BookI
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　　LETusnowdiscusssophisticrefutations，i。e。whatappeartoberefutationsbutarereallyfallaciesinstead。Wewillbegininthenaturalorderwiththefirst。
　　Thatsomereasoningsaregenuine，whileothersseemtobesobutarenot，isevident。Thishappenswitharguments，asalsoelsewhere，throughacertainlikenessbetweenthegenuineandthesham。Forphysicallysomepeopleareinavigorouscondition，whileothersmerelyseemtobesobyblowingandriggingthemselvesoutasthetribesmendotheirvictimsforsacrifice；andsomepeoplearebeautifulthankstotheirbeauty，whileothersseemtobeso，bydintofembellishingthemselves。Soitis，too，withinanimatethings；
　　forofthese，too，somearereallysilverandothersgold，whileothersarenotandmerelyseemtobesuchtooursense；e。g。thingsmadeoflithargeandtinseemtobeofsilver，whilethosemadeofyellowmetallookgolden。Inthesamewaybothreasoningandrefutationaresometimesgenuine，sometimesnot，thoughinexperiencemaymakethemappearso：forinexperiencedpeopleobtainonly，asitwere，adistantviewofthesethings。Forreasoningrestsoncertainstatementssuchthattheyinvolvenecessarilytheassertionofsomethingotherthanwhathasbeenstated，throughwhathasbeenstated：refutationisreasoninginvolvingthecontradictoryofthegivenconclusion。Nowsomeofthemdonotreallyachievethis，thoughtheyseemtodosoforanumberofreasons；andofthesethemostprolificandusualdomainistheargumentthatturnsuponnamesonly。Itisimpossibleinadiscussiontobringintheactualthingsdiscussed：weusetheirnamesassymbolsinsteadofthem；andthereforewesupposethatwhatfollowsinthenames，followsinthethingsaswell，justaspeoplewhocalculatesupposeinregardtotheircounters。Butthetwocases（namesandthings）arenotalike。
　　Fornamesarefiniteandsoisthesum—totalofformulae，whilethingsareinfiniteinnumber。Inevitably，then，thesameformulae，andasinglename，haveanumberofmeanings。Accordinglyjustas，incounting，thosewhoarenotcleverinmanipulatingtheircountersaretakeninbytheexperts，inthesamewayinargumentstoothosewhoarenotwellacquaintedwiththeforceofnamesmisreasonbothintheirowndiscussionsandwhentheylistentoothers。Forthisreason，then，andforotherstobementionedlater，thereexistsbothreasoningandrefutationthatisapparentbutnotreal。Nowforsomepeopleitisbetterworthwhiletoseemtobewise，thantobewisewithoutseemingtobe（fortheartofthesophististhesemblanceofwisdomwithoutthereality，andthesophistisonewhomakesmoneyfromanapparentbutunrealwisdom）；forthem，then，itisclearlyessentialalsotoseemtoaccomplishthetaskofawisemanratherthantoaccomplishitwithoutseemingtodoso。Toreduceittoasinglepointofcontrastitisthebusinessofonewhoknowsathing，himselftoavoidfallaciesinthesubjectswhichheknowsandtobeabletoshowupthemanwhomakesthem；andoftheseaccomplishmentstheonedependsonthefacultytorenderananswer，andtheotheruponthesecuringofone。Those，then，whowouldbesophistsareboundtostudytheclassofargumentsaforesaid：foritisworththeirwhile：forafacultyofthiskindwillmakeamanseemtobewise，andthisisthepurposetheyhappentohaveinview。
　　Clearly，then，thereexistsaclassofargumentsofthiskind，anditisatthiskindofabilitythatthoseaimwhomwecallsophists。
　　Letusnowgoontodiscusshowmanykindsthereareofsophisticalarguments，andhowmanyinnumberaretheelementsofwhichthisfacultyiscomposed，andhowmanybranchestherehappentobeofthisinquiry，andtheotherfactorsthatcontributetothisart。
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　　Ofargumentsindialogueformtherearefourclasses：
　　Didactic，Dialectical，Examination—arguments，andContentiousarguments。Didacticargumentsarethosethatreasonfromtheprinciplesappropriatetoeachsubjectandnotfromtheopinionsheldbytheanswerer（forthelearnershouldtakethingsontrust）：
　　dialecticalargumentsarethosethatreasonfrompremissesgenerallyaccepted，tothecontradictoryofagiventhesis：
　　examination—argumentsarethosethatreasonfrompremisseswhichareacceptedbytheanswererandwhichanyonewhopretendstopossessknowledgeofthesubjectisboundtoknow—inwhatmanner，hasbeendefinedinanothertreatise：contentiousargumentsarethosethatreasonorappeartoreasontoaconclusionfrompremissesthatappeartobegenerallyacceptedbutarenotso。Thesubject，then，ofdemonstrativeargumentshasbeendiscussedintheAnalytics，whilethatofdialecticargumentsandexamination—argumentshasbeendiscussedelsewhere：letusnowproceedtospeakoftheargumentsusedincompetitionsandcontests。
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　　Firstwemustgraspthenumberofaimsentertainedbythosewhoargueascompetitorsandrivalstothedeath。Thesearefiveinnumber，refutation，fallacy，paradox，solecism，andfifthlytoreducetheopponentinthediscussiontobabbling—i。e。toconstrainhimtorepeathimselfanumberoftimes：oritistoproducetheappearanceofeachofthesethingswithoutthereality。Fortheychooseifpossibleplainlytorefutetheotherparty，orasthesecondbesttoshowthatheiscommittingsomefallacy，orasathirdbesttoleadhimintoparadox，orfourthlytoreducehimtosolecism，i。e。
　　tomaketheanswerer，inconsequenceoftheargument，touseanungrammaticalexpression；or，asalastresort，tomakehimrepeathimself。
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　　Therearetwostylesofrefutation：forsomedependonthelanguageused，whilesomeareindependentoflanguage。Thosewaysofproducingthefalseappearanceofanargumentwhichdependonlanguagearesixinnumber：theyareambiguity，amphiboly，combination，divisionofwords，accent，formofexpression。Ofthiswemayassureourselvesbothbyinduction，andbysyllogisticproofbasedonthis—anditmaybeonotherassumptionsaswell—thatthisisthenumberofwaysinwhichwemightfalltomeanthesamethingbythesamenamesorexpressions。Argumentssuchasthefollowingdependuponambiguity。’Thoselearnwhoknow：foritisthosewhoknowtheirletterswholearnthelettersdictatedtothem’。Forto’learn’isambiguous；itsignifiesboth’tounderstand’bytheuseofknowledge，andalso’toacquireknowledge’。Again，’Evilsaregood：
　　forwhatneedstobeisgood，andevilsmustneedsbe’。For’whatneedstobe’hasadoublemeaning：itmeanswhatisinevitable，asoftenisthecasewithevils，too（forevilofsomekindisinevitable），whileontheotherhandwesayofgoodthingsaswellthatthey’needtobe’。Moreover，’Thesamemanisbothseatedandstandingandheisbothsickandinhealth：foritishewhostoodupwhoisstanding，andhewhoisrecoveringwhoisinhealth：butitistheseatedmanwhostoodup，andthesickmanwhowasrecovering’。For’Thesickmandoessoandso’，or’hassoandsodonetohim’isnotsingleinmeaning：sometimesitmeans’themanwhoissickorisseatednow’，sometimes’themanwhowassickformerly’。
　　Ofcourse，themanwhowasrecoveringwasthesickman，whoreallywassickatthetime：butthemanwhoisinhealthisnotsickatthesametime：heis’thesickman’inthesensenotthatheissicknow，butthathewassickformerly。Examplessuchasthefollowingdependuponamphiboly：’Iwishthatyoutheenemymaycapture’。Alsothethesis，’Theremustbeknowledgeofwhatoneknows’：foritispossiblebythisphrasetomeanthatknowledgebelongstoboththeknowerandtheknown。Also，’Theremustbesightofwhatonesees：oneseesthepillar：ergothepillarhassight’。Also，’Whatyouprofessto—be，thatyouprofessto—be：youprofessastoneto—be：ergoyouprofess—to—beastone’。Also，’Speakingofthesilentispossible’：
　　for’speakingofthesilent’alsohasadoublemeaning：itmaymeanthatthespeakerissilentorthatthethingsofwhichhespeaksareso。Therearethreevarietiesoftheseambiguitiesandamphibolies：
　　（1）Wheneithertheexpressionorthenamehasstrictlymorethanonemeaning，e。g。aetosandthe’dog’；（2）whenbycustomweusethemso；（3）whenwordsthathaveasimplesensetakenalonehavemorethanonemeaningincombination；e。g。’knowingletters’。Foreachword，both’knowing’and’letters’，possiblyhasasinglemeaning：butbothtogetherhavemorethanone—eitherthatthelettersthemselveshaveknowledgeorthatsomeoneelsehasitofthem。
　　Amphibolyandambiguity，then，dependonthesemodesofspeech。Uponthecombinationofwordstheredependinstancessuchasthefollowing：
　　’Amancanwalkwhilesitting，andcanwritewhilenotwriting’。Forthemeaningisnotthesameifonedividesthewordsandifonecombinestheminsayingthat’itispossibletowalk—while—sitting’
　　andwritewhilenotwriting]。Thesameappliestothelatterphrase，too，ifonecombinesthewords’towrite—while—not—writing’：forthenitmeansthathehasthepowertowriteandnottowriteatonce；
　　whereasifonedoesnotcombinethem，itmeansthatwhenheisnotwritinghehasthepowertowrite。Also，’Henowifhehaslearnthisletters’。Moreover，thereisthesayingthat’Onesinglethingifyoucancarryacrowdyoucancarrytoo’。
　　Upondivisiondependthepropositionsthat5is2and3，andodd，andthatthegreaterisequal：foritisthatamountandmorebesides。
　　Forthesamephrasewouldnotbethoughtalwaystohavethesamemeaningwhendividedandwhencombined，e。g。’Imadetheeaslaveonceafreeman’，and’God—likeAchillesleftfiftyahundredmen’。
　　Anargumentdependinguponaccentitisnoteasytoconstructinunwrittendiscussion；inwrittendiscussionsandinpoetryitiseasier。Thus（e。g。）somepeopleemendHomeragainstthosewhocriticizeasunnaturalhisexpressiontomenoukataputhetaiombro。Fortheysolvethedifficultybyachangeofaccent，pronouncingtheouwithanacuteraccent。Also，inthepassageaboutAgamemnon’sdream，theysaythatZeusdidnothimselfsay’Wegranthimthefulfilmentofhisprayer’，butthathebadethedreamgrantit。Instancessuchasthese，then，turnupontheaccentuation。
　　Otherscomeaboutowingtotheformofexpressionused，whenwhatisreallydifferentisexpressedinthesameform，e。g。amasculinethingbyafemininetermination，orafemininethingbyamasculine，oraneuterbyeitheramasculineorafeminine；or，again，whenaqualityisexpressedbyaterminationpropertoquantityorviceversa，orwhatisactivebyapassiveword，orastatebyanactiveword，andsoforthwiththeotherdivisionspreviously’laiddown。Foritispossibletouseanexpressiontodenotewhatdoesnotbelongtotheclassofactionsatallasthoughitdidsobelong。Thus（e。g。）
　　’flourishing’isawordwhichintheformofitsexpressionislike’cutting’or’building’：yettheonedenotesacertainquality—i。e。
　　acertaincondition—whiletheotherdenotesacertainaction。Inthesamemanneralsointheotherinstances。
　　Refutations，then，thatdependuponlanguagearedrawnfromthesecommon—placerules。Offallacies，ontheotherhand，thatareindependentoflanguagetherearesevenkinds：
　　（1）thatwhichdependsuponAccident：
　　（2）theuseofanexpressionabsolutelyornotabsolutelybutwithsomequalificationofrespectorplace，ortime，orrelation：
　　（3）thatwhichdependsuponignoranceofwhat’refutation’is：
　　（4）thatwhichdependsupontheconsequent：
　　（5）thatwhichdependsuponassumingtheoriginalconclusion：
　　（6）statingascausewhatisnotthecause：
　　（7）themakingofmorethanonequestionintoone。
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　　Fallacies，then，thatdependonAccidentoccurwheneveranyattributeisclaimedtobelonginlikemannertoathingandtoitsaccident。Forsincethesamethinghasmanyaccidentsthereisnonecessitythatallthesameattributesshouldbelongtoallofathing’spredicatesandtotheirsubjectaswell。Thus（e。g。），’IfCoriscusbedifferentfrom"man"，heisdifferentfromhimself：forheisaman’：or’IfhebedifferentfromSocrates，andSocratesbeaman，then’，theysay，’hehasadmittedthatCoriscusisdifferentfromaman，becauseitsohappens（accidit）thatthepersonfromwhomhesaidthathe（Coriscus）isdifferentisaman’。
　　Thosethatdependonwhetheranexpressionisusedabsolutelyorinacertainrespectandnotstrictly，occurwheneveranexpressionusedinaparticularsenseistakenasthoughitwereusedabsolutely，e。g。intheargument’Ifwhatisnotistheobjectofanopinion，thenwhatisnotis’：foritisnotthesamething’tobex’and’tobe’
　　absolutely。Oragain，’Whatis，isnot，ifitisnotaparticularkindofbeing，e。g。ifitisnotaman。’Foritisnotthesamething’nottobex’and’nottobe’atall：itlooksasifitwere，becauseoftheclosenessoftheexpression，i。e。because’tobex’
　　isbutlittledifferentfrom’tobe’，and’nottobex’from’nottobe’。Likewisealsowithanyargumentthatturnsuponthepointwhetheranexpressionisusedinacertainrespectorusedabsolutely。Thuse。g。’SupposeanIndiantobeblackallover，butwhiteinrespectofhisteeth；thenheisbothwhiteandnotwhite。’Orifbothcharactersbelonginaparticularrespect，then，theysay，’contraryattributesbelongatthesametime’。Thiskindofthingisinsomecaseseasilyseenbyanyone，e。g。supposeamanweretosecurethestatementthattheEthiopianisblack，andwerethentoaskwhetherheiswhiteinrespectofhisteeth；andthen，ifhebewhiteinthatrespect，weretosupposeattheconclusionofhisquestionsthatthereforehehadproveddialecticallythathewasbothwhiteandnotwhite。Butinsomecasesitoftenpassesundetected，viz。inallcaseswhere，wheneverastatementismadeofsomethinginacertainrespect，itwouldbegenerallythoughtthattheabsolutestatementfollowsaswell；andalsoinallcaseswhereitisnoteasytoseewhichoftheattributesoughttoberenderedstrictly。Asituationofthiskindarises，whereboththeoppositeattributesbelongalike：forthenthereisgeneralsupportfortheviewthatonemustagreeabsolutelytotheassertionofboth，orofneither：e。g。ifathingishalfwhiteandhalfblack，isitwhiteorblack？
　　Otherfallaciesoccurbecausetheterms’proof’or’refutation’havenotbeendefined，andbecausesomethingisleftoutintheirdefinition。Fortorefuteistocontradictoneandthesameattribute—notmerelythename，butthereality—andanamethatisnotmerelysynonymousbutthesamename—andtoconfuteitfromthepropositionsgranted，necessarily，withoutincludinginthereckoningtheoriginalpointtobeproved，inthesamerespectandrelationandmannerandtimeinwhichitwasasserted。A’falseassertion’aboutanythinghastobedefinedinthesameway。Somepeople，however，omitsomeoneofthesaidconditionsandgiveamerelyapparentrefutation，showing（e。g。）thatthesamethingisbothdoubleandnotdouble：fortwoisdoubleofone，butnotdoubleofthree。Or，itmaybe，theyshowthatitisbothdoubleandnotdoubleofthesamething，butnotthatitissointhesamerespect：
　　foritisdoubleinlengthbutnotdoubleinbreadth。Or，itmaybe，theyshowittobebothdoubleandnotdoubleofthesamethingandinthesamerespectandmanner，butnotthatitissoatthesametime：
　　andthereforetheirrefutationismerelyapparent。Onemight，withsomeviolence，bringthisfallacyintothegroupoffallaciesdependentonlanguageaswell。
　　Thosethatdependontheassumptionoftheoriginalpointtobeproved，occurinthesameway，andinasmanyways，asitispossibletobegtheoriginalpoint；theyappeartorefutebecausemenlackthepowertokeeptheireyesatonceuponwhatisthesameandwhatisdifferent。
　　Therefutationwhichdependsupontheconsequentarisesbecausepeoplesupposethattherelationofconsequenceisconvertible。Forwhenever，supposeAis，Bnecessarilyis，theythensupposealsothatifBis，Anecessarilyis。Thisisalsothesourceofthedeceptionsthatattendopinionsbasedonsense—perception。Forpeopleoftensupposebiletobehoneybecausehoneyisattendedbyayellowcolour：also，sinceafterrainthegroundiswetinconsequence，wesupposethatifthegroundiswet，ithasbeenraining；whereasthatdoesnotnecessarilyfollow。Inrhetoricproofsfromsignsarebasedonconsequences。Forwhenrhetoricianswishtoshowthatamanisanadulterer，theytakeholdofsomeconsequenceofanadulterouslife，viz。thatthemanissmartlydressed，orthatheisobservedtowanderaboutatnight。Thereare，however，manypeopleofwhomthesethingsaretrue，whilethechargeinquestionisuntrue。Ithappenslikethisalsoinrealreasoning；
　　e。g。Melissus’argument，thattheuniverseiseternal，assumesthattheuniversehasnotcometobe（forfromwhatisnotnothingcouldpossiblycometobe）andthatwhathascometobehasdonesofromafirstbeginning。If，therefore，theuniversehasnotcometobe，ithasnofirstbeginning，andisthereforeeternal。Butthisdoesnotnecessarilyfollow：forevenifwhathascometobealwayshasafirstbeginning，itdoesnotalsofollowthatwhathasafirstbeginninghascometobe；anymorethanitfollowsthatifamaninafeverbehot，amanwhoishotmustbeinafever。
　　Therefutationwhichdependsupontreatingascausewhatisnotacause，occurswheneverwhatisnotacauseisinsertedintheargument，asthoughtherefutationdependeduponit。Thiskindofthinghappensinargumentsthatreasonadimpossible：forintheseweareboundtodemolishoneofthepremisses。If，then，thefalsecausebereckonedinamongthequestionsthatarenecessarytoestablishtheresultingimpossibility，itwilloftenbethoughtthattherefutationdependsuponit，e。g。intheproofthatthe’soul’
　　and’life’arenotthesame：forifcoming—to—bebecontrarytoperishing，thenaparticularformofperishingwillhaveaparticularformofcoming—to—beasitscontrary：nowdeathisaparticularformofperishingandiscontrarytolife：life，therefore，isacomingto—be，andtoliveistocome—to—be。Butthisisimpossible：accordingly，the’soul’and’life’arenotthesame。Nowthisisnotproved：fortheimpossibilityresultsallthesame，evenifonedoesnotsaythatlifeisthesameasthesoul，butmerelysaysthatlifeiscontrarytodeath，whichisaformofperishing，andthatperishinghas’coming—to—be’asitscontrary。Argumentsofthatkind，then，thoughnotinconclusiveabsolutely，areinconclusiveinrelationtotheproposedconclusion。Alsoeventhequestionersthemselvesoftenfailquiteasmuchtoseeapointofthatkind。
　　Such，then，aretheargumentsthatdependupontheconsequentanduponfalsecause。Thosethatdependuponthemakingoftwoquestionsintooneoccurwheneverthepluralityisundetectedandasingleanswerisreturnedasiftoasinglequestion。Now，insomecases，itiseasytoseethatthereismorethanone，andthatananswerisnottobegiven，e。g。’Doestheearthconsistofsea，orthesky？’Butinsomecasesitislesseasy，andthenpeopletreatthequestionasone，andeitherconfesstheirdefeatbyfailingtoanswerthequestion，orareexposedtoanapparentrefutation。Thus’IsAandisBaman？’’Yes。’’ThenifanyonehitsAandB，hewillstrikeaman’（singular），’notmen’（plural）。Oragain，wherepartisgoodandpartbad，’isthewholegoodorbad？’Forwhicheverhesays，itispossiblethathemightbethoughttoexposehimselftoanapparentrefutationortomakeanapparentlyfalsestatement：fortosaythatsomethingisgoodwhichisnotgood，ornotgoodwhichisgood，istomakeafalsestatement。Sometimes，however，additionalpremissesmayactuallygiverisetoagenuinerefutation；e。g。supposeamanweretograntthatthedescriptions’white’and’naked’and’blind’
　　applytoonethingandtoanumberofthingsinalikesense。Forif’blind’describesathingthatcannotseethoughnaturedesignedittosee，itwillalsodescribethingsthatcannotseethoughnaturedesignedthemtodoso。Whenever，then，onethingcanseewhileanothercannot，theywilleitherbothbeabletoseeorelsebothbeblind；whichisimpossible。
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　　Therightway，then，iseithertodivideapparentproofsandrefutationsasabove，orelsetoreferthemalltoignoranceofwhat’refutation’is，andmakethatourstarting—point：foritispossibletoanalysealltheaforesaidmodesoffallacyintobreachesofthedefinitionofarefutation。Inthefirstplace，wemayseeiftheyareinconclusive：fortheconclusionoughttoresultfromthepremisseslaiddown，soastocompelusnecessarilytostateitandnotmerelytoseemtocompelus。Nextweshouldalsotakethedefinitionbitbybit，andtrythefallacythereby。Forofthefallaciesthatconsistinlanguage，somedependuponadoublemeaning，e。g。ambiguityofwordsandofphrases，andthefallacyoflikeverbalforms（forwehabituallyspeakofeverythingasthoughitwereaparticularsubstance）—whilefallaciesofcombinationanddivisionandaccentarisebecausethephraseinquestionorthetermasalteredisnotthesameaswasintended。Eventhis，however，shouldbethesame，justasthethingsignifiedshouldbeaswell，ifarefutationorproofistobeeffected；e。g。ifthepointconcernsadoublet，thenyoushoulddrawtheconclusionofa’doublet’，notofa’cloak’。Fortheformerconclusionalsowouldbetrue，butithasnotbeenproved；weneedafurtherquestiontoshowthat’doublet’meansthesamething，inordertosatisfyanyonewhoaskswhyyouthinkyourpointproved。
　　FallaciesthatdependonAccidentareclearcasesofignoratioelenchiwhenonce’proof’hasbeendefined。Forthesamedefinitionoughttoholdgoodof’refutation’too，exceptthatamentionof’thecontradictory’ishereadded：forarefutationisaproofofthecontradictory。If，then，thereisnoproofasregardsanaccidentofanything，thereisnorefutation。Forsupposing，whenA
　　andBare，Cmustnecessarilybe，andCiswhite，thereisnonecessityforittobewhiteonaccountofthesyllogism。So，ifthetrianglehasitsanglesequaltotworight—angles，andithappenstobeafigure，orthesimplestelementorstartingpoint，itisnotbecauseitisafigureorastartingpointorsimplestelementthatithasthischaracter。Forthedemonstrationprovesthepointaboutitnotquafigureorquasimplestelement，butquatriangle。Likewisealsoinothercases。If，then，refutationisaproof，anargumentwhicharguedperaccidenscouldnotbearefutation。Itis，however，justinthisthattheexpertsandmenofsciencegenerallysufferrefutationatthehandoftheunscientific：forthelattermeetthescientistswithreasoningsconstitutedperaccidens；andthescientistsforlackofthepowertodrawdistinctionseithersay’Yes’
　　totheirquestions，orelsepeoplesupposethemtohavesaid’Yes’，althoughtheyhavenot。
　　Thosethatdependuponwhethersomethingissaidinacertainrespectonlyorsaidabsolutely，areclearcasesofignoratioelenchibecausetheaffirmationandthedenialarenotconcernedwiththesamepoint。Forof’whiteinacertainrespect’thenegationis’notwhiteinacertainrespect’，whileof’whiteabsolutely’itis’notwhite，absolutely’。If，then，amantreatstheadmissionthatathingis’whiteinacertainrespect’asthoughitweresaidtobewhiteabsolutely，hedoesnoteffectarefutation，butmerelyappearstodosoowingtoignoranceofwhatrefutationis。
　　Theclearestcasesofall，however，arethosethatwerepreviouslydescribed’asdependinguponthedefinitionofa’refutation’：andthisisalsowhytheywerecalledbythatname。Fortheappearanceofarefutationisproducedbecauseoftheomissioninthedefinition，andifwedividefallaciesintheabovemanner，weoughttoset’Defectivedefinition’asacommonmarkuponthemall。
　　Thosethatdependupontheassumptionoftheoriginalpointanduponstatingasthecausewhatisnotthecause，areclearlyshowntobecasesofignoratioelenchithroughthedefinitionthereof。Fortheconclusionoughttocomeabout’becausethesethingsareso’，andthisdoesnothappenwherethepremissesarenotcausesofit：andagainitshouldcomeaboutwithouttakingintoaccounttheoriginalpoint，andthisisnotthecasewiththoseargumentswhichdependuponbeggingtheoriginalpoint。
　　Thosethatdependupontheassumptionoftheoriginalpointanduponstatingasthecausewhatisnotthecause，areclearlyshowntobecasesofignoratioelenchithroughthedefinitionthereof。Fortheconclusionoughttocomeabout’becausethesethingsareso’，andthisdoesnothappenwherethepremissesarenotcausesofit：andagainitshouldcomeaboutwithouttakingintoaccounttheoriginalpoint，andthisisnotthecasewiththoseargumentswhichdependuponbeggingtheoriginalpoint。
　　ThosethatdependupontheconsequentareabranchofAccident：
　　fortheconsequentisanaccident，onlyitdiffersfromtheaccidentinthis，thatyoumaysecureanadmissionoftheaccidentinthecaseofonethingonly（e。g。theidentityofayellowthingandhoneyandofawhitethingandswan），whereastheconsequentalwaysinvolvesmorethanonething：forweclaimthatthingsthatarethesameasoneandthesamethingarealsothesameasoneanother，andthisisthegroundofarefutationdependentontheconsequent。Itis，however，notalwaystrue，e。g。supposethatandBarethesameasC
　　peraccidens；forboth’snow’andthe’swan’arethesameassomethingwhite’。Oragain，asinMelissus’argument，amanassumesthatto’havebeengenerated’andto’haveabeginning’arethesamething，orto’becomeequal’andto’assumethesamemagnitude’。Forbecausewhathasbeengeneratedhasabeginning，heclaimsalsothatwhathasabeginninghasbeengenerated，andarguesasthoughbothwhathasbeengeneratedandwhatisfinitewerethesamebecauseeachhasabeginning。Likewisealsointhecaseofthingsthataremadeequalheassumesthatifthingsthatassumeoneandthesamemagnitudebecomeequal，thenalsothingsthatbecomeequalassumeonemagnitude：
　　i。e。heassumestheconsequent。Inasmuch，then，asarefutationdependingonaccidentconsistsinignoranceofwhatarefutationis，clearlysoalsodoesarefutationdependingontheconsequent。Weshallhavefurthertoexaminethisinanotherwayaswell。
　　Thosefallaciesthatdependuponthemakingofseveralquestionsintooneconsistinourfailuretodissectthedefinitionof’proposition’。Forapropositionisasinglestatementaboutasinglething。Forthesamedefinitionappliesto’onesinglethingonly’andtothe’thing’，simply，e。g。to’man’andto’onesinglemanonly’andlikewisealsoinothercases。If，then，a’singleproposition’beonewhichclaimsasinglethingofasinglething，a’proposition’，simply，willalsobetheputtingofaquestionofthatkind。Nowsinceaproofstartsfrompropositionsandrefutationisaproof，refutation，too，willstartfrompropositions。If，then，apropositionisasinglestatementaboutasinglething，itisobviousthatthisfallacytooconsistsinignoranceofwhatarefutationis：forinitwhatisnotapropositionappearstobeone。If，then，theanswererhasreturnedananswerasthoughtoasinglequestion，therewillbearefutation；whileifhehasreturnedonenotreallybutapparently，therewillbeanapparentrefutationofhisthesis。Allthetypesoffallacy，then，fallunderignoranceofwhatarefutationis，someofthembecausethecontradiction，whichisthedistinctivemarkofarefutation，ismerelyapparent，andtherestfailingtoconformtothedefinitionofaproof。
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　　Thedeceptioncomesaboutinthecaseofargumentsthatdependonambiguityofwordsandofphrasesbecauseweareunabletodividetheambiguousterm（forsometermsitisnoteasytodivide，e。g。
　　’unity’，’being’，and’sameness’），whileinthosethatdependoncombinationanddivision，itisbecausewesupposethatitmakesnodifferencewhetherthephrasebecombinedordivided，asisindeedthecasewithmostphrases。Likewisealsowiththosethatdependonaccent：fortheloweringorraisingofthevoiceuponaphraseisthoughtnottoalteritsmeaning—withanyphrase，ornotwithmany。
　　Withthosethatdependontheofexpressionitisbecauseofthelikenessofexpression。Foritishardtodistinguishwhatkindofthingsaresignifiedbythesameandwhatbydifferentkindsofexpression：foramanwhocandothisispracticallynextdoortotheunderstandingofthetruth。Aspecialreasonwhyamanisliabletobehurriedintoassenttothefallacyisthatwesupposeeverypredicateofeverythingtobeanindividualthing，andweunderstanditasbeingonewiththething：andwethereforetreatitasasubstance：foritistothatwhichisonewithathingorsubstance，asalsotosubstanceitself，that’individually’and’being’aredeemedtobelonginthefullestsense。Forthisreason，too，thistypeoffallacyistoberankedamongthosethatdependonlanguage；inthefirstplace，becausethedeceptioniseffectedthemorereadilywhenweareinquiringintoaproblemincompanywithothersthanwhenwedosobyourselves（foraninquirywithanotherpersoniscarriedonbymeansofspeech，whereasaninquirybyoneselfiscarriedonquiteasmuchbymeansoftheobjectitself）；secondlyamanisliabletobedeceived，evenwheninquiringbyhimself，whenhetakesspeechasthebasisofhisinquiry：moreoverthedeceptionarisesoutofthelikeness（oftwodifferentthings），andthelikenessarisesoutofthelanguage。WiththosefallaciesthatdependuponAccident，deceptioncomesaboutbecausewecannotdistinguishthesamenessandothernessofterms，i。e。theirunityandmultiplicity，orwhatkindsofpredicatehaveallthesameaccidentsastheirsubject。LikewisealsowiththosethatdependontheConsequent：fortheconsequentisabranchofAccident。Moreover，inmanycasesappearancespointtothis—andtheclaimismadethatifisinseparablefromB，soalsoisB
　　fromWiththosethatdependuponanimperfectioninthedefinitionofarefutation，andwiththosethatdependuponthedifferencebetweenaqualifiedandanabsolutestatement，thedeceptionconsistsinthesmallnessofthedifferenceinvolved；forwetreatthelimitationtotheparticularthingorrespectormannerortimeasaddingnothingtothemeaning，andsograntthestatementuniversally。
　　Likewisealsointhecaseofthosethatassumetheoriginalpoint，andthoseoffalsecause，andallthattreatanumberofquestionsasone：
　　forinallofthemthedeceptionliesinthesmallnessofthedifference：forourfailuretobequiteexactinourdefinitionof’premiss’andof’proof’isduetotheaforesaidreason。
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　　Sinceweknowonhowmanypointsapparentsyllogismsdepend，weknowalsoonhowmanysophisticalsyllogismsandrefutationsmaydepend。ByasophisticalrefutationandsyllogismImeannotonlyasyllogismorrefutationwhichappearstobevalidbutisnot，butalsoonewhich，thoughitisvalid，onlyappearstobeappropriatetothethinginquestion。Thesearethosewhichfailtorefuteandprovepeopletobeignorantaccordingtothenatureofthethinginquestion，whichwasthefunctionoftheartofexamination。Nowtheartofexaminingisabranchofdialectic：andthismayproveafalseconclusionbecauseoftheignoranceoftheanswerer。Sophisticrefutationsontheotherhand，eventhoughtheyprovethecontradictoryofhisthesis，donotmakeclearwhetherheisignorant：forsophistsentanglethescientistaswellwiththesearguments。
　　Thatweknowthembythesamelineofinquiryisclear：forthesameconsiderationswhichmakeitappeartoanaudiencethatthepointsrequiredfortheproofwereaskedinthequestionsandthattheconclusionwasproved，wouldmaketheanswererthinksoaswell，sothatfalseproofwilloccurthroughallorsomeofthesemeans：forwhatamanhasnotbeenaskedbutthinkshehasgranted，hewouldalsograntifhewereasked。Ofcourse，insomecasesthemomentweaddthemissingquestion，wealsoshowupitsfalsity，e。g。infallaciesthatdependonlanguageandonsolecism。Ifthen，fallaciousproofsofthecontradictoryofathesisdependontheirappearingtorefute，itisclearthattheconsiderationsonwhichbothproofsoffalseconclusionsandanapparentrefutationdependmustbethesameinnumber。Nowanapparentrefutationdependsupontheelementsinvolvedinagenuineone：forthefailureofoneorotherofthesemustmaketherefutationmerelyapparent，e。g。thatwhichdependsonthefailureoftheconclusiontofollowfromtheargument（theargumentadimpossible）andthatwhichtreatstwoquestionsasoneandsodependsuponaflawinthepremiss，andthatwhichdependsonthesubstitutionofanaccidentforanessentialattribute，and—abranchofthelast—thatwhichdependsupontheconsequent：moreover，theconclusionmayfollownotinfactbutonlyverbally：then，insteadofprovingthecontradictoryuniversallyandinthesamerespectandrelationandmanner，thefallacymaybedependentonsomelimitofextentorononeorotherofthesequalifications：moreover，thereistheassumptionoftheoriginalpointtobeproved，inviolationoftheclause’withoutreckoningintheoriginalpoint’。Thusweshouldhavethenumberofconsiderationsonwhichthefallaciousproofsdepend：fortheycouldnotdependonmore，butallwilldependonthepointsaforesaid。
　　Asophisticalrefutationisarefutationnotabsolutelybutrelativelytosomeone：andsoisaproof，inthesameway。Forunlessthatwhichdependsuponambiguityassumesthattheambiguoustermhasasinglemeaning，andthatwhichdependsonlikeverbalformsassumesthatsubstanceistheonlycategory，andtherestinthesameway，therewillbeneitherrefutationsnorproofs，eitherabsolutelyorrelativelytotheanswerer：whereasiftheydoassumethesethings，theywillstand，relativelytotheanswerer；butabsolutelytheywillnotstand：fortheyhavenotsecuredastatementthatdoeshaveasinglemeaning，butonlyonethatappearstohave，andthatonlyfromthisparticularman。
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　　Thenumberofconsiderationsonwhichdependtherefutationsofthosewhoarerefuted，weoughtnottotrytograspwithoutaknowledgeofeverythingthatis。This，however，isnottheprovinceofanyspecialstudy：forpossiblythesciencesareinfiniteinnumber，sothatobviouslydemonstrationsmaybeinfinitetoo。Nowrefutationsmaybetrueaswellasfalse：forwheneveritispossibletodemonstratesomething，itisalsopossibletorefutethemanwhomaintainsthecontradictoryofthetruth；e。g。ifamanhasstatedthatthediagonaliscommensuratewiththesideofthesquare，onemightrefutehimbydemonstratingthatitisincommensurate。Accordingly，toexhaustallpossiblerefutationsweshallhavetohavescientificknowledgeofeverything：forsomerefutationsdependupontheprinciplesthatruleingeometryandtheconclusionsthatfollowfromthese，othersuponthosethatruleinmedicine，andothersuponthoseoftheothersciences。Forthematterofthat，thefalserefutationslikewisebelongtothenumberoftheinfinite：foraccordingtoeveryartthereisfalseproof，e。g。
　　accordingtogeometrythereisfalsegeometricalproof，andaccordingtomedicinethereisfalsemedicalproof。By’accordingtotheart’，Imean’accordingtotheprinciplesofit’。Clearly，then，itisnotofallrefutations，butonlyofthosethatdependupondialecticthatweneedtograspthecommon—placerules：forthesestandinacommonrelationtoeveryartandfaculty。Andasregardstherefutationthatisaccordingtooneorotheroftheparticularsciencesitisthetaskofthatparticularscientisttoexaminewhetheritismerelyapparentwithoutbeingreal，and，ifitbereal，whatisthereasonforit：whereasitisthebusinessofdialecticianssotoexaminetherefutationthatproceedsfromthecommonfirstprinciplesthatfallundernoparticularspecialstudy。
　　Forifwegraspthestartingpointsoftheacceptedproofsonanysubjectwhateverwegraspthoseoftherefutationscurrentonthatsubject。Forarefutationistheproofofthecontradictoryofagiventhesis，sothateitheroneortwoproofsofthecontradictoryconstitutearefutation。Wegrasp，then，thenumberofconsiderationsonwhichallsuchdepend：if，however，wegraspthis，wealsograsptheirsolutionsaswell；fortheobjectionstothesearethesolutionsofthem。Wealsograspthenumberofconsiderationsonwhichthoserefutationsdepend，thataremerelyapparent—apparent，I
　　mean，nottoeverybody，buttopeopleofacertainstamp；foritisanindefinitetaskifoneistoinquirehowmanyaretheconsiderationsthatmakethemapparenttothemaninthestreet。Accordinglyitisclearthatthedialectician’sbusinessistobeabletograsponhowmanyconsiderationsdependstheformation，throughthecommonfirstprinciples，ofarefutationthatiseitherrealorapparent，i。e。
　　eitherdialecticalorapparentlydialectical，orsuitableforanexamination。
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　　Itisnotruedistinctionbetweenargumentswhichsomepeopledrawwhentheysaythatsomeargumentsaredirectedagainsttheexpression，andothersagainstthethoughtexpressed：foritisabsurdtosupposethatsomeargumentsaredirectedagainsttheexpressionandothersagainstthethought，andthattheyarenotthesame。Forwhatisfailuretodirectanargumentagainstthethoughtexceptwhatoccurswheneveramandoesnotinusingtheexpressionthinkittobeusedinhisquestioninthesamesenseinwhichthepersonquestionedgrantedit？Andthisisthesamethingastodirecttheargumentagainsttheexpression。Ontheotherhand，itisdirectedagainstthethoughtwheneveramanusestheexpressioninthesamesensewhichtheanswererhadinmindwhenhegrantedit。Ifnowany（i。e。boththequestionerandthepersonquestioned），indealingwithanexpressionwithmorethanonemeaning，weretosupposeittohaveonemeaning—ase。g。itmaybethat’Being’and’One’havemanymeanings，andyetboththeanswereranswersandthequestionerputshisquestionsupposingittobeone，andtheargumentistotheeffectthat’Allthingsareone’—willthisdiscussionbedirectedanymoreagainsttheexpressionthanagainstthethoughtofthepersonquestioned？If，ontheotherhand，oneofthemsupposestheexpressiontohavemanymeanings，itisclearthatsuchadiscussionwillnotbedirectedagainstthethought。Suchbeingthemeaningsofthephrasesinquestion，theyclearlycannotdescribetwoseparateclassesofargument。For，inthefirstplace，itispossibleforanysuchargumentasbearsmorethanonemeaningtobedirectedagainsttheexpressionandagainstthethought，andnextitispossibleforanyargumentwhatsoever；forthefactofbeingdirectedagainstthethoughtconsistsnotinthenatureoftheargument，butinthespecialattitudeoftheanswerertowardsthepointsheconcedes。Next，allofthemmaybedirectedtotheexpression。For’tobedirectedagainsttheexpression’meansinthisdoctrine’nottobedirectedagainstthethought’。Forifnotallaredirectedagainsteitherexpressionorthought，therewillbecertainotherargumentsdirectedneitheragainsttheexpressionnoragainstthethought，whereastheysaythatallmustbeoneortheother，anddividethemallasdirectedeitheragainsttheexpressionoragainstthethought，whileothers（theysay）therearenone。Butinpointoffactthosethatdependonmereexpressionareonlyabranchofthosesyllogismsthatdependonamultiplicityofmeanings。Fortheabsurdstatementhasactuallybeenmadethatthedescription’dependentonmereexpression’describesalltheargumentsthatdependonlanguage：whereassomeofthesearefallaciesnotbecausetheanswereradoptsaparticularattitudetowardsthem，butbecausetheargumentitselfinvolvestheaskingofaquestionsuchasbearsmorethanonemeaning。
　　Itis，too，altogetherabsurdtodiscussRefutationwithoutfirstdiscussingProof：forarefutationisaproof，sothatoneoughttodiscussproofaswellbeforedescribingfalserefutation：forarefutationofthatkindisamerelyapparentproofofthecontradictoryofathesis。Accordingly，thereasonofthefalsitywillbeeitherintheprooforinthecontradiction（formentionofthe’contradiction’mustbeadded），whilesometimesitisinboth，iftherefutationbemerelyapparent。Intheargumentthatspeakingofthesilentispossibleitliesinthecontradiction，notintheproof；
　　intheargumentthatonecangivewhatonedoesnotpossess，itliesinboth；intheproofthatHomer’spoemisafigurethroughitsbeingacycleitliesintheproof。Anargumentthatdoesnotfailineitherrespectisatrueproof。
　　But，toreturntothepointwhenceourargumentdigressed，aremathematicalreasoningsdirectedagainstthethought，ornot？Andifanyonethinks’triangle’tobeawordwithmanymeanings，andgranteditinsomedifferentsensefromthefigurewhichwasprovedtocontaintworightangles，hasthequestionerheredirectedhisargumentagainstthethoughtoftheformerornot？
　　Moreover，iftheexpressionbearsmanysenses，whiletheanswererdoesnotunderstandorsupposeittohavethem，surelythequestionerherehasdirectedhisargumentagainsthisthought!Orhowelseoughthetoputhisquestionexceptbysuggestingadistinction—supposeone’squestiontobespeakingofthesilentpossibleornot？’—asfollows，’Istheanswer"No"inonesense，but"Yes"inanother？’If，then，anyoneweretoanswerthatitwasnotpossibleinanysenseandtheotherweretoarguethatitwas，hasnothisargumentbeendirectedagainstthethoughtoftheanswerer？Yethisargumentissupposedtobeoneofthosethatdependontheexpression。Thereisnot，then，anydefinitekindofargumentsthatisdirectedagainstthethought。Someargumentsare，indeed，directedagainsttheexpression：butthesearenotallevenapparentrefutations，letaloneallrefutations。Fortherearealsoapparentrefutationswhichdonotdependuponlanguage，e。g。thosethatdependuponaccident，andothers。
　　If，however，anyoneclaimsthatoneshouldactuallydrawthedistinction，andsay，’By"speakingofthesilent"Imean，inonesensethisandintheothersensethat’，surelytoclaimthisisinthefirstplaceabsurd（forsometimesthequestionerdoesnotseetheambiguityofhisquestion，andhecannotpossiblydrawadistinctionwhichhedoesnotthinktobethere）：inthesecondplace，whatelsebutthiswilldidacticargumentbe？Foritwillmakemanifestthestateofthecasetoonewhohasneverconsidered，anddoesnotknoworsupposethatthereisanyothermeaningbutone。
　　Forwhatistheretopreventthesamethingalsohappeningtousincaseswherethereisnodoublemeaning？’Aretheunitsinfourequaltothetwos？Observethatthetwosarecontainedinfourinonesenseinthisway，inanothersenseinthat’。Also，’Istheknowledgeofcontrariesoneornot？Observethatsomecontrariesareknown，whileothersareunknown’。Thusthemanwhomakesthisclaimseemstobeunawareofthedifferencebetweendidacticanddialecticalargument，andofthefactthatwhilehewhoarguesdidacticallyshouldnotaskquestionsbutmakethingsclearhimself，theothershouldmerelyaskquestions。