Itisanessentialpointtofixthenumberofcitizenswhoaretoformthepublicassemblies；otherwiseitwouldbeuncertainwhetherthewhole，oronlyapartofthepeople，hadgiventheirvotes。AtSpartathenumberwasfixedattenthousand。ButRome，designedbyProvidencetorisefromtheweakestbeginningstothehighestpitchofgrandeur；
　　Rome，doomedtoexperienceallthevicissitudesoffortune；Rome，whohadsometimesallherinhabitantswithoutherwalls，andsometimesallItalyandaconsiderablepartoftheworldwithinthem；Rome，Isay，neverfixedthenumber[3]andthiswasoneoftheprincipalcausesofherruin。
　　Thepeople，inwhomthesupremepowerresides，oughttohavethemanagementofeverythingwithintheirreach：thatwhichexceedstheirabilitiesmustbeconductedbytheirministers。
　　Buttheycannotproperlybesaidtohavetheirministers，withoutthepowerofnominatingthem：itis，therefore，afundamentalmaximinthisgovernment，thatthepeopleshouldchoosetheirministers——thatis，theirmagistrates。
　　Theyhaveoccasion，aswellasmonarchs，andevenmoreso，tobedirectedbyacouncilorsenate。Buttohaveaproperconfidenceinthese，theyshouldhavethechoosingofthemembers；whethertheelectionbemadebythemselves，asatAthens，orbysomemagistratedeputedforthatpurpose，asoncertainoccasionswascustomaryatRome。
　　Thepeopleareextremelywellqualifiedforchoosingthosewhomtheyaretoentrustwithpartoftheirauthority。Theyhaveonlytobedeterminedbythingstowhichtheycannotbestrangers，andbyfactsthatareobvioustosense。Theycantellwhenapersonhasfoughtmanybattles，andbeencrownedwithsuccess；theyare，therefore，capableofelectingageneral。Theycantellwhenajudgeisassiduousinhisoffice，givesgeneralsatisfaction，andhasneverbeenchargedwithbribery：thisissufficientforchoosingapr？tor。Theyarestruckwiththemagnificenceorrichesofafellow—citizen；nomoreisrequisiteforelectinganedile。Thesearefactsofwhichtheycanhavebetterinformationinapublicforumthanamonarchinhispalace。Butaretheycapableofconductinganintricateaffair，ofseizingandimprovingtheopportunityandcriticalmomentofaction？No；thissurpassestheirabilities。
　　Shouldwedoubtthepeople’snaturalcapacity，inrespecttothediscernmentofmerit，weneedonlycastaneyeontheseriesofsurprisingelectionsmadebytheAtheniansandRomans；whichnoonesurelywillattributetohazard。
　　WeknowthatthoughthepeopleofRomeassumedtherightofraisingplebeianstopublicoffices，yettheyneverwouldexertthispower；andthoughatAthensthemagistrateswereallowed，bythelawofAristides，tobeelectedfromallthedifferentclassesofinhabitants，thereneverwasacase，saysXenophon，[4]whenthecommonpeoplepetitionedforemploymentswhichcouldendangereithertheirsecurityortheirglory。
　　Asmostcitizenshavesufficientabilitytochoose，thoughunqualifiedtobechosen，sothepeople，thoughcapableofcallingotherstoanaccountfortheiradministration，areincapableofconductingtheadministrationthemselves。
　　Thepublicbusinessmustbecarriedonwithacertainmotion，neithertooquicknortooslow。Butthemotionofthepeopleisalwayseithertooremissortooviolent。Sometimeswithahundredthousandarmstheyoverturnallbeforethem；andsometimeswithahundredthousandfeettheycreeplikeinsects。
　　Inapopularstatetheinhabitantsaredividedintocertainclasses。Itisinthemannerofmakingthisdivisionthatgreatlegislatorshavesignalisedthemselves；anditisonthisthedurationandprosperityofdemocracyhaveeverdepended。
　　ServiusTulliusfollowedthespiritofaristocracyinthedistributionofhisclasses。WefindinLivy[5]andinDionysiusHalicarnassus，[6]inwhatmannerhelodgedtherightofsuffrageinthehandsoftheprincipalcitizens。HehaddividedthepeopleofRomeinto193
　　centuries，whichformedsixclasses；andrankingtherich，whowereinsmallernumbers，inthefirstcenturies，andthoseinmiddlingcircumstances，whoweremorenumerous，inthenext，heflungtheindigentmultitudeintothelast；andaseachcenturyhadbutonevote[7]itwaspropertyratherthannumbersthatdecidedtheelection。
　　SolondividedthepeopleofAthensintofourclasses。Inthishewasdirectedbythespiritofdemocracy，hisintentionnotbeingtofixthosewhoweretochoose，butsuchaswereeligible：therefore，leavingtoeverycitizentherightofelection，hemade[8]thejudgeseligiblefromeachofthosefourclasses；butthemagistratesheorderedtobechosenonlyoutofthefirstthree，consistingofpersonsofeasyfortunes。[9]
　　Asthedivisionofthosewhohavearightofsuffrageisafundamentallawinrepublics，sothemannerofgivingthissuffrageisanotherfundamental。
　　Thesuffragebylotisnaturaltodemocracy；asthatbychoiceistoaristocracy。[10]
　　Thesuffragebylotisamethodofelectingthatoffendsnoone，butanimateseachcitizenwiththepleasinghopeofservinghiscountry。
　　Yetasthismethodisinitselfdefective，ithasbeentheendeavourofthemosteminentlegislatorstoregulateandamendit。
　　SolonmadealawatAthensthatmilitaryemploymentsshouldbeconferredbychoice；butthatsenatorsandjudgesshouldbeelectedbylot。
　　Thesamelegislatorordainedthatcivilmagistracies，attendedwithgreatexpense，shouldbegivenbychoice；andtheothersbylot。
　　Inorder，however，toamendthesuffragebylot，hemadearulethatnonebutthosewhopresentedthemselvesshouldbeelected；thatthepersonelectedshouldbeexaminedbyjudges[11]andthateveryoneshouldhavearighttoaccusehimifhewereunworthyoftheoffice：[12]
　　thisparticipatedatthesametimeofthesuffragebylot，andofthatbychoice。Whenthetimeoftheirmagistracyhadexpired，theywereobligedtosubmittoanotherjudgmentinregardtotheirconduct。
　　Personsutterlyunqualifiedmusthavebeenextremelybackwardingivingintheirnamestobedrawnbylot。
　　Thelawwhichdeterminesthemannerofgivingsuffrageislikewisefundamentalinademocracy。Itisaquestionofsomeimportancewhetherthesuffragesoughttobepublicorsecret。Ciceroobserves[13]thatthelaws[14]whichrenderedthemsecrettowardsthecloseoftherepublicwerethecauseofitsdecline。Butasthisisdifferentlypractisedindifferentrepublics，Ishallofferheremythoughtsconcerningthissubject。
　　Thepeople’ssuffragesoughtdoubtlesstobepublic[15]andthisshouldbeconsideredasafundamentallawofdemocracy。Thelowerclassoughttobedirectedbythoseofhigherrank，andrestrainedwithinboundsbythegravityofeminentpersonages。Hence，byrenderingthesuffragessecretintheRomanrepublic，allwaslost；itwasnolongerpossibletodirectapopulacethatsoughtitsowndestruction。Butwhenthebodyofthenoblesaretovoteinanaristocracy[16]orinademocracythesenate[17]asthebusinessisthenonlytopreventintrigues，thesuffragescannotbetoosecret。
　　Intriguinginasenateisdangerous；itisdangerousalsoinabodyofnobles；butnotsoamongthepeople，whosenatureistoactthroughpassion。Incountrieswheretheyhavenoshareinthegovernment，weoftenseethemasmuchinflamedonaccountofanactorasevertheycouldbeforthewelfareofthestate。Themisfortuneofarepubliciswhenintriguesareatanend；whichhappenswhenthepeoplearegainedbybriberyandcorruption：inthiscasetheygrowindifferenttopublicaffairs，andavaricebecomestheirpredominantpassion。Unconcernedaboutthegovernmentandeverythingbelongingtoit，theyquietlywaitfortheirhire。
　　Itislikewiseafundamentallawindemocracies，thatthepeopleshouldhavethesolepowertoenactlaws。Andyetthereareathousandoccasionsonwhichitisnecessarythesenateshouldhavethepowerofdecreeing；nay，itisfrequentlypropertomakesometrialofalawbeforeitisestablished。TheconstitutionsofRomeandAthenswereexcellent。Thedecreesofthesenate[18]hadtheforceoflawsforthespaceofayear，butdidnotbecomeperpetualtilltheywereratifiedbytheconsentofthepeople。
　　3。OftheLawsinrelationtotheNatureofAristocracy。Inanaristocracythesupremepowerislodgedinthehandsofacertainnumberofpersons。Theseareinvestedbothwiththelegislativeandexecutiveauthority；andtherestofthepeopleare，inrespecttothem，thesameasthesubjectsofamonarchyinregardtothesovereign。
　　Theydonotvoteherebylot，forthiswouldbeproductiveofinconveniencesonly。Andindeed，inagovernmentwherethemostmortifyingdistinctionsarealreadyestablished，thoughtheyweretobechosenbylot，stilltheywouldnotceasetobeodious；itisthenoblemantheyenvy，andnotthemagistrate。
　　Whenthenobilityarenumerous，theremustbeasenatetoregulatetheaffairswhichthebodyofthenoblesareincapableofdeciding，andtoprepareothersfortheirdecision。Inthiscaseitmaybesaidthatthearistocracyisinsomemeasureinthesenate，thedemocracyinthebodyofthenobles，andthepeopleareacipher。
　　Itwouldbeaveryhappythinginanaristocracyifthepeople，insomemeasure，couldberaisedfromtheirstateofannihilation。ThusatGenoa，thebankofSt。Georgebeingadministeredbythepeople[19]givesthemacertaininfluenceinthegovernment，whencetheirwholeprosperityisderived。
　　Thesenatorsoughtbynomeanstohavetherightofnamingtheirownmembers；forthiswouldbetheonlywaytoperpetuateabuses。AtRome，whichinitsearlyyearswasakindofaristocracy，thesenatedidnotfillupthevacantplacesintheirownbody；thenewmemberswerenominatedbythecensors。[20]
　　Inarepublic，thesuddenriseofaprivatecitizentoexorbitantpowerproducesmonarchy，orsomethingmorethanmonarchy。Inthelatterthelawshaveprovidedfor，orinsomemeasureadaptedthemselvesto，theconstitution；andtheprincipleofgovernmentchecksthemonarch：butinarepublic，whereaprivatecitizenhasobtainedanexorbitantpower，[21]theabuseofthispowerismuchgreater，becausethelawsforesawitnot，andconsequentlymadenoprovisionagainstit。
　　Thereisanexceptiontothisrule，whentheconstitutionissuchastohaveimmediateneedofamagistrateinvestedwithextraordinarypower。
　　SuchwasRomewithherdictators，suchisVenicewithherstateinquisitors；theseareformidablemagistrates，whorestore，asitwerebyviolence，thestatetoitsliberty。Buthowcomesitthatthesemagistraciesaresoverydifferentinthesetworepublics？ItisbecauseRomesupportedtheremainsofheraristocracyagainstthepeople；
　　whereasVeniceemploysherstateinquisitorstomaintainheraristocracyagainstthenobles。TheconsequencewasthatatRomethedictatorshipcouldbeonlyofshortduration，asthepeopleactedthroughpassionandnotwithdesign。Itwasnecessarythatamagistracyofthiskindshouldbeexercisedwithlustreandpomp，thebusinessbeingtointimidate，andnottopunish，themultitude。Itwasalsoproperthatthedictatorshouldbecreatedonlyforsomeparticularaffair，andforthisonlyshouldhaveanunlimitedauthority，ashewasalwayscreateduponsomesuddenemergency。Onthecontrary，atVenicetheyhaveoccasionforapermanentmagistracy；forhereitisthatschemesmaybesetonfoot，continued，suspended，andresumed；thattheambitionofasinglepersonbecomesthatofafamily，andtheambitionofonefamilythatofmany。
　　Theyhaveoccasionforasecretmagistracy，thecrimestheypunishbeinghatchedinsecrecyandsilence。Thismagistracymusthaveageneralinquisition，fortheirbusinessisnottoremedyknowndisorders，buttopreventtheunknown。Inaword，thelatterisdesignedtopunishsuspectedcrimes；whereastheformerusedrathermenacesthanpunishmentevenforcrimesthatwereopenlyavowed。
　　Inallmagistracies，thegreatnessofthepowermustbecompensatedbythebrevityoftheduration。Thismostlegislatorshavefixedtoayear；
　　alongerspacewouldbedangerous，andashorterwouldbecontrarytothenatureofgovernment。Forwhoisitthatinthemanagementevenofhisdomesticaffairswouldbethusconfined？AtRagusa[22]thechiefmagistrateoftherepublicischangedeverymonth，theotherofficerseveryweek，andthegovernorofthecastleeveryday。Butthiscantakeplaceonlyinasmallrepublicenvironed[23]byformidablepowers，whomighteasilycorruptsuchpettyandinsignificantmagistrates。
　　Thebestaristocracyisthatinwhichthosewhohavenoshareinthelegislaturearesofewandinconsiderablethatthegoverningpartyhavenointerestinoppressingthem。Thuswhen[24]AntipatermadealawatAthensthatwhosoeverwasnotworthtwothousanddrachmsshouldhavenopowertovote，heformedbythismethodthebestaristocracypossible；
　　becausethiswassosmallasumastoexcludeveryfew，andnotoneofanyrankorconsiderationinthecity。
　　Aristocraticfamiliesoughttherefore，asmuchaspossible，tolevelthemselvesinappearancewiththepeople。Themoreanaristocracybordersondemocracy，theneareritapproachesperfection：and，inproportionasitdrawstowardsmonarchy，themoreisitimperfect。
　　Butthemostimperfectofallisthatinwhichthepartofthepeoplethatobeysisinastateofcivilservitudetothosewhocommand，asthearistocracyofPoland，wherethepeasantsareslavestothenobility。
　　4。OftheRelationofLawstotheNatureofMonarchicalGovernment。Theintermediate，subordinate，anddependentpowersconstitutethenatureofmonarchicalgovernment；Imeanofthatinwhichasinglepersongovernsbyfundamentallaws。Isaidtheintermediate，subordinate，anddependentpowers。Andindeed，inmonarchiestheprinceisthesourceofallpower，politicalandcivil。Thesefundamentallawsnecessarilysupposetheintermediatechannelsthroughwhichthepowerflows：foriftherebeonlythemomentaryandcapriciouswillofasinglepersontogovernthestate，nothingcanbefixed，andofcoursethereisnofundamentallaw。
　　Themostnatural，intermediate，andsubordinatepoweristhatofthenobility。Thisinsomemeasureseemstobeessentialtoamonarchy，whosefundamentalmaximis：nomonarch，nonobility；nonobility，nomonarch；buttheremaybeadespoticprince。
　　TherearemenwhohaveendeavouredinsomecountriesinEuropetosuppressthejurisdictionofthenobility，notperceivingthattheyweredrivingattheverythingthatwasdonebytheparliamentofEngland。
　　Abolishtheprivilegesofthelords，theclergyandcitiesinamonarchy，andyouwillsoonhaveapopularstate，orelseadespoticgovernment。
　　ThecourtsofaconsiderablekingdominEuropehave，formanyages，beenstrikingatthepatrimonialjurisdictionofthelordsandclergy。Wedonotpretendtocensurethesesagemagistrates；butweleaveittothepublictojudgehowfarthismayaltertheconstitution。FaramIfrombeingprejudicedinfavouroftheprivilegesoftheclergy；however，I
　　shouldbegladiftheirjurisdictionwereoncefixed。Thequestionisnotwhethertheirjurisdictionwasjustlyestablished；butwhetheritbereallyestablished；whetheritconstitutesapartofthelawsofthecountry，andisineveryrespectinrelationtothoselaws：whetherbetweentwopowersacknowledgedindependent，theconditionsoughtnottobereciprocal；andwhetheritbenotequallythedutyofagoodsubjecttodefendtheprerogativeoftheprince，andtomaintainthelimitswhichfromtimeimmemorialhavebeenprescribedtohisauthority。
　　Thoughtheecclesiasticpowerbesodangerousinarepublic，yetitisextremelyproperinamonarchy，especiallyoftheabsolutekind。WhatwouldbecomeofSpainandPortugal，sincethesubversionoftheirlaws，wereitnotforthisonlybarrieragainsttheincursionsofarbitrarypower？Abarriereverusefulwhenthereisnoother：forsinceadespoticgovernmentisproductiveofthemostdreadfulcalamitiestohumannature，theveryevilthatrestrainsitisbeneficialtothesubject。
　　Inthesamemannerastheocean，threateningtooverflowthewholeearth，isstoppedbyweedsandpebblesthatliescatteredalongtheshore，somonarchs，whosepowerseemsunbounded，arerestrainedbythesmallestobstacles，andsuffertheirnaturalpridetobesubduedbysupplicationandprayer。
　　TheEnglish，tofavourtheirliberty，haveabolishedalltheintermediatepowersofwhichtheirmonarchywascomposed。Theyhaveagreatdealofreasontobejealousofthisliberty；weretheyevertobesounhappyastoloseit，theywouldbeoneofthemostservilenationsuponearth。
　　Mr。Law，throughignorancebothofarepublicanandmonarchicalconstitution，wasoneofthegreatestpromotersofabsolutepowereverknowninEurope。Besidestheviolentandextraordinarychangesowingtohisdirection，hewouldfainsuppressalltheintermediateranks，andabolishthepoliticalcommunities。Hewasdissolving[25]themonarchybyhischimericalreimbursements，andseemedasifheevenwantedtoredeemtheconstitution。
　　Itisnotenoughtohaveintermediatepowersinamonarchy；theremustbealsoadepositaryofthelaws。Thisdepositarycanonlybethejudgesofthesupremecourtsofjustice，whopromulgatethenewlaws，andrevivetheobsolete。Thenaturalignoranceofthenobility，theirindolenceandcontemptofcivilgovernment，requirethatthereshouldbeabodyinvestedwiththepowerofrevivingandexecutingthelaws，whichwouldbeotherwiseburiedinoblivion。Theprince’scouncilarenotaproperdepositary。Theyarenaturallythedepositaryofthemomentarywilloftheprince，andnotofthefundamentallaws。Besides，theprince’scounciliscontinuallychanging；itisneitherpermanentnornumerous；neitherhasitasufficientshareoftheconfidenceofthepeople；consequentlyitiscapableofsettingthemrightindifficultconjunctures，orofreducingthemtoproperobedience。
　　Despoticgovernments，wheretherearenofundamentallaws，havenosuchkindofdepositary。Henceitisthatreligionhasgenerallysomuchinfluenceinthosecountries，becauseitformsakindofpermanentdepositary；andifthiscannotbesaidofreligion，itmayofthecustomsthatarerespectedinsteadoflaws。
　　5。OftheLawsinrelationtotheNatureofadespoticGovernment。Fromthenatureofdespoticpoweritfollowsthatthesingleperson，investedwiththispower，commitstheexecutionofitalsotoasingleperson。A
　　manwhomhissensescontinuallyinformthathehimselfiseverythingandthathissubjectsarenothing，isnaturallylazy，voluptuous，andignorant。Inconsequenceofthis，heneglectsthemanagementofpublicaffairs。Butwerehetocommittheadministrationtomany，therewouldbecontinualdisputesamongthem；eachwouldformintriguestobehisfirstslave；andhewouldbeobligedtotakethereinsintohisownhands。Itis，therefore，morenaturalforhimtoresignittoavizir，[26]andtoinvesthimwiththesamepowerashimself。Thecreationofavizirisafundamentallawofthisgovernment。
　　Itisrelatedofapopethathehadstartedaninfinitenumberofdifficultiesagainsthiselection，fromathoroughconvictionofhisincapacity。Atlengthhewasprevailedontoacceptofthepontificate，andresignedtheadministrationentirelytohisnephew。Hewassoonstruckwithsurprise，andsaid，"Ishouldneverhavethoughtthatthesethingsweresoeasy。"ThesamemaybesaidoftheprincesoftheEast，who，beingeducatedinaprisonwhereeunuchscorrupttheirheartsanddebasetheirunderstandings，andwheretheyarefrequentlykeptignorantevenoftheirhighrank，whendrawnforthinordertobeplacedonthethrone，areatfirstconfounded：butassoonastheyhavechosenavizir，andabandonedthemselvesintheirseragliotothemostbrutalpassions；pursuing，inthemidstofaprostitutedcourt，everycapriciousextravagance，theywouldneverhavedreamedthattheycouldfindmatterssoeasy。
　　Themoreextensivetheempire，thelargertheseraglio；andconsequentlythemorevoluptuoustheprince。Hencethemorenationssuchasovereignhastorule，thelessheattendstothecaresofgovernment；themoreimportanthisaffairs，thelesshemakesthemthesubjectofhisdeliberations。
　　______
　　1。CompareAristotle，Politics，vi。2。
　　2。Declamations，17，18。
　　3。SeetheConsiderationsontheCausesoftheGrandeurandDeclineoftheRomans，9。
　　4。Pp。691，693，ed。Wechel，1596。
　　5。Bk。i。
　　6。Bk。iv，art。15etseq。
　　7。SeeintheConsiderationsontheCausesoftheGrandeurandDeclineoftheRomans，9，howthisspiritofServiusTulliuswaspreservedintherepublic。
　　8。DionysiusHalicarnassus，EulogiumofIsocrates，ii，p。97，ed。
　　Wechel。Pollux，viii。10，art。130。
　　9。SeeAristotle’sPolitics，ii。12。
　　10。Ibid，iv。9。
　　11。SeetheorationofDemosthenes，DeFalsalegat。，andtheorationagainstTimarchus。
　　12。Theyusedeventodrawtwoticketsforeachplace，onewhichgavetheplace，andtheotherwhichnamedthepersonwhowastosucceed，incasethefirstwasrejected。
　　13。DeLeg。，i，iii。
　　14。Theywerecalledlegestabulares；twotabletswerepresentedtoeachcitizen，thefirstmarkedwithanA，forAntique，orIforbidit；andtheotherwithanUandanR，forUtirogas，orBeitasyoudesire。
　　15。AtAthensthepeopleusedtoliftuptheirhands。
　　16。AsatVenice。
　　17。ThethirtytyrantsatAthensorderedthesuffragesoftheAreopagitestobepublic，inordertomanagethemastheypleased。——
　　Lysias，Orat。contraAgorat。8。
　　18。SeeDionysiusHalicarnassus，iv，ix。
　　19。SeeMr。Addison，TravelstoItaly，p。16。
　　20。Theywerenamedatfirstbytheconsuls。
　　21。ThisiswhatruinedtherepublicofRome。SeeConsiderationsontheCausesoftheGrandeurandDeclineoftheRomans，14，16。
　　22。Tournefort，Voyages。
　　23。AtLuccathemagistratesarechosenonlyfortwomonths。
　　24。Diodorus，xviii，p。601，ed。Rhodoman。
　　25。Ferdinand，kingofAragon，madehimselfgrandmasteroftheorders，andthatalonechangedtheconstitution。
　　26。TheEasternkingsareneverwithoutvizirs，saysSirJohnChardin。
　　BookIII。OfthePrinciplesoftheThreeKindsofGovernment1。DifferencebetweentheNatureandPrincipleofGovernment。Havingexaminedthelawsinrelationtothenatureofeachgovernment，wemustinvestigatethosewhichrelatetoitsprinciple。
　　Thereisthisdifferencebetweenthenatureandprinciple[1]ofgovernment，thattheformeristhatbywhichitisconstituted，thelatterthatbywhichitismadetoact。Oneisitsparticularstructure，andtheotherthehumanpassionswhichsetitinmotion。
　　Now，lawsoughtnolesstorelatetotheprinciplethantothenatureofeachgovernment。Wemust，therefore，inquireintothisprinciple，whichshallbethesubjectofthisthirdbook。
　　2。OfthePrincipleofdifferentGovernments。Ihavealreadyobservedthatitisthenatureofarepublicangovernmentthateitherthecollectivebodyofthepeople，orparticularfamilies，shouldbepossessedofthesupremepower；ofamonarchy，thattheprinceshouldhavethispower，butintheexecutionofitshouldbedirectedbyestablishedlaws；ofadespoticgovernment，thatasinglepersonshouldruleaccordingtohisownwillandcaprice。Thisenablesmetodiscovertheirthreeprinciples；whicharethencenaturallyderived。Ishallbeginwitharepublicangovernment，andinparticularwiththatofdemocracy。
　　3。OfthePrincipleofDemocracy。Thereisnogreatshareofprobitynecessarytosupportamonarchicalordespoticgovernment。Theforceoflawsinone，andtheprince’sarmintheother，aresufficienttodirectandmaintainthewhole。Butinapopularstate，onespringmoreisnecessary，namely，virtue。
　　WhatIhavehereadvancedisconfirmedbytheunanimoustestimonyofhistorians，andisextremelyagreeabletothenatureofthings。Foritisclearthatinamonarchy，wherehewhocommandstheexecutionofthelawsgenerallythinkshimselfabovethem，thereislessneedofvirtuethaninapopulargovernment，wherethepersonentrustedwiththeexecutionofthelawsissensibleofhisbeingsubjecttotheirdirection。
　　Clearisitalsothatamonarchwho，throughbadadviceorindolence，ceasestoenforcetheexecutionofthelaws，mayeasilyrepairtheevil；
　　hehasonlytofollowotheradvice；ortoshakeoffthisindolence。Butwhen，inapopulargovernment，thereisasuspensionofthelaws，asthiscanproceedonlyfromthecorruptionoftherepublic，thestateiscertainlyundone。
　　AverydrollspectacleitwasinthelastcenturytobeholdtheimpotenteffortsoftheEnglishtowardstheestablishmentofdemocracy。Astheywhohadashareinthedirectionofpublicaffairswerevoidofvirtue；
　　astheirambitionwasinffamedbythesuccessofthemostdaringoftheirmembers；[2]astheprevailingpartiesweresuccessivelyanimatedbythespiritoffaction，thegovernmentwascontinuallychanging：thepeople，amazedatsomanyrevolutions，invainattemptedtoerectacommonwealth。Atlength，whenthecountryhadundergonethemostviolentshocks，theywereobligedtohaverecoursetotheverygovernmentwhichtheyhadsowantonlyproscribed。
　　WhenSyllathoughtofrestoringRometoherliberty，thisunhappycitywasincapableofreceivingthatblessing。Shehadonlythefeebleremainsofvirtue，whichwerecontinuallydiminishing。InsteadofbeingrousedfromherlethargybyC？sar，Tiberius，CaiusClaudius，Nero，andDomitian，sherivetedeverydayherchains；ifshestrucksomeblows，heraimwasatthetyrant，notatthetyranny。