HithertonocitizenhasshownanydispositiontoexposehishonorandhislifeinordertobecomethePresidentoftheUnitedStates;becausethepowerofthatofficeistemporary，limited，andsubordinate。Theprizeoffortunemustbegreattoencourageadventurersinsodesperateagame。Nocandidatehasasyetbeenabletoarousethedangerousenthusiasmorthepassionatesympathiesofthepeopleinhisfavor，fortheverysimplereasonthatwhenheisattheheadoftheGovernmenthehasbutlittlepower，butlittlewealth，andbutlittleglorytoshareamongsthisfriends;andhisinfluenceintheStateistoosmallforthesuccessortheruinofafactiontodependupontheelevationofanindividualtopower。
Thegreatadvantageofhereditarymonarchiesis，thatastheprivateinterestofafamilyisalwaysintimatelyconnectedwiththeinterestsoftheState，theexecutivegovernmentisneversuspendedforasingleinstant;andiftheaffairsofamonarchyarenotbetterconductedthanthoseofarepublic，atleastthereisalwayssomeonetoconductthem，wellorill，accordingtohiscapacity。InelectiveStates，onthecontrary，thewheelsofgovernmentceasetoact，asitwere，oftheirownaccordattheapproachofanelection，andevenforsometimeprevioustothatevent。Thelawsmayindeedacceleratetheoperationoftheelection，whichmaybeconductedwithsuchsimplicityandrapiditythattheseatofpowerwillneverbeleftvacant;but，notwithstandingtheseprecautions，abreaknecessarilyoccursinthemindsofthepeople。
Attheapproachofanelectiontheheadoftheexecutivegovernmentiswhollyoccupiedbythecomingstruggle;hisfutureplansaredoubtful;hecanundertakenothingnew，andthehewillonlyprosecutewithindifferencethosedesignswhichanotherwillperhapsterminate。"Iamsonearthetimeofmyretirementfromoffice，"saidPresidentJeffersononthe21stofJanuary，1809
（sixweeksbeforetheelection），"thatIfeelnopassion，Itakenopart，Iexpressnosentiment。Itappearstomejusttoleavetomysuccessorthecommencementofthosemeasureswhichhewillhavetoprosecute，andforwhichhewillberesponsible。"
Ontheotherhand，theeyesofthenationarecentredonasinglepoint;allarewatchingthegradualbirthofsoimportantanevent。Thewidertheinfluenceoftheexecutivepowerextends，thegreaterandthemorenecessaryisitsconstantaction，themorefatalisthetermofsuspense;andanationwhichisaccustomedtothegovernment，or，stillmore，oneusedtotheadministrativeprotectionofapowerfulexecutiveauthoritywouldbeinfalliblyconvulsedbyanelectionofthiskind。IntheUnitedStatestheactionoftheGovernmentmaybeslackenedwithimpunity，becauseitisalwaysweakandcircumscribed。*u[Footnoteu:[This，however，maybeagreatdanger。TheperiodduringwhichMr。Buchananretainedoffice，aftertheelectionofMr。Lincoln，fromNovember，1860，toMarch，1861，wasthatwhichenabledthesecedingStatesoftheSouthtocompletetheirpreparationsfortheCivilWar，andtheExecutiveGovernmentwasparalyzed。Nogreaterevilcouldbefallanation。—Translator’sNote。]]
OneoftheprincipalvicesoftheelectivesystemisthatitalwaysintroducesacertaindegreeofinstabilityintotheinternalandexternalpolicyoftheState。Butthisdisadvantageislesssensiblyfeltiftheshareofpowervestedintheelectedmagistrateissmall。InRometheprinciplesoftheGovernmentunderwentnovariation，althoughtheConsulswerechangedeveryyear，becausetheSenate，whichwasanhereditaryassembly，possessedthedirectingauthority。IftheelectivesystemwereadoptedinEurope，theconditionofmostofthemonarchicalStateswouldbechangedateverynewelection。InAmericathePresidentexercisesacertaininfluenceonStateaffairs，buthedoesnotconductthem;thepreponderatingpowerisvestedintherepresentativesofthewholenation。Thepoliticalmaximsofthecountrydependthereforeonthemassofthepeople，notonthePresidentalone;andconsequentlyinAmericatheelectivesystemhasnoveryprejudicialinfluenceonthefixedprinciplesoftheGovernment。ButthewantoffixedprinciplesisanevilsoinherentintheelectivesystemthatitisstillextremelyperceptibleinthenarrowspheretowhichtheauthorityofthePresidentextends。
TheAmericanshaveadmittedthattheheadoftheexecutivepower，whohastobearthewholeresponsibilityofthedutiesheiscalledupontofulfil，oughttobeempoweredtochoosehisownagents，andtoremovethematpleasure:thelegislativebodieswatchtheconductofthePresidentmorethantheydirectit。Theconsequenceofthisarrangementis，thatateverynewelectionthefateofalltheFederalpublicofficersisinsuspense。Mr。
QuincyAdams，onhisentryintooffice，dischargedthemajorityoftheindividualswhohadbeenappointedbyhispredecessor:andIamnotawarethatGeneralJacksonallowedasingleremovablefunctionaryemployedintheFederalservicetoretainhisplacebeyondthefirstyearwhichsucceededhiselection。ItissometimesmadeasubjectofcomplaintthatintheconstitutionalmonarchiesofEuropethefateofthehumblerservantsofanAdministrationdependsuponthatoftheMinisters。ButinelectiveGovernmentsthisevilisfargreater。Inaconstitutionalmonarchysuccessiveministriesarerapidlyformed;
butastheprincipalrepresentativeoftheexecutivepowerdoesnotchange，thespiritofinnovationiskeptwithinbounds;thechangeswhichtakeplaceareinthedetailsratherthanintheprinciplesoftheadministrativesystem;buttosubstituteonesystemforanother，asisdoneinAmericaeveryfouryears，bylaw，istocauseasortofrevolution。Astothemisfortuneswhichmayfalluponindividualsinconsequenceofthisstateofthings，itmustbeallowedthattheuncertainsituationofthepublicofficersislessfraughtwithevilconsequencesinAmericathanelsewhere。ItissoeasytoacquireanindependentpositionintheUnitedStatesthatthepublicofficerwholoseshisplacemaybedeprivedofthecomfortsoflife，butnotofthemeansofsubsistence。
IremarkedatthebeginningofthischapterthatthedangersoftheelectivesystemappliedtotheheadoftheStateareaugmentedordecreasedbythepeculiarcircumstancesofthepeoplewhichadoptsit。Howeverthefunctionsoftheexecutivepowermayberestricted，itmustalwaysexerciseagreatinfluenceupontheforeignpolicyofthecountry，foranegotiationcannotbeopenedorsuccessfullycarriedonotherwisethanbyasingleagent。Themoreprecariousandthemoreperilousthepositionofapeoplebecomes，themoreabsoluteisthewantofafixedandconsistentexternalpolicy，andthemoredangerousdoestheelectivesystemoftheChiefMagistratebecome。ThepolicyoftheAmericansinrelationtothewholeworldisexceedinglysimple;foritmayalmostbesaidthatnocountrystandsinneedofthem，nordotheyrequiretheco—operationofanyotherpeople。Theirindependenceisneverthreatened。Intheirpresentcondition，therefore，thefunctionsoftheexecutivepowerarenolesslimitedbycircumstancesthanbythelaws;andthePresidentmayfrequentlychangehislineofpolicywithoutinvolvingtheStateindifficultyordestruction。
Whatevertheprerogativesoftheexecutivepowermaybe，theperiodwhichimmediatelyprecedesanelectionandthemomentofitsdurationmustalwaysbeconsideredasanationalcrisis，whichisperilousinproportiontotheinternalembarrassmentsandtheexternaldangersofthecountry。FewofthenationsofEuropecouldescapethecalamitiesofanarchyorofconquesteverytimetheymighthavetoelectanewsovereign。InAmericasocietyissoconstitutedthatitcanstandwithoutassistanceuponitsownbasis;nothingistobefearedfromthepressureofexternaldangers，andtheelectionofthePresidentisacauseofagitation，butnotofruin。
ModeOfElectionSkilloftheAmericanlegislatorsshowninthemodeofelectionadoptedbythem—Creationofaspecialelectoralbody—Separatevotesoftheseelectors—CaseinwhichtheHouseofRepresentativesiscalledupontochoosethePresident—ResultsofthetwelveelectionswhichhavetakenplacesincetheConstitutionhasbeenestablished。
Besidesthedangerswhichareinherentinthesystem，manyotherdifficultiesmayarisefromthemodeofelection，whichmaybeobviatedbytheprecautionofthelegislator。Whenapeoplemetinarmsonsomepublicspottochooseitshead，itwasexposedtoallthechancesofcivilwarresultingfromsomartialamodeofproceeding，besidesthedangersoftheelectivesysteminitself。ThePolishlaws，whichsubjectedtheelectionofthesovereigntothevetoofasingleindividual，suggestedthemurderofthatindividualorpreparedthewaytoanarchy。
IntheexaminationoftheinstitutionsandthepoliticalaswellassocialconditionoftheUnitedStates，wearestruckbytheadmirableharmonyofthegiftsoffortuneandtheeffortsofman。Thenationpossessedtwoofthemaincausesofinternalpeace;itwasanewcountry，butitwasinhabitedbyapeoplegrownoldintheexerciseoffreedom。Americahadnohostileneighborstodread;andtheAmericanlegislators，profitingbythesefavorablecircumstances，createdaweakandsubordinateexecutivepowerwhichcouldwithoutdangerbemadeelective。
Itthenonlyremainedforthemtochoosetheleastdangerousofthevariousmodesofelection;andtheruleswhichtheylaiddownuponthispointadmirablycorrespondtothesecuritieswhichthephysicalandpoliticalconstitutionofthecountryalreadyafforded。Theirobjectwastofindthemodeofelectionwhichwouldbestexpressthechoiceofthepeoplewiththeleastpossibleexcitementandsuspense。Itwasadmittedinthefirstplacethatthesimplemajorityshouldbedecisive;butthedifficultywastoobtainthismajoritywithoutanintervalofdelaywhichitwasmostimportanttoavoid。Itrarelyhappensthatanindividualcanatoncecollectthemajorityofthesuffragesofagreatpeople;andthisdifficultyisenhancedinarepublicofconfederateStates，wherelocalinfluencesareapttopreponderate。Themeansbywhichitwasproposedtoobviatethissecondobstaclewastodelegatetheelectoralpowersofthenationtoabodyofrepresentatives。Thismodeofelectionrenderedamajoritymoreprobable;forthefewertheelectorsare，thegreateristhechanceoftheircomingtoafinaldecision。Italsoofferedanadditionalprobabilityofajudiciouschoice。Itthenremainedtobedecidedwhetherthisrightofelectionwastobeentrustedtoalegislativebody，thehabitualrepresentativeassemblyofthenation，orwhetheranelectoralassemblyshouldbeformedfortheexpresspurposeofproceedingtothenominationofaPresident。TheAmericanschosethelatteralternative，fromabeliefthattheindividualswhowerereturnedtomakethelawswereincompetenttorepresentthewishesofthenationintheelec...完整阅读请扫描二维码下载丁香书院APP免费看：
第12章