subordinatetothatpre-eminentlycertainandirrefragableintuition-whichstandsasthefirstprincipleofUtilitarianism；then，ofcourse，itwillbetheUtilitarianCodetowhichweshallbelievetheDivineSanctionstobeattached。
　　Or，again，wemayarguethus。If——asalltheologiansagree——wearetoconceiveGodasactingforsomeend，wemustconceivethatendtobeUniversalGood，and，ifUtilitariansareright，UniversalHappiness:andwecannotsupposethatinaworldmorallygoverneditcanbeprudentforanymantoactinconsciousoppositiontowhatwebelievetobetheDivineDesign。HenceifinanycaseaftercalculatingtheconsequencesoftwoalternativesofconductwechoosethatwhichseemslikelytobelessconducivetoHappinessgenerally，weshallbeactinginamannerforwhichwecannotbutexpecttosuffer。
　　Tothisithasbeenobjected，thatobservationoftheactualworldshowsusthatthehappinessofsentientbeingsissoimperfectlyattainedinit，andwithsolargeanintermixtureofpainandmisery，thatwecannotreallyconceiveUniversalHappinesstobeGod’send，unlessweadmitthatHeisnotOmnipotent。AndnodoubttheassertionthatGodisomnipotentwillrequiretobeunderstoodwithsomelimitation；butperhapswithnogreaterlimitationthanhasalwaysbeenimplicitlyadmittedbythoughtfultheologians。FortheseseemalwaystohaveallowedthatsomethingsareimpossibletoGod:as，forexample，tochangethepast。AndperhapsifourknowledgeoftheUniversewerecomplete，wemightdiscernthequantumofhappinessultimatelyattainedinittobeasgreatascouldbeattainedwithouttheaccomplishmentofwhatweshouldthenseetobejustasinconceivableandabsurdaschangingthepast。This，however，isaviewwhichitbelongsrathertothetheologiantodevelop。IshouldratherurgethattheredoesnotseemtobeanyotheroftheordinaryinterpretationsofGoodaccordingtowhichitwouldappeartobemorecompletelyrealisedintheactualuniverse。Forthewonderfulperfectionsofworkthatweadmireinthephysicalworldareyeteverywheremingledwithimperfection，andsubjecttodestructionanddecay:andsimilarlyintheworldofhumanconductVirtueisatleastasmuchbalancedbyViceasHappinessisbymisery。Sothat，iftheethicalreasoningthatledustointerpretUltimateGoodasHappinessissound，thereseemsnoargumentfromNaturalTheologytosetagainstit。
　　If，then，wemayassumetheexistenceofsuchaBeing，asGod，bytheconsensusoftheologians，isconceivedtobe，itseemsthatUtilitariansmaylegitimatelyinfertheexistenceofDivinesanctionstothecodeofsocialdutyasconstructedonaUtilitarianbasis；andsuchsanctionswould，ofcourse，sufficetomakeitalwayseveryone’sinteresttopromoteuniversalhappinesstothebestofhisknowledge。Itis，however，desirable，beforeweconclude，toexaminecarefullythevalidityofthisassumption，insofarasitissupportedonethicalgroundsalone。Forbytheresultofsuchanexaminationwillbedetermined，aswenowsee，theveryimportantquestionwhetherethicalsciencecanbeconstructedonanindependentbasis；orwhetheritisforcedtoborrowafundamentalandindispensablepremissfromTheologyorsomesimilarsource。Inorderfairlytoperformthisexamination，letusreflectupontheclearestandmostcertainofourmoralintuitions。IfindthatIundoubtedlyseemtoperceive，asclearlyandcertainlyasIseeanyaxiominArithmeticorGeometry，thatitis`right’and`reasonable’formetotreatothersasIshouldthinkthatImyselfoughttobetreatedundersimilarconditions，andtodowhatIbelievetobeultimatelyconducivetouniversalGoodorHappiness。ButIcannotfindinseparablyconnectedwiththisconviction，andsimilarlyattainablebymerereflectiveintuition，anycognitionthatthereactuallyisaSupremeBeingwhowilladequatelyrewardmeforobeyingtheserulesofduty，orpunishmeforviolatingthem。
　　Or，——omittingthestrictlytheologicalelementoftheproposition，——I
　　maysaythatIdonotfindinmymoralconsciousnessanyintuition，claimingtobeclearandcertain，thattheperformanceofdutywillbeadequatelyrewardedanditsviolationpunished。[3]Ifeelindeedadesire，apparentlyinseparablefromthemoralsentiments，thatthisresultmayberealisednotonlyinmyowncasebutuniversally；butthemereexistenceofthedesirewouldnotgofartoestablishtheprobabilityofitsfulfilment，consideringthelargeproportionofhumandesiresthatexperienceshowstobedoomedtodisappointment。Ialsojudgethatinacertainsensethisresultoughttoberealised:inthisjudgment，however，Ioughtisnotusedinastrictlyethicalmeaning；itonlyexpressesthevitalneedthatourPracticalReasonfeelsofprovingorpostulatingthisconnexionofVirtueandself-interest，ifitistobemadeconsistentwithitself。
　　ForthenegationoftheconnexionmustforceustoadmitanultimateandfundamentalcontradictioninourapparentintuitionsofwhatisReasonableinconduct；andfromthisadmissionitwouldseemtofollowthattheapparentlyintuitiveoperationofthePracticalReason，manifestedinthesecontradictoryjudgments，isafterallillusory。
　　Idonotmeanthatifwegaveupthehopeofattainingapracticalsolutionofthisfundamentalcontradiction，throughanylegitimatelyobtainedconclusionorpostulateastothemoralorderoftheworld，itwouldbecomereasonableforustoabandonmoralityaltogether:butitwouldseemnecessarytoabandontheideaofrationalisingitcompletely。Weshoulddoubtlessstill，notonlyfromself-interest，butalsothroughsympathyandsentimentsprotectiveofsocialwellbeing，impartedbyeducationandsustainedbycommunicationwithothermen，feeladesireforthegeneralobservanceofrulesconducivetogeneralhappiness；andpracticalreasonwouldstillimpelusdecisivelytotheperformanceofdutyinthemoreordinarycasesinwhichwhatisrecognisedasdutyisinharmonywithself-interestproperlyunderstood。Butintherarercasesofarecognisedconflictbetweenself-interestandduty，practicalreason，beingdividedagainstitself，wouldceasetobeamotiveoneitherside；theconflictwouldhavetobedecidedbythecomparativepreponderanceofoneorotheroftwogroupsofnon-rationalimpulses。
　　Ifthenthereconciliationofdutyandself-interestistoberegardedasahypothesislogicallynecessarytoavoidafundamentalcontradictioninonechiefdepartmentofourthought，itremainstoaskhowfarthisnecessityconstitutesasufficientreasonforacceptingthishypothesis。This，however，isaprofoundlydifficultandcontrovertedquestion，thediscussionofwhichbelongsrathertoatreatiseonGeneralPhilosophythantoaworkontheMethodsofEthics:asitcouldnotbesatisfactorilyanswered，withoutageneralexaminationofthecriteriaoftrueandfalsebeliefs。Thosewhoholdthattheedificeofphysicalscienceisreallyconstructedofconclusionslogicallyinferredfromself-evidentpremises，mayreasonablydemandthatanypracticaljudgmentsclaimingphilosophiccertaintyshouldbebasedonanequallyfirmfoundation。Ifontheotherbandwefindthatinoursupposedknowledgeoftheworldofnaturepropositionsarecommonlytakentobeuniversallytrue，whichyetseemtorestonnoothergroundsthanthatwehaveastrongdispositiontoacceptthem，andthattheyareindispensabletothesystematiccoherenceofourbeliefs，——itwillbemoredifficulttorejectasimilarlysupportedassumptioninethics，withoutopeningthedoortouniversalscepticism。
　　[Reprinted，withsomeomissions，fromMIND，1888，Vol。XIII，No。51。]
　　Myaimistoshowthat，indifferentpartsofKant’sexpositionofhisdoctrine，twoessentiallydifferentconceptionsareexpressedbythesamewordfreedom；whileyetKantdoesnotappeartobeconsciousofanyvariationinthemeaningoftheterm。
　　[Intheonesense，Freedom=Rationality，sothatamanisfreeinproportionasheactsinaccordancewithReason。]
　　IdonotintheleastobjecttothisuseofthetermFreedom，onaccountofitsdeviationfromordinaryusage。Onthecontrary，Ithinkithasmuchsupportinmen’snaturalexpressionofordinarymoralexperienceindiscourse。
　　Intheconflictthatiscontinuallygoingoninallofus，betweennon-rationalimpulsesandwhatwerecogniseasdictatesofpracticalreason，weareinthehabitofidentifyingourselveswiththelatterratherthanwiththeformer:asWhewellsays，``wespeakofDesire，Love，Anger，asmasteringus，andofourselvesascontrollingthem’’——wecontinuallycallmen``slaves’’
　　ofappetiteorpassion，whereasnoonewasevercalledaslaveofreason。
　　If，therefore，thetermFreedombadnotalreadybeenappropriatedbymoraliststoanothermeaning——ifitweremerelyaquestionoftakingitfromordinarydiscourseandstampingitwithgreaterprecisionforpurposesofethicaldiscussion——Ishouldmakenoobjectiontothestatementthat``amanisafreeagentinproportionasheactsrationally’’。But，whatEnglishdefendersofman’sfreeagencyhavegenerallybeenconcernedtomaintain，isthat``manhasafreedomofchoicebetweengoodandevil’’，whichisrealisedormanifestedwhenhedeliberatelychooseseviljustasmuchaswhenhedeliberatelychoosesgood；anditisdearthatifwesaythatamanisafreeagentinproportionasbeactsrationally，wecannotalsosay，inthesamesenseoftheterm，thatitisbyhisfreechoicethatheactsirrationallywhenhedoessoact。ThenotionsofFreedommustbeadmittedtobefundamentallydifferentinthetwostatements:andthoughusagemightfairlyallowthewordFreedomtorepresenteithernotion，ifonlyoneorotheroftheabove-mentionedpropositionswereaffirmed，touseittorepresentboth，inaffirmingbothpropositions，isobviouslyinconvenient；anditimpliesaconfusionofthoughtsotouseit，withoutpointingoutthedifferenceofmeaning。
　　Ifthisbeadmitted，thenextthingistoshowthatKantdoesusetheterminthisdoubleway。
　　Inarguingthis，itwillbeconvenienttohavenamesforwhatweadmittobetwodistinctideas。Accordingly，thekindoffreedomwhichIfirstmentioned——whichamanissaidtomanifestmoreinproportionasheactsmoreundertheguidanceofreason——shallbereferredtoas`Good’or`RationalFreedom’，andthefreedomthatismanifestedinchoosingbetweengoodandevilshallbecalled`Neutral’or`MoralFreedom’。[1]
　　ButbeforeIproceedtothedifferentpassagesofKant’sexpositioninwhich`GoodFreedom’and`NeutralFreedom’respectivelyoccur，itseemsdesirabletodistinguishthislatterfromawidernotionwithwhichitmaypossiblybeconfounded，andwhichitwouldbeclearlywrongtoattributetoKant。Imeanthe``powerofactingwithoutamotive’’，whichReidandotherwriters，onwhatusedtobecalledtheLibertarianside，havethoughtitnecessarytoclaim。``Ifamancouldnotactwithoutamotive’’，saysReid，``hecouldhavenopower’’——thatis，inReid’smeaning，nofreeagency——``atall’’。ThisconceptionofFreedom——whichImayconvenientlydistinguishas`CapriciousFreedom’——is，asIsaid，certainlynotKantian:notonlydoesheexpresslyrepudiateit，butnowhere——sofarasIknow——doesheunconsciouslyintroduceit。Indeeditisincompatiblewithanyandeverypartofhisexplanationofhumanvolition:theoriginalityandinterestofhisdefenceofNeutralFreedom——thepowerofchoicebetweengoodandevil——liesinitscompleteavoidanceofCapriciousFreedomorthepowerofactingwithoutamotiveinanyparticularvolition。
　　[This]distinctionhelpsmetounderstandhow[itisthat]manyintelligentreadershavefailedtoseeinKant’sexpositionthetwoFreedoms-GoodorRationalFreedomandNeutralorMoralFreedom-whichIfindinKant。TheyhavetheirviewfixedonthedifferencebetweenRationalorMoralFreedom，whichKantmaintains，andtheFreedomofCaprice，whichheundoubtedlyrepudiates:andarethusledtooverlookwithhimthedistinctionbetweentheFreedomthatwerealiseormanifestinproportionaswedoright，andtheFreedomthatisrealisedormanifestedequallyinchoosingeitherrightorwrong。WhenwehaveonceputcompletelyoutofviewtheFreedomofCaprice，thepowerofActingwithoutamotive，oragainstthestrongestmotivewhenthecompetitionisamongmerelynaturalornon-rationaldesiresoraversions，-whenwehaveagreedtoexcludethis，andtoconcentrateattentiononthedifferencebetweenGoodFreedomandNeutralFreedom-IventuretothinkthatnoonecanavoidseeingeachmemberofthislatterantithesisinKant。Itwillbeeasilyunderstoodthat，ashedoesnothimselfdistinguishthetwoconceptions，itisnaturallyimpossibleforthemostcarefulreaderalwaystotellwhichistobeunderstood；buttherearemanypassageswherehisargumentunmistakablyrequirestheone，andmanyotherpassageswhereitunmistakablyrequirestheother。Speakingbroadly，Imaysaythat，whereverKanthastoconnectthenotionofFreedomwiththatofMoralResponsibilityormoralimputation，he，likeallothermoralistswhohavemaintainedFreeWillinthisconnexion，meanschiefly，butnotsolelyNeutralFreedom——Freedomexhibitedinchoosingwrongasmuchasinchoosingright。Indeed，insuchpassagesitiswiththeFreedomofthewrong-chooserthatheisprimarilyconcerned:sinceitisthewrong-chooserthatheespeciallywishestopreventfromshiftinghisresponsibilityontocausesbeyondhiscontrol。Ontheotherhand，whenwhathehastoproveisthepossibilityofdisinterestedobediencetoLawassuch，withouttheinterventionofsensibleimpulses，whenheseekstoexhibittheindependenceofReasonininfluencingchoice，theninmanythoughnotallhisstatementsheexplicitlyidentifiesFreedom。withthisindependenceofReason，andthusdearlyimpliesthepropositionthatamanisfreeinproportionasheactsrationally。
　　Asanexampleofthefirstkind，Iwilltakethepassagetowardsthecloseofchap。iii。ofthe``AnalyticofPracticalReason’’，[2]wherehetreats，initsbearingonMoralResponsibility，hispeculiarmetaphysicaldoctrineofadoublekindofcausationinhumanactions。AccordingtoKant，everysuchaction，regardedasaphenomenondeterminedintime，mustbethoughtasanecessaryresultofdeterminingcausesinantecedenttime——otherwiseitsexistencewouldbeinconceivable——butitmaybealsoregardedinrelationtotheagentconsideredasathing-in-himself，as。the``noü；menon’’ofwhichtheactionisaphenomenon:andtheconceptionofFreedommaybeappliedtotheagentsoconsideredinrelationtohisphenomena。Forsincehisexistenceasanoü；menonisnotsubjecttotime-conditions，nothinginthisnoü；menalexistencecomesundertheprincipleofdeterminationbyantecedentcauses:hence，asKantsays，``inthishisexistencenothingisantecedenttothedeterminationofhiswill，buteveryaction？eventhewholeseriesofhisexistenceasasensiblebeing，isintheconsciousnessofhissupersensibleexistencenothingbuttheresultofhiscausalityasanoü；menon’’。Thisisthewell-knownmetaphysicalsolutionofthedifficultyofreconcilingFreeWillwiththeUniversalityofphysicalcausation: