32。Amongothers，DeLange’saccount。
　　33。OftheFamilyofSourniama，EdifyingLetters，coll。xviii。
　　34。SeeinFatherDuHaldehowthemissionariesavailedthemselvesoftheauthorityofCanhitosilencethemandarins，whoconstantlydeclaredthatbythelawsofthecountrynoforeignworshipcouldbeestablishedintheempire。
　　35。SeeLettrespersanes，210。
　　36。SeetheorderofTsongtoufortillingtheland，intheEdifyingLetters，coll。xxi。
　　BookIX。OfLawsintheRelationTheyBeartoaDefensiveForce1。InwhatMannerRepublicsprovidefortheirSafety。Ifarepublicbesmall，itisdestroyedbyaforeignforce；ifitbelarge，itisruinedbyaninternalimperfection。
　　Tothistwofoldinconveniencedemocraciesandaristocraciesareequallyliable，whethertheybegoodorbad。Theevilisintheverythingitself，andnoformcanredressit。
　　Itis，therefore，veryprobablethatmankindwouldhavebeen，atlength，obligedtoliveconstantlyunderthegovernmentofasingleperson，hadtheynotcontrivedakindofconstitutionthathasalltheinternaladvantagesofarepublican，togetherwiththeexternalforceofamonarchical，government。Imeanaconfederaterepublic。
　　Thisformofgovernmentisaconventionbywhichseveralpettystatesagreetobecomemembersofalargerone，whichtheyintendtoestablish。
　　Itisakindofassemblageofsocieties，thatconstituteanewone，capableofincreasingbymeansoffurtherassociations，tilltheyarriveatsuchadegreeofpowerastobeabletoprovideforthesecurityofthewholebody。
　　ItwastheseassociationsthatsolongcontributedtotheprosperityofGreece。BythesetheRomansattackedthewholeglobe，andbythesealonethewholeglobewithstoodthem；forwhenRomehadarrivedatherhighestpitchofgrandeur，itwastheassociationsbeyondtheDanubeandtheRhine——associationsformedbytheterrorofherarms——thatenabledthebarbarianstoresisther。
　　HenceitproceedsthatHolland，[1]Germany，andtheSwisscantonsareconsideredinEuropeasperpetualrepublics。
　　Theassociationsofcitieswereformerlymorenecessarythaninourtimes。Aweak，defencelesstownwasexposedtogreaterdanger。Byconquestitwasdeprivednotonlyoftheexecutiveandlegislativepower，asatpresent，butmoreoverofallhumanproperty。[2]
　　Arepublicofthiskind，abletowithstandanexternalforce，maysupportitselfwithoutanyinternalcorruption；theformofthissocietypreventsallmannerofinconveniences。
　　Ifasinglemembershouldattempttousurpthesupremepower，hecouldnotbesupposedtohaveanequalauthorityandcreditinalltheconfederatestates。Werehetohavetoogreataninfluenceoverone，thiswouldalarmtherest；werehetosubdueapart，thatwhichwouldstillremainfreemightopposehimwithforcesindependentofthosewhichhehadusurped，andoverpowerhimbeforehecouldbesettledinhisusurpation。
　　Shouldapopularinsurrectionhappeninoneoftheconfederatestates，theothersareabletoquellit。Shouldabusescreepintoonepart，theyarereformedbythosethatremainsound。Thestatemaybedestroyedononeside，andnotontheother；theconfederacymaybedissolved，andtheconfederatespreservetheirsovereignty。
　　Asthisgovernmentiscomposedofpettyrepublics，itenjoystheinternalhappinessofeach；andwithregardtoitsexternalsituation，bymeansoftheassociation，itpossessesalltheadvantagesoflargemonarchies。
　　2。ThataconfederateGovernmentoughttobecomposedofStatesofthesameNature，especiallyoftherepublicanKind。TheCanaanitesweredestroyedbyreasonthattheywerepettymonarchies，thathadnounionorconfederacyfortheircommondefence；and，indeed，aconfederacyisnotagreeabletothenatureofpettymonarchies。
　　AstheconfederaterepublicofGermanyconsistsoffreecities，andofpettystatessubjecttodifferentprinces，experienceshowsusthatitismuchmoreimperfectthanthatofHollandandSwitzerland。
　　Thespiritofmonarchyiswarandenlargementofdominion：peaceandmoderationarethespiritofarepublic。Thesetwokindsofgovernmentcannotnaturallysubsistinaconfederaterepublic。
　　Thusweobserve，intheRomanhistory，thatwhentheVeienteshadchosenaking，theywereimmediatelyabandonedbyalltheotherpettyrepublicsofTuscany。GreecewasundoneassoonasthekingsofMacedonobtainedaseatamongtheAmphyktyons。
　　TheconfederaterepublicofGermany，composedofprincesandfreetowns，subsistsbymeansofachief，whois，insomerespects，themagistrateoftheunion，inothers，themonarch。
　　3。OtherRequisitesinaconfederateRepublic。IntherepublicofHollandoneprovincecannotconcludeanalliancewithouttheconsentoftheothers。Thislaw，whichisanexcellentone，andevennecessaryinaconfederaterepublic，iswantingintheGermanicconstitution，whereitwouldpreventthemisfortunesthatmayhappentothewholeconfederacy，throughtheimprudence，ambition，oravariceofasinglemember。A
　　republicunitedbyapoliticalconfederacyhasgivenitselfentirelyup，andhasnothingmoretoresign。
　　Itisdifficultfortheunitedstatestobeallofequalpowerandextent。TheLycian[3]republicwasanassociationoftwenty—threetowns；
　　thelargeoneshadthreevotesinthecommoncouncil，themiddlingonestwo，andthesmalltownsone。TheDutchrepublicconsistsofsevenprovincesofdifferentextentofterritory，whichhaveeachonevoice。
　　ThecitiesofLycia[4]contributedtotheexpensesofthestate，accordingtotheproportionofsuffrages。TheprovincesoftheUnitedNetherlandscannotfollowthisproportion；theymustbedirectedbythatoftheirpower。
　　InLycia[5]thejudgesandtownmagistrateswereelectedbythecommoncouncil，andaccordingtotheproportionalreadymentioned。IntherepublicofHollandtheyarenotchosenbythecommoncouncil，buteachtownnamesitsmagistrates。WereItogiveamodelofanexcellentconfederaterepublic，IshouldpitchuponthatofLycia。
　　4。InwhatMannerdespoticGovernmentsprovidefortheirSecurity。Asrepublicsprovidefortheirsecuritybyuniting，despoticgovernmentsdoitbyseparating，andbykeepingthemselves，asitwere，single。Theysacrificeapartofthecountry；andbyravaginganddesolatingthefrontierstheyrendertheheartoftheempireinaccessible。
　　Itisareceivedaxiomingeometrythatthegreatertheextentofbodies，themoretheircircumferenceisrelativelysmall。Thispractice，therefore，oflayingthefrontierswasteismoretolerableinlargethaninmiddlingstates。
　　Adespoticgovernmentdoesallthemischieftoitselfthatcouldbecommittedbyacruelenemy，whosearmsitwereunabletoresist。
　　Itpreservesitselflikewisebyanotherkindofseparation，whichisbyputtingthemostdistantprovincesintothehandsofagreatvassal。TheMogul，thekingofPersia，andtheemperorsofChinahavetheirfeudatories；andtheTurkshavefoundtheiraccountinputtingtheTartars，theMoldavians，theWallachians，andformerlytheTransylvanians，betweenthemselvesandtheirenemies。
　　5。InwhatManneraMonarchicalGovernmentprovidesforitsSecurity。A
　　monarchyneverdestroysitselflikeadespoticgovernment。Butakingdomofamoderateextentisliabletosuddeninvasions：itmustthereforehavefortressestodefenditsfrontiers；andtroopstogarrisonthosefortresses。Theleastspotofgroundisdisputedwithmilitaryskillandresolution。Despoticstatesmakeincursionsagainstoneanother；itismonarchiesonlythatwagewar。
　　Fortressesareproperformonarchies；despoticgovernmentsareafraidofthem。Theydarenotentrusttheirofficerswithsuchacommand，asnoneofthemhaveanyaffectionfortheprinceorhisgovernment。
　　6。OfthedefensiveForceofStatesingeneral。Topreserveastateinitsdueforce，itmusthavesuchanextentastoadmitofaproportionbetweentheceleritywithwhichitmaybeinvaded，andthatwithwhichitmaydefeattheinvasion。Asaninvadermayappearoneveryside，itisrequisitethatthestateshouldbeabletomakeoneverysideitsdefence；consequentlyitshouldbeofamoderateextent，proportionedtothedegreeofvelocitythatnaturehasgiventoman，toenablehimtomovefromoneplacetoanother。
　　FranceandSpainareexactlyofaproperextent。Theyhavesoeasyacommunicationfortheirforcesastobeabletoconveythemimmediatelytowhatparttheyhaveamind；thearmiesuniteandpasswithrapidityfromonefrontiertoanother，withoutanyapprehensionofsuchdifficultiesasrequiretimetoremove。
　　ItisextremelyhappyforFrancethatthecapitalstandsneartothedifferentfrontiersinproportiontotheirweakness；andtheprincehasabetterviewofeachpartofhiscountryaccordingasitismoreexposed。
　　Butwhenavastempire，likePersia，isattacked，itisseveralmonthsbeforethetroopsareassembledinabody；andthentheyarenotabletomakesuchforcedmarches，forthatspaceoftime，astheycouldforfifteendays。Shouldthearmyonthefrontiersbedefeated，itissoondispersed，becausethereisnoneighbouringplaceofretreat。Thevictor，meetingwithnoresistance，advanceswithallexpedition，sitsdownbeforethecapital，andlayssiegetoit，whenthereisscarcelytimesufficienttosummonthegovernorsoftheprovincestoitsrelief。
　　Thosewhoforeseeanapproachingrevolutionhastenitbytheirdisobedience。Formenwhosefidelityisentirelyowingtothedangerofpunishmentareeasilycorruptedassoonasitbecomesdistant；theiraimistheirownprivateinterest。Theempireissubverted，thecapitaltaken，andtheconquerordisputestheseveralprovinceswiththegovernors。
　　Therealpowerofaprincedoesnotconsistsomuchinthefacilityhemeetswithinmakingconquestsasinthedifficultyanenemyfindsinattackinghim，and，ifImaysospeak，intheimmutabilityofhiscondition。Buttheincreaseofterritoryobligesagovernmenttolayitselfmoreopentoanenemy。
　　Asmonarchsthereforeoughttobeenduedwithwisdominordertoincreasetheirpower，theyoughtlikewisetohaveanequalshareofprudencetoconfineitwithinbounds。Uponremovingtheinconveniencesoftoosmallaterritory，theyshouldhavetheireyeconstantlyontheinconvenienceswhichattenditsextent。
　　7。AReflection。Theenemiesofagreatprince，whosereignwasprotractedtoanunusuallength，haveveryoftenaccusedhim，rather，I
　　believe，fromtheirownfearsthanuponanysolidfoundation，ofhavingformedandcarriedonaprojectofuniversalmonarchy。Hadheattainedhisaim，nothingwouldhavebeenmorefataltohissubjects，tohimself，tohisfamily，andtoallEurope。Heaven，thatknowsourtrueinterests，favouredhimmorebypreventingthesuccessofhisarmsthanitcouldhavedonebycrowninghimwithvictories。InsteadofraisinghimtobetheonlysovereigninEurope，itmadehimhappierbyrenderinghimthemostpowerful。
　　Thesubjectsofthisprince，whointravellingabroadareneveraffectedbutwithwhattheyhaveleftathome；whoonquittingtheirownhabitationslookupongloryastheirchiefobject，andindistantcountriesasanobstacletotheirreturn；whodisgustyouevenbytheirgoodqualities，becausetheyaretaintedwithsomuchvanity；whoarecapableofsupportingwounds，perils，andfatigues，butnotofforegoingtheirpleasures；whoaresupremelyfondofgaiety，andcomfortthemselvesforthelossofabattlebyasonguponthegeneral：thosesubjects，Isay，wouldneverhavethesolidityrequisiteforanenterpriseofthiskind，whichifdefeatedinonecountrywouldbeunsuccessfuleverywhereelse；andifonceunsuccessful，wouldbesoforever。
　　8。AparticularCaseinwhichthedefensiveForceofaStateisinferiortotheoffensive。ItwasasayingoftheLordofCoucytoKingCharlesV
　　thattheEnglishareneverweaker，normoreeasilyovercome，thanintheirowncountry。ThesamewasobservedoftheRomans；thesameoftheCarthaginians；andthesamewillhappentoeverypowerthatsendsarmiestodistantcountries，inordertoreunitebydisciplineandmilitaryforcethosewhoaredividedamongthemselvesbypoliticalorcivilinterests。Thestatefindsitselfweakenedbythedisorderthatstillcontinues，andmoresobytheremedy。
　　TheLordofCoucy’smaximisanexceptiontothegeneralrule，whichdisapprovesofwarsagainstdistantcountries。Andthisexceptionconfirmslikewisetherulebecauseittakesplaceonlywithregardtothosebywhomsuchwarsareundertaken。
　　9。OftherelativeForceofStates。Allgrandeur，force，andpowerarerelative。Carethereforemustbetakenthatinendeavouringtoincreasetherealgrandeur，therelativebenotdiminished。
　　DuringthereignofLouisXIVFrancewasatitshighestpitchofrelativegrandeur。Germanyhadnotyetproducedsuchpowerfulprincesashavesinceappearedinthatcountry。Italywasinthesamecase。EnglandandScotlandwerenotyetformedintooneunitedkingdom。AragonwasnotjoinedtoCastile：thedistantbranchesoftheSpanishmonarchywereweakenedbyit，andweakeneditintheirturn；andMuscovywasaslittleknowninEuropeasCrimTartary。
　　10。OftheWeaknessofneighbouringStates。Whensoeverastateliescontiguoustoanotherthathappenstobeinitsdecline，theformeroughttotakeparticularcarenottoprecipitatetheruinofthelatter，becausethisisthehappiestsituationimaginable；nothingbeingsoconvenientasforoneprincetobenearanother，whoreceivesforhimalltherebuffsandinsultsoffortune。Anditseldomhappensthatbysubduingsuchastatetherealpoweroftheconquerorisasmuchincreasedastherelativeisdiminished。
　　______
　　1。Itiscomposedofaboutfiftydifferentrepublics，alldifferentfromoneanother。——M。Janisson，StateoftheUnitedProvinces。
　　2。Civilliberty，goods，wives，children，temples，andevenburying—places。
　　3。Strabo，xiv。
　　4。Ibid。
　　5。Ibid。
　　BookX。OfLawsintheRelationTheyBeartoOffensiveForce1。OfoffensiveForce。Offensiveforceisregulatedbythelawofnations，whichisthepoliticallawofeachcountryconsideredinitsrelationtoeveryother。
　　2。OfWar。Thelifeofgovernmentsislikethatofman。Thelatterhasarighttokillincaseofnaturaldefence：theformerhavearighttowagewarfortheirownpreservation。
　　InthecaseofnaturaldefenceIhavearighttokill，becausemylifeisinrespecttomewhatthelifeofmyantagonististohim：inthesamemannerastatewageswarbecauseitspreservationislikethatofanyotherbeing。
　　Withindividualstherightofnaturaldefencedoesnotimplyanecessityofattacking。Insteadofattackingtheyneedonlyhaverecoursetopropertribunals。Theycannotthereforeexercisethisrightofdefencebutinsuddencases，whenimmediatedeathwouldbetheconsequenceofwaitingfortheassistanceofthelaw。Butwithstatestherightofnaturaldefencecarriesalongwithitsometimesthenecessityofattacking；asforinstance，whenonenationseesthatacontinuanceofpeacewillenableanothertodestroyher，andthattoattackthatnationinstantlyistheonlywaytopreventherowndestruction。
　　Thenceitfollowsthatpettystateshaveoftenerarighttodeclarewarthangreatones，becausetheyareoftenerinthecaseofbeingafraidofdestruction。
　　Therightofwar，therefore，isderivedfromnecessityandstrictjustice。Ifthosewhodirecttheconscienceorcouncilsofprincesdonotabidebythismaxim，theconsequenceisdreadful：whentheyproceedonarbitraryprinciplesofglory，convenience，andutility，torrentsofbloodmustoverspreadtheearth。
　　But，aboveall，letthemnotpleadsuchanidlepretextasthegloryoftheprince：hisgloryisnothingbutpride；itisapassion，andnotalegitimateright。
　　Itistruethefameofhispowermightincreasethestrengthofhisgovernment；butitmightbeequallyincreasedbythereputationofhisjustice。
　　3。OftheRightofConquest。Fromtherightofwarcomesthatofconquest；whichistheconsequenceofthatright，andoughtthereforetofollowitsspirit。
　　Therighttheconquerorhasoveraconqueredpeopleisdirectedbyfoursortsoflaws：thelawofnature，whichmakeseverythingtendtothepreservationofthespecies；thelawofnaturalreason，whichteachesustodotootherswhatwewouldhavedonetoourselves；thelawthatformspoliticalsocieties，whosedurationnaturehasnotlimited；and，infine，thelawderivedfromthenatureofthethingitself。Conquestisanacquisition，andcarrieswithitthespiritofpreservationanduse，notofdestruction。
　　Theinhabitantsofaconqueredcountryaretreatedbytheconquerorinoneofthefourfollowingways：Eitherhecontinuestorulethemaccordingtotheirownlaws，andassumestohimselfonlytheexerciseofthepoliticalandcivilgovernment；orhegivesthemnewpoliticalandcivilgovernment；orhedestroysanddispersesthesociety；or，infine，heexterminatesthepeople。
　　Thefirstwayisconformabletothelawofnationsnowfollowed；thefourthismoreagreeabletothelawofnationsfollowedbytheRomans：
　　inrespecttowhichIleavethereadertojudgehowfarwehaveimprovedupontheancients。Wemustgiveduecommendationstoourmodernrefinementsinreason，religion，philosophy，andmanners。
　　Theauthorsofourpubliclaw，guidedbyancienthistories，withoutconfiningthemselvestocasesofstrictnecessity，havefallenintoverygreaterrors。Theyhaveadoptedtyrannicalandarbitraryprinciples，bysupposingtheconquerorstobeinvestedwithIknownotwhatrighttokill：thencetheyhavedrawnconsequencesasterribleastheveryprinciple，andestablishedmaximswhichtheconquerorsthemselves，whenpossessedoftheleastgrainofsense，neverpresumedtofollow。Itisaplaincasethatwhentheconquestiscompleted，theconquerorhasnolongerarighttokill，becausehehasnolongerthepleaofnaturaldefenceandself—preservation。
　　Whathasledthemintothismistakeis，thattheyimaginedaconquerorhadarighttodestroythestate；whencetheyinferredthathehadarighttodestroythementhatcomposeit：awrongconsequencefromafalseprinciple。Forfromthedestructionofthestateitdoesnotatallfollowthatthepeoplewhocomposeitoughttobealsodestroyed。
　　Thestateistheassociationofmen，andnotthementhemselves；thecitizenmayperish，andthemanremain。
　　Fromtherightofkillinginthecaseofconquest，politicianshavedrawnthatofreducingtoslavery——aconsequenceasill—groundedastheprinciple。
　　Thereisnosuchthingasarightofreducingpeopletoslavery，savewhenitbecomesnecessaryforthepreservationoftheconquest。
　　Preservation，andnotservitude，istheendofconquest；thoughservitudemayhappensometimestobeanecessarymeansofpreservation。
　　Eveninthatcaseitiscontrarytothenatureofthingsthattheslaveryshouldbeperpetual。Thepeopleenslavedoughttoberenderedcapableofbecomingsubjects。Slaveryinconquestsisanaccidentalthing。Whenaftertheexpirationofacertainspaceoftimeallthepartsoftheconqueringstateareconnectedwiththeconquerednation，bycustom，marriages，laws，associations，andbyacertainconformityofdisposition，thereoughttobeanendoftheslavery。Fortherightsoftheconquerorarefoundedentirelyontheoppositionbetweenthetwonationsinthoseveryarticles，whenceprejudicesarise，andthewantofmutualconfidence。
　　Aconqueror，therefore，whoreducestheconqueredpeopletoslavery，oughtalwaystoreservetohimselfthemeans（formeanstherearewithoutnumber）ofrestoringthemtotheirliberty。
　　Thesearefarfrombeingvagueanduncertainnotions。Thusourancestorsacted，thoseancestorswhoconqueredtheRomanempire。Thelawstheymadeintheheatandtransportofpassionandintheinsolenceofvictoryweregraduallysoftened；thoselawswereatfirstsevere，butwereafterwardsrenderedimpartial。TheBurgundians，Goths，andLombardswouldhavetheRomanscontinueaconqueredpeople；butthelawsofEuric，Gundebald，andRotharismadetheRomansandbarbariansfellow—citizens。[1]
　　Charlemagne，totametheSaxons，deprivedthemoftheirlibertyandproperty。LouistheDebonnairemadethemafreepeople，[2]andthiswasoneofthemostprudentregulationsduringhiswholereign。Timeandservitudehadsoftenedtheirmanners，andtheyeverafteradheredtohimwiththegreatestfidelity。
　　4。SomeAdvantagesofaconqueredPeople。Insteadofinferringsuchdestructiveconsequencesfromtherightofconquest，muchbetterwouldithavebeenforpoliticianstomentiontheadvantageswhichthisveryrightmaysometimesgivetoaconqueredpeople——advantageswhichwouldbemoresensiblyandmoreuniversallyexperiencedwereourlawofnationsexactlyfollowed，andestablishedineverypartoftheglobe。
　　Conqueredcountriesare，generallyspeaking，degeneratedfromtheiroriginalinstitution。Corruptionhascreptin，theexecutionofthelawshasbeenneglected，andthegovernmenthasgrownoppressive。Whocanquestionbutsuchastatewouldbeagainer，andderivesomeadvantagesfromtheveryconquestitself，ifitdidnotprovedestructive？Whenagovernmenthasarrivedatthatdegreeofcorruptionastobeincapableofreformingitself，itwouldnotlosemuchbybeingnewlymoulded。A