’Hewhodoesnotgiveapledgetofastingisanevaderofall；hewhodisregardsallthingsshallnotbepaidbyGodorman。’ButanIrishBrehoncouldscarcelymakeanydistinctassertiononthesubject，sincefastinghadnowbecomeaspecificordinanceoftheChristianChurch，anditsconditionandspiritualeffectswereexpresslydefinedbytheChristianpriesthood。Theoretically，I
　　shouldstate，apersonwhorefusedunjustlytoyieldtofastinghadhislegalliabilitiesconsiderablyincreased，atleast，accordingtothedictaoftheBrehoncommentators；butsuchprovisionsonlybringustothedifficultyofwhichIfirstspoke，andraiseanewthequestionoftheexactvalueoflegalrulesataperiodwhenCourtsofJusticearenotasyetarmedwithresistlesspowersofcompellingattendanceandsubmission。
　　IfwearejustifiedintracingthepedigreeoftheBrehonCodetoasystemenforcedbysupernaturalsanctions，weareabletocontrastitinvariouswayswithotherbodiesoflawinrespectofitsmodeofdevelopment。ItcloselyresemblestheHindoolaw，inasmuchasitconsistsofwhatwasinallprobabilityanoriginalbasisofAryanusagevastlyenlargedbyasuperstructureofinterpretationwhichalongsuccessionofprofessionalcommentatorshaveelected；butitcannothavehadanysuchsacredness，andconsequentlyanysuchauthority，astheBrahminicaljurisprudence。BoththeBrahminsandtheBrehonsassumethatKingsandJudgeswillenforcetheirlaw，andemphaticallyenjoinonthemitsenforcement；but，whiletheBrahmincoulddeclarethatneglectordisobediencewouldbefollowedbyendlessdegradationandtorment，theBrehoncouldonlyassertthattheunlearnedbrotherwhopronouncedafalsejudgmentwouldfindblotchescomeonhischeeks，andthattheChiefwhoallowedsoundusagetobedepartedfromwouldbringbadweatheronhiscountry。ThedevelopmentoftheBrehonlawwasagainparalleltothatwhichthereisstrongreasonforsupposingtheRomanlawtohaveallowedinearlytimes。ThewriterofthePrefacetotheThirdVolume，fromwhichIhavemorethanoncequoted，citessomeobservationswhichIpublishedseveralyearsagoonthesubjectoftheextensionoftheRomanjurisprudencebytheagencyknownastheResponsaPrudentum，theaccumulatedanswersor，astheBrehonphraseis，thejudgmentsofmanysuccessivegenerationsoffamousRomanlawyers；andheadoptsmyaccountasgivingthemostprobableexplanationofthegrowthoftheBrehonlaw。ButintheRomanStateatestwasalwaysappliedtothe’answersofthelearned，’whichwasnotapplied，ornotsystematicallyapplied，tothejudgmentsoftheBrehons。WeneverknowtheRomansexceptassubjecttooneofthestrongestofcentralgovernments，whicharmedthelawcourtswiththeforceatitscommand。AlthoughtheRomansystemdidnotworkexactlyinthewaytowhichourEnglishexperiencehasaccustomedus，therecan，ofcourse，benodoubtthattheultimatecriterionofthevalidityofprofessionallegalopinionatRome，aselsewhere，wastheactionofCourtsofJusticeenforcingrightsanddutiesinconformitywithsuchopinion。ButinancientIrelanditisatleastdoubtfulwhethertherewasever，inoursenseofthewords，acentralgovernment；itisalsodoubtfulwhetherthepublicforceatthecommandofanyrulerorrulerswaseversystematicallyexertedthroughthemechanismofCourtsofJustice；anditisatleastatenableviewthattheinstitutionswhichstoodintheplaceofCourtsofJusticeonlyexercisedjurisdictionthroughthevoluntarysubmissionofintendinglitigants。
　　Perhaps，however，fromourpresentpointofview，thestrongestcontrastisbetweentheancientlawofIrelandandthelawofEnglandataperiodwhichanEnglishlawyerwouldnotcallrecent。TheadministrationofjusticeinEngland，fromcomparativelyearlytimes，hasbeenmorestronglycentralisedthaninanyotherEuropeancountry；butinIrelandtherewasnocentralgovernmenttonervethearmofthelaw。TheprocessoftheEnglishCourtshasforcenturiespastbeenpracticallyirresistible；theprocessoftheIrishCourts，evenifitwascompulsory，wasattheutmostextremelyweak。TheIrishlawwasdevelopedbyhereditarycommentators；butweinEnglandhavealwaysattributedfarlessauthoritythandoesanyEuropeanContinentalcommunitytotheunofficialcommentariesofthemostlearnedwritersoftextbooks。Weobtainourlaw，andadjustittotheneedsofeachsuccessivegeneration，eitherthroughlegislativeenactmentorthroughthedecisionsofourjudgesonisolatedgroupsoffactsestablishedbythemostlaboriousmethods。But，asIhavealreadystated，theopiniontowhichI
　　inclineis，thatnopartoftheBrehonlawhaditsorigininlegislation。TheauthorofinnovationandimprovementwasthelearnedBrehon，andtheBrehonappearstohaveinventedatpleasurethefactswhichheusedastheframeworkforhislegaldoctrine。Hisinventionwasnecessarilylimitedbyhisexperience，andhencethecasessuggestedinthelaw-tractspossessgreatinterest，asthrowinglightonthesocietyamidwhichtheywerecomposed；butthesecasesseemtobepurelyhypothetical，andonlyintendedtoillustratetherulewhichhappenstobeunderdiscussion。
　　InthevolumeofmyowntowhichIreferredafewmomentsagoIsaidoftheearlyRomanlawthat’greatinfluencemusthavebeenexercisedoveritbythewantofanydistinctcheckonthesuggestionorinventionofpossiblequestions。Whenthedatacanbemultipliedatpleasure，thefacilitiesforevolvingageneralruleareimmenselyincreased。AsthelawisadministeredamongourselvesinEnglandthejudgecannottraveloutofthesetsoffactsexhibitedbeforehimorbeforehispredecessors。
　　Accordingly，eachgroupofcircumstanceswhichisadjudicateduponreceives，toemployaGallicism，asortofconsecration。Itacquirescertainqualitieswhichdistinguishitfromeveryothercase，genuineorhypothetical。’IdonotthinkitcanbedoubtedthatthisEnglishpracticeofneverdeclaringalegalruleauthoritativelyuntilastateoffactsarisestowhichitcanbefitted，isthesecretoftheapparentbackwardnessandbarrennessofEnglishlawatparticularepochs，ascontrastedwiththerichnessandreasonablenessofothersystemswhichitmorethanrivalsinitspresentcondition。Itistrue，asIsaidbefore，evenoftheBrehonlaw，thatitdoesnotwhollydisappointthepatrioticexpectationsentertainedofit。Whentheyaredisencumberedofarchaicphraseandform，therearesomethingsremarkablymoderninit。IquiteagreewithoneoftheEditorsthat，intheancientIrishLawofCivilWrong，thereisasingularlycloseapproachtomoderndoctrinesonthesubjectofContributoryNegligence；andIhavefounditpossibletoextractfromthequainttextsoftheBookofAicillsomeextremelysensiblerulingsonthedifficultsubjectoftheMeasureofDamages，forwhichitwouldbevaintostudythewritingsofLordCoke，thoughtheselastarerelativelyofmuchlaterdate。ButtheBrehonlawpaysheavilyforthisapparentanticipationofthemodernlegalspirit。Itmustbeconfessedthatmostofithasastrongairoffancifulnessandunreality。ItseemsasiftheBrehonlawyer，afterformingletussayaconceptionofaparticularkindofinjury，sethimself，asasortofmentalexercise，todeviseallthevarietiesofcircumstanceunderwhichthewrongcouldbecommitted，andthentodeterminethewayinwhichsometraditionalprincipleofredresscouldbeappliedtothecasessupposed。Thisindulgenceofhisimaginationdrewhimfrequentlyintotrivialityorsilliness，andledtoanextraordinarymultiplicationoflegaldetail。FourpagesoftheBookofAicillaverylargeproportionofanancientbodyoflawareconcernedwithinjuriesreceivedfromdogsindog-fights，andtheysetforthinthemostelaboratewaythemodificationofthegoverningrulerequiredinthecaseoftheowners——inthecaseofthespectators——inthecaseofthe’impartialinterposer’——inthecaseofthe’half-interposer，’
　　i。e。themanwhotriestoseparatethedogswithabiasinfavourofoneofthem——inthecaseofanaccidentallooker-on——inthecaseofayouthunderage，andinthecaseofanidiot。
　　Thesamelaw-tractdealsalsowiththecurioussubjectsofinjuriesfromacatstealinginakitchen，fromwomenusingtheirdistaffsinawoman-battle，andfrombees，adistinctionbeingdrawnbetweenthecaseinwhichthestingdrawsbloodandthecaseinwhichitdoesnot。Numberlessotherinstancescouldbegiven；butIrepeatthatallthisismixedupwithmuchthatevennowhasjuridicalinterest，andwithmuchwhichinthatstateofsocietyhadprobablythegreatestpracticalimportance。
　　Itisnot，perhaps，asoftennoticedasitshouldbebyEnglishwritersonlawthatthemethodofenunciatinglegalprincipleswithwhichourCourtsofJusticehavefamiliarisedusisabsolutelypeculiartoEnglandandtocommunitiesunderthedirectinfluenceofEnglishpractice。InallWesternsocieties，Legislation，whichisthedirectissueofthecommandsofthesovereignstate，tendsmoreandmoretobecometheexclusivesourceoflaw；butstillinallContinentalcountriesotherauthoritiesofvariouskindsareoccasionallyreferredto，amongwhicharethetextsoftheRomanCorpusJuris，commentariesonCodesandotherbodiesofwrittenlaw，theunofficialwritingsoffamouslawyers，andotherbranchesofthevastliteratureoflawholdingatmostasecondaryplaceintheestimationoftheEnglishJudgesandBar。Nowhere，however，isanythinglikethesamedignityaswithusattributedtoadecided’case，’andI
　　havefounditdifficulttomakeforeignlawyersunderstandwhytheirEnglishbrethrenshouldbowsoimplicitlytowhatFrenchmentermthe’jurisprudence’ofaparticulartribunal。FromonepointofviewEnglishlawhasdoubtlesssufferedthroughthisreluctancetoinventorimaginefactsaSthegroundworkofrules，anditwillcontinuetobearthemarksoftheinjuryuntillegislativere-arrangementandre-statementfullydisclosethestoresofcommonsensewhichareatpresentconcealedbyitsdefectsoflanguageandform。Ontheotherhand，thesehabitsoftheEnglishCourtsseemtobecloselyconnectedwithoneofthemosthonourablecharacteristicsoftheEnglishsystem，itsextremecarefulnessaboutfacts。Nowhereelseintheworldistherethesamerespectforafact，unlesstherespectbeofEnglishorigin。ThefeelingisnotsharedbyourEuropeancontemporaries，andwasnotsharedbyourremoteancestors。Ithasbeensaid——andtheremarkseemstomeaveryjustone——
　　thatinearlytimesquestionsoffactareregardedasthesimplestofallquestions。SuchtestsoftruthasOrdealandCompurgationsatisfymen’smindscompletelyandeasily，andtheonlydifficultyrecognisedisthediscoveryofthelegaltraditionanditsapplicationtotheresultsofthetest。Uptoacertainpointnodoubtourownmechanismforthedeterminationofafactisalsoamereartifice。Wetakeasourcriterionoftruththeunanimousopinionoftwelvemenonstatementsmadebeforethem。Butthenthemodeofconvincing，orattemptingtoconvince，themisexactlythatwhichwouldhavetobefollowedifitweresoughttoobtainadecisionuponevidencefromtheveryhighesthumanintelligence。Theoldprocedurewassometimeswhollysenseless，sometimesonlydistantlyrational；themodernEnglishprocedureisatmostimperfect，andsomeofitsimperfectionarisesfromtheveryconstitutionofhumannatureandhumansociety。Iquiteconcur，therefore，intheordinaryprofessionalopinionthatitsviewoffactsanditsmodesofascertainingthemarethegreatgloryofEnglishlaw。Iamafraid，however，thatfactsmustalwaysbethedespairofthelawreformer。BenthamseemstomefromseveralexpressionstohavesupposedthatiftheEnglishLawofEvidencewerere-constructedonhisprinciplesquestionsoffactwouldceasetopresentanyseriousdifficulty。
　　AlmosteveryoneofhissuggestionshasbeenadoptedbytheLegislature，andyetenquiriesintofactsbecomemoreprotractedandcomplexthanever。Thetruthisthatthefactsofhumannature，withwhichCourtsofJusticehavechieflytodeal，arefarobscurerandmoreintricatelyinvolvedthanthefactsofphysicalnature；andthedifficultyofascertainingthemwithprecisionconstantlyincreasesinourage，throughtheprogressofinventionandenterprise，throughtheever-growingmiscellaneousnessofallmoderncommunities，andthroughtheeverquickeningplayofmodernsocialmovements。PossiblywemayseeEnglishlawtaketheformwhichBenthamhopedforandlabouredfor；everysuccessiveyearbringsusinsomeslightdegreenearertothisachievement；andconsequently，littleaswemayagreeinhisopinionthatallquestionsoflawaretheeffectofsomejudicialdelusionorlegalabuse，wemayreasonablyexpectthemtobecomelessfrequentandeasierofsolution。Butneitherfactsnorthemodesofascertainingthemtendintheleasttosimplifythemselves，andinnoconceivablestateofsocietywillCourtsofJusticeenjoyperpetualvacation。
　　IhavebeenatsomepainstoexplainwhatsortofauthoritytheIrishBrehonlawdidnot，inmyopinion，possess。The’lawofnature’hadlostallsupernaturalsanction，exceptsofarasitcoincidedwiththe’lawoftheletter。’Ithadnotyetacquired，orhadveryimperfectlyacquired，thatbindingpowerwhichlawobtainswhentheStateexertsthepublicforcethroughCourtsofJusticetocompelobediencetoit。Hadit，then，anyauthorityatall；andifso，whatsortofauthority？PartoftheanswertothisquestionIendeavouredtogivethreeyearsago’VillageCommunities，intheEastandWest，’pp。56，57；andthoughmuchmoremightbesaidonthesubject，Ideferittillanotheropportunity。SofarastheBrehonlawdeclaredactualancientandindigenouspractices，itsharedintheobstinatevitalityofallcustomswhenobservedbyasocietydistributedintocorporatenaturalgroups。But，besidesthis，ithadanothersourceofinfluenceovermen’sminds，intheboldandneverflaggingself-assertionoftheclasswhichexpoundedit。AportionoftheauthorityenjoyedbytheIndianBrahminicaljurisprudenceisundoubtedlytobeexplainedinthesameway。TheBrehoncouldnot，liketheBrahmin，makeanysuchportentousassertionasthathisordersprangfromtheheadofBrahma，thatitwasanembodimentofperfectpurity，andthatthefirstteacherofitslorewasadirectemanationfromGod。ButtheBrehondidclaimthatSt。PatrickandothergreatIrishsaintshadsanctionedthelawwhichhedeclared，andthatsomeofthemhadevenrevisedit。
　　LiketheBrahmin，too，heneverthrewawayanopportunityofaffirmingthedignityofhisprofession。Intheselaw-tractstheheadsofthisprofessionareuniformlyplaced，whereCaesarplacedtheDruids，onthesamelevelwiththehighestclassesofCelticsociety。Thefinespayableforinjurytothem，andtheirrightsoffeastingattheexpenseofotherclassesaformofrightwhichwilldemandmuchattentionfromushereafter，areadjustedtothoseofBishopsandSings。Itismorethanlikelythatthebelievingmultitudeendedbyacceptingthesepretensions。Fromwhatweknowofthatstageofthoughtwecanhardlysetlimitstotheamountofauthorityspontaneouslyconcededtotheutterancesofasoleliteraryclass。Itmusthavestruckmanythattheinfluenceofthecorrespondingclassinourownmodernsocietyfarexceedsanythingwhichcouldhavebeenassertedofitfromthemereconsiderationofoursocialmechanism。Thereis，perhaps，animpressionabroadthattheinfluenceitexertsincreasesashistorygoeson，animpressionpossiblyproducedandcertainlystrengthenedbythebrilliantpassagesinwhichLordMacaulaycontrastedthewell-paidliterarylabourofhisowndaywiththemiseriesoftheliteraryhackofGrubStreetacenturybefore。Ithinkthatthisopinion，ifbroadlystated，isattheveryleastdoubtful。Theclasswhich，touseamodernneologism，’formulates’theideasdimlyconceivedbythemultitude——whichsavesitmentaltroublebycollectingthroughgeneralisation，whichisanessentiallylabour-savingprocess，thescatteredfragmentsofitsknowledgeandexperience——hasnotalwaysconsistedofphilosophers，historians，andnovelists，buthadearlierrepresentativesinpoets，priests，andlawyers。Itisnotatallaparadoxicalopinionthattheselastwereitsmostpowerfulmembers。For，nowadays，ithastocopewiththecriticalfaculty，moreorlessfoundeverywhere，andenormouslystrengthenedbyobservationofthemethodsofphysicaldiscovery。Noauthorityofourdayispossiblycomparablewiththatofthemenwho，inanutterlyuncriticalage，simplysaidofalegalrule，’Soithasbeenlaiddownbythelearned，’orusedthestillmoreimpressiveformula，’Itisthuswritten。’