Justice，thelastandgreatestofthefourcardinalvirtues，tookplace，accordingtothissystem，wheneachofthosethreefacultiesofthemindconfineditselftoitsproperoffice，withoutattemptingtoencroachuponthatofanyother；whenreasondirectedandpassionobeyed，andwheneachpassionperformeditsproperduty，andexerteditselftowardsitsproperobjecteasilyandwithoutreluctance，andwiththatdegreeofforceandenergy，whichwassuitabletothevalueofwhatitpursued。Inthisconsistedthatcompletevirtue，thatperfectproprietyofconduct，whichPlato，aftersomeoftheancientPythagoreans，denominatedJustice。
　　Theword，itistobeobserved，whichexpressesjusticeintheGreeklanguage，hasseveraldifferentmeanings；andasthecorrespondentwordinallotherlanguages，sofarasIknow，hasthesame，theremustbesomenaturalaffinityamongthosevarioussignifications。Inonesensewearesaidtodojusticetoourneighbourwhenweabstainfromdoinghimanypositiveharm，anddonotdirectlyhurthim，eitherinhisperson，orinhisestate，orinhisreputation。ThisisthatjusticewhichIhavetreatedofabove，theobservanceofwhichmaybeextortedbyforce，andtheviolationofwhichexposestopunishment。Inanothersensewearesaidnottodojusticetoourneighbourunlessweconceiveforhimallthatlove，respect，andesteem，whichhischaracter，hissituation，andhisconnexionwithourselves，rendersuitableandproperforustofeel，andunlessweactaccordingly。Itisinthissensethatwearesaidtodoinjusticetoamanofmeritwhoisconnectedwithus，thoughweabstainfromhurtinghimineveryrespect，ifwedonotexertourselvestoservehimandtoplacehiminthatsituationinwhichtheimpartialspectatorwouldbepleasedtoseehim。ThefirstsenseofthewordcoincideswithwhatAristotleandtheSchoolmencallcommutativejustice，andwithwhatGrotiuscallsthejustitiaexpletrix，whichconsistsinabstainingfromwhatisanother’s，andindoingvoluntarilywhateverwecanwithproprietybeforcedtodo。Thesecondsenseofthewordcoincideswithwhatsomehavecalleddistributivejustice，2*andwiththejustitiaattributrixofGrotius，whichconsistsinproperbeneficence，inthebecominguseofwhatisourown，andintheapplyingittothosepurposeseitherofcharityorgenerosity，towhichitismostsuitable，inoursituation，thatitshouldbeapplied。Inthissensejusticecomprehendsallthesocialvirtues:Thereisyetanothersenseinwhichthewordjusticeissometimestaken，stillmoreextensivethaneitheroftheformer，thoughverymucha-kintothelast；
　　andwhichrunstoo，sofarasIknow，throughalllanguages。Itisinthislastsensethatwearesaidtobeunjust，whenwedonotseemtovalueanyparticularobjectwiththatdegreeofesteem，ortopursueitwiththatdegreeofardourwhichtotheimpartialspectatoritmayappeartodeserveortobenaturallyfittedforexciting。Thuswearesaidtodoinjusticetoapoemorapicture，whenwedonotadmirethemenough，andwearesaidtodothemmorethanjusticewhenweadmirethemtoomuch。Inthesamemannerwearesaidtodoinjusticetoourselveswhenweappearnottogivesufficientattentiontoanyparticularobjectofself-interest。Inthislastsense，whatiscalledjusticemeansthesamethingwithexactandperfectproprietyofconductandbehaviour，andcomprehendsinit，notonlytheofficesofbothcommutativeanddistributivejustice，butofeveryothervirtue，ofprudence，offortitude，oftemperance。ItisinthislastsensethatPlatoevidentlyunderstandswhathecallsjustice，andwhich，therefore，accordingtohim，comprehendsinittheperfectionofeverysortofvirtue。
　　SuchistheaccountgivenbyPlatoofthenatureofvirtue，orofthattemperofmindwhichistheproperobjectofpraiseandapprobation。Itconsists，accordingtohim，inthatstateofmindinwhicheveryfacultyconfinesitselfwithinitsproperspherewithoutencroachinguponthatofanyother，andperformsitsproperofficewiththatprecisedegreeofstrengthandvigourwhichbelongstoit。Hisaccount，itisevident，coincidesineveryrespectwithwhatwehavesaidaboveconcerningtheproprietyofconduct。
　　II。Virtue，accordingtoAristotle，3*consistsinthehabitofmediocrityaccordingtorightreason。Everyparticularvirtue，accordingtohim，liesinakindofmiddlebetweentwooppositevices，ofwhichtheoneoffendsfrombeingtoomuch，theotherfrombeingtoolittleaffectedbyaparticularspeciesofobjects。Thusthevirtueoffortitudeorcourageliesinthemiddlebetweentheoppositevicesofcowardiceandofpresumptuousrashness，ofwhichtheoneoffendsfrombeingtoomuch，andtheotherfrombeingtoolittleaffectedbytheobjectsoffear。Thustoothevirtueoffrugalityliesinamiddlebetweenavariceandprofusion，ofwhichtheoneconsistsinanexcess，theotherinadefectoftheproperattentiontotheobjectsofself-interest。Magnanimity，inthesamemanner，liesinamiddlebetweentheexcessofarroganceandthedefectofpusillanimity，ofwhichtheoneconsistsintooextravagant，theotherintooweakasentimentofourownworthanddignity。Itisunnecessarytoobservethatthisaccountofvirtuecorrespondstooprettyexactlywithwhathasbeensaidaboveconcerningtheproprietyandimproprietyofconduct。
　　AccordingtoAristotle，4*indeed，virtuedidnotsomuchconsistinthosemoderateandrightaffections，asinthehabitofthismoderation。Inordertounderstandthis，itistobeobserved，thatvirtuemaybeconsideredeitherasthequalityofanaction，orasthequalityofaperson。Consideredasthequalityofanaction，itconsists，evenaccordingtoAristotle，inthereasonablemoderationoftheaffectionfromwhichtheactionproceeds，whetherthisdispositionbehabitualtothepersonornot。Consideredasthequalityofaperson，itconsistsinthehabitofthisreasonablemoderation，initshavingbecomethecustomaryandusualdispositionofthemind。Thustheactionwhichproceedsfromanoccasionalfitofgenerosityisundoubtedlyagenerousaction，butthemanwhoperformsit，isnotnecessarilyagenerousperson，becauseitmaybethesingleactionofthekindwhichheeverperformed。Themotiveanddispositionofheart，fromwhichthisactionwasperformed，mayhavebeenquitejustandproper:butasthishappymoodseemstohavebeentheeffectratherofaccidentalhumourthanofanythingsteadyorpermanentinthecharacter，itcanreflectnogreathonourontheperformer。Whenwedenominateacharactergenerousorcharitable，orvirtuousinanyrespect，wemeantosignifythatthedispositionexpressedbyeachofthoseappellationsistheusualandcustomarydispositionoftheperson。Butsingleactionsofanykind，howproperandsuitablesoever，areoflittleconsequencetoshowthatthisisthecase。
　　Ifasingleactionwassufficienttostampthecharacterofanyvirtueuponthepersonwhoperformedit，themostworthlessofmankind。mightlayclaimtoallthevirtues；sincethereisnomanwhohasnot，uponsomeoccasions，actedwithprudence，justice，temperance，andfortitude。Butthoughsingleactions，howlaudablesoever，reflectverylittlepraiseuponthepersonwhoperformsthem，asingleviciousactionperformedbyonewhoseconductisusuallyveryregular，greatlydiminishesandsometimesdestroysaltogetherouropinionofhisvirtue。Asingleactionofthiskindsufficientlyshowsthathishabitsarenotperfect，andthatheislesstobedependedupon，than，fromtheusualtrainofhisbehaviour，wemighthavebeenapttoimagine。
　　Aristotletoo，5*whenhemadevirtuetoconsistinpracticalhabits，haditprobablyinhisviewtoopposethedoctrineofPlato，whoseemstohavebeenofopinionthatjustsentimentsandreasonablejudgmentsconcerningwhatwasfittobedoneortobeavoided，werealonesufficienttoconstitutethemostperfectvirtue。Virtue，accordingtoPlato，mightbeconsideredasaspeciesofscience，andnoman，hethought，couldseeclearlyanddemonstrativelywhatwasrightandwhatwaswrong，andnotactaccordingly。Passionmightmakeusactcontrarytodoubtfulanduncertainopinions，nottoplainandevidentjudgments。Aristotle，onthecontrary，wasofopinion，thatnoconvictionoftheunderstandingwascapableofgettingthebetterofinveteratehabits，andthatgoodmoralsarosenotfromknowledgebutfromaction。
　　III。AccordingtoZeno，6*thefounderoftheStoicaldoctrine，everyanimalwasbynaturerecommendedtoitsowncare，andwasendowedwiththeprincipleofself-love，thatitmightendeavourtopreserve，notonlyitsexistence，butallthedifferentpartsofitsnature，inthebestandmostperfectstateofwhichtheywerecapable。
　　Theself-loveofmanembraced，ifImaysayso，hisbodyandallitsdifferentmembers，hismindandallitsdifferentfacultiesandpowers，anddesiredthepreservationandmaintenanceofthemallintheirbestandmostperfectcondition。
　　Whatevertendedtosupportthisstateofexistencewas，therefore，bynaturepointedouttohimasfittobechosen；andwhatevertendedtodestroyit，asfittoberejected。Thushealth，strength，agilityandeaseofbodyaswellastheeternalconveniencieswhichcouldpromotethese；wealth，power，honours，therespectandesteemofthosewelivewith；werenaturallypointedouttousasthingseligible，andofwhichthepossessionwaspreferabletothewant。Ontheotherhand，sickness，infirmity，unwieldiness，painofbody，aswellasalltheeternalinconveniencieswhichtendtooccasionorbringonanyofthem；
　　poverty，thewantofauthority，thecontemptorhatredofthosewelivewith；were，inthesamemanner，pointedouttousasthingstobeshunnedandavoided。Ineachofthosetwooppositeclassesofobjects，thereweresomewhichappearedtobemoretheobjectseitherofchoiceorrejection，thanothersinthesameclass。Thus，inthefirstclass，healthappearedevidentlypreferabletostrength，andstrengthtoagility；reputationtopower，andpowertoriches。Andthustoo，inthesecondclass，sicknesswasmoretobeavoidedthanunwieldinessofbody，ignominythanpoverty，andpovertythanthelossofpower。Virtueandtheproprietyofconductconsistedinchoosingandrejectingalldifferentobjectsandcircumstancesaccordingastheywerebynaturerenderedmoreorlesstheobjectsofchoiceorrejection；
　　inselectingalwaysfromamongtheseveralobjectsofchoicepresentedtous，thatwhichwasmosttobechosen，whenwecouldnotobtainthemall；andinselectingtoo，outoftheseveralobjectsofrejectionofferedtous，thatwhichwasleasttobeavoided，whenitwasnotinourpowertoavoidthemall。Bychoosingandrejectingwiththisjustandaccuratediscernment，bythusbestowinguponeveryobjecttheprecisedegreeofattentionitdeserved，accordingtotheplacewhichitheldinthisnaturalscaleofthings，wemaintained，accordingtotheStoics，thatperfectrectitudeofconductwhichconstitutedtheessenceofvirtue。Thiswaswhattheycalledtoliveconsistently，toliveaccordingtonature，andtoobeythoselawsanddirectionswhichnature，ortheAuthorofnature，hadprescribedforourconduct。
　　SofartheStoicalideaofproprietyandvirtueisnotverydifferentfromthatofAristotleandtheancientPeripatetics。
　　Amongthoseprimaryobjectswhichnaturehadrecommendedtousaseligible，wastheprosperityofourfamily，ofourrelations，ofourfriends，ofourcountry，ofmankind，andoftheuniverseingeneral。Nature，too，hadtaughtus，thatastheprosperityoftwowaspreferabletothatofone，thatofmany，orofall，mustbeinfinitelymoreso。Thatweourselveswerebutone，andthatconsequentlywhereverourprosperitywasinconsistentwiththat，eitherofthewhole，orofanyconsiderablepartofthewhole，itought，eveninourownchoice，toyieldtowhatwassovastlypreferable。Asalltheeventsinthisworldwereconductedbytheprovidenceofawise，powerful，andgoodGod，wemightbeassuredthatwhateverhappenedtendedtotheprosperityandperfectionofthewhole。Ifweourselves，therefore，wereinpoverty，insickness，orinanyothercalamity，weought，firstofall，touseourutmostendeavours，sofarasjusticeandourdutytootherswouldallow，torescueourselvesfromthisdisagreeablecircumstance。Butif，afterallwecoulddo，wefoundthisimpossible，weoughttorestsatisfiedthattheorderandperfectionoftheuniverserequiredthatweshouldinthemeantimecontinueinthissituation。Andastheprosperityofthewholeshould，eventous，appearpreferabletosoinsignificantapartasourselves，oursituation，whateveritwas，oughtfromthatmomenttobecometheobjectofourliking，ifwewouldmaintainthatcompleteproprietyandrectitudeofsentimentandconductinwhichconsistedtheperfectionofournature。If，indeed，anyopportunityofextricatingourselvesshouldoffer，itbecameourdutytoembraceit。Theorderoftheuniverse，itwasevident，nolongerrequiredourcontinuanceinthissituation，andthegreatDirectoroftheworldplainlycalleduponustoleaveit，bysoclearlypointingouttheroadwhichweweretofollow。Itwasthesamecasewiththeadversityofourrelations，ourfriends，ourcountry。If，withoutviolatinganymoresacredobligation，itwasinourpowertopreventorputanendtotheircalamity，itundoubtedlywasourdutytodoso。