[Footnoted:TheUnionwasdividedintodistricts，ineachofwhicharesidentFederaljudgewasappointed，andthecourtinwhichhepresidedwastermeda"DistrictCourt。"EachofthejudgesoftheSupremeCourtannuallyvisitsacertainportionoftheRepublic，inordertotrythemostimportantcausesuponthespot;thecourtpresidedoverbythismagistrateisstyleda"CircuitCourt。"Lastly，allthemostseriouscasesoflitigationarebroughtbeforetheSupremeCourt，whichholdsasolemnsessiononceayear，atwhichallthejudgesoftheCircuitCourtsmustattend。ThejurywasintroducedintotheFederalCourtsinthesamemanner，andinthesamecases，asintothecourtsoftheStates。
ItwillbeobservedthatnoanalogyexistsbetweentheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatesandtheFrenchCourdeCassation，sincethelatteronlyhearsappealsonquestionsoflaw。TheSupremeCourtdecidesupontheevidenceofthefactaswellasuponthelawofthecase，whereastheCourdeCassationdoesnotpronounceadecisionofitsown，butrefersthecausetothearbitrationofanothertribunal。SeethelawofSeptember24，1789，"LawsoftheUnitedStates，"byStory，vol。i。p。53。]
MeansOfDeterminingTheJurisdictionOfTheFederalCourtsDifficultyofdeterminingthejurisdictionofseparatecourtsofjusticeinconfederations—ThecourtsoftheUnionobtainedtherightoffixingtheirownjurisdiction—InwhatrespectthisruleattackstheportionofsovereigntyreservedtotheseveralStates—ThesovereigntyoftheseStatesrestrictedbythelaws，andtheinterpretationofthelaws—Consequently，thedangeroftheseveralStatesismoreapparentthanreal。
AstheConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesrecognizedtwodistinctpowersinpresenceofeachother，representedinajudicialpointofviewbytwodistinctclassesofcourtsofjustice，theutmostcarewhichcouldbetakenindefiningtheirseparatejurisdictionswouldhavebeeninsufficienttopreventfrequentcollisionsbetweenthosetribunals。Thequestionthenarosetowhomtherightofdecidingthecompetencyofeachcourtwastobereferred。
Innationswhichconstituteasinglebodypolitic，whenaquestionisdebatedbetweentwocourtsrelatingtotheirmutualjurisdiction，athirdtribunalisgenerallywithinreachtodecidethedifference;andthisiseffectedwithoutdifficulty，becauseinthesenationsthequestionsofjudicialcompetencyhavenoconnectionwiththeprivilegesofthenationalsupremacy。
ButitwasimpossibletocreateanarbiterbetweenasuperiorcourtoftheUnionandthesuperiorcourtofaseparateStatewhichwouldnotbelongtooneofthesetwoclasses。Itwas，therefore，necessarytoallowoneofthesecourtstojudgeitsowncause，andtotakeortoretaincognizanceofthepointwhichwascontested。TograntthisprivilegetothedifferentcourtsoftheStateswouldhavebeentodestroythesovereigntyoftheUniondefactoafterhavingestablisheditdejure;fortheinterpretationoftheConstitutionwouldsoonhaverestoredthatportionofindependencetotheStatesofwhichthetermsofthatactdeprivedthem。TheobjectofthecreationofaFederaltribunalwastopreventthecourtsoftheStatesfromdecidingquestionsaffectingthenationalinterestsintheirowndepartment，andsotoformauniformbodyofjurisprudenefortheinterpretationofthelawsoftheUnion。ThisendwouldnothavebeenaccomplishedifthecourtsoftheseveralStateshadbeencompetenttodecideuponcasesintheirseparatecapacitiesfromwhichtheywereobligedtoabstainasFederaltribunals。TheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStateswasthereforeinvestedwiththerightofdeterminingallquestionsofjurisdiction。*e[Footnotee:Inordertodiminishthenumberofthesesuits，itwasdecidedthatinagreatmanyFederalcausesthecourtsoftheStatesshouldbeempoweredtodecideconjointlywiththoseoftheUnion，thelosingpartyhavingthenarightofappealtotheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStates。TheSupremeCourtofVirginiacontestedtherightoftheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatestojudgeanappealfromitsdecisions，butunsuccessfully。
See"Kent’sCommentaries，"vol。i。p。300，pp。370etseq。;
Story’s"Commentaries，"p。646;and"TheOrganicLawoftheUnitedStates，"vol。i。p。35。]
ThiswasasevereblowupontheindependenceoftheStates，whichwasthusrestrictednotonlybythelaws，butbytheinterpretationofthem;byonelimitwhichwasknown，andbyanotherwhichwasdubious;byarulewhichwascertain，andarulewhichwasarbitrary。ItistruetheConstitutionhadlaiddownthepreciselimitsoftheFederalsupremacy，butwheneverthissupremacyiscontestedbyoneoftheStates，aFederaltribunaldecidesthequestion。Nevertheless，thedangerswithwhichtheindependenceoftheStateswasthreatenedbythismodeofproceedingarelessseriousthantheyappearedtobe。WeshallseehereafterthatinAmericatherealstrengthofthecountryisvestedintheprovincialfarmorethanintheFederalGovernment。TheFederaljudgesareconsciousoftherelativeweaknessofthepowerinwhosenametheyact，andtheyaremoreinclinedtoabandonarightofjurisdictionincaseswhereitisjustlytheirownthantoassertaprivilegetowhichtheyhavenolegalclaim。
DifferentCasesOfJurisdictionThematterandthepartyarethefirstconditionsoftheFederaljurisdiction—Suitsinwhichambassadorsareengaged—SuitsoftheUnion—OfaseparateState—Bywhomtried—CausesresultingfromthelawsoftheUnion—WhyjudgedbytheFederaltribunals—CausesrelatingtotheperformanceofcontractstriedbytheFederalcourts—Consequenceofthisarrangement。
AfterhavingappointedthemeansoffixingthecompetencyoftheFederalcourts，thelegislatorsoftheUniondefinedthecaseswhichshouldcomewithintheirjurisdiction。Itwasestablished，ontheonehand，thatcertainpartiesmustalwaysbebroughtbeforetheFederalcourts，withoutanyregardtothespecialnatureofthecause;and，ontheother，thatcertaincausesmustalwaysbebroughtbeforethesamecourts，withoutanyregardtothequalityofthepartiesinthesuit。ThesedistinctionswerethereforeadmittedtobethebasisoftheFederaljurisdiction。
AmbassadorsaretherepresentativesofnationsinastateofamitywiththeUnion，andwhateverconcernsthesepersonagesconcernsinsomedegreethewholeUnion。Whenanambassadorisapartyinasuit，thatsuitaffectsthewelfareofthenation，andaFederaltribunalisnaturallycalledupontodecideit。
TheUnionitselfmaybeinvokedinlegalproceedings，andinthiscaseitwouldbealikecontrarytothecustomsofallnationsandtocommonsensetoappealtoatribunalrepresentinganyothersovereigntythanitsown;theFederalcourts，therefore，takecognizanceoftheseaffairs。
WhentwopartiesbelongingtotwodifferentStatesareengagedinasuit，thecasecannotwithproprietybebroughtbeforeacourtofeitherState。ThesurestexpedientistoselectatribunallikethatoftheUnion，whichcanexcitethesuspicionsofneitherparty，andwhichoffersthemostnaturalaswellasthemostcertainremedy。
Whenthetwopartiesarenotprivateindividuals，butStates，animportantpoliticalconsiderationisaddedtothesamemotiveofequity。Thequalityofthepartiesinthiscasegivesanationalimportancetoalltheirdisputes;andthemosttriflinglitigationoftheStatesmaybesaidtoinvolvethepeaceofthewholeUnion。*f[Footnotef:TheConstitutionalsosaysthattheFederalcourtsshalldecide"controversiesbetweenaStateandthecitizensofanotherState。"Andhereamostimportantquestionofaconstitutionalnaturearose，whichwas，whetherthejurisdictiongivenbytheConstitutionincasesinwhichaStateisapartyextendedtosuitsbroughtagainstaStateaswellasbyit，orwasexclusivelyconfinedtothelatter。ThequestionwasmostelaboratelyconsideredinthecaseofChisholmv。Georgia，andwasdecidedbythemajorityoftheSupremeCourtintheaffirmative。ThedecisioncreatedgeneralalarmamongtheStates，andanamendmentwasproposedandratifiedbywhichthepowerwasentirelytakenaway，sofarasitregardssuitsbroughtagainstaState。SeeStory’s"Commentaries，"p。624，orinthelargeeditionSection1677。]
Thenatureofthecausefrequentlyprescribestheruleofcompetency。ThusallthequestionswhichconcernmaritimecommerceevidentlyfallunderthecognizanceoftheFederaltribunals。*gAlmostallthesequestionsareconnectedwiththeinterpretationofthelawofnations，andinthisrespecttheyessentiallyinteresttheUnioninrelationtoforeignpowers。
Moreover，astheseaisnotincludedwithinthelimitsofanypeculiarjurisdiction，thenationalcourtscanonlyhearcauseswhichoriginateinmaritimeaffairs。
[Footnoteg:Asforinstance，allcasesofpiracy。]
TheConstitutioncomprisesunderoneheadalmostallthecaseswhichbytheirverynaturecomewithinthelimitsoftheFederalcourts。Therulewhichitlaysdownissimple，butpregnantwithanentiresystemofideas，andwithavastmultitudeoffacts。ItdeclaresthatthejudicialpoweroftheSupremeCourtshallextendtoallcasesinlawandequityarisingunderthelawsoftheUnitedStates。
Twoexampleswillputtheintentionofthelegislatorintheclearestlight:
TheConstitutionprohibitstheStatesfrommakinglawsonthevalueandcirculationofmoney:If，notwithstandingthisprohibition，aStatepassesalawofthiskind，withwhichtheinterestedpartiesrefusetocomplybecauseitiscontrarytotheConstitution，thecasemustcomebeforeaFederalcourt，becauseitarisesunderthelawsoftheUnitedStates。Again，ifdifficultiesariseinthelevyingofimportdutieswhichhavebeenvotedbyCongress，theFederalcourtmustdecidethecase，becauseitarisesundertheinterpretationofalawoftheUnitedStates。
ThisruleisinperfectaccordancewiththefundamentalprinciplesoftheFederalConstitution。TheUnion，asitwasestablishedin1789，possesses，itistrue，alimitedsupremacy;
butitwasintendedthatwithinitslimitsitshouldformoneandthesamepeople。*hWithinthoselimitstheUnionissovereign。
Whenthispointisestablishedandadmitted，theinferenceiseasy;forifitbeacknowledgedthattheUnitedStatesconstituteoneandthesamepeoplewithintheboundsprescribedbytheirConstitution，itisimpossibletorefusethemtherightswhichbelongtoothernations。Butithasbeenallowed，fromtheoriginofsociety，thateverynationhastherightofdecidingbyitsowncourtsthosequestionswhichconcerntheexecutionofitsownlaws。TothisitisansweredthattheUnionisinsosingularapositionthatinrelationtosomemattersitconstitutesapeople，andthatinrelationtoalltherestitisanonentity。Buttheinferencetobedrawnis，thatinthelawsrelatingtothesematterstheUnionpossessesalltherightsofabsolutesovereignty。Thedifficultyistoknowwhatthesemattersare;andwhenonceitisresolved（andwehaveshownhowitwasresolved，inspeakingofthemeansofdeterminingthejurisdictionoftheFederalcourt...完整阅读请扫描二维码下载丁香书院APP免费看：
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