ThegreaternumberoftheConstitutionsoftheStatesassignoneyearforthedurationoftheHouseofRepresentatives，andtwoyearsforthatoftheSenate;sothatmembersofthelegislativebodyareconstantlyandnarrowlytieddownbytheslightestdesiresoftheirconstituents。ThelegislatorsoftheUnionwereofopinionthatthisexcessivedependenceoftheLegislaturetendedtoalterthenatureofthemainconsequencesoftherepresentativesystem，sinceitvestedthesource，notonlyofauthority，butofgovernment，inthepeople。Theyincreasedthelengthofthetimeforwhichtherepresentativeswerereturned，inordertogivethemfreerscopefortheexerciseoftheirownjudgment。
TheFederalConstitution，aswellastheConstitutionsofthedifferentStates，dividedthelegislativebodyintotwobranches。ButintheStatesthesetwobrancheswerecomposedofthesameelements，andelectedinthesamemanner。Theconsequencewasthatthepassionsandinclinationsofthepopulacewereasrapidlyandasenergeticallyrepresentedinonechamberasintheother，andthatlawsweremadewithallthecharacteristicsofviolenceandprecipitation。BytheFederalConstitutionthetwohousesoriginateinlikemannerinthechoiceofthepeople;buttheconditionsofeligibilityandthemodeofelectionwerechanged，totheendthat，if，asisthecaseincertainnations，onebranchoftheLegislaturerepresentsthesameinterestsastheother，itmayatleastrepresentasuperiordegreeofintelligenceanddiscretion。Amatureagewasmadeoneoftheconditionsofthesenatorialdignity，andtheUpperHousewaschosenbyanelectedassemblyofalimitednumberofmembers。
Toconcentratethewholesocialforceinthehandsofthelegislativebodyisthenaturaltendencyofdemocracies;forasthisisthepowerwhichemanatesthemostdirectlyfromthepeople，itismadetoparticipatemostfullyinthepreponderatingauthorityofthemultitude，anditisnaturallyledtomonopolizeeveryspeciesofinfluence。Thisconcentrationisatonceprejudicialtoawell—conductedadministration，andfavorabletothedespotismofthemajority。ThelegislatorsoftheStatesfrequentlyyieldedtothesedemocraticpropensities，whichwereinvariablyandcourageouslyresistedbythefoundersoftheUnion。
IntheStatestheexecutivepowerisvestedinthehandsofamagistrate，whoisapparentlyplaceduponalevelwiththeLegislature，butwhoisinrealitynothingmorethantheblindagentandthepassiveinstrumentofitsdecisions。Hecanderivenoinfluencefromthedurationofhisfunctions，whichterminatewiththerevolvingyear，orfromtheexerciseofprerogativeswhichcanscarcelybesaidtoexist。TheLegislaturecancondemnhimtoinactionbyintrustingtheexecutionofthelawstospecialcommitteesofitsownmembers，andcanannulhistemporarydignitybydeprivinghimofhissalary。TheFederalConstitutionvestsalltheprivilegesandalltheresponsibilityoftheexecutivepowerinasingleindividual。ThedurationofthePresidencyisfixedatfouryears;thesalaryoftheindividualwhofillsthatofficecannotbealteredduringthetermofhisfunctions;heisprotectedbyabodyofofficialdependents，andarmedwithasuspensiveveto。Inshort，everyeffortwasmadetoconferastrongandindependentpositionupontheexecutiveauthoritywithinthelimitswhichhadbeenprescribedtoit。
IntheConstitutionsofalltheStatesthejudicialpoweristhatwhichremainsthemostindependentofthelegislativeauthority;nevertheless，inalltheStatestheLegislaturehasreservedtoitselftherightofregulatingtheemolumentsofthejudges，apracticewhichnecessarilysubjectsthesemagistratestoitsimmediateinfluence。InsomeStatesthejudgesareonlytemporarilyappointed，whichdeprivesthemofagreatportionoftheirpowerandtheirfreedom。Inothersthelegislativeandjudicialpowersareentirelyconfounded;thustheSenateofNewYork，forinstance，constitutesincertaincasestheSuperiorCourtoftheState。TheFederalConstitution，ontheotherhand，carefullyseparatesthejudicialauthorityfromallexternalinfluences;anditprovidesfortheindependenceofthejudges，bydeclaringthattheirsalaryshallnotbealtered，andthattheirfunctionsshallbeinalienable。
Thepracticalconsequencesofthesedifferentsystemsmayeasilybeperceived。AnattentiveobserverwillsoonremarkthatthebusinessoftheUnionisincomparablybetterconductedthanthatofanyindividualState。TheconductoftheFederalGovernmentismorefairandmoretemperatethanthatoftheStates，itsdesignsaremorefraughtwithwisdom，itsprojectsaremoredurableandmoreskilfullycombined，itsmeasuresareputintoexecutionwithmorevigorandconsistency。
Irecapitulatethesubstanceofthischapterinafewwords:
Theexistenceofdemocraciesisthreatenedbytwodangers，viz。，thecompletesubjectionofthelegislativebodytothecapricesoftheelectoralbody，andtheconcentrationofallthepowersoftheGovernmentinthelegislativeauthority。ThegrowthoftheseevilshasbeenencouragedbythepolicyofthelegislatorsoftheStates，butithasbeenresistedbythelegislatorsoftheUnionbyeverymeanswhichlaywithintheircontrol。
CharacteristicsWhichDistinguishTheFederalConstitutionOfTheUnitedStatesOfAmericaFromAllOtherFederalConstitutionsAmericanUnionappearstoresembleallotherconfederations—
Neverthelessitseffectsaredifferent—Reasonofthis—
DistinctionsbetweentheUnionandallotherconfederations—TheAmericanGovernmentnotafederalbutanimperfectnationalGovernment。
TheUnitedStatesofAmericadonotaffordeitherthefirstortheonlyinstanceofconfederateStates，severalofwhichhaveexistedinmodernEurope，withoutadvertingtothoseofantiquity。Switzerland，theGermanicEmpire，andtheRepublicoftheUnitedProvinceseitherhavebeenorstillareconfederations。Instudyingtheconstitutionsofthesedifferentcountries，thepoliticianissurprisedtoobservethatthepowerswithwhichtheyinvestedtheFederalGovernmentarenearlyidenticalwiththeprivilegesawardedbytheAmericanConstitutiontotheGovernmentoftheUnitedStates。Theyconferuponthecentralpowerthesamerightsofmakingpeaceandwar，ofraisingmoneyandtroops，andofprovidingforthegeneralexigenciesandthecommoninterestsofthenation。NeverthelesstheFederalGovernmentofthesedifferentpeopleshasalwaysbeenasremarkableforitsweaknessandinefficiencyasthatoftheUnionisforitsvigorousandenterprisingspirit。Again，thefirstAmericanConfederationperishedthroughtheexcessiveweaknessofitsGovernment;andthisweakGovernmentwas，notwithstanding，inpossessionofrightsevenmoreextensivethanthoseoftheFederalGovernmentofthepresentday。ButthemorerecentConstitutionoftheUnitedStatescontainscertainprincipleswhichexerciseamostimportantinfluence，althoughtheydonotatoncestriketheobserver。
ThisConstitution，whichmayatfirstsightbeconfoundedwiththefederalconstitutionswhichprecededit，restsuponanoveltheory，whichmaybeconsideredasagreatinventioninmodernpoliticalscience。InalltheconfederationswhichhadbeenformedbeforetheAmericanConstitutionof1789thealliedStatesagreedtoobeytheinjunctionsofaFederalGovernment;
buttheyreservedtothemselvestherightofordainingandenforcingtheexecutionofthelawsoftheUnion。TheAmericanStateswhichcombinedin1789agreedthattheFederalGovernmentshouldnotonlydictatethelaws，butthatitshouldexecuteitownenactments。Inbothcasestherightisthesame，buttheexerciseoftherightisdifferent;andthisalterationproducedthemostmomentousconsequences。
InalltheconfederationswhichhadbeenformedbeforetheAmericanUniontheFederalGovernmentdemandeditssuppliesatthehandsoftheseparateGovernments;andifthemeasureitprescribedwasoneroustoanyoneofthosebodiesmeanswerefoundtoevadeitsclaims:iftheStatewaspowerful，ithadrecoursetoarms;ifitwasweak，itconnivedattheresistancewhichthelawoftheUnion，itssovereign，metwith，andresortedtoinactionunderthepleaofinability。Underthesecircumstancesoneofthetwoalternativeshasinvariablyoccurred;eitherthemostpreponderantofthealliedpeopleshasassumedtheprivilegesoftheFederalauthorityandruledalltheStatesinitsname，*portheFederalGovernmenthasbeenabandonedbyitsnaturalsupporters，anarchyhasarisenbetweentheconfederates，andtheUnionhaslostallpowersofaction。*q[Footnotep:ThiswasthecaseinGreece，whenPhilipundertooktoexecutethedecreeoftheAmphictyons;intheLowCountries，wheretheprovinceofHollandalwaysgavethelaw;and，inourowntime，intheGermanicConfederation，inwhichAustriaandPrussiaassumeagreatdegreeofinfluenceoverthewholecountry，inthenameoftheDiet。]
[Footnoteq:SuchhasalwaysbeenthesituationoftheSwissConfederation，whichwouldhaveperishedagesagobutforthemutualjealousiesofitsneighbors。]
InAmericathesubjectsoftheUnionarenotStates，butprivatecitizens:thenationalGovernmentleviesatax，notupontheStateofMassachusetts，butuponeachinhabitantofMassachusetts。Allformerconfederategovernmentspresidedovercommunities，butthatoftheUnionrulesindividuals;itsforceisnotborrowed，butself—derived;anditisservedbyitsowncivilandmilitaryofficers，byitsownarmy，anditsowncourtsofjustice。Itcannotbedoubtedthatthespiritofthenation，thepassionsofthemultitude，andtheprovincialprejudicesofeachStatetendsingularlytodiminishtheauthorityofaFederalauthoritythusconstituted，andtofacilitatethemeansofresistancetoitsmandates;butthecomparativeweaknessofarestrictedsovereigntyisanevilinherentintheFederalsystem。
InAmerica，eachStatehasfeweropportunitiesofresistanceandfewertemptationstonon—compliance;norcansuchadesignbeputinexecution（ifindeeditbeentertained）withoutanopenviolationofthelawsoftheUnion，adirectinterruptionoftheordinarycourseofjustice，andabolddeclarationofrevolt;inaword，withouttakingadecisivestepwhichmenhesitatetoadopt。
InallformerconfederationstheprivilegesoftheUnionfurnishedmoreelementsofdiscordthanofpower，sincetheymultipliedtheclaimsofthenationwithoutaugmentingthemeansofenforcingthem:andinaccordancewiththisfactitmayberemarkedthattherealweaknessoffederalgovernmentshasalmostalwaysbeenintheexactratiooftheirnominalpower。SuchisnotthecaseintheAmericanUnion，inwhich，asinordinarygovernments，theFederalGovernmenthasthemeansofenforcingallitisempoweredtodemand。
Thehumanunderstandingm...完整阅读请扫描二维码下载丁香书院APP免费看：
第14章