheencroachmentsofpartyspirit，andthetyrannyoffactions。Laws，howeverwholesomeornecessary，arefrequentlytheobjectsoftemporaryaversion，andpopularodium，andsometimesofpopularresistance。[*3：469]Nothingismorefacileinrepublics，thanfordemagogues，underartfulpretences，tostirupcombinationsagainsttheregularexerciseofauthority。Theirselfishpurposesaretooofteninterruptedbythefirmnessandindependenceofuprightmagistrates，nottomakethematalltimeshostiletoapower，whichrebukes，andanimpartiality，whichcondemnsthem。TheJudiciary，astheweakestpointintheconstitution，onwhichtomakeanattack，istherefore，constantlythat，towhichtheydirecttheirassaults；andatriumphhere，aidedbyanymomentarypopularencouragement，achievesalastingvictoryovertheconstitutionitself。Hence，inrepublics，those，whoaretoprofitbypubliccommotions，ortheprevalenceoffaction，arealwaystheenemiesofaregularandindependentadministrationofjustice。Theyspreadallsortsofdelusion，inordertomisleadthepublicmind，andexcitethepublicprejudices。
　　Theyknowfullwell，that，withouttheaidofthepeople，theirschemesmustproveabortive；andthey，therefore，employeveryarttounderminethepublicconfidence，andtomakethepeopletheinstrumentsofsubvertingtheirownrightsandliberties。
　　Sec。1606。Itisobvious，that，undersuchcircumstances，ifthetenureofofficeofthejudgesisnotpermanent，theywillsoonberenderedodious，notbecausetheydowrong；butbecausetheyrefusetodowrong；andtheywillbemadetogivewaytoothers，whoshallbecomemoreplianttoolsoftheleadingdemagoguesoftheday。Therecanbenosecurityfortheminorityinafreegovernment，exceptthroughthejudicialdepartment。
　　Inamonarchy，thesympathiesofthepeoplearenaturallyenlistedagainstthemeditatedoppressionsoftheirruler；andtheyscreenhisvictimsfromhisvengeance。Hisisthecauseofoneagainstthe[*3：470]community。
　　But，infreegovernments，wherethemajority，whoobtainpowerforthemoment，aresupposedtorepresentthewillofthepeople，persecution，especiallyofapoliticalnature，becomesthecauseofthecommunityagainstone。Itisthemoreviolentandunrelenting，becauseitisdeemedindispensabletoattainpower，ortoenjoythefruitsofvictory。Infreegovernments，therefore，theindependenceofthejudiciarybecomesfarmoreimportanttothesecurityoftherightsofthecitizens，thaninamonarchy；sinceitistheonlybarrieragainsttheoppressionsofadominantfaction，armedforthemoment。withpower，andabusingtheinfluence，acquiredunderaccidentalexcitements，tooverthrowtheinstitutionsandliberties，whichhavebeenthedeliberatechoiceofthepeople。
　　Sec。1607。Inthenextplace，theindependenceofthejudiciaryisindispensabletosecurethepeopleagainsttheintentional，aswellasunintentional，usurpationsoftheexecutiveandlegislativedepartments。Ithasbeenobservedwithgreatsagacity，thatpowerisperpetuallystealingfromthemanytothefew；andthetendencyofthelegislativedepartmenttoabsorballtheotherpowersofthegovernmenthasalwaysbeendweltuponbystatesmenandpatriots，asageneraltruth，confirmedbyallhumanexperience。Ifthejudgesareappointedatshortintervals，eitherbythelegislative，ortheexecutivedepartment，theywillnaturally，and，indeed，almostnecessarily，becomemeredependentsupontheappointingpower。Iftheyhaveanydesiretoobtain，ortoholdoffice，theywillatalltimesevinceadesiretofollow，andobeythewillofthepredominantpower[*3：471]inthestate。
　　Justicewillbeadministeredwithafaulteringandfeeblehand。Itwillsecurenothing，butitsownplace，andtheapprobationofthose，whovalue，becausetheycontrolit。Itwilldecree，whatbestsuitstheopinionsoftheday；anditwillforget，thatthepreceptsofthelawrestoneternalfoundations。Therulersandthecitizenswillnotstanduponanequalgroundinlitigations。Thefavouritesofthedaywilloverawebytheirpower，orseducebytheirinfluence；andthus，thefundamentalmaximofarepublic，thatitisagovernmentoflaws，andnotofmen，willbesilentlydisproved，oropenlyabandoned。**Itisfarfrombeingtrue，thatthegrossmisconductoftheEnglishJudgesinmanystateprosecutions，whiletheyheldtheirofficesduringthepleasureofthecrown，wasincomplianceonlywiththemerewillofthemonarch。Onthecontrary，theyadministeredbuttookeenlytopopularvengeance，actingunderdelusionsofanextraordinarynature，sometimespolitical，sometimesreligious，andsometimesarisingfromtemporaryprejudices。Sec。1608。Inthenextplace，theseconsiderationsacquireashasbeenalreadyseenstillmorecogencyandforce，whenappliedtoquestionsofconstitutionallaw。Inmonarchies，theonlypracticalresistance，whichthejudiciarycanpresent，istotheusurpationsofasingledepartmentofthegovernment，unaided，andactingforitself。But，iftheexecutiveandlegislativedepartmentsarecombinedinanycourseofmeasures，obediencetotheirwillbecomesaduty，aswellasanecessity。Thus，eveninthefreegovernmentofGreatBritain，anactofparliament，combining，asitdoes，thewillofthecrown，andofthelegislature，isabsoluteandomnipotent。
　　Itcannotbelawfullyresisted，ordisobeyed。Thejudiciaryisboundtocarryitintoeffectateveryhazard，eventhoughitshould[*3：472]subvertprivaterightsandpublicliberty。Butitisfarotherwiseinarepublic，likeourown，withalimitedconstitution，prescribingatoncethepowersoftherulers，andtherightsofthecitizens。Thisverycircumstancewouldseemconclusivelytoshow，thattheindependenceofthejudiciaryisabsolutelyindispensabletopreservethebalanceofsuchaconstitution。Innootherwaycantherebeanypracticalrestraintupontheactsofthegovernment，oranypracticalenforcementoftherightsofthecitizens。*Thissubjecthasbeenalreadyexaminedverymuchatlarge，andneedsonlytobetouchedinthisplace。Nomancandenythenecessityofajudiciarytointerprettheconstitutionandlaws，andtopreservethecitizensagainstoppressionandusurpationincivilandcriminalprosecutions。Doesitnotfollow，that，toenablethejudiciarytofulfilitsfunctions，itisindispensable，thatthejudgesshouldnotholdtheirofficesatthemerepleasureofthose，whoseactstheyaretocheck，and，ifneedbe，todeclare[*3：473]void？
　　Canitbesupposedforamoment，thatmenholdingtheirofficesfortheshortperiodoftwo，orfour，orevensixyears，willbe。generallyfoundfirmenoughtoresistthewillofthose，whoappointthem，andmayremovethem？*[*3：472]TheremarksofMr。Boudinotonthissubject，inadebateinthehouseofrepresentatives，deserveinsertioninthisplace，fromhishighcharacterforwisdomandpatriotism。"Ithasbeenobjected，"sayshe，"that，byadoptingthebillbeforeus，weexposethemeasuretobeconsidered，anddefeatedt，ythejudiciaryoftheUnitedStates，whomayadjudgeittobecontrarytotheconstitution，andthereforevoid，andnotlendtheiraidtocarryitintoexecution。Thisgivesmenouneasiness。
　　Iamsofarfromcontrovertingthisrightinthejudiciary，thatitismyboast，andmyconfidence。Itleadsmetogreaterdecisiononallsubjectsofaconstitutionalnature，whenIreflect，that，iffrominattention，wantofprecision，oranyotherdefect，Ishoulddowrong，thereisapowerinthegovernment，whichcanconstitutionallypreventtheoperationofawrongmeasurefromaffectingmyconstituents。Iamlegislatingforanation，andforthousandsyetunborn；anditisthegloryoftheconstitution，thatthereisaremedyforthefailuresevenofthelegislatureitself。"[*3：473]Sec。1609。Theargumentofthose，whocontendforashortperiodofofficeofthejudges，isfoundeduponthenecessityofaconformitytothewillofthepeople。Buttheargumentproceedsuponafallacy，insupposing，thatthewilloftherulers，andthewillofthepeoplearethesame。Now，theynotonlymaybe，butoftenactuallyare，indirectvariancetoeachother。Nomaninarepublicangovernmentcandoubt，thatthewillofthepeopleis，andoughttobe，supreme。Butitisthedeliberatewillofthepeople，evincedbytheirsolemnacts，andnotthemomentaryebullitionsofthose，whoactforthemajority，foraday，oramonth，orayear。Theconstitutionisthewill，thedeliberatewill，ofthepeople。
　　Theyhavedeclaredunderwhatcircumstances，andinwhatmanneritshallbeamended，andaltered；anduntilachangeiseffectedinthemannerprescribed，itisdeclared，thatit，shallbethesupremelawoftheland，towhichallpersons，rulers，aswellascitizens，mustbowinobedience。Whenitisconstitutionallyaltered，thenandnotuntilthen，arethejudgesatlibertytodisregarditsoriginalinjunctions。When，therefore，theargumentispressed，thatthejudgesoughttobesubjecttothewillofthepeople，noonedoubtstheproprietyofthedoctrineinitstrueandlegitimatesense。
　　Sec。1610。Butthose，whopresstheargument，useitinafarbroadersense。Intheirview，thewillofthepeople，asexhibitedinthechoiceoftherulers，istobefollowed。Iftherulersinterprettheconstitution[*3：474]differentlyfromthejudges，theformeraretobeobeyed，becausetheyrepresenttheopinionsofthepeople；andtherefore，thejudgesoughttoberemovable，orappointedforashortperiod，soastobecamesubjecttothewillofthepeople，asexpressedbyandthroughtheirrulers。But，isitnotatonceseen，thatthisisinfactsubvertingtheconstitution？
　　Woulditnotmaketheconstitutionaninstrumentofflexibleandchangeableinterpretation，andnotasettledformofgovernmentwithfixedlimitations？
　　Woulditnotbecome，insteadofasupremelawforourselvesandourposterity，amereoracleofthepowersoftherulersoftheday，towhichimplicithomageistobepaid，andspeakingatdifferenttimesthemostoppositecommands，andinthemostambiguousvoices？Inshort，isnotthisanattempttoerect，behindtheconstitution，apowerunknown，andunprovidedforbytheconstitution，andgreaterthanitself？Whatbecomeofthelimitationsoftheconstitution，ifthewillofthepeople，thusinofficiallypromulgated，forms，forthetimebeing，thesupremelaw，andthesupremeexpositionofthelaw？Iftheconstitutiondefinesthepowersofthegovernment，andpointsoutthemodeofchangingthem；andyet，theinstrumentistoexpandinthehandsofonesetofrulers，andtocontractinthoseofanother，whereisthestandard？Ifthewillofthepeopleistogovernintheconstructionofthepowersoftheconstitution，andthatwillistobegatheredateverysuccessiveelectionatthepolls，andnotfromtheirdeliberatejudgment，andsolemnactsinratifyingtheconstitution，orinamendingit，whatcertaintycantherebeinthosepowers？Iftheconstitutionistobeexpounded，notbyitswrittentext，butbytheopinionsoftherulersforthetimebeing，whoseopinionsareto[*3：475]prevail，thefirst，orthelast？
　　When，therefore，itissaid，thatthejudgesoughttobesubjectedtothewillofthepeople，andtoconformtotheirinterpretationoftheconstitution，thepracticalmeaningmustbe，thattheyshouldbesubjectedtothecontroloftherepresentativesofthepeopleintheexecutiveandlegislativedepartments，andshouldinterprettheconstitution，asthelattermay，fromtimetotime，deemcorrect。
　　Sec。1611。Butitisobvious，thatejectionscanrarely，ifever，furnishanysufficientproofs，whatisdeliberatelythewillofthepeople，astoanyconstitutionalorlegaldoctrines。Representativesandrulersmustbeordinarilychosenforverydifferentpurposes；and，inmanyinstances，theiropinionsuponconstitutionalquestionsmustbeunknowntotheirconstituents。
　　Theonlymeansknowntotheconstitution，bywhichtoascertainthewillofthepeopleuponaconstitutionalquestion，isintheshapeofanaffirmativeornegativepropositionbywayofamendment，offeredfortheiradoptioninthemodeprescribedbytheconstitution。Theelectionsinoneyearmaybringonepartyintopower；andinthenextyeartheiropponents，embracingoppositedoctrines，maysucceed；andsoalternatesuccessanddefeatmayperpetuallyrecurinthesamedistricts，andinthesame，ordifferentstates。
　　Sec。1612。Surelyitwillnotbepretended，thatanyconstitution，adaptedtotheAmericanpeople，couldevercontemplatetheexecutiveandlegislativedepartmentsofthegovernment，astheultimatedepositariesofthepowertointerprettheconstitution；orastheultimaterepresentativesofthewillofthepeople，tochangeitatpleasure。If，then，thejudgeswereappointedfortwo，orfour，orsixyears，insteadofduringgoodbehaviour，theonlysecurity，whichthe[*3：476]peopiewouldhaveforadueadministrationofpublicjustice，andafirmsupportoftheconstitution，wouldbe，thatbeingdependentupontheexecutivefortheirappointmentduringtheirbriefperiodofoffice，theymight，andwouldrepresentmorefully，forthetimebeing，theconstitutionalopinionofeachsuccessiveexecutive；andthuscarryintoeffecthissystemofgovernment。Wouldthisbemorewise，ormoresafe，moreforthepermanenceoftheconstitution，orthepreservationofthelibertiesofthepeople，thanthepresentsystem？Wouldthejudiciary，then，be，infact，anindependentcoordinatedepartment？Woulditprotectthepeopleagainstanambitiousorcorruptexecutive；orrestrainthelegislaturefromactsofunconstitutionalauthority？**Mr。Jefferson，duringthelatteryearsofhislife，andindeedfromthetimewhenhebecamepresidentoftheUnitedStates，wasamoststrenuousadvocateoftheplanofmakingthejudgesholdtheirofficesforalimitedtermofyearsonly。Heproposedthattheirappointmentsshouldbeforfour，orsixyears，renewablebythepresidentandsenate。Itisnotmypurposetobringhisopinionsintoreview，ortocommentontheterms，inwhichtheyareexpressed。Itisimpossiblenottoperceive，thatheentertainedadecidedhostilitytothejudicialdepartment；andthatheallowedhimselfinlanguageofinsinuationagainsttheconductofjudges，whichislittlecalculatedtoaddweighttohisopinions。Hewroteonthissubjectapparentlywiththefeelingsofapartisan，andunderinfluences，whichhisbestfriendswillmostregret。Hisearlieropinionswereofadifferentcharacter。Sec。1613。Thetruthis，that，evenwiththemostsecuretenureofoffice，duringgoodbehaviour，thedangerisnot，thatthejudgeswillbetoofirminresistingpublicopinion，andindefenceofprivaterightsorpublicliberties；but，thattheywillbetooreadytoyieldthemselvestothepassions，andpolitics，andprejudicesoftheday。Inamonarchy，thejudges，intheperformance[*3：477]oftheirdutieswithuprightnessandimpartiality，willalwayshavethesupportofsomeofthedepartmentsofthegovernment，oratleastofthepeople。Inrepublics，theymaysometimesfindtheotherdepartmentscombinedinhostilityagainstthejudicial；andeventhepeople，forawhile，undertheinfluenceofpartyspiritandturbulentfactions，readytoabandonthemtotheirfate。*Fewmenpossessthefirmnesstoresistthetorrentofpopularopinion；orarecontenttosacrificepresenteaseandpublicfavour，inordertoearntheslowrewardsofaconscientiousdischargeofduty；thesure，butdistant，gratitudeofthepeople；andthesevere，butenlightened，awardofposterity。***AnobjectionwastakeninthePennsylvaniaconventionagainsttheconstitutionoftheUnitedStates，thatthejudgeswerenotmadesufficientlyindependent，becausetheymightholdotheroffices。**Mr。nowJudgeHopkinsonhastreatedthissubject，ashehastreatedeveryother，failingwithintherangeofhisforensicorliterarylabours，inamasterlymanner。IextractthefollowingpassagesfromhisDefenceofMr。JusticeChase，uponhisImpeachment，asequallyremarkablefortruth，wisdom，andeloquence。
　　"Thepureanduprightadministrationofjusticeisoftheutmostimportancetoanypeople；theothermovementsofgovernmentarenotofsuchuniversalconcern。Whoshallbepresident，。orwhattreatiesorgeneralstatutesshallbemade，occupiestheattentionofafewbusypoliticians；butthesethingstouchnot，orbutseldom，theprivateinterestsandhappinessofthegreatmassofthecommunity。Butthesettlementofprivatecontroversies，theadministrationoflawbetweenmanandman，thedistributionofjusticeandrighttothecitizeninhisprivatebusinessandconcern，comestoeveryman’sdoor，andisessentialtoeveryman’sprosperityandhappiness。
　　HenceIconsiderthejudiciaryofourcountrymostimportantamongthebranchesofgovernment，anditspurityandindependenceofthemostinterestingconsequencetoeveryman。Whilstitishonorablyandfullyprotectedfromtheinfluenceoffavour，orfear，fromanyquarter，thesituationofapeoplecanneverbeveryuncomfortableorunsafe。Butifajudgeisforevertobeexposedtoprosecutionsandimpeachmentsforhisofficialconductonthemeresuggestionsofcaprice，andtobecondemnedbythemerevoiceofprejudice，underthespeciousnameofcommonsense，canhehold[*3：478]
　　thatfirmandsteadyhandhishighfunctionsrequire？No；ifhisnervesereofiron，theymusttrembleinsoperilousasituation。InEnglandthecompleteindependenceofthejudiciaryhasbeenconsidered，andhasbeenfoundthebestandsurestsafeguardoftrueliberty，securingagovernmentofknownanduniformlaws，actingalikeuponeveryman。Ithas，however，beensuggestedbysomeofournewspaperpoliticians，perhapsfromahighersource，thatalthoughthisindependentjudiciaryisverynecessaryinamonarchytoprotectthepeoplefromtheoppressionofacourt，yetthatinourrepublicaninstitutionthesamereasonsforitdonotexist；thatitisindeedinconsistentwiththenatureofourgovernment，thatanypartorbranchofitshouldbeindependentofthepeople，fromwhomthepowerisderived。And，asthehouseofrepresentativescomemostfrequentlyfromthisgreatsourceofpower，theyclaimthebestrightofknowingandexpressingitswill；andofcoursetherightofacontrollinginfluenceovertheotherbranches。Mydoctrineispreciselythereverseofthis。
　　"IfIwerecalledupontodeclare，whethertheindependenceofjudgesweremoreessentiallyimportantinamonarchy，orarepublic，Ishouldcertainlysay，inthelatter，allgovernmentsrequire，inordertogivethemfirmness，stability，andcharacter，somepermanentprinciple；somesettledestablishment。Thewantofthisisthegreatdeficiencyinrepublicaninstitutions；nothingcanbereliedupon；nofaithcanbegiven，eitherathomeorabroad，toapeople，whosesystems，andoperations，andpolicy，areconstantlychangingwithpopularopinion；if，however，thejudiciaryisstableandindependent；iftheruleofjusticebetweenmenrestsonpermanentandknownprinciples，itgivesasecurityendcharactertoacountry，whichisabsolutelynecessaryinitsintercoursewiththeworld，andinitsowninternalconcerns。Thisindependenceisfurtherrequisite，asasecurityfromoppression。Historydemonstrates；frompagetopage，thattyrannyandoppressionhavenotbeenconfinedtodespotisms，buthavebeenfreelyexercisedinrepublics，bothancientandmodern；withthisdifference，—thatinthelatter，theoppressionhassprungfromtheimpulseofsomesuddengustofpassionorprejudice，while，intheformer，itissystematicallyplannedandpursued，asaningredientandprincipleofthegovernment；thepeopledestroynotdeliberately，andwillreturntoreflectionandjustice，ifpassionisnotkeptaliveandexcitedbyartfulintrigue；
　　but，whilethefitison，theirdevastationandcrueltyismoreterribleandunbounded，thanthemostmonstroustyrant。Itisfortheirownbenefit，andtoprotectthemfromtheviolenceoftheirownpassions，thatitisessentialtohavesomefirm，unshaken，independent，branchofgovernment，able[*3：479]andwillingtoresisttheirphrenzy；ifwehavereadofthedeathofSeneca，undertheferocityofaNero；wehavereadtooofthemurderofaSocrates，underthedelusionofarepublic。Anindependentandfirmjudiciary，protectedgodprotectingbythelaws，wouldhavesnatchedtheonefromthefuryofadespot，andpreservedtheotherfromthemadnessorepeople。"[*3：478]Sec。1614。Ifpassingfromgeneralreasoning，anappealismadetothelessonsofexperience，thereiseverythingtoconvinceus，thatthejudicial[*3：479]departmentissafetoarepublic，withthetenureofofficeduringgoodbehaviour；andthatjusticewillordinarilybebestadministered，wherethereismostindependence。Ofthestateconstitutions，fiveonlyoutoftwentyfourhaveprovidedforanyothertenureofoffice，thanduringgoodbehaviour；andthoseadoptedbythenewstatesadmittedintotheUnion，sincetheformationofthenationalgovernment，have，withtwoorthreeexceptionsonly，embracedthesamepermanenttenureofoffice。