Itwillreadilybeunderstoodthatbyconnectingthecensorshipofthelawswiththeprivateinterestsofmembersofthecommunity，andbyintimatelyunitingtheprosecutionofthelawwiththeprosecutionofanindividual，legislationisprotectedfromwantonassailants，andfromthedailyaggressionsofpartyspirit。Theerrorsofthelegislatorareexposedwhenevertheirevilconsequencesaremostfelt，anditisalwaysapositiveandappreciablefactwhichservesasthebasisofaprosecution。
　　IaminclinedtobelievethispracticeoftheAmericancourtstobeatoncethemostfavorabletolibertyaswellastopublicorder。Ifthejudgecouldonlyattackthelegislatoropenlyanddirectly，hewouldsometimesbeafraidtoopposeanyresistancetohiswill;andatothermomentspartyspiritmightencouragehimtobraveitateveryturn。Thelawswouldconsequentlybeattackedwhenthepowerfromwhichtheyemanateisweak，andobeyedwhenitisstrong。Thatistosay，whenitwouldbeusefultorespectthemtheywouldbecontested，andwhenitwouldbeeasytoconvertthemintoaninstrumentofoppressiontheywouldberespected。ButtheAmericanjudgeisbroughtintothepoliticalarenaindependentlyofhisownwill。Heonlyjudgesthelawbecauseheisobligedtojudgeacase。Thepoliticalquestionwhichheiscalledupontoresolveisconnectedwiththeinterestofthesuitors，andhecannotrefusetodecideitwithoutabdicatingthedutiesofhispost。Heperformshisfunctionsasacitizenbyfulfillingtheprecisedutieswhichbelongtohisprofessionasamagistrate。Itistruethatuponthissystemthejudicialcensorshipwhichisexercisedbythecourtsofjusticeoverthelegislationcannotextendtoalllawsindiscriminately，inasmuchassomeofthemcannevergiverisetothatexactspeciesofcontestationwhichistermedalawsuit;andevenwhensuchacontestationispossible，itmayhappenthatnoonecarestobringitbeforeacourtofjustice。TheAmericanshaveoftenfeltthisdisadvantage，buttheyhavelefttheremedyincomplete，lesttheyshouldgiveitanefficacywhichmightinsomecasesprovedangerous。WithintheselimitsthepowervestedintheAmericancourtsofjusticeofpronouncingastatutetobeunconstitutionalformsoneofthemostpowerfulbarrierswhichhaseverbeendevisedagainstthetyrannyofpoliticalassemblies。
　　OtherPowersGrantedToAmericanJudgesTheUnitedStatesallthecitizenshavetherightofindictingpublicfunctionariesbeforetheordinarytribunals—Howtheyusethisright—Art。75oftheFrenchConstitutionoftheAnVIII—
　　TheAmericansandtheEnglishcannotunderstandthepurportofthisclause。
　　ItisperfectlynaturalthatinafreecountrylikeAmericaallthecitizensshouldhavetherightofindictingpublicfunctionariesbeforetheordinarytribunals，andthatallthejudgesshouldhavethepowerofpunishingpublicoffences。Therightgrantedtothecourtsofjusticeofjudgingtheagentsoftheexecutivegovernment，whentheyhaveviolatedthelaws，issonaturalaonethatitcannotbelookeduponasanextraordinaryprivilege。NordothespringsofgovernmentappeartometobeweakenedintheUnitedStatesbythecustomwhichrendersallpublicofficersresponsibletothejudgesoftheland。TheAmericansseem，onthecontrary，tohaveincreasedbythismeansthatrespectwhichisduetotheauthorities，andatthesametimetohaverenderedthosewhoareinpowermorescrupulousofoffendingpublicopinion。IwasstruckbythesmallnumberofpoliticaltrialswhichoccurintheUnitedStates，butIhadnodifficultyinaccountingforthiscircumstance。Alawsuit，ofwhatevernatureitmaybe，isalwaysadifficultandexpensiveundertaking。Itiseasytoattackapublicmaninajournal，butthemotiveswhichcanwarrantanactionatlawmustbeserious。
　　Asolidgroundofcomplaintmustthereforeexisttoinduceanindividualtoprosecuteapublicofficer，andpublicofficersarecarefulnottofurnishthesegroundsofcomplaintwhentheyareafraidofbeingprosecuted。
　　ThisdoesnotdependupontherepublicanformofAmericaninstitutions，forthesamefactspresentthemselvesinEngland。
　　ThesetwonationsdonotregardtheimpeachmentoftheprincipalofficersofStateasasufficientguaranteeoftheirindependence。Buttheyholdthattherightofminorprosecutions，whicharewithinthereachofthewholecommunity，isabetterpledgeoffreedomthanthosegreatjudicialactionswhicharerarelyemployeduntilitistoolate。
　　IntheMiddleAges，whenitwasverydifficulttoovertakeoffenders，thejudgesinflictedthemostdreadfultorturesonthefewwhowerearrested，whichbynomeansdiminishedthenumberofcrimes。Ithassincebeendiscoveredthatwhenjusticeismorecertainandmoremild，itisatthesametimemoreefficacious。
　　TheEnglishandtheAmericansholdthattyrannyandoppressionaretobetreatedlikeanyothercrime，bylesseningthepenaltyandfacilitatingconviction。
　　IntheyearVIIIoftheFrenchRepublicaconstitutionwasdrawnupinwhichthefollowingclausewasintroduced:"Art。75。
　　AlltheagentsofthegovernmentbelowtherankofministerscanonlybeprosecutedforoffencesrelatingtotheirseveralfunctionsbyvirtueofadecreeoftheConseild’Etat;inwhichthecasetheprosecutiontakesplacebeforetheordinarytribunals。"Thisclausesurvivedthe"Constitutiondel’AnVIII，"
　　anditisstillmaintainedinspiteofthejustcomplaintsofthenation。IhavealwaysfoundtheutmostdifficultyinexplainingitsmeaningtoEnglishmenorAmericans。TheywereatonceledtoconcludethattheConseild’EtatinFrancewasagreattribunal，establishedinthecentreofthekingdom，whichexercisedapreliminaryandsomewhattyrannicaljurisdictioninallpoliticalcauses。ButwhenItoldthemthattheConseild’Etatwasnotajudicialbody，inthecommonsenseoftheterm，butanadministrativecouncilcomposedofmendependentontheCrown，sothattheking，afterhavingorderedoneofhisservants，calledaPrefect，tocommitaninjustice，hasthepowerofcommandinganotherofhisservants，calledaCouncillorofState，topreventtheformerfrombeingpunished;whenIdemonstratedtothemthatthecitizenwhohasbeeninjuredbytheorderofthesovereignisobligedtosolicitfromthesovereignpermissiontoobtainredress，theyrefusedtocreditsoflagrantanabuse，andweretemptedtoaccusemeoffalsehoodorofignorance。ItfrequentlyhappenedbeforetheRevolutionthataParliamentissuedawarrantagainstapublicofficerwhohadcommittedanoffence，andsometimestheproceedingswerestoppedbytheauthorityoftheCrown，whichenforcedcompliancewithitsabsoluteanddespoticwill。Itispainfultoperceivehowmuchlowerwearesunkthanourforefathers，sinceweallowthingstopassunderthecolorofjusticeandthesanctionofthelawwhichviolencealonecouldimposeuponthem。
　　ChapterVII:PoliticalJurisdictionInTheUnitedStatesChapterSummaryDefinitionofpoliticaljurisdiction—WhatisunderstoodbypoliticaljurisdictioninFrance，inEngland，andintheUnitedStates—InAmericathepoliticaljudgecanonlypasssentenceonpublicofficers—Hemorefrequentlypassesasentenceofremovalfromofficethanapenalty—PoliticaljurisdictionasitexistsintheUnitedStatesis，notwithstandingitsmildness，andperhapsinconsequenceofthatmildness，amostpowerfulinstrumentinthehandsofthemajority。
　　PoliticalJurisdictionInTheUnitedStatesIunderstand，bypoliticaljurisdiction，thattemporaryrightofpronouncingalegaldecisionwithwhichapoliticalbodymaybeinvested。
　　Inabsolutegovernmentsnoutilitycanaccruefromtheintroductionofextraordinaryformsofprocedure;theprinceinwhosenameanoffenderisprosecutedisasmuchthesovereignofthecourtsofjusticeasofeverythingelse，andtheideawhichisentertainedofhispowerisofitselfasufficientsecurity。
　　Theonlythinghehastofearis，thattheexternalformalitiesofjusticeshouldbeneglected，andthathisauthorityshouldbedishonoredfromawishtorenderitmoreabsolute。Butinmostfreecountries，inwhichthemajoritycanneverexercisethesameinfluenceuponthetribunalsasanabsolutemonarch，thejudicialpowerhasoccasionallybeenvestedforatimeintherepresentativesofthenation。Ithasbeenthoughtbettertointroduceatemporaryconfusionbetweenthefunctionsofthedifferentauthoritiesthantoviolatethenecessaryprincipleoftheunityofgovernment。
　　England，France，andtheUnitedStateshaveestablishedthispoliticaljurisdictionbylaw;anditiscurioustoexaminethedifferentadaptationswhichthesethreegreatnationshavemadeoftheprinciple。InEnglandandinFrancetheHouseofLordsandtheChambredesParis*aconstitutethehighestcriminalcourtoftheirrespectivenations，andalthoughtheydonothabituallytryallpoliticaloffences，theyarecompetenttotrythemall。AnotherpoliticalbodyenjoystherightofimpeachmentbeforetheHouseofLords:theonlydifferencewhichexistsbetweenthetwocountriesinthisrespectis，thatinEnglandtheCommonsmayimpeachwhomsoevertheypleasebeforetheLords，whilstinFrancetheDeputiescanonlyemploythismodeofprosecutionagainsttheministersoftheCrown。
　　[Footnotea:[Asitexistedundertheconstitutionalmonarchydownto1848。]]
　　InbothcountriestheUpperHousemaymakeuseofalltheexistingpenallawsofthenationtopunishthedelinquents。
　　IntheUnitedStates，aswellasinEurope，onebranchofthelegislatureisauthorizedtoimpeachandanothertojudge:
　　theHouseofRepresentativesarraignstheoffender，andtheSenateawardshissentence。ButtheSenatecanonlytrysuchpersonsasarebroughtbeforeitbytheHouseofRepresentatives，andthosepersonsmustbelongtotheclassofpublicfunctionaries。ThusthejurisdictionoftheSenateislessextensivethanthatofthePeersofFrance，whilsttherightofimpeachmentbytheRepresentativesismoregeneralthanthatoftheDeputies。ButthegreatdifferencewhichexistsbetweenEuropeandAmericais，thatinEuropepoliticaltribunalsareempoweredtoinflictallthedispositionsofthepenalcode，whileinAmerica，whentheyhavedeprivedtheoffenderofhisofficialrank，andhavedeclaredhimincapableoffillinganypoliticalofficeforthefuture，theirjurisdictionterminatesandthatoftheordinarytribunalsbegins。
　　Suppose，forinstance，thatthePresidentoftheUnitedStateshascommittedthecrimeofhightreason;theHouseofRepresentativesimpeacheshim，andtheSenatedegradeshim;hemustthenbetriedbyajury，whichalonecandeprivehimofhislibertyorhislife。Thisaccuratelyillustratesthesubjectwearetreating。ThepoliticaljurisdictionwhichisestablishedbythelawsofEuropeisintendedtotrygreatoffenders，whatevermaybetheirbirth，theirrank，ortheirpowersintheState;andtothisendalltheprivilegesofthecourtsofjusticearetemporarilyextendedtoagreatpoliticalassembly。Thelegislatoristhentransformedintothemagistrate;heiscalledupontoadmit，todistinguish，andtopunishtheoffence;andasheexercisesalltheauthorityofajudge，thelawrestrictshimtotheobservanceofallthedutiesofthathighoffice，andofalltheformalitiesofjustice。WhenapublicfunctionaryisimpeachedbeforeanEnglishoraFrenchpoliticaltribunal，andisfoundguilty，thesentencedepriveshimipsofactoofhisfunctions，anditmaypronouncehimtobeincapableofresumingthemoranyothersforthefuture。Butinthiscasethepoliticalinterdictisaconsequenceofthesentence，andnotthesentenceitself。InEuropethesentenceofapoliticaltribunalistoberegardedasajudicialverdictratherthanasanadministrativemeasure。IntheUnitedStatesthecontrarytakesplace;andalthoughthedecisionoftheSenateisjudicialinitsform，sincetheSenatorsareobligedtocomplywiththepracticesandformalitiesofacourtofjustice;althoughitisjudicialinrespecttothemotivesonwhichitisfounded，sincetheSenateisingeneralobligedtotakeanoffenceatcommonlawasthebasisofitssentence;neverthelesstheobjectoftheproceedingispurelyadministrative。IfithadbeentheintentionoftheAmericanlegislatortoinvestapoliticalbodywithgreatjudicialauthority，itsactionwouldnothavebeenlimitedtothecircleofpublicfunctionaries，sincethemostdangerousenemiesoftheStatemaybeinthepossessionofnofunctionsatall;andthisisespeciallytrueinrepublics，wherepartyinfluenceisthefirstofauthorities，andwherethestrengthofmanyareaderisincreasedbyhisexercisingnolegalpower。
　　IfithadbeentheintentionoftheAmericanlegislatortogivesocietythemeansofrepressingStateoffencesbyexemplarypunishment，accordingtothepracticeofordinaryjustice，theresourcesofthepenalcodewouldallhavebeenplacedatthedisposalofthepoliticaltribunals。Buttheweaponwithwhichtheyareintrustedisanimperfectone，anditcanneverreachthemostdangerousoffenders，sincemenwhoaimattheentiresubversionofthelawsarenotlikelytomurmuratapoliticalinterdict。
　　ThemainobjectofthepoliticaljurisdictionwhichobtainsintheUnitedStatesis，therefore，todeprivetheill—disposedcitizenofanauthoritywhichhehasusedamiss，andtopreventhimfromeveracquiringitagain。Thisisevidentlyanadministrativemeasuresanctionedbytheformalitiesofajudicialdecision。InthismattertheAmericanshavecreatedamixedsystem;theyhavesurroundedtheactwhichremovesapublicfunctionarywiththesecuritiesofapoliticaltrial;andtheyhavedeprivedallpoliticalcondemnationsoftheirseverestpenalties。Everylinkofthesystemmayeasilybetracedfromthispoint;weatonceperceivewhytheAmericanconstitutionssubjectallthecivilfunctionariestothejurisdictionoftheSenate，whilstthemilitary，whosecrimesareneverthelessmoreformidable，areexemptedfromthattribunal。InthecivilservicenoneoftheAmericanfunctionariescanbesaidtoberemovable;theplaceswhichsomeofthemoccupyareinalienable，andtheothersarechosenforatermwhichcannotbeshortened。
　　Itisthereforenecessarytotrythemallinordertodeprivethemoftheirauthority。ButmilitaryofficersaredependentonthechiefmagistrateoftheState，whoishimselfacivilfunctionary，andthedecisionwhichcondemnshimisablowuponthemall。
　　IfwenowcomparetheAmericanandtheEuropeansystems，weshallmeetwithdifferencesnolessstrikinginthedifferenteffectswhicheachofthemproducesormayproduce。InFranceandinEnglandthejurisdictionofpoliticalbodiesislookeduponasanextraordinaryresource，whichisonlytobeemployedinordertorescuesocietyfromunwonteddangers。Itisnottobedeniedthatthesetribunals，astheyareconstitutedinEurope，areapttoviolatetheconservativeprincipleofthebalanceofpowerintheState，andtothreatenincessantlythelivesandlibertiesofthesubject。ThesamepoliticaljurisdictionintheUnitedStatesisonlyindirectlyhostiletothebalanceofpower;itcannotmenacethelivesofthecitizens，anditdoesnothover，asinEurope，overtheheadsofthecommunity，sincethoseonlywhohavesubmittedtoitsauthorityonacceptingofficeareexposedtotheseverityofitsinvestigations。Itisatthesametimelessformidableandlessefficacious;indeed，ithasnotbeenconsideredbythelegislatorsoftheUnitedStatesasaremedyforthemoreviolentevilsofsociety，butasanordinarymeansofconductingthegovernment。InthisrespectitprobablyexercisesmorerealinfluenceonthesocialbodyinAmericathaninEurope。WemustnotbemisledbytheapparentmildnessoftheAmericanlegislationinallthatrelatestopoliticaljurisdiction。Itistobeobserved，inthefirstplace，thatintheUnitedStatesthetribunalwhichpassessentenceiscomposedofthesameelements，andsubjecttothesameinfluences，asthebodywhichimpeachestheoffender，andthatthisuniformitygivesanalmostirresistibleimpulsetothevindictivepassionsofparties。IfpoliticaljudgesintheUnitedStatescannotinflictsuchheavypenaltiesasthoseofEurope，thereisthelesschanceoftheiracquittingaprisoner;andtheconviction，ifitislessformidable，ismorecertain。TheprincipalobjectofthepoliticaltribunalsofEuropeistopunishtheoffender;thepurposeofthoseinAmericaistodeprivehimofhisauthority。
　　ApoliticalcondemnationintheUnitedStatesmay，therefore，belookeduponasapreventivemeasure;andthereisnoreasonforrestrictingthejudgestotheexactdefinitionsofcriminallaw。
　　NothingcanbemorealarmingthantheexcessivelatitudewithwhichpoliticaloffencesaredescribedinthelawsofAmerica。
　　ArticleII。，Section4，oftheConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesrunsthus:—"ThePresident，Vice—President，andallcivilofficersoftheUnitedStatesshallberemovedfromofficeonimpeachmentfor，andconvictionof，treason，bribery，orotherhighcrimesandmisdemeanors。"ManyoftheConstitutionsoftheStatesareevenlessexplicit。"Publicofficers，"saystheConstitutionofMassachusetts，*b"shallbeimpeachedformisconductormaladministration;"theConstitutionofVirginiadeclaresthatallthecivilofficerswhoshallhaveoffendedagainsttheState，bymaladministration，corruption，orotherhighcrimes，maybeimpeachedbytheHouseofDelegates;insomeconstitutionsnooffencesarespecified，inordertosubjectthepublicfunctionariestoanunlimitedresponsibility。*cButI
　　willventuretoaffirmthatitispreciselytheirmildnesswhichrenderstheAmericanlawsmostformidableinthisrespect。WehaveshownthatinEuropetheremovalofafunctionaryandhispoliticalinterdictionaretheconsequencesofthepenaltyheistoundergo，andthatinAmericatheyconstitutethepenaltyitself。TheconsequenceisthatinEuropepoliticaltribunalsareinvestedwithrightswhichtheyareafraidtouse，andthatthefearofpunishingtoomuchhindersthemfrompunishingatall。ButinAmericanoonehesitatestoinflictapenaltyfromwhichhumanitydoesnotrecoil。Tocondemnapoliticalopponenttodeath，inordertodeprivehimofhispower，istocommitwhatalltheworldwouldexecrateasahorribleassassination;buttodeclarethatopponentunworthytoexercisethatauthority，todeprivehimofit，andtoleavehimuninjuredinlifeandlimb，maybejudgedtobethefairissueofthestruggle。Butthissentence，whichitissoeasytopronounce，isnotthelessfatallyseveretothemajorityofthoseuponwhomitisinflicted。Greatcriminalsmayundoubtedlybraveitsintangiblerigor，butordinaryoffenderswilldreaditasacondemnationwhichdestroystheirpositionintheworld，castsablightupontheirhonor，andcondemnsthemtoashamefulinactivityworsethandeath。TheinfluenceexercisedintheUnitedStatesupontheprogressofsocietybythejurisdictionofpoliticalbodiesmaynotappeartobeformidable，butitisonlythemoreimmense。Itdoesnotdirectlycoercethesubject，butitrendersthemajoritymoreabsoluteoverthoseinpower;itdoesnotconferanunboundedauthorityonthelegislatorwhichcanbeexertedatsomemomentouscrisis，butitestablishesatemperateandregularinfluence，whichisatalltimesavailable。Ifthepowerisdecreased，itcan，ontheotherhand，bemoreconvenientlyemployedandmoreeasilyabused。BypreventingpoliticaltribunalsfrominflictingjudicialpunishmentstheAmericansseemtohaveeludedtheworstconsequencesoflegislativetyranny，ratherthantyrannyitself;andIamnotsurethatpoliticaljurisdiction，asitisconstitutedintheUnitedStates，isnotthemostformidableweaponwhichhaseverbeenplacedintherudegraspofapopularmajority。WhentheAmericanrepublicsbegintodegenerateitwillbeeasytoverifythetruthofthisobservation，byremarkingwhetherthenumberofpoliticalimpeachmentsaugments。*d[Footnoteb:Chap。I。sect。ii。Section8。]
　　[Footnotec:SeetheconstitutionsofIllinois，Maine，Connecticut，andGeorgia。]
　　[Footnoted:SeeAppendix，N。
　　[TheimpeachmentofPresidentAndrewJohnsonin1868—whichwasresortedtobyhispoliticalopponentssolelyasameansofturninghimoutofoffice，foritcouldnotbecontendedthathehadbeenguiltyofhighcrimesandmisdemeanors，andhewasinfacthonorablyacquittedandreinstatedinoffice—isastrikingconfirmationofthetruthofthisremark。—Translator’sNote，1874。]]
　　ChapterVIII:TheFederalConstitution—PartI
　　IhavehithertoconsideredeachStateasaseparatewhole，andIhaveexplainedthedifferentspringswhichthepeoplesetsinmotion，andthedifferentmeansofactionwhichitemploys。
　　ButalltheStateswhichIhaveconsideredasindependentareforcedtosubmit，incertaincases，tothesupremeauthorityoftheUnion。ThetimeisnowcomeformetoexamineseparatelythesupremacywithwhichtheUnionhasbeeninvested，andtocastarapidglanceovertheFederalConstitution。
　　ChapterSummaryOriginofthefirstUnion—Itsweakness—Congressappealstotheconstituentauthority—IntervaloftwoyearsbetweenthisappealandthepromulgationofthenewConstitution。
　　HistoryOfTheFederalConstitutionThethirteencolonieswhichsimultaneouslythrewofftheyokeofEnglandtowardstheendofthelastcenturyprofessed，asIhavealreadyobserved，thesamereligion，thesamelanguage，thesamecustoms，andalmostthesamelaws;theywerestrugglingagainstacommonenemy;andthesereasonsweresufficientlystrongtounitethemonetoanother，andtoconsolidatethemintoonenation。Butaseachofthemhadenjoyedaseparateexistenceandagovernmentwithinitsowncontrol，thepeculiarinterestsandcustomswhichresultedfromthissystemwereopposedtoacompactandintimateunionwhichwouldhaveabsorbedtheindividualimportanceofeachinthegeneralimportanceofall。
　　Hencearosetwooppositetendencies，theonepromptingtheAnglo—Americanstounite，theothertodividetheirstrength。Aslongasthewarwiththemother—countrylastedtheprincipleofunionwaskeptalivebynecessity;andalthoughthelawswhichconstituteditweredefective，thecommontiesubsistedinspiteoftheirimperfections。*aButnosoonerwaspeaceconcludedthanthefaultsofthelegislationbecamemanifest，andtheStateseemedtobesuddenlydissolved。Eachcolonybecameanindependentrepublic，andassumedanabsolutesovereignty。Thefederalgovernment，condemnedtoimpotencebyitsconstitution，andnolongersustainedbythepresenceofacommondanger，witnessedtheoutragesofferedtoitsflagbythegreatnationsofEurope，whilstitwasscarcelyabletomaintainitsgroundagainsttheIndiantribes，andtopaytheinterestofthedebtwhichhadbeencontractedduringthewarofindependence。Itwasalreadyonthevergeofdestruction，whenitofficiallyproclaimeditsinabilitytoconductthegovernment，andappealedtotheconstituentauthorityofthenation。*bIfAmericaeverapproached（forhoweverbriefatime）thatloftypinnacleofglorytowhichthefancyofitsinhabitantsiswonttopoint，itwasatthesolemnmomentatwhichthepowerofthenationabdicated，asitwere，theempireoftheland。Allageshavefurnishedthespectacleofapeoplestrugglingwithenergytowinitsindependence;andtheeffortsoftheAmericansinthrowingofftheEnglishyokehavebeenconsiderablyexaggerated。
　　Separatedfromtheirenemiesbythreethousandmilesofocean，andbackedbyapowerfulally，thesuccessoftheUnitedStatesmaybemorejustlyattributedtotheirgeographicalpositionthantothevaloroftheirarmiesorthepatriotismoftheircitizens。
　　ItwouldberidiculoustocomparetheAmericanwastothewarsoftheFrenchRevolution，ortheeffortsoftheAmericanstothoseoftheFrenchwhentheywereattackedbythewholeofEurope，withoutcreditandwithoutallies，yetcapableofopposingatwentiethpartoftheirpopulationtotheworld，andofbearingthetorchofrevolutionbeyondtheirfrontierswhilsttheystifleditsdevouringflamewithinthebosomoftheircountry。
　　Butitisanoveltyinthehistoryofsocietytoseeagreatpeopleturnacalmandscrutinizingeyeuponitself，whenapprisedbythelegislaturethatthewheelsofgovernmentarestopped;toseeitcarefullyexaminetheextentoftheevil，andpatientlywaitfortwowholeyearsuntilaremedywasdiscovered，whichitvoluntarilyadoptedwithouthavingwrungatearoradropofbloodfrommankind。AtthetimewhentheinadequacyofthefirstconstitutionwasdiscoveredAmericapossessedthedoubleadvantageofthatcalmwhichhadsucceededtheeffervescenceoftherevolution，andofthosegreatmenwhohadledtherevolutiontoasuccessfulissue。Theassemblywhichacceptedthetaskofcomposingthesecondconstitutionwassmall;
　　*cbutGeorgeWashingtonwasitsPresident，anditcontainedthechoicesttalentsandthenoblestheartswhichhadeverappearedintheNewWorld。Thisnationalcommission，afterlongandmaturedeliberation，offeredtotheacceptanceofthepeoplethebodyofgenerallawswhichstillrulestheUnion。AlltheStatesadopteditsuccessively。*dThenewFederalGovernmentcommenceditsfunctionsin1789，afteraninterregnumoftwoyears。TheRevolutionofAmericaterminatedwhenthatofFrancebegan。
　　[Footnotea:Seethearticlesofthefirstconfederationformedin1778。ThisconstitutionwasnotadoptedbyalltheStatesuntil1781。Seealsotheanalysisgivenofthisconstitutionin"TheFederalist"fromNo。15toNo。22，inclusive，andStory’s"CommentariesontheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates，"pp。
　　85—115。]
　　[Footnoteb:CongressmadethisdeclarationonFebruary21，1787。]
　　[Footnotec:Itconsistedoffifty—fivemembers;Washington，Madison，Hamilton，andthetwoMorriseswereamongstthenumber。]
　　[Footnoted:Itwasnotadoptedbythelegislativebodies，butrepresentativeswereelectedbythepeopleforthissolepurpose;
　　andthenewconstitutionwasdiscussedatlengthineachoftheseassemblies。]
　　SummaryOfTheFederalConstitutionDivisionofauthoritybetweentheFederalGovernmentandtheStates—TheGovernmentoftheStatesistherule，theFederalGovernmenttheexception。
　　ThefirstquestionwhichawaitedtheAmericanswasintricate，andbynomeanseasyofsolution:theobjectwassotodividetheauthorityofthedifferentStateswhichcomposedtheUnionthateachofthemshouldcontinuetogovernitselfinallthatconcerneditsinternalprosperity，whilsttheentirenation，representedbytheUnion，shouldcontinuetoformacompactbody，andtoprovideforthegeneralexigenciesofthepeople。Itwasasimpossibletodeterminebeforehand，withanydegreeofaccuracy，theshareofauthoritywhicheachoftwogovernmentswastoenjoy，astoforeseealltheincidentsintheexistenceofanation。
　　TheobligationsandtheclaimsoftheFederalGovernmentweresimpleandeasilydefinable，becausetheUnionhadbeenformedwiththeexpresspurposeofmeetingthegeneralexigenciesofthepeople;buttheclaimsandobligationsoftheStateswere，ontheotherhand，complicatedandvarious，becausethoseGovernmentshadpenetratedintoallthedetailsofsociallife。
　　TheattributesoftheFederalGovernmentwerethereforecarefullyenumeratedandallthatwasnotincludedamongstthemwasdeclaredtoconstituteapartoftheprivilegesoftheseveralGovernmentsoftheStates。ThusthegovernmentoftheStatesremainedtherule，andthatoftheConfederationbecametheexception。*e[Footnotee:SeetheAmendmenttotheFederalConstitution;
　　"Federalist，"No。32;Story，p。711;Kent’s"Commentaries，"vol。
　　i。p。364。
　　ItistobeobservedthatwhenevertheexclusiverightofregulatingcertainmattersisnotreservedtoCongressbytheConstitution，theStatesmaytakeuptheaffairuntilitisbroughtbeforetheNationalAssembly。Forinstance，Congresshastherightofmakingagenerallawonbankruptcy，which，however，itneglectstodo。EachStateisthenatlibertytomakealawforitself。Thispointhasbeenestablishedbydiscussioninthelaw—courts，andmaybesaidtobelongmoreproperlytojurisprudence。]
　　Butasitwasforeseenthat，inpractice，questionsmightariseastotheexactlimitsofthisexceptionalauthority，andthatitwouldbedangeroustosubmitthesequestionstothedecisionoftheordinarycourtsofjustice，establishedintheStatesbytheStatesthemselves，ahighFederalcourtwascreated，*fwhichwasdestined，amongstotherfunctions，tomaintainthebalanceofpowerwhichhadbeenestablishedbytheConstitutionbetweenthetworivalGovernments。*g[Footnotef:Theactionofthiscourtisindirect，asweshallhereaftershow。]
　　[Footnoteg:Itisthusthat"TheFederalist，"No。45，explainsthedivisionofsupremacybetweentheUnionandtheStates:"ThepowersdelegatedbytheConstitutiontotheFederalGovernmentarefewanddefined。ThosewhicharetoremainintheStateGovernmentsarenumerousandindefinite。Theformerwillbeexercisedprincipallyonexternalobjects，aswar，peace，negotiation，andforeigncommerce。ThepowersreservedtotheseveralStateswillextendtoalltheobjectswhich，intheordinarycourseofaffairs，concerntheinternalorderandprosperityoftheState。"Ishalloftenhaveoccasiontoquote"TheFederalist"inthiswork。WhenthebillwhichhassincebecometheConstitutionoftheUnitedStateswassubmittedtotheapprovalofthepeople，andthediscussionswerestillpending，threemen，whohadalreadyacquiredaportionofthatcelebritywhichtheyhavesinceenjoyed—JohnJay，Hamilton，andMadison—
　　formedanassociationwiththeintentionofexplainingtothenationtheadvantagesofthemeasurewhichwasproposed。Withthisviewtheypublishedaseriesofarticlesintheshapeofajournal，whichnowformacompletetreatise。Theyentitledtheirjournal"TheFederalist，"anamewhichhasbeenretainedinthework。"TheFederalist"isanexcellentbook，whichoughttobefamiliartothestatesmenofallcountries，althoughitespeciallyconcernsAmerica。]
　　PrerogativeOfTheFederalGovernmentPowerofdeclaringwar，makingpeace，andlevyinggeneraltaxesvestedintheFederalGovernment—Whatpartoftheinternalpolicyofthecountryitmaydirect—TheGovernmentoftheUnioninsomerespectsmorecentralthantheKing’sGovernmentintheoldFrenchmonarchy。
　　Theexternalrelationsofapeoplemaybecomparedtothoseofprivateindividuals，andtheycannotbeadvantageouslymaintainedwithouttheagencyofasingleheadofaGovernment。
　　Theexclusiverightofmakingpeaceandwar，ofconcludingtreatiesofcommerce，ofraisingarmies，andequippingfleets，wasgrantedtotheUnion。*hThenecessityofanationalGovernmentwaslessimperiouslyfeltintheconductoftheinternalpolicyofsociety;buttherearecertaingeneralinterestswhichcanonlybeattendedtowithadvantagebyageneralauthority。TheUnionwasinvestedwiththepowerofcontrollingthemonetarysystem，ofdirectingthepostoffice，andofopeningthegreatroadswhichweretoestablishacommunicationbetweenthedifferentpartsofthecountry。*iTheindependenceoftheGovernmentofeachStatewasformallyrecognizedinitssphere;nevertheless，theFederalGovernmentwasauthorizedtointerfereintheinternalaffairsoftheStates*jinafewpredeterminedcases，inwhichanindiscreetabuseoftheirindependencemightcompromisethesecurityoftheUnionatlarge。Thus，whilstthepowerofmodifyingandchangingtheirlegislationatpleasurewaspreservedinalltherepublics，theywereforbiddentoenactexpostfactolaws，ortocreateaclassofnoblesintheircommunity。*kLastly，asitwasnecessarythattheFederalGovernmentshouldbeabletofulfilitsengagements，itwasendowedwithanunlimitedpoweroflevyingtaxes。*l[Footnoteh:SeeConstitution，sect。8;"Federalist，"Nos。41and42;Kent’s"Commentaries，"vol。i。p。207;Story，pp。358—382;