Ibid。pp。409—426。]
　　[Footnotei:Severalotherprivilegesofthesamekindexist，suchasthatwhichempowerstheUniontolegislateonbankruptcy，tograntpatents，andothermattersinwhichitsinterventionisclearlynecessary。]
　　[Footnotej:Eveninthesecasesitsinterferenceisindirect。
　　TheUnioninterferesbymeansofthetribunals，aswillbehereaftershown。]
　　[Footnotek:FederalConstitution，sect。10，art。I。]
　　[Footnotel:Constitution，sects。8，9，and10;"Federalist，"
　　Nos。30—36，inclusive，and41—44;Kent’s"Commentaries，"vol。i。
　　pp。207and381;Story，pp。329and514。]
　　InexaminingthebalanceofpowerasestablishedbytheFederalConstitution;inremarkingontheonehandtheportionofsovereigntywhichhasbeenreservedtotheseveralStates，andontheothertheshareofpowerwhichtheUnionhasassumed，itisevidentthattheFederallegislatorsentertainedtheclearestandmostaccuratenotionsonthenatureofthecentralizationofgovernment。TheUnitedStatesformnotonlyarepublic，butaconfederation;neverthelesstheauthorityofthenationismorecentralthanitwasinseveralofthemonarchiesofEuropewhentheAmericanConstitutionwasformed。Take，forinstance，thetwofollowingexamples。
　　ThirteensupremecourtsofjusticeexistedinFrance，which，generallyspeaking，hadtherightofinterpretingthelawwithoutappeal;andthoseprovinceswhichwerestyledpaysd’etatswereauthorizedtorefusetheirassenttoanimpostwhichhadbeenleviedbythesovereignwhorepresentedthenation。IntheUnionthereisbutonetribunaltointerpret，asthereisonelegislaturetomakethelaws;andanimpostvotedbytherepresentativesofthenationisbindinguponallthecitizens。
　　Inthesetwoessentialpoints，therefore，theUnionexercisesmorecentralauthoritythantheFrenchmonarchypossessed，althoughtheUnionisonlyanassemblageofconfederaterepublics。
　　InSpaincertainprovinceshadtherightofestablishingasystemofcustom—housedutiespeculiartothemselves，althoughthatprivilegebelongs，byitsverynature，tothenationalsovereignty。InAmericatheCongressalonehastherightofregulatingthecommercialrelationsoftheStates。ThegovernmentoftheConfederationisthereforemorecentralizedinthisrespectthanthekingdomofSpain。ItistruethatthepoweroftheCrowninFranceorinSpainwasalwaysabletoobtainbyforcewhatevertheConstitutionofthecountrydenied，andthattheultimateresultwasconsequentlythesame;butIamherediscussingthetheoryoftheConstitution。
　　FederalPowersAfterhavingsettledthelimitswithinwhichtheFederalGovernmentwastoact，thenextpointwastodeterminethepowerswhichitwastoexert。
　　LegislativePowers*m[Footnotem:[InthischaptertheauthorpointsouttheessenceoftheconflictbetweenthesecedingStatesandtheUnionwhichcausedtheCivilWarof1861。]]
　　DivisionoftheLegislativeBodyintotwobranches—DifferenceinthemannerofformingthetwoHouses—TheprincipleoftheindependenceoftheStatespredominatesintheformationoftheSenate—TheprincipleofthesovereigntyofthenationinthecompositionoftheHouseofRepresentatives—SingulareffectsofthefactthataConstitutioncanonlybelogicalintheearlystagesofanation。
　　TheplanwhichhadbeenlaiddownbeforehandfortheConstitutionsoftheseveralStateswasfollowed，inmanypoints，intheorganizationofthepowersoftheUnion。TheFederallegislatureoftheUnionwascomposedofaSenateandaHouseofRepresentatives。Aspiritofconciliationprescribedtheobservanceofdistinctprinciplesintheformationofthesetwoassemblies。IhavealreadyshownthattwocontraryinterestswereopposedtoeachotherintheestablishmentoftheFederalConstitution。Thesetwointerestshadgivenrisetotwoopinions。ItwasthewishofonepartytoconverttheUnionintoaleagueofindependentStates，orasortofcongress，atwhichtherepresentativesoftheseveralpeopleswouldmeettodiscusscertainpointsoftheircommoninterests。TheotherpartydesiredtounitetheinhabitantsoftheAmericancoloniesintoonesolenation，andtoestablishaGovernmentwhichshouldactasthesolerepresentativeofthenation，asfarasthelimitedsphereofitsauthoritywouldpermit。Thepracticalconsequencesofthesetwotheorieswereexceedinglydifferent。
　　Thequestionwas，whetheraleaguewastobeestablishedinsteadofanationalGovernment;whetherthemajorityoftheState，insteadofthemajorityoftheinhabitantsoftheUnion，wastogivethelaw:foreveryState，thesmallaswellasthegreat，wouldthenremaininthefullenjoymentofitsindependence，andentertheUnionuponafootingofperfectequality。If，however，theinhabitantsoftheUnitedStatesweretobeconsideredasbelongingtooneandthesamenation，itwouldbejustthatthemajorityofthecitizensoftheUnionshouldprescribethelaw。OfcoursethelesserStatescouldnotsubscribetotheapplicationofthisdoctrinewithout，infact，abdicatingtheirexistenceinrelationtothesovereigntyoftheConfederation;sincetheywouldhavepassedfromtheconditionofaco—equalandco—legislativeauthoritytothatofaninsignificantfractionofagreatpeople。Butiftheformersystemwouldhaveinvestedthemwithanexcessiveauthority，thelatterwouldhaveannulledtheirinfluencealtogether。Underthesecircumstancestheresultwas，thatthestrictrulesoflogicwereevaded，asisusuallythecasewheninterestsareopposedtoarguments。Amiddlecoursewashituponbythelegislators，whichbroughttogetherbyforcetwosystemstheoreticallyirreconcilable。
　　TheprincipleoftheindependenceoftheStatesprevailedintheformationoftheSenate，andthatofthesovereigntyofthenationpredominatedinthecompositionoftheHouseofRepresentatives。ItwasdecidedthateachStateshouldsendtwosenatorstoCongress，andanumberofrepresentativesproportionedtoitspopulation。*nItresultsfromthisarrangementthattheStateofNewYorkhasatthepresentdayfortyrepresentativesandonlytwosenators;theStateofDelawarehastwosenatorsandonlyonerepresentative;theStateofDelawareisthereforeequaltotheStateofNewYorkintheSenate，whilstthelatterhasfortytimestheinfluenceoftheformerintheHouseofRepresentatives。Thus，iftheminorityofthenationpreponderatesintheSenate，。itmayparalyzethedecisionsofthemajorityrepresentedintheotherHouse，whichiscontrarytothespiritofconstitutionalgovernment。
　　[Footnoten:EverytenyearsCongressfixesanewthenumberofrepresentativeswhicheachStateistofurnish。Thetotalnumberwas69in1789，and240in1833。（See"AmericanAlmanac，"1834，p。194。）TheConstitutiondecidedthatthereshouldnotbemorethanonerepresentativeforevery30，000persons;butnominimumwasfixedon。TheCongresshasnotthoughtfittoaugmentthenumberofrepresentativesinproportiontotheincreaseofpopulation。ThefirstActwhichwaspassedonthesubject（April14，1792:see"LawsoftheUnitedStates，"byStory，vol。i。p。
　　235）decidedthatthereshouldbeonerepresentativeforevery33，000inhabitants。ThelastAct，whichwaspassedin1832，fixestheproportionatonefor48，000。Thepopulationrepresentediscomposedofallthefreemenandofthree—fifthsoftheslaves。
　　[ThelastActofapportionment，passedFebruary2，1872，fixestherepresentationatoneto134，684inhabitants。Therearenow（1875）283membersofthelowerHouseofCongress，and9
　　fortheStatesatlarge，makinginall292members。TheoldStateshaveofcourselosttherepresentativeswhichthenewStateshavegained。—Translator’sNote。]]
　　Thesefactsshowhowrareandhowdifficultitisrationallyandlogicallytocombinealltheseveralpartsoflegislation。
　　Inthecourseoftimedifferentinterestsarise，anddifferentprinciplesaresanctionedbythesamepeople;andwhenageneralconstitutionistobeestablished，theseinterestsandprinciplesaresomanynaturalobstaclestotherigorousapplicationofanypoliticalsystem，withallitsconsequences。Theearlystagesofnationalexistencearetheonlyperiodsatwhichitispossibletomaintainthecompletelogicoflegislation;andwhenweperceiveanationintheenjoymentofthisadvantage，beforewehastentoconcludethatitiswise，weshoulddowelltorememberthatitisyoung。WhentheFederalConstitutionwasformed，theinterestsofindependencefortheseparateStates，andtheinterestofunionforthewholepeople，weretheonlytwoconflictinginterestswhichexistedamongsttheAnglo—Americans，andacompromisewasnecessarilymadebetweenthem。
　　Itis，however，justtoacknowledgethatthispartoftheConstitutionhasnothithertoproducedthoseevilswhichmighthavebeenfeared。AlltheStatesareyoungandcontiguous;theircustoms，theirideas，andtheirexigenciesarenotdissimilar;
　　andthedifferenceswhichresultfromtheirsizeorinferioritydonotsufficetosettheirinterestsatvariance。ThesmallStateshaveconsequentlyneverbeeninducedtoleaguethemselvestogetherintheSenatetoopposethedesignsofthelargerones;
　　andindeedthereissoirresistibleanauthorityinthelegitimateexpressionofthewillofapeoplethattheSenatecouldofferbutafeebleoppositiontothevoteofthemajorityoftheHouseofRepresentatives。
　　Itmustnotbeforgotten，ontheotherhand，thatitwasnotinthepoweroftheAmericanlegislatorstoreducetoasinglenationthepeopleforwhomtheyweremakinglaws。TheobjectoftheFederalConstitutionwasnottodestroytheindependenceoftheStates，buttorestrainit。Byacknowledgingtherealauthorityofthesesecondarycommunities（anditwasimpossibletodeprivethemofit），theydisavowedbeforehandthehabitualuseofconstraintinenforcinggthedecisionsofthemajority。
　　UponthisprincipletheintroductionoftheinfluenceoftheStatesintothemechanismoftheFederalGovernmentwasbynomeanstobewonderedat，sinceitonlyattestedtheexistenceofanacknowledgedpower，whichwastobehumoredandnotforciblychecked。
　　AFurtherDifferenceBetweenTheSenateAndTheHouseOfRepresentativesTheSenatenamedbytheprovinciallegislators，theRepresentativesbythepeople—Doubleelectionoftheformer;
　　singleelectionofthelatter—Termofthedifferentoffices—
　　PeculiarfunctionsofeachHouse。
　　TheSenatenotonlydiffersfromtheotherHouseintheprinciplewhichitrepresents，butalsointhemodeofitselection，inthetermforwhichitischosen，andinthenatureofitsfunctions。TheHouseofRepresentativesisnamedbythepeople，theSenatebythelegislatorsofeachState;theformerisdirectlyelected，thelatteriselectedbyanelectedbody;
　　thetermforwhichtherepresentativesarechosenisonlytwoyears，thatofthesenatorsissix。ThefunctionsoftheHouseofRepresentativesarepurelylegislative，andtheonlyshareittakesinthejudicialpowerisintheimpeachmentofpublicofficers。TheSenateco—operatesintheworkoflegislation，andtriesthosepoliticaloffenceswhichtheHouseofRepresentativessubmitstoitsdecision。Italsoactsasthegreatexecutivecouncilofthenation;thetreatieswhichareconcludedbythePresidentmustberatifiedbytheSenate，andtheappointmentshemaymakemustbedefinitelyapprovedbythesamebody。*o[Footnoteo:See"TheFederalist，"Nos。52—56，inclusive;Story，pp。199—314;ConstitutionoftheUnitedStates，sects。2and3。]
　　TheExecutivePower*p[Footnotep:See"TheFederalist，"Nos。67—77;ConstitutionoftheUnitedStates，art。2;Story，p。315，pp。615—780;Kent’s"Commentaries，"p。255。]
　　DependenceofthePresident—Heiselectiveandresponsible—Heisfreetoactinhisownsphereundertheinspection，butnotunderthedirection，oftheSenate—Hissalaryfixedathisentryintooffice—Suspensiveveto。
　　TheAmericanlegislatorsundertookadifficulttaskinattemptingtocreateanexecutivepowerdependentonthemajorityofthepeople，andneverthelesssufficientlystrongtoactwithoutrestraintinitsownsphere。Itwasindispensabletothemaintenanceoftherepublicanformofgovernmentthattherepresentativeoftheexecutivepowershouldbesubjecttothewillofthenation。
　　ThePresidentisanelectivemagistrate。Hishonor，hisproperty，hisliberty，andhislifearethesecuritieswhichthepeoplehasforthetemperateuseofhispower。Butintheexerciseofhisauthorityhecannotbesaidtobeperfectlyindependent;theSenatetakescognizanceofhisrelationswithforeignpowers，andofthedistributionofpublicappointments，sothathecanneitherbebribednorcanheemploythemeansofcorruption。ThelegislatorsoftheUnionacknowledgedthattheexecutivepowerwouldbeincompetenttofulfilitstaskwithdignityandutility，unlessitenjoyedagreaterdegreeofstabilityandofstrengththanhadbeengrantedtoitintheseparateStates。
　　ThePresidentischosenforfouryears，andhemaybereelected;sothatthechancesofaprolongedadministrationmayinspirehimwithhopefulundertakingsforthepublicgood，andwiththemeansofcarryingthemintoexecution。ThePresidentwasmadethesolerepresentativeoftheexecutivepoweroftheUnion，andcarewastakennottorenderhisdecisionssubordinatetothevoteofacouncil—adangerousmeasure，whichtendsatthesametimetoclogtheactionoftheGovernmentandtodiminishitsresponsibility。TheSenatehastherightofannullinggcertainactsofthePresident;butitcannotcompelhimtotakeanysteps，nordoesitparticipateintheexerciseoftheexecutivepower。
　　Theactionofthelegislatureontheexecutivepowermaybedirect;andwehavejustshownthattheAmericanscarefullyobviatedthisinfluence;butitmay，ontheotherhand，beindirect。Publicassemblieswhichhavethepowerofdeprivinganofficerofstateofhissalaryencroachuponhisindependence;
　　andastheyarefreetomakethelaws，itistobefearedlesttheyshouldgraduallyappropriatetothemselvesaportionofthatauthoritywhichtheConstitutionhadvestedinhishands。Thisdependenceoftheexecutivepowerisoneofthedefectsinherentinrepublicanconstitutions。TheAmericanshavenotbeenabletocounteractthetendencywhichlegislativeassemblieshavetogetpossessionofthegovernment，buttheyhaverenderedthispropensitylessirresistible。ThesalaryofthePresidentisfixed，atthetimeofhisenteringuponoffice，forthewholeperiodofhismagistracy。ThePresidentis，moreover，providedwithasuspensiveveto，whichallowshimtoopposethepassingofsuchlawsasmightdestroytheportionofindependencewhichtheConstitutionawardshim。ThestrugglebetweenthePresidentandthelegislaturemustalwaysbeanunequalone，sincethelatteriscertainofbearingdownallresistancebyperseveringinitsplans;butthesuspensivevetoforcesitatleasttoreconsiderthematter，and，ifthemotionbepersistedin，itmustthenbebackedbyamajorityoftwo—thirdsofthewholehouse。Thevetois，infact，asortofappealtothepeople。Theexecutivepower，which，withoutthissecurity，mighthavebeensecretlyoppressed，adoptsthismeansofpleadingitscauseandstatingitsmotives。
　　Butifthelegislatureiscertainofoverpoweringallresistancebyperseveringinitsplans，Ireply，thatintheconstitutionsofallnations，ofwhateverkindtheymaybe，acertainpointexistsatwhichthelegislatorisobligedtohaverecoursetothegoodsenseandthevirtueofhisfellow—citizens。Thispointismoreprominentandmorediscoverableinrepublics，whilstitismoreremoteandmorecarefullyconcealedinmonarchies，butitalwaysexistssomewhere。Thereisnocountryintheworldinwhicheverythingcanbeprovidedforbythelaws，orinwhichpoliticalinstitutionscanproveasubstituteforcommonsenseandpublicmorality。
　　DifferencesBetweenThePositionOfThePresidentOfTheUnitedStatesAndThatOfAConstitutionalKingOfFranceExecutivepowerintheNorthernStatesaslimitedandaspartialasthesupremacywhichitrepresents—ExecutivepowerinFranceasuniversalasthesupremacyitrepresents—TheKingabranchofthelegislature—ThePresidentthemereexecutorofthelaw—
　　Otherdifferencesresultingfromthedurationofthetwopowers—
　　ThePresidentcheckedintheexerciseoftheexecutiveauthority—TheKingindependentinitsexercise—NotwithstandingthesediscrepanciesFranceismoreakintoarepublicthantheUniontoamonarchy—Comparisonofthenumberofpublicofficersdependingupontheexecutivepowerinthetwocountries。
　　TheexecutivepowerhassoimportantaninfluenceonthedestiniesofnationsthatIaminclinedtopauseforaninstantatthisportionofmysubject，inordermoreclearlytoexplainthepartitsustainsinAmerica。InordertoformanaccurateideaofthepositionofthePresidentoftheUnitedStates，itmaynotbeirrelevanttocompareittothatofoneoftheconstitutionalkingsofEurope。InthiscomparisonIshallpaybutlittleattentiontotheexternalsignsofpower，whicharemoreapttodeceivetheeyeoftheobserverthantoguidehisresearches。Whenamonarchyisbeinggraduallytransformedintoarepublic，theexecutivepowerretainsthetitles，thehonors，theetiquette，andeventhefundsofroyaltylongafteritsauthorityhasdisappeared。TheEnglish，afterhavingcutofftheheadofonekingandexpelledanotherfromhisthrone，wereaccustomedtoaccostthesuccessorofthoseprincesupontheirknees。Ontheotherhand，whenarepublicfallsundertheswayofasingleindividual，thedemeanorofthesovereignissimpleandunpretending，asifhisauthoritywasnotyetparamount。Whentheemperorsexercisedanunlimitedcontroloverthefortunesandthelivesoftheirfellow—citizens，itwascustomarytocallthemCaesarinconversation，andtheywereinthehabitofsuppingwithoutformalityattheirfriends’houses。Itisthereforenecessarytolookbelowthesurface。
　　ThesovereigntyoftheUnitedStatesissharedbetweentheUnionandtheStates，whilstinFranceitisundividedandcompact:hencearisesthefirstandthemostnotabledifferencewhichexistsbetweenthePresidentoftheUnitedStatesandtheKingofFrance。IntheUnitedStatestheexecutivepowerisaslimitedandpartialasthesovereigntyoftheUnioninwhosenameitacts;inFranceitisasuniversalastheauthorityoftheState。TheAmericanshaveafederalandtheFrenchanationalGovernment。
　　ChapterVIII:TheFederalConstitution—PartII
　　Thiscauseofinferiorityresultsfromthenatureofthings，butitisnottheonlyone;thesecondinimportanceisasfollows:Sovereigntymaybedefinedtobetherightofmakinglaws:inFrance，theKingreallyexercisesaportionofthesovereignpower，sincethelawshavenoweighttillhehasgivenhisassenttothem;heis，moreover，theexecutorofalltheyordain。ThePresidentisalsotheexecutorofthelaws，buthedoesnotreallyco—operateintheirformation，sincetherefusalofhisassentdoesnotannulthem。Heisthereforemerelytobeconsideredastheagentofthesovereignpower。ButnotonlydoestheKingofFranceexerciseaportionofthesovereignpower，healsocontributestothenominationofthelegislature，whichexercisestheotherportion。Hehastheprivilegeofappointingthemembersofonechamber，andofdissolvingtheotherathispleasure;whereasthePresidentoftheUnitedStateshasnoshareintheformationofthelegislativebody，andcannotdissolveanypartofit。TheKinghasthesamerightofbringingforwardmeasuresastheChambers;arightwhichthePresidentdoesnotpossess。TheKingisrepresentedineachassemblybyhisministers，whoexplainhisintentions，supporthisopinions，andmaintaintheprinciplesoftheGovernment。ThePresidentandhisministersarealikeexcludedfromCongress;sothathisinfluenceandhisopinionscanonlypenetrateindirectlyintothatgreatbody。TheKingofFranceisthereforeonanequalfootingwiththelegislature，whichcannomoreactwithouthimthanhecanwithoutit。ThePresidentexercisesanauthorityinferiorto，anddependingupon，thatofthelegislature。
　　Evenintheexerciseoftheexecutivepower，properlysocalled—thepointuponwhichhispositionseemstobemostanalogoustothatoftheKingofFrance—thePresidentlaborsunderseveralcausesofinferiority。TheauthorityoftheKing，inFrance，has，inthefirstplace，theadvantageofdurationoverthatofthePresident，anddurabilityisoneofthechiefelementsofstrength;nothingiseitherlovedorfearedbutwhatislikelytoendure。ThePresidentoftheUnitedStatesisamagistrateelectedforfouryears;theKing，inFrance，isanhereditarysovereign。IntheexerciseoftheexecutivepowerthePresidentoftheUnitedStatesisconstantlysubjecttoajealousscrutiny。Hemaymake，buthecannotconclude，atreaty;hemaydesignate，buthecannotappoint，apublicofficer。*qTheKingofFranceisabsolutewithinthelimitsofhisauthority。ThePresidentoftheUnitedStatesisresponsibleforhisactions;
　　butthepersonoftheKingisdeclaredinviolablebytheFrenchCharter。*r[Footnoteq:TheConstitutionhadleftitdoubtfulwhetherthePresidentwasobligedtoconsulttheSenateintheremovalaswellasintheappointmentofFederalofficers。"TheFederalist"
　　（No。77）seemedtoestablishtheaffirmative;butin1789
　　Congressformallydecidedthat，asthePresidentwasresponsibleforhisactions，heoughtnottobeforcedtoemployagentswhohadforfeitedhisesteem。SeeKent’s"Commentaries，vol。i。p。
　　289。]
　　[Footnoter:[ThiscomparisonappliedtotheConstitutionalKingofFranceandtothepowersheheldundertheCharterof1830，tilltheoverthrowofthemonarchyin1848。—Translator’sNote。]]
　　Nevertheless，thesupremacyofpublicopinionisnolessabovetheheadoftheonethanoftheother。Thispowerislessdefinite，lessevident，andlesssanctionedbythelawsinFrancethaninAmerica，butinfactitexists。InAmerica，itactsbyelectionsanddecrees;inFranceitproceedsbyrevolutions;butnotwithstandingthedifferentconstitutionsofthesetwocountries，publicopinionisthepredominantauthorityinbothofthem。Thefundamentalprincipleoflegislation—aprincipleessentiallyrepublican—isthesameinbothcountries，althoughitsconsequencesmaybedifferent，anditsresultsmoreorlessextensive。WhenceIamledtoconcludethatFrancewithitsKingisnearerakintoarepublicthantheUnionwithitsPresidentistoamonarchy。
　　InwhatIhavebeensayingIhaveonlytoucheduponthemainpointsofdistinction;andifIcouldhaveenteredintodetails，thecontrastwouldhavebeenrenderedstillmorestriking。
　　IhaveremarkedthattheauthorityofthePresidentintheUnitedStatesisonlyexercisedwithinthelimitsofapartialsovereignty，whilstthatoftheKinginFranceisundivided。I
　　mighthavegoneontoshowthatthepoweroftheKing’sgovernmentinFranceexceedsitsnaturallimits，howeverextensivetheymaybe，andpenetratesinathousanddifferentwaysintotheadministrationofprivateinterests。Amongsttheexamplesofthisinfluencemaybequotedthatwhichresultsfromthegreatnumberofpublicfunctionaries，whoallderivetheirappointmentsfromtheGovernment。Thisnumbernowexceedsallpreviouslimits;itamountsto138，000*snominations，eachofwhichmaybeconsideredasanelementofpower。ThePresidentoftheUnitedStateshasnottheexclusiverightofmakinganypublicappointments，andtheirwholenumberscarcelyexceeds12，000。*t[Footnotes:ThesumsannuallypaidbytheStatetotheseofficersamountto200，000，000fr。（$40，000，000）。]
　　[Footnotet:Thisnumberisextractedfromthe"NationalCalendar"for1833。The"NationalCalendar"isanAmericanalmanacwhichcontainsthenamesofalltheFederalofficers。ItresultsfromthiscomparisonthattheKingofFrancehaseleventimesasmanyplacesathisdisposalasthePresident，althoughthepopulationofFranceisnotmuchmorethandoublethatoftheUnion。
　　[IhavenotthemeansofascertainingthenumberofappointmentsnowatthedisposalofthePresidentoftheUnitedStates，buthispatronageandtheabuseofithavelargelyincreasedsince1833。—Translator’sNote，1875。]]
　　AccidentalCausesWhichMayIncreaseTheInfluenceOfTheExecutiveGovernmentExternalsecurityoftheUnion—Armyofsixthousandmen—Fewships—ThePresidenthasnoopportunityofexercisinghisgreatprerogatives—Intheprerogativesheexercisesheisweak。
　　IftheexecutivegovernmentisfeeblerinAmericathaninFrance，thecauseismoreattributabletothecircumstancesthantothelawsofthecountry。
　　Itischieflyinitsforeignrelationsthattheexecutivepowerofanationiscalledupontoexertitsskillanditsvigor。IftheexistenceoftheUnionwereperpetuallythreatened，andifitschiefinterestswereindailyconnectionwiththoseofotherpowerfulnations，theexecutivegovernmentwouldassumeanincreasedimportanceinproportiontothemeasuresexpectedofit，andthosewhichitwouldcarryintoeffect。ThePresidentoftheUnitedStatesisthecommander—in—chiefofthearmy，butofanarmycomposedofonlysixthousandmen;hecommandsthefleet，butthefleetreckonsbutfewsail;heconductstheforeignrelationsoftheUnion，buttheUnitedStatesareanationwithoutneighbors。Separatedfromtherestoftheworldbytheocean，andtooweakasyettoaimatthedominionoftheseas，theyhavenoenemies，andtheirinterestsrarelycomeintocontactwiththoseofanyothernationoftheglobe。
　　ThepracticalpartofaGovernmentmustnotbejudgedbythetheoryofitsconstitution。ThePresidentoftheUnitedStatesisinthepossessionofalmostroyalprerogatives，whichhehasnoopportunityofexercising;andthoseprivilegeswhichhecanatpresentuseareverycircumscribed。Thelawsallowhimtopossessadegreeofinfluencewhichcircumstancesdonotpermithimtoemploy。
　　Ontheotherhand，thegreatstrengthoftheroyalprerogativeinFrancearisesfromcircumstancesfarmorethanfromthelaws。Theretheexecutivegovernmentisconstantlystrugglingagainstprodigiousobstacles，andexertingallitsenergiestorepressthem;sothatitincreasesbytheextentofitsachievements，andbytheimportanceoftheeventsitcontrols，withoutmodifyingitsconstitution。IfthelawshadmadeitasfeebleandascircumscribedasitisintheUnion，itsinfluencewouldverysoonbecomestillmorepreponderant。
　　WhyThePresidentOfTheUnitedStatesDoesNotRequireTheMajorityOfTheTwoHousesInOrderToCarryOnTheGovernmentItisanestablishedaxiominEuropethataconstitutionalKingcannotpersevereinasystemofgovernmentwhichisopposedbythetwootherbranchesofthelegislature。ButseveralPresidentsoftheUnitedStateshavebeenknowntolosethemajorityinthelegislativebodywithoutbeingobligedtoabandonthesupremepower，andwithoutinflictingaseriouseviluponsociety。IhaveheardthisfactquotedasaninstanceoftheindependenceandthepoweroftheexecutivegovernmentinAmerica:amoment’sreflectionwillconvinceus，onthecontrary，thatitisaproofofitsextremeweakness。
　　AKinginEuroperequiresthesupportofthelegislaturetoenablehimtoperformthedutiesimposeduponhimbytheConstitution，becausethosedutiesareenormous。A
　　constitutionalKinginEuropeisnotmerelytheexecutorofthelaw，buttheexecutionofitsprovisionsdevolvessocompletelyuponhimthathehasthepowerofparalyzingitsinfluenceifitopposeshisdesigns。Herequirestheassistanceofthelegislativeassembliestomakethelaw，butthoseassembliesstandinneedofhisaidtoexecuteit:thesetwoauthoritiescannotsubsistwithouteachother，andthemechanismofgovernmentisstoppedassoonastheyareatvariance。
　　InAmericathePresidentcannotpreventanylawfrombeingpassed，norcanheevadetheobligationofenforcingit。Hissincereandzealousco—operationisnodoubtuseful，butitisnotindispensable，inthecarryingonofpublicaffairs。Allhisimportantactsaredirectlyorindirectlysubmittedtothelegislature，andofhisownfreeauthorityhecandobutlittle。
　　Itisthereforehisweakness，andnothispower，whichenableshimtoremaininoppositiontoCongress。InEurope，harmonymustreignbetweentheCrownandtheotherbranchesofthelegislature，becauseacollisionbetweenthemmayproveserious;
　　inAmerica，thisharmonyisnotindispensable，becausesuchacollisionisimpossible。
　　ElectionOfThePresidentDangersoftheelectivesystemincreaseinproportiontotheextentoftheprerogative—ThissystempossibleinAmericabecausenopowerfulexecutiveauthorityisrequired—Whatcircumstancesarefavorabletotheelectivesystem—WhytheelectionofthePresidentdoesnotcauseadeviationfromtheprinciplesoftheGovernment—InfluenceoftheelectionofthePresidentonsecondaryfunctionaries。
　　Thedangersofthesystemofelectionappliedtotheheadoftheexecutivegovernmentofagreatpeoplehavebeensufficientlyexemplifiedbyexperienceandbyhistory，andtheremarksIamabouttomakerefertoAmericaalone。Thesedangersmaybemoreorlessformidableinproportiontotheplacewhichtheexecutivepoweroccupies，andtotheimportanceitpossessesintheState;
　　andtheymayvaryaccordingtothemodeofelectionandthecircumstancesinwhichtheelectorsareplaced。Themostweightyargumentagainsttheelectionofachiefmagistrateis，thatitofferssosplendidaluretoprivateambition，andissoapttoinflamemeninthepursuitofpower，thatwhenlegitimatemeansarewantingforcemaynotunfrequentlyseizewhatrightdenied。
　　Itisclearthatthegreatertheprivilegesoftheexecutiveauthorityare，thegreateristhetemptation;themoretheambitionofthecandidatesisexcited，themorewarmlyaretheirinterestsespousedbyathrongofpartisanswhohopetosharethepowerwhentheirpatronhaswontheprize。Thedangersoftheelectivesystemincrease，therefore，intheexactratiooftheinfluenceexercisedbytheexecutivepowerintheaffairsofState。TherevolutionsofPolandwerenotsolelyattributabletotheelectivesystemingeneral，buttothefactthattheelectedmonarchwasthesovereignofapowerfulkingdom。Beforewecandiscusstheabsoluteadvantagesoftheelectivesystemwemustmakepreliminaryinquiriesastowhetherthegeographicalposition，thelaws，thehabits，themanners，andtheopinionsofthepeopleamongstwhomitistobeintroducedwilladmitoftheestablishmentofaweakanddependentexecutivegovernment;fortoattempttorendertherepresentativeoftheStateapowerfulsovereign，andatthesametimeelective，is，inmyopinion，toentertaintwoincompatibledesigns。Toreducehereditaryroyaltytotheconditionofanelectiveauthority，theonlymeansthatI
　　amacquaintedwitharetocircumscribeitssphereofactionbeforehand，graduallytodiminishitsprerogatives，andtoaccustomthepeopletolivewithoutitsprotection。Nothing，however，isfurtherfromthedesignsoftherepublicansofEuropethanthiscourse:asmanyofthemowetheirhatredoftyrannytothesufferingswhichtheyhavepersonallyundergone，itisoppression，andnottheextentoftheexecutivepower，whichexcitestheirhostility，andtheyattacktheformerwithoutperceivinghownearlyitisconnectedwiththelatter。