whentherewasnocertaintywhetherthecountrywaswithhimorwiththeVindictives。Perhapsthatnewcouragewhichdefinitelyrevealeditselfthenextmonth，maybefirstglimpsedintheproclamationoverrulingHunter：
　　“Ifurthermakeknownthatwhetheritbecompetentforme，asCommander-in-ChiefoftheArmyandNavy，todeclaretheslavesofanyStateorStatesfree，andwhetheratanytime，inanycase，itshallhavebecomeanecessityindispensabletothemaintenanceofthegovernmenttoexercisesuchsupposedpower，arequestionswhich，undermyresponsibility，Ireservetomyself，andwhichIcannotfeeljustifiedinleavingtothedecisionofcommandersinthefield。“[5]
　　TherevocationofHunter’sorderinfuriatedtheAbolitionists。
　　Itdeeplydisappointedthegrowingnumberwho，carelessaboutslavery，wantedemancipationasawarmeasure，asablowattheSouth。Fewofeitherofthesegroupsnoticedtheimpliedhintthatemancipationmightcomebyexecutiveaction。Herewasthematterofthewarpowersinasurprisingform。However，itwasnotunknowntoCongress。AttemptshadbeenmadetoinduceCongresstoconcedethewarpowerstothePresidentandtoask，notcommand，himtousethemfortheliberationofslavesintheSecededStates。Longbefore，inastrangelydifferentconnection，suchvehementAbolitionistsasGiddingsandJ。Q。
　　Adamshadpicturedthefreeingofslavesasanaturalincidentofmilitaryoccupation。
　　WhatinducedLincolntothrowoutthishintofapossiblesurrenderonthesubjectofemancipation？Again，assooften，thesilenceastohismotivesisunbroken。However，therecanbenodoubtthathisthinkingonthesubjectpassedthroughseveralsuccessivestages。Butallhisthinkingwasruledbyoneidea。Anypolicyhemightaccept，oranyrefusalofpolicy，wouldbejudgedinhisownmindbythedegreetowhichithelped，orhindered，thenationalcause。NothingwasmoreabsurdthanthesneeroftheAbolitioniststhathewas“tender“
　　ofslavery。Browningspokeforhimfaithfully，“Ifslaverycansurvivetheshockofwarandsecession，beitso。Ifintheconflictforliberty，theConstitutionandtheUnion，itmustnecessarilyperish，thenletitperish。“Browningrefusedtopredictwhichalternativewoulddevelop。Hispointwasthatslavesmustbetreatedlikeotherproperty。But，ifneedbe，hewouldsacrificeslaveryashewouldsacrificeanythingelse，tosavetheUnion。Hehadnointentionto“protect“slavery。[6]
　　InthefirststageofLincoln’sthinkingonthisthornysubject，hischiefanxietywastoavoidscaringofffromthenationalcausethoseSouthernUnionistswhowerenotpreparedtoabandonslavery。ThiswasthemotivebehindhispromptsuppressionofFremont。ItwasthisthatinspiredtheAbolitionistsneerabouthisrelativeattitudetowardGodandKentucky。Asacompromise，tocutthegroundfromundertheVindictives，hehadurgedtheloyalSlaveStatestoendorseaprogramofcompensatedemancipation。ButtheseStateswereasunabletoseethehandwritingonthewallasweretheLittleMen。InthesameproclamationthatoverruledHunter，whilehintingatwhattheAdministrationmightfeeldriventodo，LincolnappealedagaintotheloyalSlaveStatestoacceptcompensatedemancipation。“Idonotargue，“saidhe，“I
　　beseechyoutomaketheargumentforyourselves。Youcannot，ifyouwould，beblindtothesignsofthetimes……
　　Thisproposalmakescommoncauseforacommonobject，castingnoreproachesuponany。ItactsnotthePharisee。Thechangeitcontemplateswouldcomegentlyasthedewsofheaven，notrendingorwreckinganything。“[7]
　　ThoughLincoln，atthismoment，wasanxiouslywatchingthemovementinCongresstoforcehishand，hewasnotapparentlycastdown。Hewasemergingfromhiseclipse。Junewasapproachingandwithitthefinaldawn。Furthermore，whenheissuedthisproclamationonMaynineteenth，hehadnotlostfaithinMcClellan。Hewasstillhopingfornewsofacrushingvictory；ofMcClellan’striumphalentryintoRichmond。Thenexttwomonthsembracedboththosetransformationswhichtogetherrevolutionizedhisposition。Heemergedfromhislasteclipse；andMcClellanfailedhim。
　　WhenLincolnreturnedtoWashingtonafterhistwodaysatthefront，heknewthatthefortunesofhisAdministrationwereatalowebb。NeverhadhebeenderidedinCongresswithmorebrazeninjustice。TheCommittee，waitingonlyforMcClellan’sfailure，wouldnowunmasktheirguns-asChandlerdid，sevendayslater。ThelineofVindictivecriticismcouldeasilybeforeshadowed：thegovernmenthadfailed；itwasresponsibleforacolossalmilitarycatastrophe；butwhatcouldyouexpectofanAdministrationthatwouldnotstrikeitsenemiesthroughemancipation；whatashatteringdemonstrationthattheExecutivewasnotasaferepositoryofthewarpowers。
　　WasthereanywaytoforestallordisarmtheVindictives？Hissilencegivesusnocluewhenorhowtheansweroccurredtohim——byseparatingthetwoissues；bycarryingoutthehintintheMayproclamation；byyieldingonemancipationwhile，intheveryact，pushingthewarpowersofthePresidenttotheirlimit，declaringslavesfreebyanexecutiveorder。
　　TheimportanceofpreservingthewarpowerofthePresidenthadbecomeafixedconditionofLincoln’sthought。Already，hewaslookingforwardnotonlytovictorybuttothegreattaskthatshouldcomeaftervictory。Hewasdetermined，ifitwerehumanlypossible，tokeepthattaskinthehandsofthePresident，andoutofthehandsofCongress。Afirststephadalreadybeentaken。Inportionsofoccupiedterritory，militarygovernorshadbeenappointed。Simpleasthisseemedtothecarelessobserver，itfocussedthewholeissue。Thepowerful，legalmindofSumneratonceperceiveditssignificance。HedeniedintheSenatetherightofthePresidenttomakesuchappointments；hebesoughttheSenatetodemandthecancellationofsuchappointment。HereassertedtheabsolutesovereigntyofCongress。[8]Itwouldbeafar-reachingstrokeifLincoln，inanyway，couldextortfromCongressacquiescenceinhisuseofthewarpowersonavastscale。
　　Freeingtheslavesbyexecutiveorderwouldbesuchause。
　　Anothertrainofthoughtalsopointedtothesameresult。
　　Lincoln’sdesiretofurtherthecauseof“theLiberalpartythroughouttheworld，“thatdesirewhichdatedbacktohisearlylifeasapolitician，hadsufferedadisappointment。
　　EuropeanLiberals，whosepoliticalvisionwaslessanalyticalthanhis，hadfailedtounderstandhispolicy。TheConfederateauthoritieshadbeenquicktopublishinEuropehisofficialpronouncementsthatthewarhadbeenundertakennottoabolishslaverybuttopreservetheUnion。AsfarbackasSeptember，1861，CarlSchurzwrotefromSpaintoSewardthattheLiberalsabroadweredisappointed，that“theimpressiongainedgroundthatthewaraswagedbytheFederalgovernment，farfrombeingawarofprinciple，wasmerelyawarofpolicy，“and“thatfromthispointofviewmuchmightbesaidfortheSouth。“[9]Infact，thesehastyEuropeanshadfoundadefinitegroundforcomplainingthattheAmericanwarwasareactionaryinfluence。
　　TheconcentrationofAmericancruisersintheSouthernblockadegavetheAfricanslavetradeitslastleaseoflife。WithnoAmericanwar-shipamongtheWestIndies，theAmericanflagbecamethesafeguardoftheslaver。Englishmencomplainedthat“theswiftshipscrammedwiththeirhumancargoes“hadonlyto“hoisttheStarsandStripesandpassunderthebowsofourcruisers。“[10]ThoughSewardscoredapointbyhistreatygivingBritishcruiserstherighttosearchanyshipscarryingtheAmericanflag，thedistrustoftheforeignLiberalswasnotremoved。TheyinclinedtostandasideandtoallowthecommercialclassesofFranceandEnglandtodictatepolicytowardtheUnitedStates。Theblockade，byshuttingofftheEuropeansupplyofrawcotton，onbothsidesthechannel，wasthecauseofmeasurelessunemployment，ofintolerablemisery。
　　Therewastalkinbothcountriesofintervention。Napoleon，especially，loomedlargeonthehorizonasapossibleallyoftheConfederacy。Andyet，allthiswhile，Lincolnhaditinhispoweratanyminutetolaythespecterofforeignintervention。Apledgetothe“Liberalpartythroughouttheworld“thatthewarwouldbringaboutthedestructionofslavery，andgreatpoliticalpowersbothinEnglandandinFrancewouldatoncecrossthepathsoftheirgovernmentsshouldtheymovetowardintervention。Weightyaswereallthesereasonsforachangeofpolicy——turningtheflankoftheVindictivesonthewarpowers，committingtheAbolitioniststotheAdministration，winningovertheEuropeanLiberals——therewasafourthreasonwhich，veryprobably，weigheduponLincolnmostpowerfullyofthemall。Profoundgloomhadsettleduponthecountry。Therewasnoenthusiasmformilitaryservice。
　　AndStanton，wholackedentirelythepsychologicvisionofthestatesman，hadrecentlycommittedanastoundingblunder。Afterafewmonthsinpowerhehadconcludedthatthegovernmenthadenoughsoldiersandhadclosedtherecruitingoffices。[11]WhyLincolnpermittedthissingularproceedinghasneverbeensatisfactorilyexplained。*Nowhewasreapingthefruits。A
　　defeatedarmy，ahopelesscountry，andnoprospectofswiftreinforcement!Ifashiftofgroundonthequestionofemancipationwouldarousenewenthusiasm，bringinanewstreamofrecruits，Lincolnwaspreparedtoshift。
　　*Stanton’smotivewasprobablyeconomy。Congresswasterrifiedbytheexpenseofthewar。TheCommitteewasdeeplyalarmedoverthepoliticaleffectofwartaxation。TheyandStantonwereallconvincedthatMcClellanwasamplystrongenoughtocrushtheConfederacy。
　　Buteveninthisdireextremity，hewouldnotgivewaywithoutalastattempttosavehisearlierpolicy。OnJulytwelfth，hecalledtogethertheSenatorsandRepresentativesoftheBorderStates。Hereadtothemawrittenargumentinfavorofcompensatedemancipation，theFederalgovernmenttoassisttheStatesinprovidingfundsforthepurpose。
　　“LettheStatesthatareinrebellion，“saidhe，“seedefinitelyandcertainlythatinnoeventwilltheStatesyourepresenteverjointheirproposedConfederacy，andtheycannotmuchlongermaintainthecontest。ButyoucannotdivestthemoftheirhopetoultimatelyhaveyouwiththemsolongasyoushowadeterminationtoperpetuatetheinstitutionwithinyourownStates……Ifthewarcontinueslong，asitmustiftheobjectbenotsoonerattained，theinstitutioninyourStateswillbeextinguishedbymerefrictionandabrasion——bythemereincidentsofwar……Ourcommoncountryisingreatperil，demandingtheloftiestviewsandboldestactiontobringitspeedyrelief。Oncerelieveditsformofgovernmentissavedtotheworld，itsbelovedhistoryandcherishedmemoriesarevindicated，anditshappyfuturefullyassuredandrenderedinconceivablygrand。“[12]
　　Hemadenoimpression。Theywouldcommitthemselvestonothing。Lincolnabandonedhisearlierpolicy。
　　Ofwhathappenednext，hesaidlater，“Ithadgottobe……ThingshadgoneonfrombadtoworseuntilIfeltthatwehadreachedtheendofourropeontheplanofoperationswehadbeenpursuing；thatwehadaboutplayedourlastcardandmustchangeourtacticsorlosethegame。Inowdeterminedupontheadoptionoftheemancipationpolicy……“[13]
　　ThenextdayheconfidedhisdecisionandhisreasonstoSewardandWelles。Though“thiswasanewdepartureforthePresident，“boththeseMinistersagreedwithhimthatthechangeofpolicyhadbecomeinevitable。[14]
　　Lincolnwasnowentirelyhimself，astuteinactionaswellasboldinthought。HewouldnotdisclosehischangeofpolicywhileCongresswasinsession。Shouldhedoso，therewasnotellingwhatattempttheCabalwouldmaketoperverthisintention，totwisthiscourseintothesemblanceofanacceptanceofthecongressionaltheory。HelaidthematterasideuntilCongressshouldbetemporarilyoutoftheway，untilthelongrecessbetweenJulyandDecembershouldhavebegun。InthisclosingmomentofthesecondsessionoftheThirty-SeventhCongress，whichisalsotheopeningmomentofthegreatperiodofLincoln，thefeelingagainsthiminCongresswasextravagantlybitter。Itcaughtatanythingwithwhichtomakeapoint。Adisregardoftechnicalitiesofprocedurewasmagnifiedintoaseriousbreachofconstitutionalprivilege。Revivingthequestionofcompensatedemancipation，LincolnhadsentaspecialmessagetobothHouses，submittingthetextofacompensationbillwhichheurgedthemtoconsider。Hisenemiesraisedanuproar。ThePresidenthadnorighttointroduceabill-intoCongress!DictatorLincolnwastryinginanewwaytoputCongressunderhisthumb。[15]
　　Inthelastweekofthesession，Lincoln’snewboldnessbroughttheoldrelationbetweenhimselfandCongresstoadramaticclose。TheSecondConfiscationBillhadlongbeenunderdiscussion。Lincolnbelievedthatsomeofitsprovisionswereinconsistentwiththespiritatleastofourfundamentallaw。