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　　Moreover，toclaima’Yes’or’No’answeristhebusinessnotofamanwhoisshowingsomething，butofonewhoisholdinganexamination。Fortheartofexaminingisabranchofdialecticandhasinviewnotthemanwhohasknowledge，buttheignorantpretender。He，then，isadialecticianwhoregardsthecommonprincipleswiththeirapplicationtotheparticularmatterinhand，whilehewhoonlyappearstodothisisasophist。Nowforcontentiousandsophisticalreasoning：（1）onesuchisamerelyapparentreasoning，onsubjectsonwhichdialecticalreasoningisthepropermethodofexamination，eventhoughitsconclusionbetrue：foritmisleadsusinregardtothecause：also（2）therearethosemisreasoningswhichdonotconformtothelineofinquirypropertotheparticularsubject，butaregenerallythoughttoconformtotheartinquestion。Forfalsediagramsofgeometricalfiguresarenotcontentious（fortheresultingfallaciesconformtothesubjectoftheart）—anymorethanisanyfalsediagramthatmaybeofferedinproofofatruth—e。g。
　　Hippocrates’figureorthesquaringofthecirclebymeansofthelunules。ButBryson’smethodofsquaringthecircle，evenifthecircleistherebysquared，isstillsophisticalbecauseitdoesnotconformtothesubjectinhand。So，then，anymerelyapparentreasoningaboutthesethingsisacontentiousargument，andanyreasoningthatmerelyappearstoconformtothesubjectinhand，eventhoughitbegenuinereasoning，isacontentiousargument：foritismerelyapparentinitsconformitytothesubject—matter，sothatitisdeceptiveandplaysfoul。Forjustasafoulinaraceisadefinitetypeoffault，andisakindoffoulfighting，sotheartofcontentiousreasoningisfoulfightingindisputation：forintheformercasethosewhoareresolvedtowinatallcostssnatchateverything，andsointhelattercasedocontentiousreasoners。Those，then，whodothisinordertowinthemerevictoryaregenerallyconsideredtobecontentiousandquarrelsomepersons，whilethosewhodoittowinareputationwithaviewtomakingmoneyaresophistical。Fortheartofsophistryis，aswesaid，’akindofartofmoney—makingfromamerelyapparentwisdom，andthisiswhytheyaimatamerelyapparentdemonstration：andquarrelsomepersonsandsophistsbothemploythesamearguments，butnotwiththesamemotives：andthesameargumentwillbesophisticalandcontentious，butnotinthesamerespect；rather，itwillbecontentiousinsofarasitsaimisanapparentvictory，whileinsofarasitsaimisanapparentwisdom，itwillbesophistical：fortheartofsophistryisacertainappearanceofwisdomwithoutthereality。Thecontentiousargumentstandsinsomewhatthesamerelationtothedialecticalasthedraweroffalsediagramstothegeometrician；foritbeguilesbymisreasoningfromthesameprinciplesasdialecticuses，justasthedrawerofafalsediagrambeguilesthegeometrician。Butwhereasthelatterisnotacontentiousreasoner，becausehebaseshisfalsediagramontheprinciplesandconclusionsthatfallundertheartofgeometry，theargumentwhichissubordinatetotheprinciplesofdialecticwillyetclearlybecontentiousasregardsothersubjects。
　　Thus，e。g。thoughthesquaringofthecirclebymeansofthelunulesisnotcontentious，Bryson’ssolutioniscontentious：andtheformerargumentcannotbeadaptedtoanysubjectexceptgeometry，becauseitproceedsfromprinciplesthatarepeculiartogeometry，whereasthelattercanbeadaptedasanargumentagainstallthenumberofpeoplewhodonotknowwhatisorisnotpossibleineachparticularcontext：foritwillapplytothemall。OrthereisthemethodwherebyAntiphonsquaredthecircle。Oragain，anargumentwhichdeniedthatitwasbettertotakeawalkafterdinner，becauseofZeno’sargument，wouldnotbeaproperargumentforadoctor，becauseZeno’sargumentisofgeneralapplication。If，then，therelationofthecontentiousargumenttothedialecticalwereexactlylikethatofthedraweroffalsediagramstothegeometrician，acontentiousargumentupontheaforesaidsubjectscouldnothaveexisted。But，asitis，thedialecticalargumentisnotconcernedwithanydefinitekindofbeing，nordoesitshowanything，norisitevenanargumentsuchaswefindinthegeneralphilosophyofbeing。Forallbeingsarenotcontainedinanyonekind，nor，iftheywere，couldtheypossiblyfallunderthesameprinciples。Accordingly，noartthatisamethodofshowingthenatureofanythingproceedsbyaskingquestions：foritdoesnotpermitamantograntwhicheverhelikesofthetwoalternativesinthequestion：fortheywillnotbothofthemyieldaproof。Dialectic，ontheotherhand，doesproceedbyquestioning，whereasifitwereconcernedtoshowthings，itwouldhaverefrainedfromputtingquestions，evenifnotabouteverything，atleastaboutthefirstprinciplesandthespecialprinciplesthatapplytotheparticularsubjectinhand。Forsupposetheanswerernottograntthese，itwouldthennolongerhavehadanygroundsfromwhichtoargueanylongeragainsttheobjection。Dialecticisatthesametimeamodeofexaminationaswell。Forneitheristheartofexaminationanaccomplishmentofthesamekindasgeometry，butonewhichamanmaypossess，eventhoughhehasnotknowledge。Foritispossibleevenforonewithoutknowledgetoholdanexaminationofonewhoiswithoutknowledge，ifalsothelattergrantshimpointstakennotfromthingthatheknowsorfromthespecialprinciplesofthesubjectunderdiscussionbutfromallthatrangeofconsequencesattachingtothesubjectwhichamanmayindeedknowwithoutknowingthetheoryofthesubject，butwhichifhedonotknow，heisboundtobeignorantofthetheory。Sothenclearlytheartofexaminingdoesnotconsistinknowledgeofanydefinitesubject。Forthisreason，too，itdealswitheverything：forevery’theory’ofanythingemploysalsocertaincommonprinciples。Henceeverybody，includingevenamateurs，makesuseinawayofdialecticandthepracticeofexamining：forallundertaketosomeextentaroughtrialofthosewhoprofesstoknowthings。Whatservesthemhereisthegeneralprinciples：fortheyknowtheseofthemselvesjustaswellasthescientist，evenifinwhattheysaytheyseemtothelattertogowildlyastrayfromthem。All，then，areengagedinrefutation；fortheytakeahandasamateursinthesametaskwithwhichdialecticisconcernedprofessionally；andheisadialecticianwhoexaminesbythehelpofatheoryofreasoning。Nowtherearemanyidenticalprincipleswhicharetrueofeverything，thoughtheyarenotsuchastoconstituteaparticularnature，i。e。aparticularkindofbeing，butarelikenegativeterms，whileotherprinciplesarenotofthiskindbutarespecialtoparticularsubjects；accordinglyitispossiblefromthesegeneralprinciplestoholdanexaminationoneverything，andthatthereshouldbeadefiniteartofsodoing，and，moreover，anartwhichisnotofthesamekindasthosewhichdemonstrate。Thisiswhythecontentiousreasonerdoesnotstandinthesameconditioninallrespectsasthedrawerofafalsediagram：
　　forthecontentiousreasonerwillnotbegiventomisreasoningfromanydefiniteclassofprinciples，butwilldealwitheveryclass。
　　These，then，arethetypesofsophisticalrefutations：andthatitbelongstothedialecticiantostudythese，andtobeabletoeffectthem，isnotdifficulttosee：fortheinvestigationofpremissescomprisesthewholeofthisstudy。
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　　Somuch，then，forapparentrefutations。Asforshowingthattheanswereriscommittingsomefallacy，anddrawinghisargumentintoparadox—forthiswastheseconditemofthesophist’sprogramme—inthefirstplace，then，thisisbestbroughtaboutbyacertainmannerofquestioningandthroughthequestion。Fortoputthequestionwithoutframingitwithreferencetoanydefinitesubjectisagoodbaitforthesepurposes：forpeoplearemoreinclinedtomakemistakeswhentheytalkatlarge，andtheytalkatlargewhentheyhavenodefinitesubjectbeforethem。Alsotheputtingofseveralquestions，eventhoughthepositionagainstwhichoneisarguingbequitedefinite，andtheclaimthatheshallsayonlywhathethinks，createabundantopportunityfordrawinghimintoparadoxorfallacy，andalso，whethertoanyofthesequestionshereplies’Yes’orreplies’No’，ofleadinghimontostatementsagainstwhichoneiswelloffforalineofattack。Nowadays，however，menarelessabletoplayfoulbythesemeansthantheywereformerly：forpeoplerejoinwiththequestion，’Whathasthattodowiththeoriginalsubject？’Itis，too，anelementaryruleforelicitingsomefallacyorparadoxthatoneshouldneverputacontroversialquestionstraightaway，butsaythatoneputsitfromthewishforinformation：fortheprocessofinquirythusinvitedgivesroomforanattack。
　　Arulespeciallyappropriateforshowingupafallacyisthesophisticrule，thatoneshoulddrawtheanswererontothekindofstatementsagainstwhichoneiswellsuppliedwitharguments：thiscanbedonebothproperlyandimproperly，aswassaidbefore。’Again，todrawaparadoxicalstatement，lookandseetowhatschoolofphilosophersthepersonarguingwithyoubelongs，andthenquestionhimastosomepointwhereintheirdoctrineisparadoxicaltomostpeople：forwitheveryschoolthereissomepointofthatkind。Itisanelementaryruleinthesematterstohaveacollectionofthespecial’theses’ofthevariousschoolsamongyourpropositions。Thesolutionrecommendedasappropriatehere，too，istopointoutthattheparadoxdoesnotcomeaboutbecauseoftheargument：whereasthisiswhathisopponentalwaysreallywants。
　　Moreover，arguefrommen’swishesandtheirprofessedopinions。
　　Forpeopledonotwishthesamethingsastheysaytheywish：theysaywhatwilllookbest，whereastheywishwhatappearstobetotheirinterest：e。g。theysaythatamanoughttodienoblyratherthantoliveinpleasure，andtoliveinhonestpovertyratherthanindishonourableriches；buttheywishtheopposite。Accordingly，amanwhospeaksaccordingtohiswishesmustbeledintostatingtheprofessedopinionsofpeople，whilehewhospeaksaccordingtothesemustbeledintoadmittingthosethatpeoplekeephiddenaway：forineithercasetheyareboundtointroduceaparadox；fortheywillspeakcontraryeithertomen’sprofessedortotheirhiddenopinions。
　　Thewidestrangeofcommon—placeargumentforleadingmenintoparadoxicalstatementisthatwhichdependsonthestandardsofNatureandoftheLaw：itissothatbothCalliclesisdrawnasarguingintheGorgias，andthatallthemenofoldsupposedtheresulttocomeabout：fornature（theysaid）andlawareopposites，andjusticeisafinethingbyalegalstandard，butnotbythatofnature。
　　Accordingly，theysaid，themanwhosestatementagreeswiththestandardofnatureyoushouldmeetbythestandardofthelaw，butthemanwhoagreeswiththelawbyleadinghimtothefactsofnature：forinbothwaysparadoxicalstatementsmaybecommitted。Intheirviewthestandardofnaturewasthetruth，whilethatofthelawwastheopinionheldbythemajority。Sothatitisclearthatthey，too，usedtotryeithertorefutetheanswererortomakehimmakeparadoxicalstatements，justasthemenofto—daydoaswell。
　　Somequestionsaresuchthatinbothformstheanswerisparadoxical；e。g。’Oughtonetoobeythewiseorone’sfather？’and’Oughtonetodowhatisexpedientorwhatisjust？’and’Isitpreferabletosufferinjusticeortodoaninjury？’Youshouldleadpeople，then，intoviewsoppositetothemajorityandtothephilosophers；ifanyonespeaksasdotheexpertreasoners，leadhimintooppositiontothemajority，whileifhespeaksasdothemajority，thenintooppositiontothereasoners。Forsomesaythatofnecessitythehappymanisjust，whereasitisparadoxicaltothemanythatakingshouldbehappy。Toleadamanintoparadoxesofthissortisthesameastoleadhimintotheoppositionofthestandardsofnatureandlaw：forthelawrepresentstheopinionofthemajority，whereasphilosophersspeakaccordingtothestandardofnatureandthetruth。
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　　Paradoxes，then，youshouldseektoelicitbymeansofthesecommon—placerules。Nowasformakinganyonebabble，wehavealreadysaidwhatwemeanby’tobabble’。Thisistheobjectinviewinallargumentsofthefollowingkind：Ifitisallthesametostateatermandtostateitsdefinition，the’double’and’doubleofhalf’arethesame：ifthen’double’bethe’doubleofhalf’，itwillbethe’doubleofhalfofhalf’。Andif，insteadof’double’，’doubleofhalf’beagainput，thenthesameexpressionwillberepeatedthreetimes，’doubleofhalfofhalfofhalf’。Also’desireisofthepleasant，isn’tit？’desireisconationforthepleasant：
　　accordingly，’desire’is’conationforthepleasantforthepleasant’。
　　Allargumentsofthiskindoccurindealing（1）withanyrelativetermswhichnotonlyhaverelativegenera，butarealsothemselvesrelative，andarerenderedinrelationtooneandthesamething，ase。g。conationisconationforsomething，anddesireisdesireofsomething，anddoubleisdoubleofsomething，i。e。doubleofhalf：
　　alsoindealing（2）withanytermswhich，thoughtheybenotrelativetermsatall，yethavetheirsubstance，viz。thethingsofwhichtheyarethestatesoraffectionsorwhatnot，indicatedaswellintheirdefinition，theybeingpredicatedofthesethings。Thuse。g。’odd’isa’numbercontainingamiddle’：butthereisan’oddnumber’：thereforethereisa’number—containing—a—middlenumber’。
　　Also，ifsnubnessbeaconcavityofthenose，andtherebeasnubnose，thereisthereforea’concave—nosenose’。
　　Peoplesometimesappeartoproducethisresult，withoutreallyproducingit，becausetheydonotaddthequestionwhethertheexpression’double’，justbyitself，hasanymeaningorno，andifso，whetherithasthesamemeaning，oradifferentone；buttheydrawtheirconclusionstraightaway。Stillitseems，inasmuchasthewordisthesame，tohavethesamemeaningaswell。
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　　Wehavesaidbeforewhatkindofthing’solecism’is。’Itispossiblebothtocommitit，andtoseemtodosowithoutdoingso，andtodosowithoutseemingtodoso。Suppose，asProtagorasusedtosaythatmenis（’wrath’）andpelex（’helmet’）aremasculine：
　　accordingtohimamanwhocallswratha’destructress’（oulomenen）
　　commitsasolecism，thoughhedoesnotseemtodosotootherpeople，wherehewhocallsita’destructor’（oulomenon）commitsnosolecismthoughheseemstodoso。Itisclear，then，thatanyonecouldproducethiseffectbyartaswell：andforthisreasonmanyargumentsseemtoleadtosolecismwhichdonotreallydoso，ashappensinthecaseofrefutations。
　　Almostallapparentsolecismsdependupontheword’this’（tode），anduponoccasionswhentheinflectiondenotesneitheramasculinenorafeminineobjectbutaneuter。For’he’（outos）signifiesamasculine，and’she’（aute）feminine；but’this’（touto），thoughmeanttosignifyaneuter，oftenalsosignifiesoneorotheroftheformer：e。g。’Whatisthis？’’ItisCalliope’；’itisalog’；’itisCoriscus’。Nowinthemasculineandfemininetheinflectionsarealldifferent，whereasintheneutersomeareandsomearenot。Often，then，when’this’（touto）hasbeengranted，peoplereasonasif’him’
　　（touton）hadbeensaid：andlikewisealsotheysubstituteoneinflectionforanother。Thefallacycomesaboutbecause’this’
　　（touto）isacommonformofseveralinflections：for’this’signifiessometimes’he’（outos）andsometimes’him’（touton）。Itshouldsignifythemalternately；whencombinedwith’is’（esti）itshouldbe’he’，whilewith’being’itshouldbe’him’：e。g。’Coriscus（Kopiskos）is’，but’beingCoriscus’（Kopiskon）。Ithappensinthesamewayinthecaseoffemininenounsaswell，andinthecaseoftheso—called’chattels’thathavefeminineormasculinedesignations。Foronlythosenameswhichendinoandn，havethedesignationpropertoachattel，e。g。xulon（’log’），schoinion（’rope’）；thosewhichdonotendsohavethatofamasculineorfeminineobject，thoughsomeofthemweapplytochattels：e。g。askos（’wineskin’）isamasculinenoun，andkline（’bed’）afeminine。Forthisreasonincasesofthiskindaswelltherewillbeadifferenceofthesamesortbetweenaconstructionwith’is’（esti）orwith’being’（toeinai）。Also，Solecismresemblesinacertainwaythoserefutationswhicharesaidtodependonthelikeexpressionofunlikethings。For，justastherewecomeuponamaterialsolecism，soherewecomeuponaverbal：
　　for’man’isbotha’matter’forexpressionandalsoa’word’：andsoiswhite’。
　　Itisclear，then，thatforsolecismswemusttrytoconstructourargumentoutoftheaforesaidinflections。
　　These，then，arethetypesofcontentiousarguments，andthesubdivisionsofthosetypes，andthemethodsforconductingthemaforesaid。Butitmakesnolittledifferenceifthematerialsforputtingthequestionbearrangedinacertainmannerwithaviewtoconcealment，asinthecaseofdialectics。Followingthenuponwhatwehavesaid，thismustbediscussedfirst。
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　　Withaviewthentorefutation，oneresourceislength—foritisdifficulttokeepseveralthingsinviewatonce；andtosecurelengththeelementaryrulesthathavebeenstatedbefore’shouldbeemployed。
　　Oneresource，ontheotherhand，isspeed；forwhenpeopleareleftbehindtheylookaheadless。Moreover，thereisangerandcontentiousness，forwhenagitatedeverybodyislessabletotakecareofhimself。Elementaryrulesforproducingangeraretomakeashowofthewishtoplayfoul，andtobealtogethershameless。Moreover，thereistheputtingofone’squestionsalternately，whetheronehasmorethanoneargumentleadingtothesameconclusion，orwhetheronehasargumentstoshowboththatsomethingisso，andthatitisnotso：
　　fortheresultisthathehastobeonhisguardatthesametimeeitheragainstmorethanoneline，oragainstcontrarylines，ofargument。Ingeneral，allthemethodsdescribedbeforeofproducingconcealmentareusefulalsoforpurposesofcontentiousargument：
　　fortheobjectofconcealmentistoavoiddetection，andtheobjectofthisistodeceive。
　　Tocounterthosewhorefusetograntwhatevertheysupposetohelpone’sargument，oneshouldputthequestionnegatively，asthoughdesirousoftheoppositeanswer，oratanyrateasthoughoneputthequestionwithoutprejudice；forwhenitisobscurewhatansweronewantstosecure，peoplearelessrefractory。Alsowhen，indealingwithparticulars，amangrantstheindividualcase，whentheinductionisdoneyoushouldoftennotputtheuniversalasaquestion，buttakeitforgrantedanduseit：forsometimespeoplethemselvessupposethattheyhavegrantedit，andalsoappeartotheaudiencetohavedoneso，fortheyremembertheinductionandassumethatthequestionscouldnothavebeenputfornothing。Incaseswherethereisnotermtoindicatetheuniversal，stillyoushouldavailyourselfoftheresemblanceoftheparticularstosuityourpurpose；forresemblanceoftenescapesdetection。Also，withaviewtoobtainingyourpremiss，yououghttoputitinyourquestionsidebysidewithitscontrary。E。g。ifitwerenecessarytosecuretheadmissionthat’A
　　manshouldobeyhisfatherineverything’，ask’Shouldamanobeyhisparentsineverything，ordisobeythemineverything？’；andtosecurethat’Anumbermultipliedbyalargenumberisalargenumber’，ask’Shouldoneagreethatitisalargenumberorasmallone？’Forthen，ifcompelledtochoose，onewillbemoreinclinedtothinkitalargeone：fortheplacingoftheircontrariesclosebesidethemmakesthingslookbigtomen，bothrelativelyandabsolutely，andworseandbetter。
　　Astrongappearanceofhavingbeenrefutedisoftenproducedbythemosthighlysophisticalofalltheunfairtricksofquestioners，whenwithoutprovinganything，insteadofputtingtheirfinalpropositionasaquestion，theystateitasaconclusion，asthoughtheyhadprovedthat’Thereforeso—and—soisnottrue’
　　Itisalsoasophisticaltrick，whenaparadoxhasbeenlaiddown，firsttoproposeatthestartsomeviewthatisgenerallyaccepted，andthenclaimthattheanswerershallanswerwhathethinksaboutit，andtoputone’squestiononmattersofthatkindintheform’Doyouthinkthat……？’Forthen，ifthequestionbetakenasoneofthepremissesofone’sargument，eitherarefutationoraparadoxisboundtoresult；ifhegrantstheview，arefutation；ifherefusestograntitoreventoadmititasthereceivedopinion，aparadox；ifherefusestograntit，butadmitsthatitisthereceivedopinion，somethingverylikearefutation，results。
　　Moreover，justasinrhetoricaldiscourses，soalsointhoseaimedatrefutation，youshouldexaminethediscrepanciesoftheanswerer’spositioneitherwithhisownstatements，orwiththoseofpersonswhomheadmitstosayanddoaright，moreoverwiththoseofpeoplewhoaregenerallysupposedtobearthatkindofcharacter，orwhoarelikethem，orwiththoseofthemajorityorofallmen。Alsojustasanswerers，too，often，whentheyareinprocessofbeingconfuted，drawadistinction，iftheirconfutationisjustabouttotakeplace，soquestionersalsoshouldresorttothisfromtimetotimetocounterobjectors，pointingout，supposingthatagainstonesenseofthewordstheobjectionholds，butnotagainsttheother，thattheyhavetakenitinthelattersense，ase。g。CleophondoesintheMandrobulus。Theyshouldalsobreakofftheirargumentandcutdowntheirotherlinesofattack，whileinanswering，ifamanperceivesthisbeingdonebeforehand，heshouldputinhisobjectionandhavehissayfirst。Oneshouldalsoleadattackssometimesagainstpositionsotherthantheonestated，ontheunderstoodconditionthatonecannotfindlinesofattackagainsttheviewlaiddown，asLycophrondidwhenorderedtodeliveraeulogyuponthelyre。Tocounterthosewhodemand’Againstwhatareyoudirectingyoureffort？’，sinceoneisgenerallythoughtboundtostatethechargemade，while，ontheotherhand，somewaysofstatingitmakethedefencetooeasy，youshouldstateasyouraimonlythegeneralresultthatalwayshappensinrefutations，namelythecontradictionofhisthesis—viz。thatyoureffortistodenywhathehasaffirmed，ortoaffirmwhathedenied：don’tsaythatyouaretryingtoshowthattheknowledgeofcontrariesis，orisnot，thesame。Onemustnotaskone’sconclusionintheformofapremiss，whilesomeconclusionsshouldnotevenbeputasquestionsatall；oneshouldtakeanduseitasgranted。
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　　Wehavenowthereforedealtwiththesourcesofquestions，andthemethodsofquestioningincontentiousdisputations：nextwehavetospeakofanswering，andofhowsolutionsshouldbemade，andofwhatrequiresthem，andofwhatuseisservedbyargumentsofthiskind。
　　Theuseofthem，then，is，forphilosophy，twofold。Forinthefirstplace，sinceforthemostparttheydependupontheexpression，theyputusinabetterconditionforseeinginhowmanysensesanytermisused，andwhatkindofresemblancesandwhatkindofdifferencesoccurbetweenthingsandbetweentheirnames。Inthesecondplacetheyareusefulforone’sownpersonalresearches；forthemanwhoiseasilycommittedtoafallacybysomeoneelse，anddoesnotperceiveit，islikelytoincurthisfateofhimselfalsoonmanyoccasions。
　　Thirdlyandlastly，theyfurthercontributetoone’sreputation，viz。thereputationofbeingwelltrainedineverything，andnotinexperiencedinanything：forthatapartytoargumentsshouldfindfaultwiththem，ifhecannotdefinitelypointouttheirweakness，createsasuspicion，makingitseemasthoughitwerenotthetruthofthematterbutmerelyinexperiencethatputhimoutoftemper。
　　Answerersmayclearlyseehowtomeetargumentsofthiskind，ifourpreviousaccountwasrightofthesourceswhencefallaciescame，andalsoourdistinctionsadequateoftheformsofdishonestyinputtingquestions。Butitisnotthesamethingtakeanargumentinone’shandandthentoseeandsolveitsfaults，asitistobeabletomeetitquicklywhilebeingsubjectedtoquestions：forwhatweknow，weoftendonotknowinadifferentcontext。Moreover，justasinotherthingsspeedisenhancedbytraining，soitiswithargumentstoo，sothatsupposingweareunpractised，eventhoughapointbecleartous，weareoftentoolatefortherightmoment。Sometimestooithappensaswithdiagrams；fortherewecansometimesanalysethefigure，butnotconstructitagain：sotooinrefutations，thoughweknowthethingonwhichtheconnexionoftheargumentdepends，westillareatalosstosplittheargumentapart。
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　　Firstthen，justaswesaythatweoughtsometimestochoosetoprovesomethinginthegeneralestimationratherthanintruth，soalsowehavesometimestosolveargumentsratherinthegeneralestimationthanaccordingtothetruth。Foritisageneralruleinfightingcontentiouspersons，totreatthemnotasrefuting，butasmerelyappearingtorefute：forwesaythattheydon’treallyprovetheircase，sothatourobjectincorrectingthemmustbetodispeltheappearanceofit。Forifrefutationbeanunambiguouscontradictionarrivedatfromcertainviews，therecouldbenoneedtodrawdistinctionsagainstamphibolyandambiguity：theydonoteffectaproof。Theonlymotivefordrawingfurtherdistinctionsisthattheconclusionreachedlookslikearefutation。What，then，wehavetobewareof，isnotbeingrefuted，butseemingtobe，becauseofcoursetheaskingofamphiboliesandofquestionsthatturnuponambiguity，andalltheothertricksofthatkind，concealevenagenuinerefutation，andmakeituncertainwhoisrefutedandwhoisnot。Forsinceonehastherightattheend，whentheconclusionisdrawn，tosaythattheonlydenialmadeofOne’sstatementisambiguous，nomatterhowpreciselyhemayhaveaddressedhisargumenttotheverysamepointasoneself，itisnotclearwhetheronehasbeenrefuted：foritisnotclearwhetheratthemomentoneisspeakingthetruth。If，ontheotherhand，onehaddrawnadistinction，andquestionedhimontheambiguoustermortheamphiboly，therefutationwouldnothavebeenamatterofuncertainty。
　　Alsowhatisincidentallytheobjectofcontentiousarguers，thoughlesssonowadaysthanformerly，wouldhavebeenfulfilled，namelythatthepersonquestionedshouldanswereither’Yes’or’No’：whereasnowadaystheimproperformsinwhichquestionersputtheirquestionscompelthepartyquestionedtoaddsomethingtohisanswerincorrectionofthefaultinessofthepropositionasput：forcertainly，ifthequestionerdistinguisheshismeaningadequately，theanswererisboundtoreplyeither’Yes’or’No’。
　　Ifanyoneisgoingtosupposethatanargumentwhichturnsuponambiguityisarefutation，itwillbeimpossibleforananswerertoescapebeingrefutedinasense：forinthecaseofvisibleobjectsoneisboundofnecessitytodenythetermonehasasserted，andtoassertwhatonehasdenied。Fortheremedywhichsomepeoplehaveforthisisquiteunavailing。Theysay，notthatCoriscusisbothmusicalandunmusical，butthatthisCoriscusismusicalandthisCoriscusunmusical。Butthiswillnotdo，fortosay’thisCoriscusisunmusical’，or’musical’，andtosay’thisCoriscus’isso，istousethesameexpression：andthisheisbothaffirminganddenyingatonce。’Butperhapstheydonotmeanthesame。’Well，nordidthesimplenameintheformercase：sowhereisthedifference？If，however，heistoascribetotheonepersonthesimpletitle’Coriscus’，whiletotheotherheistoaddtheprefix’one’or’this’，hecommitsanabsurdity：forthelatterisnomoreapplicabletotheonethantotheother：fortowhicheverheaddsit，itmakesnodifference。
　　Allthesame，sinceifamandoesnotdistinguishthesensesofanamphiboly，itisnotclearwhetherhehasbeenconfutedorhasnotbeenconfuted，andsinceinargumentstherighttodistinguishthemisgranted，itisevidentthattograntthequestionsimplywithoutdrawinganydistinctionisamistake，sothat，evenifnotthemanhimself，atanyratehisargumentlooksasthoughithadbeenrefuted。
　　Itoftenhappens，however，that，thoughtheyseetheamphiboly，peoplehesitatetodrawsuchdistinctions，becauseofthedensecrowdofpersonswhoproposequestionsofthekind，inorderthattheymaynotbethoughttobeobstructionistsateveryturn：then，thoughtheywouldneverhavesupposedthatthatwasthepointonwhichtheargumentturned，theyoftenfindthemselvesfacedbyaparadox。
　　Accordingly，sincetherightofdrawingthedistinctionisgranted，oneshouldnothesitate，ashasbeensaidbefore。
　　Ifpeoplenevermadetwoquestionsintoonequestion，thefallacythatturnsuponambiguityandamphibolywouldnothaveexistedeither，buteithergenuinerefutationornone。Forwhatisthedifferencebetweenasking’AreCalliasandThemistoclesmusical？’andwhatonemighthaveaskedifthey，beingdifferent，hadhadonename？Forifthetermappliedmeansmorethanonething，hehasaskedmorethanonequestion。Ifthenitbenotrighttodemandsimplytobegivenasingleanswertotwoquestions，itisevidentthatitisnotpropertogiveasimpleanswertoanyambiguousquestion，notevenifthepredicatebetrueofallthesubjects，assomeclaimthatoneshould。Forthisisexactlyasthoughhehadasked’AreCoriscusandCalliasathomeornotathome？’，supposingthemtobebothinorbothout：forinbothcasesthereisanumberofpropositions：forthoughthesimpleanswerbetrue，thatdoesnotmakethequestionone。Foritispossibleforittobetruetoanswerevencountlessdifferentquestionswhenputtoone，alltogetherwitheithera’Yes’ora’No’：
　　butstilloneshouldnotanswerthemwithasingleanswer：forthatisthedeathofdiscussion。Rather，thecaseislikeasthoughdifferentthingshasactuallyhadthesamenameappliedtothem。Ifthen，oneshouldnotgiveasingleanswertotwoquestions，itisevidentthatweshouldnotsaysimply’Yes’or’No’inthecaseofambiguoustermseither：fortheremarkissimplyaremark，notanansweratall，althoughamongdisputantssuchremarksarelooselydeemedtobeanswers，becausetheydonotseewhattheconsequenceis。
　　Aswesaid，then，inasmuchascertainrefutationsaregenerallytakenforsuch，thoughnotsuchreally，inthesamewayalsocertainsolutionswillbegenerallytakenforsolutions，thoughnotreallysuch。Nowthese，wesay，mustsometimesbeadvancedratherthanthetruesolutionsincontentiousreasoningsandintheencounterwithambiguity。Theproperanswerinsayingwhatonethinksistosay’Granted’；forinthatwaythelikelihoodofbeingrefutedonasideissueisminimized。If，ontheotherhand，oneiscompelledtosaysomethingparadoxical，oneshouldthenbemostcarefultoaddthat’itseems’so：forinthatwayoneavoidstheimpressionofbeingeitherrefutedorparadoxical。Sinceitisclearwhatismeantby’beggingtheoriginalquestion’，andpeoplethinkthattheymustatallcostsoverthrowthepremissesthatlieneartheconclusion，andpleadinexcuseforrefusingtogranthimsomeofthemthatheisbeggingtheoriginalquestion，sowheneveranyoneclaimsfromusapointsuchasisboundtofollowasaconsequencefromourthesis，butisfalseorparadoxical，wemustpleadthesame：forthenecessaryconsequencesaregenerallyheldtobeapartofthethesisitself。Moreover，whenevertheuniversalhasbeensecurednotunderadefinitename，butbyacomparisonofinstances，oneshouldsaythatthequestionerassumesitnotinthesenseinwhichitwasgrantednorinwhichheproposeditinthepremiss：forthistooisapointuponwhicharefutationoftendepends。
　　Ifoneisdebarredfromthesedefencesonemustpasstotheargumentthattheconclusionhasnotbeenproperlyshown，approachingitinthelightoftheaforesaiddistinctionbetweenthedifferentkindsoffallacy。
　　Inthecase，then，ofnamesthatareusedliterallyoneisboundtoanswereithersimplyorbydrawingadistinction：thetacitunderstandingsimpliedinourstatements，e。g。inanswertoquestionsthatarenotputclearlybutelliptically—itisuponthisthattheconsequentrefutationdepends。Forexample，’IswhatbelongstoAtheniansthepropertyofAthenians？’Yes。’Andsoitislikewiseinothercases。Butobserve；manbelongstotheanimalkingdom，doesn’the？’Yes。’Thenmanisthepropertyoftheanimalkingdom。’Butthisisafallacy：forwesaythatman’belongsto’
　　theanimalkingdombecauseheisananimal，justaswesaythatLysander’belongsto’theSpartans，becauseheisaSpartan。Itisevident，then，thatwherethepremissputforwardisnotclear，onemustnotgrantitsimply。
　　Wheneveroftwothingsitisgenerallythoughtthatiftheoneistruetheotheristrueofnecessity，whereas，iftheotheristrue，thefirstisnottrueofnecessity，oneshould，ifaskedwhichofthemistrue，grantthesmallerone：forthelargerthenumberofpremisses，theharderitistodrawaconclusionfromthem。If，again，thesophisttriestosecurethathasacontrarywhileBhasnot，supposewhathesaysistrue，youshouldsaythateachhasacontrary，onlyfortheonethereisnoestablishedname。
　　Since，again，inregardtosomeoftheviewstheyexpress，mostpeoplewouldsaythatanyonewhodidnotadmitthemwastellingafalsehood，whiletheywouldnotsaythisinregardtosome，e。g。toanymatterswhereonopinionisdivided（formostpeoplehavenodistinctviewwhetherthesoulofanimalsisdestructibleorimmortal），accordingly（1）itisuncertaininwhichoftwosensesthepremissproposedisusuallymeant—whetherasmaximsare（forpeoplecallbythenameof’maxims’bothtrueopinionsandgeneralassertions）orlikethedoctrine’thediagonalofasquareisincommensuratewithitsside’：andmoreover（2）wheneveropinionsaredividedastothetruth，wethenhavesubjectsofwhichitisveryeasytochangetheterminologyundetected。Forbecauseoftheuncertaintyinwhichofthetwosensesthepremisscontainsthetruth，onewillnotbethoughttobeplayinganytrick，whilebecauseofthedivisionofopinion，onewillnotbethoughttobetellingafalsehood。Changetheterminologytherefore，forthechangewillmakethepositionirrefutable。
　　Moreover，wheneveroneforeseesanyquestioncoming，oneshouldputinone’sobjectionandhaveone’ssaybeforehand：forbydoingsooneislikelytoembarrassthequestionermosteffectually。
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　　Inasmuchasapropersolutionisanexposureoffalsereasoning，showingonwhatkindofquestionthefalsitydepends，andwhereas’falsereasoning’hasadoublemeaning—foritisusedeitherifafalseconclusionhasbeenproved，orifthereisonlyanapparentproofandnorealone—theremustbeboththekindofsolutionjustdescribed，’andalsothecorrectionofamerelyapparentproof，soastoshowuponwhichofthequestionstheappearancedepends。Thusitcomesaboutthatonesolvesargumentsthatareproperlyreasonedbydemolishingthem，whereasonesolvesmerelyapparentargumentsbydrawingdistinctions。Again，inasmuchasofargumentsthatareproperlyreasonedsomehaveatrueandothersafalseconclusion，thosethatarefalseinrespectoftheirconclusionitispossibletosolveintwoways；foritispossiblebothbydemolishingoneofthepremissesasked，andbyshowingthattheconclusionisnottherealstateofthecase：those，ontheotherhand，thatarefalseinrespectofthepremissescanbesolvedonlybyademolitionofoneofthem；fortheconclusionistrue。Sothatthosewhowishtosolveanargumentshouldinthefirstplacelookandseeifitisproperlyreasoned，orisunreasoned；andnext，whethertheconclusionbetrueorfalse，inorderthatwemayeffectthesolutioneitherbydrawingsomedistinctionorbydemolishingsomething，anddemolishingiteitherinthiswayorinthat，aswaslaiddownbefore。Thereisaverygreatdealofdifferencebetweensolvinganargumentwhenbeingsubjectedtoquestionsandwhennot：fortoforeseetrapsisdifficult，whereastoseethematone’sleisureiseasier。
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　　Oftherefutations，then，thatdependuponambiguityandamphibolysomecontainsomequestionwithmorethanonemeaning，whileotherscontainaconclusionbearinganumberofsenses：e。g。intheproofthat’speakingofthesilent’ispossible，theconclusionhasadoublemeaning，whileintheproofthat’hewhoknowsdoesnotunderstandwhatheknows’oneofthequestionscontainsanamphiboly。Alsothedouble—edgedsayingistrueinonecontextbutnotinanother：itmeanssomethingthatisandsomethingthatisnot。
　　Whenever，then，themanysenseslieintheconclusionnorefutationtakesplaceunlessthesophistsecuresaswellthecontradictionoftheconclusionhemeanstoprove；e。g。intheproofthat’seeingoftheblind’ispossible：forwithoutthecontradictiontherewasnorefutation。Whenever，ontheotherhand，themanysenseslieinthequestions，thereisnonecessitytobeginbydenyingthedouble—edgedpremiss：forthiswasnotthegoaloftheargumentbutonlyitssupport。Atthestart，then，oneshouldreplywithregardtoanambiguity，whetherofatermorofaphrase，inthismanner，that’inonesenseitisso，andinanothernotso’，ase。g。that’speakingofthesilent’isinonesensepossiblebutinanothernotpossible：alsothatinonesense’oneshoulddowhatmustneedsbedone’，butnotinanother：for’whatmustneedsbe’
　　bearsanumberofsenses。If，however，theambiguityescapesone，oneshouldcorrectitattheendbymakinganadditiontothequestion：’Isspeakingofthesilentpossible？’’No，buttospeakofwhileheissilentispossible。’Also，incaseswhichcontaintheambiguityintheirpremisses，oneshouldreplyinlikemanner：’Dopeople—thennotunderstandwhattheyknow？"Yes，butnotthosewhoknowitinthemannerdescribed’：foritisnotthesamethingtosaythat’thosewhoknowcannotunderstandwhattheyknow’，andtosaythat’thosewhoknowsomethinginthisparticularmannercannotdoso’。Ingeneral，too，eventhoughhedrawshisconclusioninaquiteunambiguousmanner，oneshouldcontendthatwhathehasnegatedisnotthefactwhichonehasassertedbutonlyitsname；andthatthereforethereisnorefutation。
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　　Itisevidentalsohowoneshouldsolvethoserefutationsthatdependuponthedivisionandcombinationofwords：foriftheexpressionmeanssomethingdifferentwhendividedandwhencombined，assoonasone’sopponentdrawshisconclusiononeshouldtaketheexpressioninthecontraryway。Allsuchexpressionsasthefollowingdependuponthecombinationordivisionofthewords：’WasX
　　beingbeatenwiththatwithwhichyousawhimbeingbeaten？’and’Didyouseehimbeingbeatenwiththatwithwhichhewasbeingbeaten？’Thisfallacyhasalsoinitanelementofamphibolyinthequestions，butitreallydependsuponcombination。Forthemeaningthatdependsuponthedivisionofthewordsisnotreallyadoublemeaning（fortheexpressionwhendividedisnotthesame），unlessalsothewordthatispronounced，accordingtoitsbreathing，aserosanderosisacaseofdoublemeaning。（Inwriting，indeed，awordisthesamewheneveritiswrittenofthesamelettersandinthesamemanner—andeventherepeoplenowadaysputmarksatthesidetoshowthepronunciation—butthespokenwordsarenotthesame。）
　　Accordinglyanexpressionthatdependsupondivisionisnotanambiguousone。Itisevidentalsothatnotallrefutationsdependuponambiguityassomepeoplesaytheydo。
　　Theanswerer，then，mustdividetheexpression：for’I—saw—a—man—being—beatenwithmyeyes’isnotthesameastosay’I
　　sawamanbeing—beaten—with—my—eyes’。AlsothereistheargumentofEuthydemusproving’ThenyouknownowinSicilythattherearetriremesinPiraeus’：andagain，’Canagoodmanwhoisacobblerbebad？’’No。’’Butagoodmanmaybeabadcobbler：thereforeagoodcobblerwillbebad。’Again，’Thingstheknowledgeofwhichisgood，aregoodthingstolearn，aren’tthey？’’Yes。’’Theknowledge，however，ofevilisgood：thereforeevilisagoodthingtoknow。’
　　’Yes。But，yousee，evilisbothevilandathing—to—learn，sothatevilisanevil—thing—to—learn，althoughtheknowledgeofevilsisgood。’Again，’Isittruetosayinthepresentmomentthatyouareborn？’’Yes。’’Thenyouareborninthepresentmoment。’’No；theexpressionasdividedhasadifferentmeaning：foritistruetosay—in—the—present—momentthat"youareborn"，butnot"Youareborn—in—the—present—moment"。’Again，’Couldyoudowhatyoucan，andasyoucan？’’Yes。’’Butwhennotharping，youhavethepowertoharp：
　　andthereforeyoucouldharpwhennotharping。’’No：hehasnotthepowertoharp—while—not—harping；merely，whenheisnotdoingit，hehasthepowertodoit。’Somepeoplesolvethislastrefutationinanotherwayaswell。For，theysay，ifhehasgrantedthathecandoanythinginthewayhecan，stillitdoesnotfollowthathecanharpwhennotharping：forithasnotbeengrantedthathewilldoanythingineverywayinwhichhecan；anditisnotthesamething’
　　todoathinginthewayhecan’and’todoitineverywayinwhichhecan’。Butevidentlytheydonotsolveitproperly：forofargumentsthatdependuponthesamepointthesolutionisthesame，whereasthiswillnotfitallcasesofthekindnoryetallwaysofputtingthequestions：itisvalidagainstthequestioner，butnotagainsthisargument。
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　　Accentuationgivesrisetonofallaciousarguments，eitheraswrittenorasspoken，exceptperhapssomefewthatmightbemadeup；
　　e。g。thefollowingargument。’Isoukatalueisahouse？’’Yes。’’Isthenoukatalueisthenegationofkatalueis？’’Yes。’’Butyousaidthatoukatalueisisahouse：thereforethehouseisanegation。’Howoneshouldsolvethis，isclear：fortheworddoesnotmeanthesamewhenspokenwithanacuterandwhenspokenwithagraveraccent。
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　　Itisclearalsohowonemustmeetthosefallaciesthatdependontheidenticalexpressionsofthingsthatarenotidentical，seeingthatweareinpossessionofthekindsofpredications。Fortheoneman，say，hasgranted，whenasked，thatatermdenotingasubstancedoesnotbelongasanattribute，whiletheotherhasshownthatsomeattributebelongswhichisintheCategoryofRelationorofQuantity，butisusuallythoughttodenoteasubstancebecauseofitsexpression；e。g。inthefollowingargument：’Isitpossibletobedoingandtohavedonethesamethingatthesametime？’’No。’’But，yousee，itissurelypossibletobeseeingandtohaveseenthesamethingatthesametime，andinthesameaspect。’Again，’Isanymodeofpassivityamodeofactivity？’’No。’’Then"heiscut"，"heisburnt"，"heisstruckbysomesensibleobject"arealikeinexpressionandalldenotesomeformofpassivity，whileagain"tosay"，"torun"，"tosee"arelikeonelikeoneanotherinexpression：but，yousee，"tosee"issurelyaformofbeingstruckbyasensibleobject；
　　thereforeitisatthesametimeaformofpassivityandofactivity。’
　　Suppose，however，thatinthatcaseanyone，aftergrantingthatitisnotpossibletodoandtohavedonethesamethinginthesametime，weretosaythatitispossibletoseeandtohaveseenit，stillhehasnotyetbeenrefuted，supposehimtosaythat’tosee’isnotaformof’doing’（activity）butof’passivity’：forthisquestionisrequiredaswell，thoughheissupposedbythelistenertohavealreadygrantedit，whenhegrantedthat’tocut’isaformofpresent，and’tohavecut’aformofpast，activity，andsoonwiththeotherthingsthathavealikeexpression。Forthelisteneraddstherestbyhimself，thinkingthemeaningtobealike：whereasreallythemeaningisnotalike，thoughitappearstobesobecauseoftheexpression。Thesamethinghappenshereashappensincasesofambiguity：forindealingwithambiguousexpressionsthetyroinargumentsupposesthesophisttohavenegatedthefactwhichhe（thetyro）affirmed，andnotmerelythename：whereastherestillwantsthequestionwhetherinusingtheambiguoustermhehadasinglemeaninginview：forifhegrantsthatthatwasso，therefutationwillbeeffected。
　　Liketheabovearealsothefollowingarguments。Itisaskedifamanhaslostwhatheoncehadandafterwardshasnot：foramanwillnolongerhavetendiceeventhoughhehasonlylostonedie。No：
　　ratheritisthathehaslostwhathehadbeforeandhasnotnow；
　　butthereisnonecessityforhimtohavelostasmuchorasmanythingsashehasnotnow。Sothen，heasksthequestionsastowhathehas，anddrawstheconclusionastothewholenumberthathehas：
　　fortenisanumber。Ifthenhehadaskedtobeginwith，whetheramannolongerhavingthenumberofthingsheoncehadhaslostthewholenumber，noonewouldhavegrantedit，butwouldhavesaid’Eitherthewholenumberoroneofthem’。Alsothereistheargumentthat’amanmaygivewhathehasnotgot’：forhehasnotgotonlyonedie。
　　No：ratheritisthathehasgivennotwhathehadnotgot，butinamannerinwhichhehadnotgotit，viz。justtheone。Fortheword’only’doesnotsignifyaparticularsubstanceorqualityornumber，butamannerrelation，e。g。thatitisnotcoupledwithanyother。
　　Itisthereforejustasifhehadasked’Couldamangivewhathehasnotgot？’and，onbeinggiventheanswer’No’，weretoaskifamancouldgiveathingquicklywhenhehadnotgotitquickly，and，onthisbeinggranted，weretoconcludethat’amancouldgivewhathehadnotgot’。Itisquiteevidentthathehasnotprovedhispoint：
　　forto’givequickly’isnottogiveathing，buttogiveinacertainmanner；andamancouldcertainlygiveathinginamannerinwhichhehasnotgotit，e。g。hemighthavegotitwithpleasureandgiveitwithpain。
　　Likethesearealsoallargumentsofthefollowingkind：’Couldamanstrikeablowwithahandwhichhehasnotgot，orseewithaneyewhichhehasnotgot？’Forhehasnotgotonlyoneeye。Somepeoplesolvethiscase，whereamanhasmorethanoneeye，ormorethanoneofanythingelse，bysayingalsothathehasonlyone。Othersalsosolveitastheysolvetherefutationoftheviewthat’whatamanhas，hehasreceived’：forAgaveonlyonevote；andcertainlyB，theysay，hasonlyonevotefromA。Others，again，proceedbydemolishingstraightawaythepropositionasked，andadmittingthatitisquitepossibletohavewhatonehasnotreceived；e。g。tohavereceivedsweetwine，butthen，owingtoitsgoingbadinthecourseofreceipt，tohaveitsour。But，aswassaidalsoabove，’allthesepersonsdirecttheirsolutionsagainsttheman，notagainsthisargument。
　　Forifthiswereagenuinesolution，then，supposeanyonetogranttheopposite，hecouldfindnosolution，justashappensinothercases；e。g。supposethetruesolutiontobe’So—and—soispartlytrueandpartlynot’，then，iftheanswerergrantstheexpressionwithoutanyqualification，thesophist’sconclusionfollows。If，ontheotherhand，theconclusiondoesnotfollow，thenthatcouldnotbethetruesolution：andwhatwesayinregardtotheforegoingexamplesisthat，evenifallthesophist’spremissesbegranted，stillnoproofiseffected。
　　Moreover，thefollowingtoobelongtothisgroupofarguments。’Ifsomethingbeinwritingdidsomeonewriteit？’’Yes。’’Butitisnowinwritingthatyouareseated—afalsestatement，thoughitwastrueatthetimewhenitwaswritten：thereforethestatementthatwaswrittenisatthesametimefalseandtrue。’Butthisisfallacious，forthefalsityortruthofastatementoropinionindicatesnotasubstancebutaquality：forthesameaccountappliestothecaseofanopinionaswell。Again，’Iswhatalearnerlearnswhathelearns？’’Yes。’’Butsupposesomeonelearns"slow"quick’。Thenhis（thesophist’s）wordsdenotenotwhatthelearnerlearnsbuthowhelearnsit。Also，’Doesamantreaduponwhathewalksthrough？
　　’Yes。’’ButXwalksthroughawholeday。’No，ratherthewordsdenotenotwhathewalksthrough，butwhenhewalks；justaswhenanyoneusesthewords’todrinkthecup’hedenotesnotwhathedrinks，butthevesseloutofwhichhedrinks。Also，’Isiteitherbylearningorbydiscoverythatamanknowswhatheknows？’’Yes。’
　　’Butsupposethatofapairofthingshehasdiscoveredoneandlearnedtheother，thepairisnotknowntohimbyeithermethod。’No：
　　’what’heknows，means’everysinglething’heknows，individually；
　　butthisdoesnotmean’allthethings’heknows，collectively。Again，thereistheproofthatthereisa’thirdman’distinctfromManandfromindividualmen。Butthatisafallacy，for’Man’，andindeedeverygeneralpredicate，denotesnotanindividualsubstance，butaparticularquality，orthebeingrelatedtosomethinginaparticularmanner，orsomethingofthatsort。Likewisealsointhecaseof’Coriscus’and’Coriscusthemusician’thereistheproblem，Aretheythesameordifferent？’Fortheonedenotesanindividualsubstanceandtheotheraquality，sothatitcannotbeisolated；
　　thoughitisnottheisolationwhichcreatesthe’thirdman’，buttheadmissionthatitisanindividualsubstance。For’Man’cannotbeanindividualsubstance，asCalliasis。Noristhecaseimprovedonewhitevenifoneweretocalltheclementhehasisolatednotanindividualsubstancebutaquality：fortherewillstillbetheonebesidethemany，justas’Man’was。Itisevidentthenthatonemustnotgrantthatwhatisacommonpredicateapplyingtoaclassuniversallyisanindividualsubstance，butmustsaythatdenoteseitheraquality，orarelation，oraquantity，orsomethingofthatkind。