Now，insofarasUtilitarianmoralitycoincideswiththatofCommonSense——aswehaveseenthatitdoesinthemain——thisinvestigationhasbeenpartlyperformedinchap。v。ofBookii。Itthereappearedthatwhileinanytolerablestateofsocietytheperformanceofdutiestowardsothersandtheexerciseofsocialvirtuesseemgenerallylikelytocoincidewiththeattainmentofthegreatestpossiblehappinessinthelongrunforthevirtuousagent，stilltheuniversalityandcompletenessofthiscoincidenceareatleastincapableofempiricalproof:andthat，indeed，themorecarefullyweanalyseandestimatethedifferentsanctions——Legal，Social，andConscientious——consideredasoperatingundertheactualconditionsofhumanlife，themoredifficultitseemstobelievethattheycanbealwaysadequatetoproducethiscoincidence。
　　ThenaturaleffectofthisargumentuponaconvincedUtilitarianismerelytomakehimanxioustoaltertheactualconditionsofhumanlife:anditwouldcertainlybeamostvaluablecontributiontotheactualhappinessofmankind，ifwecouldsoimprovetheadjustmentofthemachineofLawinanysociety，andsostimulateanddirectthecommonawardsofpraiseandblame，andsodevelopandtrainthemoralsenseofthemembersofthecommunity，astorenderitclearlyprudentforeveryindividualtopromoteasmuchaspossiblethegeneralgood。However，wearenotnowconsideringwhataconsistentUtilitarianwilltrytoeffectforthefuture，butwhataconsistentEgoististodointhepresent。Anditmustbeadmittedthat，asthingsare，whateverdifferenceexistsbetweenUtilitarianmoralityandthatofCommonSenseisofsuchakindastorenderthecoincidencewithEgoismstillmoreimprobableinthecaseoftheformer。ForwehaveseenthatUtilitarianismismorerigidthanCommonSenseinexactingthesacrificeoftheagent’sprivateinterestswheretheyareincompatiblewiththegreatesthappinessofthegreatestnumber:andofcourseinsofarastheUtilitarian’sprinciplesbringhimintoconflictwithanyofthecommonlyacceptedrulesofmorality，thewholeforceoftheSocialSanctionoperatestodeterhimfromwhatheconceivestobehisduty。
　　Thereare，however，writersoftheUtilitarianschoolwhoseemtomaintainorimply，thatbyduecontemplationoftheparamountimportanceofSympathyasanelementofhumanhappinessweshallbeledtoseethecoincidenceofthegoodofeachwiththegoodofall。Inopposingthisview，Iamasfaraspossiblefromanywishtodepreciatethevalueofsympathyasasourceofhappinesseventohumanbeingsasatpresentconstituted。IndeedIamofopinionthatitspleasuresandpainsreallyconstituteagreatpartofthatinternalrewardofsocialvirtue，andpunishmentofsocialmisconduct，whichinBookii。chap。v。Iroughlysetdownasduetothemoralsentiments。For，infact，thoughIcantosomeextentdistinguishsympatheticfromstrictlymoralfeelingsinintrospectiveanalysisofmyownconsciousness，Icannotsaypreciselyinwhatproportionthesetwoelementsarecombined。Forinstance:Iseemabletodistinguishthe``senseoftheignobilityofEgoism’’ofwhichIhavebeforespoken——which，inmyview，isthenormalemotionalconcomitantorexpressionofthemoralintuitionthattheGoodofthewholeisreasonablytobepreferredtotheGoodofapart——fromthejarofsympatheticdiscomfortwhichattendstheconsciouschoiceofmyownpleasureattheexpenseofpainorlosstoothers；
　　butIfinditimpossibletodeterminewhatforcetheformersentimentwouldhaveifactuallyseparatedfromthelatter，andIaminclinedtothinkthatthetwokindsoffeelingareveryvariouslycombinedindifferentindividuals。Perhaps，indeed，wemaytraceagenerallawofvariationintherelativeproportionofthesetwoelementsasexhibitedinthedevelopmentofthemoralconsciousnessbothintheraceandinindividuals；foritseemsthatatacertainstageofthisdevelopmentthemindismoresusceptibletoemotionsconnectedwithabstractmoralideasandrulespresentedasabsolute；whileafteremergingfromthisstageandbeforeenteringitthefeelingsthatbelongtopersonalrelationsarestronger。CertainlyinaUtilitarian’smindsympathytendstobecomeaprominentelementofallinstinctivemoralfeelingsthatrefertosocialconduct；asinhisviewtherationalbasisofthemoralimpulsemustultimatelylieinsomepleasurewonorpainsavedforhimselforforothers；sothatheneverhastosacrificehimselftoanImpersonalLaw，butalwaysforsomebeingorbeingswithwhomhehasatleastsomedegreeoffellow-feeling。
　　Butbesidesadmittingtheactualimportanceofsympatheticpleasurestothemajorityofmankind，Ishouldgofurtherandmaintainthat，onempiricalgroundsalone，enlightenedself-interestwoulddirectmostmentofosteranddeveloptheirsympatheticsusceptibilitiestoagreaterextentthanisnowcommonlyattained。TheeffectivenessofButler’sfamousargumentagainstthevulgarantithesisbetweenSelf-loveandBenevolenceisundeniable:anditseemsscarcelyextravaganttosaythat，amidalltheprofusewasteofthemeansofhappinesswhichmencommit，thereisnoimprudencemoreflagrantthanthatofSelfishnessintheordinarysenseoftheterm，——thatexcessiveconcentrationofattentionontheindividual’sownhappinesswhichrendersitimpossibleforhimtofeelanystronginterestinthepleasuresandpainsofothers。Theperpetualprominenceofselfthathenceresultstendstodepriveallenjoymentsoftheirkeennessandzest，andproducerapidsatietyandennui:theselfishmanmissesthesenseofelevationandenlargementgivenbywideinterests；hemissesthemoresecureandserenesatisfactionthatattendscontinuallyonactivitiesdirectedtowardsendsmorestableinprospectthananindividual’shappinesscanbe；hemissesthepeculiarrichsweetness，dependinguponasortofcomplexreverberationofsympathy，whichisalwaysfoundinservicesrenderedtothosewhomweloveandwhoaregrateful。Heismadetofeelinathousandvariousways，accordingtothedegreeofrefinementwhichhisnaturehasattained，thediscordbetweentherhythmsofhisownlifeandofthatlargerlifeofwhichhisownisbutaninsignificantfraction。
　　Butallowingallthis，ityetseemstomeascertainasanyconclusionarrivedatbyhedonisticcomparisoncanbe，thattheutmostdevelopmentofsympathy，intensiveandextensive，whichisnowpossibletoanybutaveryfewexceptionalpersons，wouldnotcauseaperfectcoincidencebetweenUtilitariandutyandself-interest。HereitseemstomethatwhatwassaidinBookii。chap。
　　v。§；4，toshowtheinsufficiencyoftheConscientiousSanction，appliesequally，mutatismutandis，toSympathy。Supposeamanfindsthataregardforthegeneralgood——UtilitarianDuty——demandsfromhimasacrifice，orextremerisk，oflife。Thereareperhapsoneortwohumanbeingssodeartohimthattheremainderofalifesavedbysacrificingtheirhappinesstohisownwouldbeworthlesstohimfromanegoisticpointofview。Butitisdoubtfulwhethermanymen，``sittingdowninacoolhour’’tomaketheestimate，wouldaffirmeventhis:andofcoursethatparticularportionofthegeneralhappiness，forwhichoneiscalledupontosacrificeone’sown，mayeasilybethehappinessofpersonsnotespeciallydeartoone。
　　Butagain，fromthisnormallimitationofourkeenestandstrongestsympathytoaverysmallcircleofhumanbeings，itresultsthattheverydevelopmentofsympathymayoperatetoincreasetheweightthrownintothescaleagainstUtilitarianduty。Thereareveryfewpersons，howeverstronglyandwidelysympathetic，whoaresoconstitutedastofeelforthepleasuresandpainsofmankindgenerallyadegreeofsympathyatallcommensuratewiththeirconcernforwifeorchildren，orlover，orintimatefriend:andifanytrainingoftheaffectionsisatpresentpossiblewhichwouldmateriallyalterthisproportioninthegeneraldistributionofoursympathy，itscarcelyseemsthatsuchatrainingistoberecommendedasonthewholefelicific。
　　AndthuswhenUtilitarianDutycallsonustosacrificenotonlyourownpleasuresbutthehappinessofthosewelovetothegeneralgood，theverysanctiononwhichUtilitarianismmostreliesmustactpowerfullyinoppositiontoitsprecepts。
　　Butevenapartfromtheseexceptionalcases——whichareyetsufficienttodecidetheabstractquestion——itseemsthatthecourseofconductbywhichamanwouldmostfullyreaptherewardsofsympathysofarastheyareempiricallyascertainablewilloftenbeverydifferentfromthattowhichasinceredesiretopromotethegeneralhappinesswoulddirecthim。ForthereliefofdistressandcalamityisanimportantpartofUtilitarianduty:butasthestateofthepersonrelievedisonthewholepainful，itwouldappearthatsympathyunderthesecircumstancesmustbeasourceofpainratherthanpleasure，inproportiontoitsintensity。
　　Itisprobablytrue，asageneralrule，thatinthereliefofdistressotherelementsofthecomplexpleasureofbenevolencedecidedlyoutweighthissympatheticpain:——fortheeffusionofpityisitselfpleasurable，andwecommonlyfeelmorekeenlythatameliorationofthesufferer’sstatewhichisduetoourexertionsthanwedohispainotherwisecaused，andthereisfurtherthepleasurethatwederivefromhisgratitude，andthepleasurethatisthenormalreflexofactivitydirectedunderastrongimpulsetowardsapermanentlyvaluedend。Still，whenthedistressisbitterandcontinued，andsuchaswecanonlypartiallymitigatebyallourefforts，thephilanthropist’ssympatheticdiscomfortmustnecessarilybeconsiderable；
　　andtheworkofcombatingmisery，thoughnotdevoidofelevatedhappiness，willbemuchlesshappyonthewholethanmanyotherformsofactivity；
　　whileyetitmaybetojustthisworkthatDutyseemstosummonus。Oragain，amanmayfindthathecanbestpromotethegeneralhappinessbyworkingincomparativesolitudeforendsthatheneverhopestoseerealised，orbyworkingchieflyamongandforpersonsforwhomhecannotfeelmuchaffection，orbydoingwhatmustalienateorgrievethosewhomhelovesbest，ormustmakeitnecessaryforhimtodispensewiththemostintimateofhumanties。Inshort，thereseemtobenumberlesswaysinwhichthedictatesofthatRationalBenevolence，whichasaUtilitarianheisboundabsolutelytoobey，mayconflictwiththatindulgenceofkindaffectionswhichShaftesburyandhisfollowerssopersuasivelyexhibitasitsownreward。
　　Itseems，then，thatwemustconclude，fromtheargumentsgiveninBookii。chap。v。，supplementedbythediscussionintheprecedingsection，thattheinseparableconnexionbetweenUtilitarianDutyandthegreatesthappinessoftheindividualwhoconformstoitcannotbesatisfactorilydemonstratedonempiricalgrounds。HenceanothersectionoftheUtilitarianschoolhaspreferredtothrowtheweightofDutyontheReligiousSanction:andthisprocedurehasbeenpartlyadoptedbysomeofthosewhohavechieflydweltonsympathyasamotive。FromthispointofviewtheUtilitarianCodeisconceivedastheLawofGod，whoistoberegardedashavingcommandedmentopromotethegeneralhappiness，andashavingannouncedanintentionofrewardingthosewhoobeyHiscommandsandpunishingthedisobedient。ItisclearthatifwefeelconvincedthatanOmnipotentBeinghas，inwhateverway，signifiedsuchcommandsandannouncements，arationalegoistcanwantnofurtherinducementtoframehislifeonUtilitarianprinciples。Itonlyremainstoconsiderhowthisconvictionisattained。
　　ThisiscommonlythoughttobeeitherbysupernaturalRevelation，orbythenaturalexerciseofReason，orinbothways。Asregardstheformeritistobeobservedthat——withafewexceptions——themoralistswhoholdthatGodhasdisclosedHislaweithertospecialindividualsinpastageswhohaveleftawrittenrecordofwhatwasrevealedtothem，ortoapermanentsuccessionofpersonsappointedinaparticularmanner，ortoreligiouspersonsgenerallyinsomesupernaturalway，donotconsiderthatitistheUtilitarianCodethathasthusbeenrevealed，butrathertherulesofCommon-Sensemoralitywithsomespecialmodificationsandadditions。
　　Still，asMillhasurged，insofarasUtilitarianismismorerigorousthanCommonSenseinexactingthesacrificeoftheindividual’shappinesstothatofmankindgenerally，itisstrictlyinaccordancewiththemostcharacteristicteachingofChristianity。Itseems，however，unnecessarytodiscussthepreciserelationofdifferentRevelationalCodestoUtilitarianism，asitwouldbegoingbeyondourprovincetoinvestigatethegroundsonwhichaDivineoriginhasbeenattributedtothem。
　　Insofar，however，asaknowledgeofGod’slawisbelievedtobeattainablebytheReason，EthicsandTheologyseemtobesocloselyconnectedthatwecannotsharplyseparatetheirprovinces。For，aswesaw，ithasbeenwidelymaintained，thattherelationofmoralrulestoaDivineLawgiverisimplicitlycognisedintheactofthoughtbywhichwediscerntheserulestobebinding。Andnodoubtthetermssuchas`moralobligation’，whichwecommonlyuseinspeakingoftheserules，arenaturallysuggestiveofLegalSanctionsandsoofaSovereignbywhomtheseareannouncedandenforced。IndeedmanythinkerssinceLockehaverefusedtoadmitanyothermeaninginthetermsRight，Duty，etc。，exceptthatofaruleimposedbyalawgiver。Thisview，however，seemsopposedtoCommonSense；asmaybe，perhaps，mosteasilyshownbypointingoutthattheDivineLawgiverisHimselfconceivedasaMoralAgent；i。e。asprescribingwhatisright，anddesigningwhatisgood。Itisclearthatinthisconceptionatleastthenotions`right’and`good’areusedabsolutely，withoutanyreferencetoasuperiorlawgiver；andthattheyarehereusedinasensenotessentiallydifferentfromthatwhichtheyordinarilybearseemstobeaffirmedbytheconsensusofreligiouspersons。Still，thoughCommonSensedoesnotregardmoralrulesasbeingmerelythemandatesofanOmnipotentBeingwhowillrewardandpunishmenaccordingastheyobeyorviolatethem；itcertainlyholdsthatthisisatruethoughpartialviewofthem，andperhapsthatitmaybeintuitivelyapprehended。IfthenreflectionleadsustoconcludethattheparticularmoralprinciplesofCommonSensearetobesystematisedas