destinedtocrystalliseinnewforms——arequestionsuponwhich
itisnotnowmaterialtoenter，eveniftherewereanyhopeof
solvingthem。Allweneedatpresentnoteisthattheso-called
enfranchisementofwomenismerelyaphaseofaprocesswhichhas
affectedverymanyotherclasses，thesubstitutionofindividual
humanbeingsforcompactgroupsofhumanbeingsastheunitsof
society。Now，itistruethatinthelegalinstitutionsofthe
Hindoospoliticalinstitutions，Ineedscarcelysay，formany
centuriestheyhavehadnonethedespotismofthefamilygroup
overthemenandwomencomposingitismaintainedingreater
completenessthanamonganysocietyofsimilarcivilisationand
culture。Yetthereisabundantevidencethattheemancipationof
theindividualfromthefamilyhadproceededsomeway，even
beforethecountryhadcomeundertheWesterninfluencesthrough
theBritishdominion。IfIweretogiveyouthefullproofof
this，Ishouldhavetotakeyouthroughmuchofthedetailof
Hindoolaw。Iwillmentiononeindicationofit，becausefeware
awarethatthepeculiarityinquestionservesasasortoftest
bywhichwecandistinguishveryancientorundevelopedfrom
comparativelymaturedanddevelopedlaw。
Allbeginnersinlawhaveheardofthedifferencebetween
distributinganinheritanceperstirpesanddistributingitper
capita。Amanhastwosons，oneofwhomhaseightchildren，and
theothertwo。Thegrandfatherdies，histwosonshavingdied
beforehim，andthegrandfather’spropertyhastobedivided
betweenthegrandchildren。Ifthedivisionisperstirpesthe
stocksofthetwosonswillbekeptseparate，andonehalfofthe
inheritancewillbedistributedbetweentheeightgrandchildren，
andtheotherhalfbetweenthetwo。Ifthedivisionispercapita
thepropertywillbeequallydividedbetweenthewholeten
grandchildren，shareandsharealike。Nowthetendencyofmatured
anddevelopedlawistogiveadecidedpreferencetodistribution
perstirpes；itisonlywithremoteclassesofrelativesthatit
abandonsthedistinctionsbetweenthestocksanddistributesthe
propertypercapita。Butinthis，asinseveralother
particulars，veryancientandundevelopedlawreversestheideas
ofthemodernjurist，anduniformlyprefersdistributionper
capita，exactlyequaldivisionbetweenallthesurvivingmembers
ofthefamily；andthisisapparentlyontheprinciplethat，all
havingbeenimpartiallysubjecttoadespotismwhichknewno
degrees，alloughttoshareequallyonthedissolutionofthe
communitybythedeathofitschief。Apreferencefordivision
perstirpes，aminutecareforthepreservationofthestocks，is
infactverystrongevidenceofthegrowthofarespectfor
individualinterestsinsidethefamily，distinctfromthe
interestsofthefamilygroupasawhole。Thisiswhytheplace
giventodistributionperstirpesshowsthatagivensystemof
lawhasundergonedevelopment，anditsohappensthatthisplace
isverylargeinHindoolaw，whichisextremelycarefulofthe
distinctionbetweenstocks，andmaintainsthemthroughlonglines
ofsuccession。
LetusnowturntothecauseswhichintheHindoolaw，andin
thegreatalternativeAryansystem，theRomanlaw，have
respectivelyledtothedisengagementoftheindividualfromthe
group。SofarasregardstheRomaninstitutions，weknowthat
amongthemostpowerfulsolventinfluenceswerecertain
philosophicaltheories，ofGreekorigin，whichhaddeepeffecton
themindsofthejuristswhoguidedthedevelopmentofthelaw。
Thelaw，thustransformedbyadoctrinewhichhaditsmost
distinctexpressioninthefamousproposition，’allmenare
equal，’wasspreadovermuchoftheworldbyRomanlegislation。
TheempireoftheRomans，foronereasonalone，mustbeplacedin
atotallydifferentclassfromtheOrientaldespotisms，ancient
andmodern，andevenfromthefamousAthenianEmpire。Allthese
lastweretax-takingempires，whichexercisedlittleorno
interferenceinthecustomsofvillage-communitiesortribes。But
theRomanEmpire，whileitwasatax-taking，wasalsoa
legislatingempire。Itcrushedoutlocalcustoms，andsubstituted
fortheminstitutionsofitsown。Throughitslegislationalone
iteffectedsogreataninterruptioninthehistoryofalarge
partofmankind，norhasithadanyparallelexcept——andthe
comparisonisveryimperfect——themodernBritishEmpirein
India。Thereisnoreasontosupposethatphilosophicaltheory
hadanyseriousinfluenceonthejurisprudenceoftheHindoos。I
speakwithreserveonthesubject，butIbelievethatnoneofthe
remarkablephilosophicaltheorieswhichthegeniusoftherace
producedarefoundedonaconceptionoftheindividualas
distinctfromthatofthegroupinwhichheisborn。Fromthose
ofthemwithwhichIhappentobeacquainted，Ishouldsaythat
theircharacteristicsareofexactlythereverseorder，andthat
theyhavetheirnearestcounterpartincertainphilosophical
systemsofourownday，underwhichtheindividualseemslostin
somesuchconceptionasthatofHumanity。What，then，wasthe
influenceforsomeinfluencetherecertainlywaswhich，
operatingonthemindsoftheBrahminicaljurists，ledthemto
assigntotheindividualrightsdistinctfromthosewhichwould
havebelongedtohimthroughmeremembershipinthefamilygroup？
IconceivethatitwastheinfluenceofReligion。Whereveramong
anypartofHindoosocietythereprevailedtheconvictionof
responsibilityafterdeath——whetherthatresponsibilitywasto
beenforcedbydirectrewardsandpunishments，orthroughthe
stagesofthemetempsychosis——theconceptionoftheindividual，
whowastosufferseparatelyandenjoyseparately，was
necessarilyrealisedwithextremedistinctness。
Theportionsoftheracestronglyaffectedbyreligious
beliefofthiskindwereexactlythoseforwhichtheBrahminical
juristslegislated，andatfirsttheyprobablylegislatedfor
thesealone。Butwiththenotionofresponsibilityafterdeath
thenotionofexpiationwasalwaysassociated。Buildinguponthis
lastnotion，theBrahminicalcommentatorsgraduallytransformed
thewholelawuntilitbecameanexemplificationofwhatIndian
lawyerscallthedoctrineofSpiritualBenefit。Inasmuchasthe
conditionofthedeadcouldbeamelioratedbyproperexpiatory
rites，thepropertydescendingordevolvingonamancametobe
regardedbythesewriterspartlyasafundforpayingthe
expensesoftheceremonialbywhichthesoulofthepersonfrom
whomtheinheritancecamecouldberedeemedfromsufferingor
degradation，andpartlyasarewardfortheproperperformanceof
thesacrifices。Thereoughttobenothingtosurpriseusinthe
growthofsuchadoctrine，sinceitisonlydistinguished，byits
logicalcompleteness，fromonewhichhadgreatinfluenceon
Westernjurisprudence。Theinterestwhichfromveryearlytimes
theChurchclaimedinthemoveableorpersonalpropertyof
deceasedpersonsisbestexplainedbyitsteachingthatthefirst
andbestdestinationofadeadman’sgoodswastopurchasemasses
forhissoul，andoutofthisviewoftheproperobjectsof
wealththewholetestamentaryandintestatejurisdictionofthe
EcclesiasticalCourtsappearstohavegrown。ButinIndiathelaw
constructedontheseprinciplesbecameextremelyunfavourableto
theownershipofpropertybywomen，apparentlybecauseits
priestlyauthorsthoughtthatwomen，throughtheirphysical
weaknessandtheirseclusionwhichwasdoubtlessregardedas
unavoidable，wouldhavemuchgreaterdifficultythanmen，amida
societyalwaysmoreorlessdisturbed，inapplyingapropershare
ofthepropertytothefuneralceremoniesofthepersonwhohad
transmittedit。Thereasoningonthesubjectcurrentevenin
comparativelyancienttimesisthusgivenintheMitakshara；’The
wealthofaregeneratemanisdesignedforreligioususes，anda
woman’ssuccessiontosuchpropertyisunfitbecausesheisnot
competenttotheperformanceofreligiousrites。’Thecompilerof
theMitaksharawhohaspreservedtheliberalruleastoStridhan
whichIbeforereferredto，combatsthisdoctrine，not，however，
byaffirmingthecapacityofwomenforsacrifice，butbydenying
thatallpropertyisintendedforreligioususes，andbypointing
outthatcertainactswhichafemaleownercandoareofa
quasi-religiouscharacter，e。g。，shemaydigtanks。Mitakshara，
ii。1，22，23，24。And，puttinghimaside，theBrahminical
commentatorswhosucceedoneanotherintheHindoojuridical
schoolsshowavisiblyincreasingdesiretoconnectallproperty
withthedischargeofsacrificialduties，andwiththisdesire
thereluctancetoplacepropertyinthehandsofwomenissomehow
connected。
OnthewholethesuccessivegenerationsofHindoolawyers
showanincreasinghostilitytotheinstitutionoftheStridhan，
notbyabolishingit，butbylimitingtotheutmostoftheir
powerthecircumstancesunderwhichitcanarise。Minute
distinctionsaredrawnbetweenthevariousmodesinwhich
propertymaydevolveuponawoman，andtheconditionsunderwhich
suchpropertymaybecomeStridhanmaderareandexceptional。The
aimofthelawyerswastoaddtothefamilystock，andtoplace
underthecontrolofthehusbandasmuchastheycouldof
whatevercametothewifebyinheritanceorgift；butwhenever
thepropertydoessatisfythemultifariousconditionslaiddown
forthecreationoftheStridhan，theviewofitasemphatically
’woman’sproperty’iscarriedoutwithalogicalconsistencyvery
suggestiveofthecharacteroftheancientinstitutiononwhich
theBrahminicaljuristsmadewar。Notonlyhasthewoman
singularlyfullpowerofdealingwiththeStridhan——notonlyis
thehusbanddebarredfromintermeddlingwithit，saveinextreme
distress——but，whentheproprietressdies，thereisaspecial
orderofsuccessiontoherproperty，whichismanifestlyintended
togiveapreference，whereveritispossible，tofemale
relativesovermales。
LetmeaddthattheaccountwhichIhavegivenyouofthe
probableliberalityoftheHindooinstitutionstofemalesatsome
longpastperiodoftheirdevelopment，andofthedisliketowards
thisliberalitymanifestedbytheBrahminicallawyers，isnotto
beregardedasfancifulorpurelyconjectural，although，
doubtless，wecanonlyguessattheexplanationofit。Itis
borneoutbyaveryconsiderablenumberofindications，oneof
whichImentionasofgreatbutverypainfulinterest。Themost
liberaloftheHindooschoolsofjurisprudence，thatprevailing
inBengalProper，givesachildlesswidowtheenjoymentofher
husband’sproperty，undercertainrestrictiveconditions，forher
life；andinthisitagreeswithmanybodiesofunwrittenlocal
custom。Iftherearemalechildren，theysucceedatonce；butif
therearenonethewidowcomesinforherlifebeforethe
collateralrelatives。Atthepresentmoment，marriagesamongthe
upperclassesofHindoosbeingverycommonlyinfertile，a
considerableportionofthesoilofthewealthiestIndian
provinceisinthehandsofchildlesswidowsastenantsforlife。
ButitwasexactlyinBengalProperthattheEnglish，onentering
India，foundtheSuttee，orwidow-burning，notmerelyan
occasional，butaconstantandalmostuniversalpracticewiththe
wealthierclasses，and，asarule，itwasonlythechildless
widow，andneverthewidowwithminorchildren，whoburntherself
onherhusband’sfuneralpyre。Thereisnoquestionthatthere
wastheclosestconnectionbetweenthelawandthereligious
custom，andthewidowwasmadetosacrificeherselfinorderthat
hertenancyforlifemightbegotoutoftheway。Theanxietyof
herfamilythattheriteshouldbeperformed，whichseemedso
strikingtothefirstEnglishobserversofthepractice，was，in
fact，explainedbythecoarsestmotives；buttheBrahminswho