TheConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesislikethoseexquisiteproductionsofhumanindustrywhichensurewealthandrenowntotheirinventors，butwhichareprofitlessinanyotherhands。ThistruthisexemplifiedbytheconditionofMexicoatthepresenttime。TheMexicansweredesirousofestablishingafederalsystem，andtheytooktheFederalConstitutionoftheirneighbors，theAnglo—Americans，astheirmodel，andcopieditwithconsiderableaccuracy。*sButalthoughtheyhadborrowedtheletterofthelaw，theywereunabletocreateortointroducethespiritandthesensewhichgiveitlife。Theywereinvolvedinceaselessembarrassmentsbetweenthemechanismoftheirdoublegovernment;thesovereigntyoftheStatesandthatoftheUnionperpetuallyexceededtheirrespectiveprivileges，andenteredintocollision;andtothepresentdayMexicoisalternatelythevictimofanarchyandtheslaveofmilitarydespotism。
[Footnotes:SeetheMexicanConstitutionof1824。]
ThesecondandthemostfatalofallthedefectsIhavealludedto，andthatwhichIbelievetobeinherentinthefederalsystem，istherelativeweaknessofthegovernmentoftheUnion。Theprincipleuponwhichallconfederationsrestisthatofadividedsovereignty。Thelegislatormayrenderthispartitionlessperceptible，hemayevenconcealitforatimefromthepubliceye，buthecannotpreventitfromexisting，andadividedsovereigntymustalwaysbelesspowerfulthananentiresupremacy。ThereaderhasseenintheremarksIhavemadeontheConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesthattheAmericanshavedisplayedsingularingenuityincombiningtherestrictionofthepoweroftheUnionwithinthenarrowlimitsofafederalgovernmentwiththesemblanceand，toacertainextent，withtheforceofanationalgovernment。BythismeansthelegislatorsoftheUnionhavesucceededindiminishing，thoughnotincounteractingthenaturaldangerofconfederations。
IthasbeenremarkedthattheAmericanGovernmentdoesnotapplyitselftotheStates，butthatitimmediatelytransmitsitsinjunctionstothecitizens，andcompelsthemasisolatedindividualstocomplywithitsdemands。ButiftheFederallawweretoclashwiththeinterestsandtheprejudicesofaState，itmightbefearedthatallthecitizensofthatStatewouldconceivethemselvestobeinterestedinthecauseofasingleindividualwhoshouldrefusetoobey。IfallthecitizensoftheStatewereaggrievedatthesametimeandinthesamemannerbytheauthorityoftheUnion，theFederalGovernmentwouldvainlyattempttosubduethemindividually;theywouldinstinctivelyuniteinacommondefence，andtheywouldderiveaready—preparedorganizationfromtheshareofsovereigntywhichtheinstitutionoftheirStateallowsthemtoenjoy。Fictionwouldgivewaytoreality，andanorganizedportionoftheterritorymightthencontestthecentralauthority。*tThesameobservationholdsgoodwithregardtotheFederaljurisdiction。IfthecourtsoftheUnionviolatedanimportantlawofaStateinaprivatecase，thereal，ifnottheapparent，contestwouldarisebetweentheaggrievedStaterepresentedbyacitizenandtheUnionrepresentedbyitscourtsofjustice。*u[Footnotet:[Thisispreciselywhatoccurredin1862，andthefollowingparagraphdescribescorrectlythefeelingsandnotionsoftheSouth。GeneralLeeheldthathisprimaryallegiancewasdue，nottotheUnion，buttoVirginia。]]
[Footnoteu:Forinstance，theUnionpossessesbytheConstitutiontherightofsellingunoccupiedlandsforitsownprofit。SupposingthattheStateofOhioshouldclaimthesamerightinbehalfofcertainterritorieslyingwithinitsboundaries，uponthepleathattheConstitutionreferstothoselandsalonewhichdonotbelongtothejurisdictionofanyparticularState，andconsequentlyshouldchoosetodisposeofthemitself，thelitigationwouldbecarriedoninthenamesofthepurchasersfromtheStateofOhioandthepurchasersfromtheUnion，andnotinthenamesofOhioandtheUnion。ButwhatwouldbecomeofthislegalfictioniftheFederalpurchaserwasconfirmedinhisrightbythecourtsoftheUnion，whilsttheothercompetitorwasorderedtoretainpossessionbythetribunalsoftheStateofOhio？]
Hewouldhavebutapartialknowledgeoftheworldwhoshouldimaginethatitispossible，bytheaidoflegalfictions，topreventmenfromfindingoutandemployingthosemeansofgratifyingtheirpassionswhichhavebeenleftopentothem;anditmaybedoubtedwhethertheAmericanlegislators，whentheyrenderedacollisionbetweenthetwosovereignslessprobable，destroyedthecauseofsuchamisfortune。ButitmayevenbeaffirmedthattheywereunabletoensurethepreponderanceoftheFederalelementinacaseofthiskind。TheUnionispossessedofmoneyandoftroops，buttheaffectionsandtheprejudicesofthepeopleareinthebosomoftheStates。ThesovereigntyoftheUnionisanabstractbeing，whichisconnectedwithbutfewexternalobjects;thesovereigntyoftheStatesishourlyperceptible，easilyunderstood，constantlyactive;andiftheformerisofrecentcreation，thelatteriscoevalwiththepeopleitself。ThesovereigntyoftheUnionisfactitious，thatoftheStatesisnatural，andderivesitsexistencefromitsownsimpleinfluence，liketheauthorityofaparent。Thesupremepowerofthenationonlyaffectsafewofthechiefinterestsofsociety;itrepresentsanimmensebutremotecountry，andclaimsafeelingofpatriotismwhichisvagueandilldefined;buttheauthorityoftheStatescontrolseveryindividualcitizenateveryhourandinallcircumstances;itprotectshisproperty，hisfreedom，andhislife;andwhenwerecollectthetraditions，thecustoms，theprejudicesoflocalandfamiliarattachmentwithwhichitisconnected，wecannotdoubtofthesuperiorityofapowerwhichisinterwovenwitheverycircumstancethatrenderstheloveofone’snativecountryinstinctiveinthehumanheart。
Sincelegislatorsareunabletoobviatesuchdangerouscollisionsasoccurbetweenthetwosovereigntieswhichcoexistinthefederalsystem，theirfirstobjectmustbe，notonlytodissuadetheconfederateStatesfromwarfare，buttoencouragesuchinstitutionsasmaypromotethemaintenanceofpeace。HenceitresultsthattheFederalcompactcannotbelastingunlessthereexistsinthecommunitieswhichareleaguedtogetheracertainnumberofinducementstounionwhichrendertheircommondependenceagreeable，andthetaskoftheGovernmentlight，andthatsystemcannotsucceedwithoutthepresenceoffavorablecircumstancesaddedtotheinfluenceofgoodlaws。Allthepeopleswhichhaveeverformedaconfederationhavebeenheldtogetherbyacertainnumberofcommoninterests，whichservedastheintellectualtiesofassociation。
Butthesentimentsandtheprinciplesofmanmustbetakenintoconsiderationaswellashisimmediateinterests。AcertainuniformityofcivilizationisnotlessnecessarytothedurabilityofaconfederationthanauniformityofinterestsintheStateswhichcomposeit。InSwitzerlandthedifferencewhichexistsbetweentheCantonofUriandtheCantonofVaudisequaltothatbetweenthefifteenthandthenineteenthcenturies;and，properlyspeaking，Switzerlandhasneverpossessedafederalgovernment。Theunionbetweenthesetwocantonsonlysubsistsuponthemap，andtheirdiscrepancieswouldsoonbeperceivedifanattemptweremadebyacentralauthoritytoprescribethesamelawstothewholeterritory。
OneofthecircumstanceswhichmostpowerfullycontributetosupporttheFederalGovernmentinAmericaisthattheStateshavenotonlysimilarinterests，acommonorigin，andacommontongue，butthattheyarealsoarrivedatthesamestageofcivilization;
whichalmostalwaysrendersaunionfeasible。IdonotknowofanyEuropeannation，howsmallsoeveritmaybe，whichdoesnotpresentlessuniformityinitsdifferentprovincesthantheAmericanpeople，whichoccupiesaterritoryasextensiveasone—halfofEurope。ThedistancefromtheStateofMainetothatofGeorgiaisreckonedataboutonethousandmiles;butthedifferencebetweenthecivilizationofMaineandthatofGeorgiaisslighterthanthedifferencebetweenthehabitsofNormandyandthoseofBrittany。MaineandGeorgia，whichareplacedattheoppositeextremitiesofagreatempire，areconsequentlyinthenaturalpossessionofmorerealinducementstoformaconfederationthanNormandyandBrittany，whichareonlyseparatedbyabridge。
ThegeographicalpositionofthecountrycontributedtoincreasethefacilitieswhichtheAmericanlegislatorsderivedfromthemannersandcustomsoftheinhabitants;anditistothiscircumstancethattheadoptionandthemaintenanceoftheFederalsystemaremainlyattributable。
Themostimportantoccurrencewhichcanmarktheannalsofapeopleisthebreakingoutofawar。Inwarapeoplestruggleswiththeenergyofasinglemanagainstforeignnationsinthedefenceofitsveryexistence。Theskillofagovernment，thegoodsenseofthecommunity，andthenaturalfondnesswhichmenentertainfortheircountry，maysufficetomaintainpeaceintheinteriorofadistrict，andtofavoritsinternalprosperity;butanationcanonlycarryonagreatwaratthecostofmorenumerousandmorepainfulsacrifices;andtosupposethatagreatnumberofmenwilloftheirownaccordcomplywiththeseexigenciesoftheStateistobetrayanignoranceofmankind。
Allthepeopleswhichhavebeenobligedtosustainalongandseriouswarfarehaveconsequentlybeenledtoaugmentthepoweroftheirgovernment。Thosewhichhavenotsucceededinthisattempthavebeensubjugated。Alongwaralmostalwaysplacesnationsinthewretchedalternativeofbeingabandonedtoruinbydefeatortodespotismbysuccess。Warthereforerendersthesymptomsoftheweaknessofagovernmentmostpalpableandmostalarming;andIhaveshownthattheinherentdefeatoffederalgovernmentsisthatofbeingweak。
TheFederalsystemisnotonlydeficientineverykindofcentralizedadministration，butthecentralgovernmentitselfisimperfectlyorganized，whichisinvariablyaninfluentialcauseofinferioritywhenthenationisopposedtoothercountrieswhicharethemselvesgovernedbyasingleauthority。IntheFederalConstitutionoftheUnitedStates，bywhichthecentralgovernmentpossessesmorerealforce，thisevilisstillextremelysensible。Anexamplewillillustratethecasetothereader。
TheConstitutionconfersuponCongresstherightofcallingforthmilitiatoexecutethelawsoftheUnion，suppressinsurrections，andrepelinvasions;andanotherarticledeclaresthatthePresidentoftheUnitedStatesisthecommander—in—chiefofthemilitia。Inthewarof1812thePresidentorderedthemilitiaoftheNorthernStatestomarchtothefrontiers;butConnecticutandMassachusetts，whoseinterestswereimpairedbythewar，refusedtoobeythecommand。TheyarguedthattheConstitutionauthorizestheFederalGovernmenttocallforththemilitiaincaseofinsurrectionorinvasion，butthatinthepresentinstancetherewasneitherinvasionnorinsurrection。
Theyadded，thatthesameConstitutionwhi...完整阅读请扫描二维码下载丁香书院APP免费看：
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