Inthemidstofthisfuriousconfusion，themensurroundingLincolnmaybeexcusedfornotobservingachangeinhim。Theyhaverecordedhisappearanceofindecision，hissolicitudeoverMcClellan，hiswornandhaggardlook。Thechanginglightinthosesmolderingfiresofhisdeeplysunkeneyesescapedtheirnotice。Gradually，throughprofoundunhappiness，andasalwaysinsilence，Lincolnwasworkingoutofhislasteclipse。Nocertainrecordofhisinnerlifeduringthistransition，themostimportantofhislife，hassurvived。Wecanjudgeofitonlybytheresults。Theoutstandingfactwithregardtoitisacertainchangeofattitude，anaccessofdetermination，lateinJune。Whatdesperatewrestlingwiththeangelhadtakenplaceinthemonthsofagonysincehisson’sdeath，evenhisprivatesecretarieshavenotfeltabletosay。Neither，apparently，didtheyperceive，untilitflasheduponthemfull-blown，thechangethatwascomingoverhisresolution。
　　NordidtheCabinethaveanywarningthatthePresidentwasturningacorner，developinganewphaseofhimself，somethingsterner，morepowerfulthananythingtheyhadsuspected。Thiswaseverhisway。Hisinstinctivereticencestoodfirmuntilthemomentofthenewbirth。NotonlytheCabinetbutthecountrywasamazedandstartled，when，lateinJune，thePresidentsuddenlyleftWashington。HemadeaflyingtriptoWestPointwhereScottwaslivinginvirtualretirement。[30]Whatpassedbetweenthetwo，thosefewhourstheyspenttogether，thattwenty-fourthofJune，1862，hasneverbeendivulged。Didtheyhaveanyeyes，thatday，forthewonderfulprospectfromthehighterraceoftheparadeground；fortheriversofarbelow，flooringthevalleywithsilver；forthemountainspearlandblue？DidtheytalkofStanton，ofhiswaywardness，hisfuries？OftheterribleCommittee？OfthewayLincolnhadtiedhisownhands，broughthiswilltostalemate，throughhisrecognitionoftheunofficialcouncils？Whoknows？
　　LincolnwasbackinWashingtonthenextday。Anotherday，andbyasweepingorderhecreatedanewarmyfortheprotectionofWashington，andplacedincommandofit，awesterngeneralwhowascreditedwithabrilliantstrokeontheMississippi。[31]NoonewillnowdefendthemilitarygeniusofJohnPope。ButwhenLincolnsentforhim，alltheevidencetodateappearedtobeinhisfavor。Hisfollieswereyettoappear。AnditismorethanlikelythatinthedevelopmentofLincoln’scharacter，hisappointmenthasadeepsignificance。ItappearstomarkthemomentwhenLincolnbrokeoutofthecocoonofadvisementhehadspununintentionallyaroundhiswill。Inthesorrowsofthegrimyear，newforceshadbeengenerated。Newspiritualpowerswerecomingtohisassistance。Atlast，relatively，hehadfoundpeace。Wornandtornashewas，afterhislonginwardstruggle，fewboresocalmlyashedidthedistractingnewsfromthefrontintheclosingdaysofJuneandtheopeningdaysofJuly，whenLeewasdrivinghiswholestrengthlikeasuperhumanbattering-ram，straightattheheartofthewaveringMcClellan。AvisitorattheWhiteHouse，inthemidstoftheterriblestrainoftheSevenDays，foundLincoln“thinandhaggard，butcheerful……quiteasplacidasusual……
　　hismannerwassokindlyandsofreefromtheordinarycocksurenessofthepolitician，andthevanityandself-
　　importanceofofficialpositionthatnothingbutgoodwillwasinspiredbyhispresence。“[32]
　　HisserenitywasallthemoreremarkableashisrelationswithCongressandtheCommitteewerefastapproachingacrisis。IfMcClellanfailed-andbytheshowingofhisowndespatches，therewaseveryreasontoexpecthimtofail，sobesottedwasheupontheideathatnoonecouldprevailwiththeforceallowedhim——theCommitteewhowereleadersofthecongressionalpartyagainstthepresidentialpartymightbeexpectedpromptlytomeasurestrengthwiththeAdministration。AndMcClellanfailed。AtthatmomentChandler，withtheconsentoftheCommittee，wasmakinguseofitsrecordspreparingaPhilippicagainstthegovernment。Lincoln，actingonhisowninitiative，withoutaskingtheSecretaryofWartoaccompanyhim，wentimmediatelytothefront。HepassedtwodaysquestioningMcClellanandhisgenerals。[33]Buttherewasnocouncilofwar。
　　ItwasadifferentLincolnfromthatotherwho，justfourmonthsprevious，hadcalledtogetherthegeneralofficersandpromisedthemtoabidebytheirdecisions。HereturnedtoWashingtonwithouttellingthemwhathemeanttodo。
　　ThenextdayclosedachapterandopenedachapterinthehistoryoftheFederalarmy。Stanton’sbriefandingloriouscareerasheadofthenationalforcescametoanend。Hefellbackintohisrightfulposition，thePresident’sexecutiveofficerinmilitaryaffairs。LincolntelegraphedanotherWesterngeneral，Halleck，orderinghimtoWashingtonasGeneral-in-Chief。[34]Hethen，foraseason，turnedhiswholeattentionfromthearmytopolitics。FivedaysafterthetelegramtoHalleck，ChandlerintheSenate，loosedhisinsatiabletemperinwhatostensiblywasadenunciationofMcClellan，whatinpointoffactwasasweepingarraignmentofthemilitaryefficiencyofthegovernment。[35]
　　WhileLincolnwasslowlystrugglingoutofhislasteclipse，givingmostofhisattentiontothearmy，theCongressionalCabalwaslaboringassiduouslytoforcetheissueuponslavery。
　　Thekeenpoliticianswhocomposeditsawwithunerringvisionwhere，forthemoment，laytheiropportunity。TheycouldnotbeatthePresidentonanyoneissuethenbeforethecountry。
　　Noonefactionwasstrongenoughtobetheirstand-by。Onlybyacombinationofissuesandacoalitionoffactionscouldtheybuildupananti-Lincolnparty，check-matetheAdministration，andgetcontrolofthegovernment。TheyweregreatlyassistedbythefatuousnessoftheDemocrats。Thatpartywasinapeculiarsituation。Itsmostpositivecharacters，naturally，hadtakensidesfororagainstthegovernment。ThepowerfulSouthernerswhohadbeenitschiefleadersweremainlyintheConfederacy。SuchNorthernersasDouglasandStanton，andmanymore，hadgoneovertotheRepublicans。Suddenlythecontrolofthepartyorganizationhadfallenintothehandsofsecond-ratemen。Asbythestrokeofanenchanter’swand，menofsmallcaliberwho，hadtheoldconditionsremained，wouldhavelivedanddiedoflittleconsequencesawopeningbeforethemtheroleofleadership。Itwastoomuchfortheirmentalpoise。Againthesubjectiveelementinpolitics!TheDemocraticpartyforthedurationofthewarbecametheorganizationofLittleMen。Hadtheypossessedanygreatleaders，couldtheyhaverefusedtoplaypoliticsandrespondedtoLincoln’sall-partiespolicy，historymighthavebeendifferent。Buttheywerenotthatsort。Neitherdidtheyhavethecouragetogototheotherextremeandbecomearesoluteoppositionparty，wholeheartedlyandintelligentlyagainstthewar。Theyequivocated，theyobstructed，theyprofessedloyaltyandtheypractised-itwouldbehardtosaywhat!Soshort-sightedwastheirpoliticalgamethatitseffectcontinuallywastoplayintothehandsoftheirmostrelentlessenemies，thegrimJacobins。
　　Though，forabrieftimewhiletheenthusiasmafterSumterwasstillatitsheighttheyappearedtogoalongwiththeall-partiesprogram，theysoonrevealedtheirtruecourse。Intheautumnof1861，Lincolnstillhadsufficientholduponallfactionstomakeitseemlikelythathisall-parties。programwouldbegivenachance。TheRepublicansgenerallymadeoverturestotheDemocraticmanagers，offeringtocombineinacoalitionpartywithnoplatformbutthesupportofthewarandtherestorationoftheUnion。HerewasthetestoftheorganizationoftheLittleMen。Theinsignificantnewmanagers，intoxicatedbythesuddennessoftheiropportunity，rangfalse。Theyrejectedtheall-partiesprogramandinsistedonmaintainingtheirseparatepartyformation。[1]ThiswasaturningpointinLincoln’scareer。Thoughnearlytwoyearsweretopassbeforeheadmittedhisdefeat，theall-partiesprogramwasdoomedfromthathour。Throughoutthewinter，theDemocratsinCongress，thoughsteadilyambiguousintheirstatementsofprinciple，wereassteadilyhostiletoLincoln。
　　Iftheyhadanysettledpolicy，itwasnomorethananattempttoholdthebalanceofpoweramongthewarringfactionsoftheRepublicans。Byspringtimethegametheywereplayingwasobvious；alsoitsresults。TheyhadpreventedthePresidentfrombuildingupastrongAdministrationgroupwherewithhemighthavecounterbalancedtheJacobins。ThustheyhadreleasedtheJacobinsfromtheonepossiblerestraintthatmighthavekeptthemfrompursuingtheirowndevices。
　　Thespringof1862sawageneralrealignmentoffactions。ItwasthenthattheCongressionalCabalwonitsfirstsignificanttriumph。Hitherto，alltheRepublicanplatformshadbeenprogramsofdenial。AbrilliantnewmemberoftheSenate，johnSherman，bluntlytoldhiscolleaguesthattheRepublicanpartyhadalwaysstoodonthedefensive。Thatwasitsweakness。“I
　　donotknowanymeasureonwhichithastakenanaggressiveposition。“[2]Thecluetothepsychologyofthemomentwasintheragingdemandofthemassesforaprogramofassertion，foraggressivemeasures。ThePresidentwastryingtomeetthisdemandwithhisall-partiesprogram，withhispolicyofnationalism，exclusiveofeverythingelse。Andrecentlyhehadaddedthatotherassertion，hisinsistencethattheexecutiveincertainrespectswasindependentofthelegislative。Ofhisthreeassertions，one，theall-partiesprogram，wasalreadyonthewaytodefeatAnother，nationalism，asthePresidentinterpretedit，hadalienatedtheAbolitionists。Thethird，hisargumentforhimselfastribune，wasjustwhatyourcraftypoliticianmighttwist，pervert，loadwithfalsemeaningstohisheart’scontent。MenlessastutethanChandlerandWadecouldnothavefailedtoseewherefortunepointed。Theiropportunitylayinacombinationofthetwoissues。Abolitionandtheresistancetoexecutive“usurpation。“Theirproblemwastocreateananti-Lincolnpartythatshouldalsobeawarparty。TheircoalitionofaggressiveforcesmustaccepttheAbolitionistsasitsbackbone，butitmustalsoincludeallviolentelementsofwhateverpersuasion，andespeciallyallthosethatcouldbewroughtintofuryonthethemeofthePresidentasadespot。Aboveall，theircoalitionmustabsorbandthenexpressthefurioustempersodeartotheirownheartswhichtheyfondlybelieved-mistakenly，theyweredestinedtodiscover-wasthetemperofthecountry。
　　ItcannotbesaidthatthiswastheRepublicanpro-gram。ThePresident’sprogram，fullyaspositiveasthatoftheCabal，hadasgoodarighttoappropriatethepartylabel-aseventsweretoshow，abetterright。ButthepoweroftheCabalwasverygreat，andthefollowingitwasabletocommandinthecountryreachedalmosttheproportionsoftheterrible。A
　　factionalnameisneeded。FortheJacobins，theiralliesinCongress，theirfollowersinthecountry，fromthetimetheyacquiredapositiveprogram，anaccuratelabelistheVindictives。
　　Duringtheremainderofthesession，Congressmaybethoughtofashaving-whatCongressseldomhas-threedefinitegroups，Right，LeftandCenter。TheRightwastheVindictives；theLeft，theirreconcilableDemocrats；theCenterwascomposedchieflyofliberalRepublicansbutincludedafewDemocrats，thosewhorebelledagainstthepoliticalchicaneryoftheLittleMen。
　　ThepolicyoftheVindictiveswastoforceupontheAdministrationthedoubleissueofemancipationandthesupremacyofCongress。Therefore，theiraimwastopassabillfreeingtheslavesonthesoleauthorityofacongressionalact。Manyresolutions，manybills，allhavingthisendinview，wereintroduced。Somewereburiedincommittees；somewereremadeincommitteesandsubjectedtolongdebatebytheHouses；nowandthenonewaspassedupon。Butthespringworethroughandthesummercame，andstilltheVindictiveswerenotcertainlyincontrolofCongress。Nobilltofreeslavesbycongressionalactionsecuredamajorityvote。AtthesametimeitwasplainthatthestrengthoftheVindictiveswasslowly，steadily，growing。
　　OutsideCongress，theAbolitioniststooknewhope。Theyhadorganizedasystematicpropaganda。AtWashington，weeklymeetingswereheldintheSmithsonianInstitute，wherealltheirmostconspicuousleaders，Phillips，Emerson，Brownson，GarretSmith，madeaddresses。EverySundayaservicewasheldinthechamberoftheHouseofRepresentativesandthesermonwasalmostalwaysa“terrificarrangementofslavery。“Theirwatch-wordwas“AFreeUnionorDisintegration。“Thetreatmentoffugitiveslavesbycommandersinthefieldproducedaclamor。Lincolninsistedonstrictobediencetothetwolaws，theFugitiveSlaveActandtheFirstConfiscationAct。
　　Abolitionistssneeredat“allthisgabbleaboutthesacrednessoftheConstitution。“[3]ButLincolnwasnottobemoved。WhenGeneralHunter，takingaleaffromthebookofFremont，triedtoforcehishand，hedidnothesitate。Hunterhadissuedaproclamationbywhichtheslavesintheregionwherehecommandedwere“declaredforeverfree。“
　　ThiswasinMaywhenLincoln’sdifficultieswithMcClellanwereattheirheight；whentheCommitteewaszealouslywatchingtocatchhiminanysortofmistake；whentheHousewaswithinfourvotesofamajorityforemancipationbyactofCongress；[4]