ChapterXII
　　OftheImprovementofourKnowledge1。Knowledgeisnotgotfrommaxims。Ithavingbeenthecommonreceivedopinionamongstmenofletters，thatmaximswerethefoundationofallknowledge；andthatthescienceswereeachofthembuiltuponcertainpraecognitafromwhencetheunderstandingwastotakeitsrise，andbywhichitwastoconductitselfinitsinquiriesintothemattersbelongingtothatscience，thebeatenroadoftheSchoolshasbeen，tolaydowninthebeginningoneormoregeneralpropositions，asfoundationswhereontobuildtheknowledgethatwastobehadofthatsubject。Thesedoctrines，thuslaiddownforfoundationsofanyscience，werecalledprinciples，asthebeginningsfromwhichwemustsetout，andlooknofurtherbackwardsinourinquiries，aswehavealreadyobserved。
　　2。Theoccasionofthatopinion。Onethingwhichmightprobablygiveanoccasiontothiswayofproceedinginothersciences，wasasIsupposethegoodsuccessitseemedtohaveinmathematics，whereinmen，beingobservedtoattainagreatcertaintyofknowledge，thesesciencescamebypre-eminencetobecalledMathemata，andMathesis，learning，orthingslearned，thoroughlylearned，ashavingofallothersthegreatestcertainty，clearness，andevidenceinthem。
　　3。Butfromcomparingclearanddistinctideas。Butifanyonewillconsider，hewillIguessfind，thatthegreatadvancementandcertaintyofrealknowledgewhichmenarrivedtointhesesciences，wasnotowingtotheinfluenceoftheseprinciples，norderivedfromanypeculiaradvantagetheyreceivedfromtwoorthreegeneralmaxims，laiddowninthebeginning；butfromtheclear，distinct，completeideastheirthoughtswereemployedabout，andtherelationofequalityandexcesssoclearbetweensomeofthem，thattheyhadanintuitiveknowledge，andbythatawaytodiscoveritinothers；andthiswithoutthehelpofthosemaxims。ForIask，Isitnotpossibleforayoungladtoknowthathiswholebodyisbiggerthanhislittlefinger，butbyvirtueofthisaxiom，thatthewholeisbiggerthanapart；norbeassuredofit，tillhehaslearnedthatmaxim？Orcannotacountrywenchknowthat，havingreceivedashillingfromonethatowesherthree，andashillingalsofromanotherthatowesherthree，theremainingdebtsineachoftheirhandsareequal？Cannotsheknowthis，Isay，unlessshefetchthecertaintyofitfromthismaxim，thatifyoutakeequalsfromequals，theremainderwillbeequals，amaximwhichpossiblysheneverheardorthoughtof？Idesireanyonetoconsider，fromwhathasbeenelsewheresaid，whichisknownfirstandclearestbymostpeople，theparticularinstance，orthegeneralrule；andwhichitisthatgiveslifeandbirthtotheother。Thesegeneralrulesarebutthecomparingourmoregeneralandabstractideas，whicharetheworkmanshipofthemind，made，andnamesgiventothemfortheeasierdispatchinitsreasonings，anddrawingintocomprehensivetermsandshortrulesitsvariousandmultipliedobservations。Butknowledgebeganinthemind，andwasfoundedonparticulars；thoughafterwards，perhaps，nonoticewastakenthereof:itbeingnaturalforthemindforwardstilltoenlargeitsknowledgemostattentivelytolayupthosegeneralnotions，andmaketheproperuseofthem，whichistodisburdenthememoryofthecumbersomeloadofparticulars。ForIdesireitmaybeconsidered，whatmorecertaintythereistoachild，oranyone，thathisbody，littlefinger，andall，isbiggerthanhislittlefingeralone，afteryouhavegiventohisbodythenamewhole，andtohislittlefingerthenamepart，thanhecouldhavehadbefore；
　　orwhatnewknowledgeconcerninghisbodycanthesetworelativetermsgivehim，whichhecouldnothavewithoutthem？Couldhenotknowthathisbodywasbiggerthanhislittlefinger，ifhislanguagewereyetsoimperfectthathehadnosuchrelativetermsaswholeandpart？I
　　ask，further，whenhehasgotthesenames，howishemorecertainthathisbodyisawhole，andhislittlefingerapart，thanhewasormightbecertainbeforehelearntthoseterms，thathisbodywasbiggerthanhislittlefinger？Anyonemayasreasonablydoubtordenythathislittlefingerisapartofhisbody，asthatitislessthanhisbody。Andhethatcandoubtwhetheritbeless，willascertainlydoubtwhetheritbeapart。Sothatthemaxim，thewholeisbiggerthanapart，canneverbemadeuseoftoprovethelittlefingerlessthanthebody，butwhenitisuseless，bybeingbroughttoconvinceoneofatruthwhichheknowsalready。Forhethatdoesnotcertainlyknowthatanyparcelofmatter，withanotherparcelofmatterjoinedtoit，isbiggerthaneitherofthemalone，willneverbeabletoknowitbythehelpofthesetworelativeterms，wholeandpart，makeofthemwhatmaximyouplease。
　　4。Dangeroustobuilduponprecariousprinciples。Butbeitinthemathematicsasitwill，whetheritbeclearer，that，takinganinchfromablacklineoftwoinches，andaninchfromaredlineoftwoinches，theremainingpartsofthetwolineswillbeequal，orthatifyoutakeequalsfromequals，theremainderwillbeequals:which，I
　　say，ofthesetwoistheclearerandfirstknown，Ileavetoanyonetodetermine，itnotbeingmaterialtomypresentoccasion。ThatwhichIhaveheretodo，istoinquire，whether，ifitbethereadiestwaytoknowledgetobeginwithgeneralmaxims，andbuilduponthem，itbeyetasafewaytotaketheprincipleswhicharelaiddowninanyotherscienceasunquestionabletruths；andsoreceivethemwithoutexamination，andadheretothem，withoutsufferingthemtobedoubtedof，becausemathematicianshavebeensohappy，orsofair，tousenonebutself-evidentandundeniable。Ifthisbeso，Iknownotwhatmaynotpassfortruthinmorality，whatmaynotbeintroducedandprovedinnaturalphilosophy。
　　Letthatprincipleofsomeoftheoldphilosophers，ThatallisMatter，andthatthereisnothingelse，bereceivedforcertainandindubitable，anditwillbeeasytobeseenbythewritingsofsomethathavereviveditagaininourdays，whatconsequencesitwillleadusinto。Letanyone，withPolemo，taketheworld；orwiththeStoics，theaether，orthesun；orwithAnaximenes，theair，tobeGod；andwhatadivinity，religion，andworshipmustweneedshave！Nothingcanbesodangerousasprinciplesthustakenupwithoutquestioningorexamination；especiallyiftheybesuchasconcernmorality，whichinfluencemen’slives，andgiveabiastoalltheiractions。WhomightnotjustlyexpectanotherkindoflifeinAristippus，whoplacedhappinessinbodilypleasure；andinAntisthenes，whomadevirtuesufficienttofelicity？Andhewho，withPlato，shallplacebeatitudeintheknowledgeofGod，willhavehisthoughtsraisedtoothercontemplationsthanthosewholooknotbeyondthisspotofearth，andthoseperishingthingswhicharetobehadinit。Hethat，withArchelaus，shalllayitdownasaprinciple，thatrightandwrong，honestanddishonest，aredefinedonlybylaws，andnotbynature，willhaveothermeasuresofmoralrectitudeandpravity，thanthosewhotakeitforgrantedthatweareunderobligationsantecedenttoallhumanconstitutions。
　　5。Todosoisnocertainwaytotruth。If，therefore，thosethatpassforprinciplesarenotcertain，whichwemusthavesomewaytoknow，thatwemaybeabletodistinguishthemfromthosethataredoubtful，butareonlymadesotousbyourblindassent，weareliabletobemisledbythem；andinsteadofbeingguidedintotruth，weshall，byprinciples，beonlyconfirmedinmistakeanderror。
　　6。Buttocompareclear，completeideas，understeadynames。Butsincetheknowledgeofthecertaintyofprinciples，aswellasofallothertruths，dependsonlyupontheperceptionwehaveoftheagreementordisagreementofourideas，thewaytoimproveourknowledgeisnot，Iamsure，blindly，andwithanimplicitfaith，toreceiveandswallowprinciples；butis，Ithink，togetandfixinourmindsclear，distinct，andcompleteideas，asfarastheyaretobehad，andannextothemproperandconstantnames。Andthus，perhaps，withoutanyotherprinciples，butbarelyconsideringthoseperfectideas，andbycomparingthemonewithanother，findingtheiragreementanddisagreement，andtheirseveralrelationsandhabitudes；weshallgetmoretrueandclearknowledgebytheconductofthisonerulethanbytakingupprinciples，andtherebyputtingourmindsintothedisposalofothers。
　　7。Thetruemethodofadvancingknowledgeisbyconsideringourabstractideas。Wemust，therefore，ifwewillproceedasreasonadvises，adaptourmethodsofinquirytothenatureoftheideasweexamine，andthetruthwesearchafter。Generalandcertaintruthsareonlyfoundedinthehabitudesandrelationsofabstractideas。A
　　sagaciousandmethodicalapplicationofourthoughts。forthefindingouttheserelations，istheonlywaytodiscoverallthatcanbeputwithtruthandcertaintyconcerningthemintogeneralpropositions。Bywhatstepswearetoproceedinthese，istobelearnedintheschoolsofthemathematicians，who，fromveryplainandeasybeginnings，bygentledegrees，andacontinuedchainofreasonings，proceedtothediscoveryanddemonstrationoftruthsthatappearatfirstsightbeyondhumancapacity。Theartoffindingproofs，andtheadmirablemethodstheyhaveinventedforthesinglingoutandlayinginorderthoseintermediateideasthatdemonstrativelyshowtheequalityorinequalityofunapplicablequantities，isthatwhichhascarriedthemsofar，andproducedsuchwonderfulandunexpecteddiscoveries:butwhethersomethinglikethis，inrespectofotherideas，aswellasthoseofmagnitude，maynotintimebefoundout，Iwillnotdetermine。This，Ithink，Imaysay，thatifotherideasthataretherealaswellasnominalessencesoftheirspecies，werepursuedinthewayfamiliartomathematicians，theywouldcarryourthoughtsfurther，andwithgreaterevidenceandclearnessthanpossiblyweareapttoimagine。
　　8。Bywhichmoralityalsomayhemadeclearer。Thisgavemetheconfidencetoadvancethatconjecture，whichIsuggest，chap。iii。
　　viz。thatmoralityiscapableofdemonstrationaswellasmathematics。
　　Fortheideasthatethicsareconversantabout，beingallrealessences，andsuchasIimaginehaveadiscoverableconnexionandagreementonewithanother；sofaraswecanfindtheirhabitudesandrelations，sofarweshallbepossessedofcertain，real，andgeneraltruths；andIdoubtnotbut，ifarightmethodweretaken，agreatpartofmoralitymightbemadeoutwiththatclearness，thatcouldleave，toaconsideringman，nomorereasontodoubt，thanhecouldhavetodoubtofthetruthofpropositionsinmathematics，whichhavebeendemonstratedtohim。
　　9。Ourknowledgeofsubstancesistobeimproved，notbycontemplationofabstractideas，butonlybyexperience。Inoursearchaftertheknowledgeofsubstances，ourwantofideasthataresuitabletosuchawayofproceedingobligesustoaquitedifferentmethod。Weadvancenothere，asintheother，whereourabstractideasarerealaswellasnominalessences，bycontemplatingourideas，andconsideringtheirrelationsandcorrespondences；thathelpsusverylittle，forthereasons，thatinanotherplacewehaveatlargesetdown。BywhichIthinkitisevident，thatsubstancesaffordmatterofverylittlegeneralknowledge；andthebarecontemplationoftheirabstractideaswillcarryusbutaverylittlewayinthesearchoftruthandcertainty。What，then，arewetodofortheimprovementofourknowledgeinsubstantialbeings？Herewearetotakeaquitecontrarycourse:thewantofideasoftheirrealessencessendsusfromourownthoughtstothethingsthemselvesastheyexist。
　　Experienceheremustteachmewhatreasoncannot:anditisbytryingalone，thatIcancertainlyknow，whatotherqualitiesco-existwiththoseofmycomplexidea，v。g。whetherthatyellow，heavy，fusiblebodyIcallgold，bemalleable，orno；whichexperiencewhichwayeveritproveinthatparticularbodyIexaminemakesmenotcertain，thatitissoinall，oranyotheryellow，heavy，fusiblebodies，butthatwhichIhavetried。Becauseitisnoconsequenceonewayortheotherfrommycomplexidea:thenecessityorinconsistenceofmalleabilityhathnovisibleconnexionwiththecombinationofthatcolour，weight，andfusibilityinanybody。WhatI
　　havesaidhereofthenominalessenceofgold，supposedtoconsistofabodyofsuchadeterminatecolour，weight，andfusibility，willholdtrue，ifmalleableness，fixedness，andsolubilityinaquaregiabeaddedtoit。Ourreasoningsfromtheseideaswillcarryusbutalittlewayinthecertaindiscoveryoftheotherpropertiesinthosemassesofmatterwhereinallthesearetobefound。Becausetheotherpropertiesofsuchbodies，dependingnotonthese，butonthatunknownrealessenceonwhichthesealsodepend，wecannotbythemdiscovertherest；wecangonofurtherthanthesimpleideasofournominalessencewillcarryus，whichisverylittlebeyondthemselves；
　　andsoaffordusbutverysparinglyanycertain，universal，andusefultruths。For，upontrial，havingfoundthatparticularpieceandallothersofthatcolour，weight，andfusibility，thatIevertried
　　malleable，thatalsomakesnow，perhaps，apartofmycomplexidea，partofmynominalessenceofgold:wherebythoughImakemycomplexideatowhichIaffixthenamegold，toconsistofmoresimpleideasthanbefore；yetstill，itnotcontainingtherealessenceofanyspeciesofbodies，ithelpsmenotcertainlytoknowIsaytoknow，perhapsitmaybetoconjecturetheotherremainingpropertiesofthatbody，furtherthantheyhaveavisibleconnexionwithsomeorallofthesimpleideasthatmakeupmynominalessence。Forexample，I
　　cannotbecertain，fromthiscomplexidea，whethergoldbefixedorno；because，asbefore，thereisnonecessaryconnexionorinconsistencetobediscoveredbetwixtacomplexideaofabodyyellow，heavy，fusible，malleable；betwixtthese，Isay，andfixedness；sothatImaycertainlyknow，thatinwhatsoeverbodythesearefound，therefixednessissuretobe。Here，again，forassurance，Imustapplymyselftoexperience；asfarasthatreaches，Imayhavecertainknowledge，butnofurther。
　　10。Experiencemayprocureusconvenience，notscience。Idenynotbutaman，accustomedtorationalandregularexperiments，shallbeabletoseefurtherintothenatureofbodiesandguessrighterattheiryetunknownpropertiesthanonethatisastrangertothem:
　　butyet，asIhavesaid，thisisbutjudgmentandopinion，notknowledgeandcertainty。Thiswayofgettingandimprovingourknowledgeinsubstancesonlybyexperienceandhistory，whichisallthattheweaknessofourfacultiesinthisstateofmediocritywhichweareininthisworldcanattainto，makesmesuspectthatnaturalphilosophyisnotcapableofbeingmadeascience。Weareable，I
　　imagine，toreachverylittlegeneralknowledgeconcerningthespeciesofbodiesandtheirseveralproperties。Experimentsandhistoricalobservationswemayhave，fromwhichwemaydrawadvantagesofeaseandhealth，andtherebyincreaseourstockofconveniencesforthislife；butbeyondthisIfearourtalentsreachnot，norareourfaculties，asIguess，abletoadvance。
　　11。Wearefittedformoralscience，butonlyforprobableinterpretationsofexternalnature。Fromwhenceitisobvioustoconcludethat，sinceourfacultiesarenotfittedtopenetrateintotheinternalfabricandrealessencesofbodies；butyetplainlydiscovertousthebeingofaGodandtheknowledgeofourselves，enoughtoleadusintoafullandcleardiscoveryofourdutyandgreatconcernment；itwillbecomeus，asrationalcreatures，toemploythosefacultieswehaveaboutwhattheyaremostadaptedto，andfollowthedirectionofnature，whereitseemstopointusouttheway。Foritisrationaltoconcludethatourproperemploymentliesinthoseinquiries，andinthatsortofknowledgewhichismostsuitedtoournaturalcapacities，andcarriesinitourgreatestinterest，i。e。theconditionofoureternalestate。HenceIthinkImayconcludethatmoralityistheproperscienceandbusinessofmankindingeneral，whoarebothconcernedandfittedtosearchouttheirsummumbonum；asseveralarts，conversantaboutseveralpartsofnature，arethelotandprivatetalentofparticularmenforthecommonuseofhumanlifeandtheirownparticularsubsistenceinthisworld。OfwhatconsequencethediscoveryofonenaturalbodyanditspropertiesmaybetohumanlifethewholegreatcontinentofAmericaisaconvincinginstance:whoseignoranceinusefularts，andwantofthegreatestpartoftheconveniencesoflife，inacountrythataboundedwithallsortsofnaturalplenty，Ithinkmaybeattributedtotheirignoranceofwhatwastobefoundinaveryordinary，despicablestone；Imeanthemineralofiron。Andwhateverwethinkofourpartsorimprovementsinthispartoftheworld，whereknowledgeandplentyseemtoviewitheachother；yettoanyonethatwillseriouslyreflectonit，Isupposeitwillappearpastdoubt，that，weretheuseofironlostamongus，weshouldinafewagesbeunavoidablyreducedtothewantsandignoranceoftheancientsavageAmericans，whosenaturalendowmentsandprovisionscomenowayshortofthoseofthemostflourishingandpolitenations。Sothathewhofirstmadeknowntheuseofthatcontemptiblemineral，maybetrulystyledthefatherofarts，andauthorofplenty。
　　12。Inthestudyofnaturewemustbewareofhypothesesandwrongprinciples。Iwouldnot，therefore，bethoughttodisesteemordissuadethestudyofnature。Ireadilyagreethecontemplationofhisworksgivesusoccasiontoadmire，revere，andglorifytheirAuthor:
　　and，ifrightlydirected，maybeofgreaterbenefittomankindthanthemonumentsofexemplarycharitythathaveatsogreatchargebeenraisedbythefoundersofhospitalsandalmshouses。Hethatfirstinventedprinting，discoveredtheuseofthecompass，ormadepublicthevirtureandrightuseofkinkina，didmoreforthepropagationofknowledge，forthesupplyandincreaseofusefulcommodities，andsavedmorefromthegrave，thanthosewhobuiltcolleges，workhouses，andhospitals。AllthatIwouldsayis，thatweshouldnotbetooforwardlypossessedwiththeopinionorexpectationofknowledge，whereitisnottobehad，orbywaysthatwillnotattaintoit:thatweshouldnottakedoubtfulsystemsforcompletesciences；norunintelligiblenotionsforscientificaldemonstrations。Intheknowledgeofbodies，wemustbecontenttogleanwhatwecanfromparticularexperiments:sincewecannot，fromadiscoveryoftheirrealessences，graspatatimewholesheaves，andinbundlescomprehendthenatureandpropertiesofwholespeciestogether。Whereourinquiryisconcerningco-existence，orrepugnancytoco-exist，whichbycontemplationofourideaswecannotdiscover；thereexperience，observation，andnaturalhistory，mustgiveus，byoursensesandbyretail，aninsightintocorporealsubstances。Theknowledgeofbodieswemustgetbyoursenses，warilyemployedintakingnoticeoftheirqualitiesandoperationsononeanother:andwhatwehopetoknowofseparatespiritsinthisworld，wemust，Ithink，expectonlyfromrevelation。Hethatshallconsiderhowlittlegeneralmaxims，precariousprinciples，andhypotheseslaiddownatpleasure，havepromotedtrueknowledge，orhelpedtosatisfytheinquiriesofrationalmenafterrealimprovements；howlittle，Isay，thesettingoutatthatendhas，formanyagestogether，advancedmen’sprogress，towardstheknowledgeofnaturalphilosophy，willthinkwehavereasontothankthosewhointhislatteragehavetakenanothercourse，andhavetrodouttous，thoughnotaneasierwaytolearnedignorance，yetasurerwaytoprofitableknowledge。
　　13。Thetrueuseofhypotheses。Notthatwemaynot，toexplainanyphenomenaofnature，makeuseofanyprobablehypotheseswhatsoever:hypotheses，iftheyarewellmade，areatleastgreathelpstothememory，andoftendirectustonewdiscoveries。Butmymeaningis，thatweshouldnottakeupanyonetoohastilywhichthemind，thatwouldalwayspenetrateintothecausesofthings，andhaveprinciplestoreston，isveryapttodo，tillwehaveverywellexaminedparticulars，andmadeseveralexperiments，inthatthingwhichwewouldexplainbyourhypothesis，andseewhetheritwillagreetothemall；whetherourprincipleswillcarryusquitethrough，andnotbeasinconsistentwithonephenomenonofnature，astheyseemtoaccommodateandexplainanother。Andatleastthatwetakecarethatthenameofprinciplesdeceiveusnot，norimposeonus，bymakingusreceivethatforanunquestionabletruth，whichisreallyatbestbutaverydoubtfulconjecture；suchasaremostIhadalmostsaidallofthehypothesesinnaturalphilosophy。
　　14。Clearanddistinctideaswithsettlednames，andthefindingofthoseintermediateideaswhichshowtheiragreementordisagreement，arethewaystoenlargeourknowledge。Butwhethernaturalphilosophybecapableofcertaintyorno，thewaystoenlargeourknowledge，asfaraswearecapable，seemtome，inshort，tobethesetwo:-
　　First，Thefirstistogetandsettleinourmindsdeterminedideasofthosethingswhereofwehavegeneralorspecificnames；atleast，somanyofthemaswewouldconsiderandimproveourknowledgein，orreasonabout。Andiftheybespecificideasofsubstances，weshouldendeavouralsotomakethemascompleteaswecan，wherebyImean，thatweshouldputtogetherasmanysimpleideasas，beingconstantlyobservedtoco-exist，mayperfectlydeterminethespecies；andeachofthosesimpleideaswhicharetheingredientsofourcomplexones，shouldbeclearanddistinctinourminds。Foritbeingevidentthatourknowledgecannotexceedourideas；asfarastheyareeitherimperfect，confused，orobscure，wecannotexpecttohavecertain，perfect，orclearknowledge。
　　Secondly，Theotheristheartoffindingoutthoseintermediateideas，whichmayshowustheagreementorrepugnancyofotherideas，whichcannotbeimmediatelycompared。
　　15。Mathematicsaninstanceofthis。Thatthesetwoandnottherelyingonmaxims，anddrawingconsequencesfromsomegeneralpropositionsaretherightmethodsofimprovingourknowledgeintheideasofothermodesbesidesthoseofquantity，theconsiderationofmathematicalknowledgewilleasilyinformus。Wherefirstweshallfindthathethathasnotaperfectandclearideaofthoseanglesorfiguresofwhichhedesirestoknowanything，isutterlytherebyincapableofanyknowledgeaboutthem。Supposebutamannottohaveaperfectexactideaofarightangle，ascalenum，ortrapezium，andthereisnothingmorecertainthanthathewillinvainseekanydemonstrationaboutthem。Further，itisevidentthatitwasnottheinfluenceofthosemaximswhicharetakenforprinciplesinmathematicsthathathledthemastersofthatscienceintothosewonderfuldiscoveriestheyhavemade。Letamanofgoodpartsknowallthemaximsgenerallymadeuseofinmathematicseversoperfectly，andcontemplatetheirextentandconsequencesasmuchashepleases，hewill，bytheirassistance，Isuppose，scarceevercometoknowthatthesquareofthehypothenuseinaright-angledtriangleisequaltothesquaresofthetwoothersides。Theknowledgethat"thewholeisequaltoallitsparts，"and"ifyoutakeequalsfromequals，theremainderwillbeequal，"&c。，helpedhimnot，Ipresume，tothisdemonstration:andamanmay，Ithink，porelongenoughonthoseaxiomswithouteverseeingonejotthemoreofmathematicaltruths。
　　Theyhavebeendiscoveredbythethoughtsotherwiseapplied:themindhadotherobjects，otherviewsbeforeit，fardifferentfromthosemaxims，whenitfirstgottheknowledgeofsuchtruthsinmathematics，whichmen，wellenoughacquaintedwiththosereceivedaxioms，butignorantoftheirmethodwhofirstmadethesedemonstrations，canneversufficientlyadmire。Andwhoknowswhatmethodstoenlargeourknowledgeinotherpartsofsciencemayhereafterbeinvented，answeringthatofalgebrainmathematics，whichsoreadilyfindsouttheideasofquantitiestomeasureothersby；
　　whoseequalityorproportionwecouldotherwiseveryhardly，or，perhaps，nevercometoknow？
　　ChapterXIII
　　SomeFurtherConsiderationsConcerningourKnowledge1。Ourknowledgepartlynecessary，partlyvoluntary。Ourknowledge，asinotherthings，sointhis，hassogreataconformitywithoursight，thatitisneitherwhollynecessary，norwhollyvoluntary。Ifourknowledgewerealtogethernecessary，allmen’sknowledgewouldnotonlybealike，buteverymanwouldknowallthatisknowable；andifitwerewhollyvoluntary，somemensolittleregardorvalueitthattheywouldhaveextremelittle，ornoneatall。Menthathavesensescannotchoosebutreceivesomeideasbythem；andiftheyhavememory，theycannotbutretainsomeofthem；
　　andiftheyhavememory，theycannotbutretainsomeofthem；andiftheyhaveanydistinguishingfaculty，cannotbutperceivetheagreementordisagreementofsomeofthemonewithanother；ashethathaseyes，ifhewillopenthembyday，cannotbutseesomeobjectsandperceiveadifferenceinthem。Butthoughamanwithhiseyesopeninthelight，cannotbutsee，yettherebecertainobjectswhichhemaychoosewhetherhewillturnhiseyesto；theremaybeinhisreachabookcontainingpicturesanddiscourses，capabletodelightorinstructhim，whichyethemayneverhavethewilltoopen，nevertakethepainstolookinto。
　　2。Theapplicationofourfacultiesvoluntary；but，theybeingemployed，weknowasthingsare，notasweplease。Thereisalsoanotherthinginaman’spower，andthatis，thoughheturnshiseyessometimestowardsanobject，yethemaychoosewhetherhewillcuriouslysurveyit，andwithanintentapplicationendeavourtoobserveaccuratelyallthatisvisibleinit。Butyet，whathedoessee，hecannotseeotherwisethanhedoes。Itdependsnotonhiswilltoseethatblackwhichappearsyellow；nortopersuadehimselfthatwhatactuallyscaldshim，feelscold。Theearthwillnotappearpaintedwithflowers，northefieldscoveredwithverdure，wheneverhehasamindtoit:inthecoldwinter，hecannothelpseeingitwhiteandhoary，ifhewilllookabroad。Justthusisitwithourunderstanding:allthatisvoluntaryinourknowledgeistheemployingorwithholdinganyofourfacultiesfromthisorthatsortofobjects，andamoreorlessaccuratesurveyofthem:but，theybeingemployed，ourwillhathnopowertodeterminetheknowledgeofthemindonewayoranother；thatisdoneonlybytheobjectsthemselves，asfarastheyareclearlydiscovered。Andtherefore，asfarasmen’ssensesareconversantaboutexternalobjects，themindcannotbutreceivethoseideaswhicharepresentedbythem，andbeinformedoftheexistenceofthingswithout:andsofarasmen’sthoughtsconversewiththeirowndeterminedideas，theycannotbutinsomemeasureobservetheagreementordisagreementthatistobefoundamongstsomeofthem，whichissofarknowledge:andiftheyhavenamesforthoseideaswhichtheyhavethusconsidered，theymustneedsbeassuredofthetruthofthosepropositionswhichexpressthatagreementordisagreementtheyperceiveinthem，andbeundoubtedlyconvincedofthosetruths。Forwhatamansees，hecannotbutsee；andwhatheperceives，hecannotbutknowthatheperceives。
　　3。Instanceinnumbers。Thushethathasgottheideasofnumbers，andhathtakenthepainstocompareone，two，andthree，tosix，cannotchoosebutknowthattheyareequal:hethathathgottheideaofatriangle，andfoundthewaystomeasureitsanglesandtheirmagnitudes，iscertainthatitsthreeanglesareequaltotworightones；andcanaslittledoubtofthat，asofthistruth，thatitisimpossibleforthesamethingtobe，andnottobe。
　　4。Instanceinnaturalreligion。Healsothathaththeideaofanintelligent，butfrailandweakbeing，madebyanddependingonanother，whoiseternal，omnipotent，perfectlywiseandgood，willascertainlyknowthatmanistohonour，fear，andobeyGod，asthatthesunshineswhenheseesit。Forifhehathbuttheideasoftwosuchbeingsinhismind，andwillturnhisthoughtsthatway，andconsiderthem，hewillascertainlyfindthattheinferior，finite，anddependentisunderanobligationtoobeythesupremeandinfinite，asheiscertaintofindthatthree，four，andsevenarelessthanfifteen；ifhewillconsiderandcomputethosenumbers:norcanhebesurerinaclearmorningthatthesunisrisen；ifhewillbutopenhiseyesandturnthemthatway。Butyetthesetruths，beingeversocertain，eversoclear，hemaybeignorantofeither，orallofthem，whowillnevertakethepainstoemployhisfaculties，asheshould，toinformhimselfaboutthem。
　　ChapterXIV
　　OfJudgment1。Ourknowledgebeingshort，wewantsomethingelse。Theunderstandingfacultiesbeinggiventoman，notbarelyforspeculation，butalsofortheconductofhislife，manwouldbeatagreatlossifhehadnothingtodirecthimbutwhathasthecertaintyoftrueknowledge。Forthatbeingveryshortandscanty，aswehaveseen，hewouldbeoftenutterlyinthedark，andinmostoftheactionsofhislife，perfectlyatastand，hadhenothingtoguidehimintheabsenceofclearandcertainknowledge。Hethatwillnoteattillhehasdemonstrationthatitwillnourishhim；hethatwillnotstirtillheinfalliblyknowsthebusinesshegoesaboutwillsucceed，willhavelittleelsetodobuttositstillandperish。
　　2。Whatusetobemadeofthistwilightstate。Therefore，asGodhassetsomethingsinbroaddaylight；ashehasgivenussomecertainknowledge，thoughlimitedtoafewthingsincomparison，probablyasatasteofwhatintellectualcreaturesarecapableoftoexciteinusadesireandendeavourafterabetterstate:so，inthegreatestpartofourconcernments，hehasaffordedusonlythetwilight，asI
　　maysosay，ofprobability；suitable，Ipresume，tothatstateofmediocrityandprobationershiphehasbeenpleasedtoplaceusinhere；wherein，tocheckourover-confidenceandpresumption，wemight，byeveryday’sexperience，bemadesensibleofourshort-sightednessandliablenesstoerror；thesensewhereofmightbeaconstantadmonitiontous，tospendthedaysofthisourpilgrimagewithindustryandcare，inthesearchandfollowingofthatwaywhichmightleadustoastateofgreaterperfection。Itbeinghighlyrationaltothink，evenwererevelationsilentinthecase，that，asmenemploythosetalentsGodhasgiventhemhere，theyshallaccordinglyreceivetheirrewardsatthecloseoftheday，whentheirsunshallsetandnightshallputanendtotheirlabours。
　　3。Judgment，orassenttoprobability，suppliesourwantofknowledge。ThefacultywhichGodhasgivenmantosupplythewantofclearandcertainknowledge，incaseswherethatcannotbehad，isjudgment:wherebythemindtakesitsideastoagreeordisagree；or，whichisthesame，anypropositiontobetrueorfalse，withoutperceivingademonstrativeevidenceintheproofs。Themindsometimesexercisesthisjudgmentoutofnecessity，wheredemonstrativeproofsandcertainknowledgearenottobehad；andsometimesoutoflaziness，unskilfulness，orhaste，evenwheredemonstrativeandcertainproofsaretobehad。Menoftenstaynotwarilytoexaminetheagreementordisagreementoftwoideaswhichtheyaredesirousorconcernedtoknow；but，eitherincapableofsuchattentionasisrequisiteinalongtrainofgradations，orimpatientofdelay，lightlycasttheireyeson，orwhollypassbytheproofs；andso，withoutmakingoutthedemonstration，determineoftheagreementordisagreementoftwoideas，asitwerebyaviewofthemastheyareatadistance，andtakeittobetheoneortheother，asseemsmostlikelytothemuponsuchaloosesurvey。Thisfacultyofthemind，whenitisexercisedimmediatelyaboutthings，iscalledjudgment；whenabouttruthsdeliveredinwords，ismostcommonlycalledassentordissent:whichbeingthemostusualway，whereinthemindhasoccasiontoemploythisfaculty，Ishall，undertheseterms，treatofit，asleastliableinourlanguagetoequivocation。
　　4。Judgementisthepresumingthingstobeso，withoutperceivingit。Thusthemindhastwofacultiesconversantabouttruthandfalsehood:-
　　First，KNOWLEDGE，wherebyitcertainlyperceives，andisundoubtedlysatisfiedoftheagreementordisagreementofanyideas。
　　SecondlyJUDGMENT，whichistheputtingideastogether，orseparatingthemfromoneanotherinthemind，whentheircertainagreementordisagreementisnotperceived，butpresumedtobeso；
　　whichis，asthewordimports，takentobesobeforeitcertainlyappears。Andifitsounitesorseparatesthemasinrealitythingsare，itisrightjudgment。
　　ChapterXV
　　OfProbability1。Probabilityistheappearanceofagreementuponfallibleproofs。Asdemonstrationistheshowingtheagreementordisagreementoftwoideasbytheinterventionofoneormoreproofs，whichhaveaconstant，immutable，andvisibleconnexiononewithanother；soprobabilityisnothingbuttheappearanceofsuchanagreementordisagreementbytheinterventionofproofs，whoseconnexionisnotconstantandimmutable，oratleastisnotperceivedtobeso，butis，orappearsforthemostparttobeso，andisenoughtoinducethemindtojudgethepropositiontobetrueorfalse，ratherthanthecontrary。Forexample:inthedemonstrationofitamanperceivesthecertain，immutableconnexionthereisofequalitybetweenthethreeanglesofatriangle，andthoseintermediateoneswhicharemadeuseoftoshowtheirequalitytotworightones；andso，byanintuitiveknowledgeoftheagreementordisagreementoftheintermediateideasineachstepoftheprogress，thewholeseriesiscontinuedwithanevidence，whichclearlyshowstheagreementordisagreementofthosethreeanglesinequalitytotworightones:andthushehascertainknowledgethatitisso。Butanotherman，whonevertookthepainstoobservethedemonstration，hearingamathematician，amanofcredit，affirmthethreeanglesofatriangletobeequaltotworightones，assentstoit，i。e。receivesitfortrue:inwhichcasethefoundationofhisassentistheprobabilityofthething；theproofbeingsuchasforthemostpartcarriestruthwithit:themanonwhosetestimonyhereceivesit，notbeingwonttoaffirmanythingcontrarytoorbesideshisknowledge，especiallyinmattersofthiskind:sothatthatwhichcauseshisassenttothisproposition，thatthethreeanglesofatriangleareequaltotworightones，thatwhichmakeshimtaketheseideastoagree，withoutknowingthemtodoso，isthewontedveracityofthespeakerinothercases，orhissupposedveracityinthis。
　　2。Itistosupplyourwantofknowledge。Ourknowledge，ashasbeenshown，beingverynarrow，andwenothappyenoughtofindcertaintruthineverythingwhichwehaveoccasiontoconsider；mostofthepropositionswethink，reason，discourse-nay，actupon，aresuchaswecannothaveundoubtedknowledgeoftheirtruth:yetsomeofthembordersonearuponcertainty，thatwemakenodoubtatallaboutthem；butassenttothemasfirmly，andact，accordingtothatassent，asresolutelyasiftheywereinfalliblydemonstrated，andthatourknowledgeofthemwasperfectandcertain。Buttherebeingdegreesherein，fromtheveryneighbourhoodofcertaintyanddemonstration，quitedowntoimprobabilityandunlikeness，eventotheconfinesofimpossibility；andalsodegreesofassentfromfullassuranceandconfidence，quitedowntoconjecture，doubt，anddistrust:Ishallcomenow，having，asIthink，foundouttheboundsofhumanknowledgeandcertainty，inthenextplace，toconsidertheseveraldegreesandgroundsofprobability，andassentorfaith。
　　3。Beingthatwhichmakesuspresumethingstobetrue，beforeweknowthemtobeso。Probabilityislikelinesstobetrue，theverynotationofthewordsignifyingsuchaproposition，forwhichtherebeargumentsorproofstomakeitpass，orbereceivedfortrue。Theentertainmentthemindgivesthissortofpropositionsiscalledbelief，assent，oropinion，whichistheadmittingorreceivinganypropositionfortrue，uponargumentsorproofsthatarefoundtopersuadeustoreceiveitastrue，withoutcertainknowledgethatitisso。Andhereinliesthedifferencebetweenprobabilityandcertainty，faith，andknowledge，thatinallthepartsofknowledgethereisintuition；eachimmediateidea，eachstephasitsvisibleandcertainconnexion:inbelief，notso。Thatwhichmakesmebelieve，issomethingextraneoustothethingIbelieve；somethingnotevidentlyjoinedonbothsidesto，andsonotmanifestlyshowingtheagreementordisagreementofthoseideasthatareunderconsideration。
　　4。Thegroundsofprobabilityaretwo:conformitywithourownexperience，orthetestimonyofothers’experience。Probabilitythen，beingtosupplythedefectofourknowledgeandtoguideuswherethatfails，isalwaysconversantaboutpropositionswhereofwehavenocertainty，butonlysomeinducementstoreceivethemfortrue。
　　Thegroundsofitare，inshort，thesetwofollowing:-
　　First，Theconformityofanythingwithourownknowledge，observation，andexperience。
　　Secondly，Thetestimonyofothers，vouchingtheirobservationandexperience。Inthetestimonyofothersistobeconsidered:1。Thenumber。2。Theintegrity。3。Theskillofthewitnesses。4。Thedesignoftheauthor，whereitisatestimonyoutofabookcited。5。Theconsistencyoftheparts，andcircumstancesoftherelation。6。
　　Contrarytestimonies。
　　5。Inthis，alltheargumentsproandconoughttobeexamined，beforewecometoajudgment。Probabilitywantingthatintuitiveevidencewhichinfalliblydeterminestheunderstandingandproducescertainknowledge，themind，ifitwillproceedrationally，oughttoexamineallthegroundsofprobability，andseehowtheymakemoreorlessfororagainstanyproposition，beforeitassentstoordissentsfromit；and，uponaduebalancingthewhole，rejectorreceiveit，withamoreorlessfirmassent，proportionablytothepreponderancyofthegreatergroundsofprobabilityononesideortheother。Forexample:-
　　IfImyselfseeamanwalkontheice，itispastprobability；itisknowledge。ButifanothertellsmehesawamaninEngland，inthemidstofasharpwinter，walkuponwaterhardenedwithcold，thishassogreatconformitywithwhatisusuallyobservedtohappenthatI
　　amdisposedbythenatureofthethingitselftoassenttoit；
　　unlesssomemanifestsuspicionattendtherelationofthatmatteroffact。Butifthesamethingbetoldtoonebornbetweenthetropics，whoneversawnorheardofanysuchthingbefore，therethewholeprobabilityreliesontestimony:andastherelatorsaremoreinnumber，andofmorecredit，andhavenointeresttospeakcontrarytothetruth，sothatmatteroffactisliketofindmoreorlessbelief。Thoughtoamanwhoseexperiencehasalwaysbeenquitecontrary，andwhohasneverheardofanythinglikeit，themostuntaintedcreditofawitnesswillscarcebeabletofindbelief。
　　ThekingofSiam。AsithappenedtoaDutchambassador，whoentertainingthekingofSiamwiththeparticularitiesofHolland，whichhewasinquisitiveafter，amongstotherthingstoldhimthatthewaterinhiscountrywouldsometimes，incoldweather，besohardthatmenwalkeduponit，andthatitwouldbearanelephant，ifhewerethere。Towhichthekingreplied，HithertoIhavebelievedthestrangethingsyouhavetoldme，becauseIlookuponyouasasoberfairman，butnowIamsureyoulie。
　　6。Probableargumentscapableofgreatvariety。Uponthesegroundsdependstheprobabilityofanyproposition:andastheconformityofourknowledge，asthecertaintyofobservations，asthefrequencyandconstancyofexperienceandthenumberandcredibilityoftestimoniesdomoreorlessagreeordisagreewithit，soisanypropositioninitselfmoreorlessprobable。Thereisanother，I
　　confess，which，thoughbyitselfitbenotruegroundofprobability，yetisoftenmadeuseofforone，bywhichmenmostcommonlyregulatetheirassent，anduponwhichtheypintheirfaithmorethananythingelse，andthatis，theopinionofothers；thoughtherecannotbeamoredangerousthingtorelyon，normorelikelytomisleadone；sincethereismuchmorefalsehoodanderroramongmenthantruthandknowledge。Andiftheopinionsandpersuasionsofothers，whomweknowandthinkwellof，beagroundofassent，menhavereasontobeHeathensinJapan，MahometansinTurkey，PapistsinSpain，ProtestantsinEngland，andLutheransinSweden。ButofthiswronggroundofassentIshallhaveoccasiontospeakmoreatlargeinanotherplace。
　　ChapterXVI
　　OftheDegreesofAssent1。Ourassentoughttoberegulatedbythegroundsofprobability。
　　Thegroundsofprobabilitywehavelaiddownintheforegoingchapter:
　　astheyarethefoundationsonwhichourassentisbuilt，soaretheyalsothemeasurewherebyitsseveraldegreesare，oroughttoberegulated:onlywearetotakenoticethat，whatevergroundsofprobabilitytheremaybe，theyyetoperatenofurtheronthemindwhichsearchesaftertruth，andendeavourstojudgeright，thantheyappear；atleast，inthefirstjudgmentorsearchthatthemindmakes。
　　Iconfess，intheopinionsmenhave，andfirmlysticktointheworld，theirassentisnotalwaysfromanactualviewofthereasonsthatatfirstprevailedwiththem:itbeinginmanycasesalmostimpossible，andinmost，veryhard，evenforthosewhohaveveryadmirablememories，toretainalltheproofswhich，uponadueexamination，madethemembracethatsideofthequestion。Itsufficesthattheyhaveoncewithcareandfairnesssiftedthematterasfarastheycould；andthattheyhavesearchedintoalltheparticulars，thattheycouldimaginetogiveanylighttothequestion；and，withthebestoftheirskill，castuptheaccountuponthewholeevidence:andthus，havingoncefoundonwhichsidetheprobabilityappearedtothem，afterasfullandexactaninquiryastheycanmake，theylayuptheconclusionintheirmemoriesasatruththeyhavediscovered；andforthefuturetheyremainsatisfiedwiththetestimonyoftheirmemoriesthatthisistheopinionthat，bytheproofstheyhaveonceseenofit，deservessuchadegreeoftheirassentastheyaffordit。
　　2。Thesecannotalwaysbeactuallyinview；andthenwemustcontentourselveswiththeremembrancethatweoncesawgroundforsuchadegreeofassent。Thisisallthatthegreatestpartofmenarecapableofdoing，inregulatingtheiropinionsandjudgments；unlessamanwillexactofthem，eithertoretaindistinctlyintheirmemoriesalltheproofsconcerninganyprobabletruth，andthattoo，inthesameorder，andregulardeductionofconsequencesinwhichtheyhaveformerlyplacedorseenthem；whichsometimesisenoughtofillalargevolumeononesinglequestion:orelsetheymustrequireaman，foreveryopinionthatheembraces，everydaytoexaminetheproofs:bothwhichareimpossible。Itisunavoidable，therefore，thatthememorybereliedoninthecase，andthatmenbepersuadedofseveralopinions，whereoftheproofsarenotactuallyintheirthoughts；nay，whichperhapstheyarenotableactuallytorecall。
　　Withoutthis，thegreatestpartofmenmustbeeitherverysceptic；orchangeeverymoment，andyieldthemselvesuptowhoever，havinglatelystudiedthequestion，offersthemarguments，which，forwantofmemory，theyarenotablepresentlytoanswer。
　　3。Theillconsequenceofthis，ifourformerjudgmentswerenotrightlymade。Icannotbutown，thatmen’sstickingtotheirpastjudgment，andadheringfirmlytoconclusionsformerlymade，isoftenthecauseofgreatobstinacyinerrorandmistake。Butthefaultisnotthattheyrelyontheirmemoriesforwhattheyhavebeforewelljudged，butbecausetheyjudgedbeforetheyhadwellexamined。Maywenotfindagreatnumbernottosaythegreatestpartofmenthatthinktheyhaveformedrightjudgmentsofseveralmatters；andthatfornootherreason，butbecausetheyneverthoughtotherwise？
　　thatimaginethemselvestohavejudgedright，onlybecausetheyneverquestioned，neverexamined，theirownopinions？Whichisindeedtothinktheyjudgedright，becausetheyneverjudgedatall。
　　Andyetthese，ofallmen，holdtheiropinionswiththegreateststiffness；thosebeinggenerallythemostfierceandfirmintheirtenets，whohaveleastexaminedthem。Whatweonceknow，wearecertainisso:andwemaybesecure，thattherearenolatentproofsundiscovered，whichmayoverturnourknowledge，orbringitindoubt。But，inmattersofprobability，itisnotineverycasewecanbesurethatwehavealltheparticularsbeforeus，thatanywayconcernthequestion；andthatthereisnoevidencebehind，andyetunseen，whichmaycasttheprobabilityontheotherside，andoutweighallthatatpresentseemstopreponderatewithus。Whoalmostistherethathaththeleisure，patience，andmeanstocollecttogetheralltheproofsconcerningmostoftheopinionshehas，soassafelytoconcludethathehathaclearandfullview；andthatthereisnomoretobeallegedforhisbetterinformation？Andyetweareforcedtodetermineourselvesontheonesideorother。Theconductofourlives，andthemanagementofourgreatconcerns，willnotbeardelay:forthosedepend，forthemostpart，onthedeterminationofourjudgmentinpointswhereinwearenotcapableofcertainanddemonstrativeknowledge，andwhereinitisnecessaryforustoembracetheonesideortheother。
　　4。Therightuseofit，mutualcharityandforbearance，inanecessarydiversityofopinions。Since，therefore，itisunavoidabletothegreatestpartofmen，ifnotall，tohaveseveralopinions，withoutcertainandindubitableproofsoftheirtruth；anditcarriestoogreatanimputationofignorance，lightness，orfollyformentoquitandrenouncetheirformertenetspresentlyupontheofferofanargumentwhichtheycannotimmediatelyanswer，andshowtheinsufficiencyof:itwould，methinks，becomeallmentomaintainpeace，andthecommonofficesofhumanity，andfriendship，inthediversityofopinions；sincewecannotreasonablyexpectthatanyoneshouldreadilyandobsequiouslyquithisownopinion，andembraceours，withablindresignationtoanauthoritywhichtheunderstandingofmanacknowledgesnot。Forhoweveritmayoftenmistake，itcanownnootherguidebutreason，norblindlysubmittothewillanddictatesofanother。Ifheyouwouldbringovertoyoursentimentsbeonethatexaminesbeforeheassents，youmustgivehimleaveathisleisuretogoovertheaccountagain，and，recallingwhatisoutofhismind，examinealltheparticulars，toseeonwhichsidetheadvantagelies:andifhewillnotthinkourargumentsofweightenoughtoengagehimanewinsomuchpains，itisbutwhatweoftendoourselvesinthelikecase；andweshouldtakeitamissifothersshouldprescribetouswhatpointsweshouldstudy。Andifhebeonewhotakeshisopinionsupontrust，howcanweimaginethatheshouldrenouncethosetenetswhichtimeandcustomhavesosettledinhismind，thathethinksthemself-evident，andofanunquestionablecertainty；orwhichhetakestobeimpressionshehasreceivedfromGodhimself，orfrommensentbyhim？Howcanweexpect，Isay，thatopinionsthussettledshouldbegivenuptotheargumentsorauthorityofastrangeroradversary，especiallyiftherebeanysuspicionofinterestordesign，asthereneverfailstobe，wheremenfindthemselvesilltreated？Weshoulddowelltocommiserateourmutualignorance，andendeavourtoremoveitinallthegentleandfairwaysofinformation；andnotinstantlytreatothersill，asobstinateandperverse，becausetheywillnotrenouncetheirown，andreceiveouropinions，oratleastthosewewouldforceuponthem，whenitismorethanprobablethatwearenolessobstinateinnotembracingsomeoftheirs。Forwhereisthemanthathasincontestableevidenceofthetruthofallthatheholds，orofthefalsehoodofallhecondemns；orcansaythathehasexaminedtothebottomallhisown，orothermen’sopinions？Thenecessityofbelievingwithoutknowledge，nayoftenuponveryslightgrounds，inthisfleetingstateofactionandblindnesswearein，shouldmakeusmorebusyandcarefultoinformourselvesthanconstrainothers。Atleast，thosewhohavenotthoroughlyexaminedtothebottomalltheirowntenets，mustconfesstheyareunfittoprescribetoothers；andareunreasonableinimposingthatastruthonothermen’sbelief，whichtheythemselveshavenotsearchedinto，norweighedtheargumentsofprobability，onwhichtheyshouldreceiveorrejectit。Thosewhohavefairlyandtrulyexamined，andaretherebygotpastdoubtinallthedoctrinestheyprofessandgovernthemselvesby，wouldhaveajusterpretencetorequireotherstofollowthem:butthesearesofewinnumber，andfindsolittlereasontobemagisterialintheiropinions，thatnothinginsolentandimperiousistobeexpectedfromthem:andthereisreasontothink，that，ifmenwerebetterinstructedthemselves，theywouldbelessimposingonothers。
　　5。Probabilityiseitherofsensiblematteroffact，capableofhumantestimony，orofwhatisbeyondtheevidenceofoursenses。
　　Buttoreturntothegroundsofassent，andtheseveraldegreesofit，wearetotakenotice，thatthepropositionswereceiveuponinducementsofprobabilityareoftwosorts:eitherconcerningsomeparticularexistence，or，asitisusuallytermed，matteroffact，which，fallingunderobservation，iscapableofhumantestimony；orelseconcerningthings，which，beingbeyondthediscoveryofoursenses，arenotcapableofanysuchtestimony。
　　6。Theconcurrentexperienceofallothermenwithours，producesassuranceapproachingtoknowledge。Concerningthefirstofthese，viz。Particularmatteroffact。
　　I。Whereanyparticularthing，consonanttotheconstantobservationofourselvesandothersinthelikecase，comesattestedbytheconcurrentreportsofallthatmentionit，wereceiveitaseasily，andbuildasfirmlyuponit，asifitwerecertainknowledge；andwereasonandactthereuponwithaslittledoubtasifitwereperfectdemonstration。Thus，ifallEnglishmen，whohaveoccasiontomentionit，shouldaffirmthatitfrozeinEnglandthelastwinter，orthattherewereswallowsseenthereinthesummer，Ithinkamancouldalmostaslittledoubtofitasthatsevenandfourareeleven。Thefirst，therefore，andhighestdegreeofprobability，is，whenthegeneralconsentofallmen，inallages，asfarasitcanbeknown，concurswithaman’sconstantandnever-failingexperienceinlikecases，toconfirmthetruthofanyparticularmatteroffactattestedbyfairwitnesses:suchareallthestatedconstitutionsandpropertiesofbodies，andtheregularproceedingsofcausesandeffectsintheordinarycourseofnature。Thiswecallanargumentfromthenatureofthingsthemselves。Forwhatourownandothermen’sconstantobservationhasfoundalwaystobeafterthesamemanner，thatwewithreasonconcludetobetheeffectofsteadyandregularcauses；thoughtheycomenotwithinthereachofourknowledge。
　　Thus，Thatfirewarmedaman，madeleadfluid，andchangesthecolourorconsistencyinwoodorcharcoal；thatironsunkinwater，andswaminquicksilver:theseandthelikepropositionsaboutparticularfacts，beingagreeabletoourconstantexperience，asoftenaswehavetodowiththesematters；andbeinggenerallyspokeofwhenmentionedbyothersasthingsfoundconstantlytobeso，andthereforenotsomuchascontrovertedbyanybody-weareputpastdoubtthatarelationaffirminganysuchthingtohavebeen，oranypredictionthatitwillhappenagaininthesamemanner，isverytrue。
　　Theseprobabilitiesrisesoneartocertainty，thattheygovernourthoughtsasabsolutely，andinfluenceallouractionsasfully，asthemostevidentdemonstration；andinwhatconcernsuswemakelittleornodifferencebetweenthemandcertainknowledge。Ourbelief，thusgrounded，risestoassurance。
　　7。II。Unquestionabletestimony，andourownexperiencethatathingisforthemostpartso，produceconfidence。Thenextdegreeofprobabilityis，whenIfindbymyownexperience，andtheagreementofallothersthatmentionit，athingtobeforthemostpartso，andthattheparticularinstanceofitisattestedbymanyandundoubtedwitnesses:v。g。historygivingussuchanaccountofmeninallages，andmyownexperience，asfarasIhadanopportunitytoobserve，confirmingit，thatmostmenprefertheirprivateadvantagetothepublic:ifallhistoriansthatwriteofTiberius，saythatTiberiusdidso，itisextremelyprobable。Andinthiscase，ourassenthasasufficientfoundationtoraiseitselftoadegreewhichwemaycallconfidence。
　　8。III。Fairtestimony，andthenatureofthethingindifferent，produceunavoidableassent。Inthingsthathappenindifferently，asthatabirdshouldflythisorthatway；thatitshouldthunderonaman’srightorlefthand，&c。，whenanyparticularmatteroffactisvouchedbytheconcurrenttestimonyofunsuspectedwitnesses，thereourassentisalsounavoidable。Thus:thatthereissuchacityinItalyasRome:thataboutonethousandsevenhundredyearsago，therelivedinitaman，calledJuliusCaesar；thathewasageneral，andthathewonabattleagainstanother，calledPompey。
　　This，thoughinthenatureofthethingtherebenothingfornoragainstit，yetbeingrelatedbyhistoriansofcredit，andcontradictedbynoonewriter，amancannotavoidbelievingit，andcanaslittledoubtofitashedoesofthebeingandactionsofhisownacquaintance，whereofhehimselfisawitness。
　　9。Experienceandtestimoniesclashinginfinitelyvarythedegreesofprobability。Thusfarthemattergoeseasyenough。Probabilityuponsuchgroundscarriessomuchevidencewithit，thatitnaturallydeterminesthejudgment，andleavesusaslittlelibertytobelieveordisbelieve，asademonstrationdoes，whetherwewillknow，orbeignorant。Thedifficultyis，whentestimoniescontradictcommonexperience，andthereportsofhistoryandwitnessesclashwiththeordinarycourseofnature，orwithoneanother；thereitis，wherediligence，attention，andexactnessarerequired，toformarightjudgment，andtoproportiontheassenttothedifferentevidenceandprobabilityofthething:whichrisesandfalls，accordingasthosetwofoundationsofcredibility，viz。commonobservationinlikecases，andparticulartestimoniesinthatparticularinstance，favourorcontradictit。Theseareliabletosogreatvarietyofcontraryobservations，circumstances，reports，differentqualifications，tempers，designs，oversights，&c。，ofthereporters，thatitisimpossibletoreducetopreciserulesthevariousdegreeswhereinmengivetheirassent。Thisonlymaybesaidingeneral，Thatastheargumentsandproofsproandcon，upondueexamination，nicelyweighingeveryparticularcircumstance，shalltoanyoneappear，uponthewholematter，inagreaterorlessdegreetopreponderateoneitherside；sotheyarefittedtoproduceinthemindsuchdifferententertainments，aswecallbelief，conjecture，guess，doubt，wavering，distrust，disbelief，&c。
　　10。Traditionaltestimonies，thefurtherremovedthelesstheirproofbecomes。Thisiswhatconcernsassentinmatterswhereintestimonyismadeuseof:concerningwhich，Ithink，itmaynotbeamisstotakenoticeofaruleobservedinthelawofEngland；whichis，Thatthoughtheattestedcopyofarecordbegoodproof，yetthecopyofacopy，eversowellattested，andbyeversocrediblewitnesses，willnotbeadmittedasaproofinjudicature。Thisissogenerallyapprovedasreasonable，andsuitedtothewisdomandcautiontobeusedinourinquiryaftermaterialtruths，thatIneveryetheardofanyonethatblamedit。Thispractice，ifitbeallowableinthedecisionsofrightandwrong，carriesthisobservationalongwithit，viz。Thatanytestimony，thefurtheroffitisfromtheoriginaltruth，thelessforceandproofithas。Thebeingandexistenceofthethingitself，iswhatIcalltheoriginaltruth。A
　　crediblemanvouchinghisknowledgeofitisagoodproof；butifanotherequallycredibledowitnessitfromhisreport，thetestimonyisweaker:andathirdthatatteststhehearsayofanhearsayisyetlessconsiderable。Sothatintraditionaltruths，eachremoveweakenstheforceoftheproof:andthemorehandsthetraditionhassuccessivelypassedthrough，thelessstrengthandevidencedoesitreceivefromthem。ThisIthoughtnecessarytobetakennoticeof:becauseIfindamongstsomementhequitecontrarycommonlypractised，wholookonopinionstogainforcebygrowingolder；andwhatathousandyearssincewouldnot，toarationalmancontemporarywiththefirstvoucher，haveappearedatallprobable，isnowurgedascertainbeyondallquestion，onlybecauseseveralhavesince，fromhim，saiditoneafteranother。Uponthisgroundpropositions，evidentlyfalseordoubtfulenoughintheirfirstbeginning，come，byaninvertedruleofprobability，topassforauthentictruths；andthosewhichfoundordeservedlittlecreditfromthemouthsoftheirfirstauthors，arethoughttogrowvenerablebyage，areurgedasundeniable。
　　11。Yethistoryisofgreatuse。Iwouldnotbethoughtheretolessenthecreditanduseofhistory:itisallthelightwehaveinmanycases，andwehaveinmanycases，andwereceivefromitagreatpartoftheusefultruthswehave，withaconvincingevidence。I
　　thinknothingmorevaluablethantherecordsofantiquity:Iwishwehadmoreofthem，andmoreuncorrupted。Butthistruthitselfforcesmetosay，Thatnoprobabilitycanrisehigherthanitsfirstoriginal。Whathasnootherevidencethanthesingletestimonyofoneonlywitnessmuststandorfallbyhisonlytestimony，whethergood，bad，orindifferent；andthoughcitedafterwardsbyhundredsofothers，oneafteranother，issofarfromreceivinganystrengththereby，thatitisonlytheweaker。Passion，interest，inadvertency，mistakeofhismeaning，andathousandoddreasons，orcapricios，men’smindsareactedby，impossibletobediscovered，
　　maymakeonemanquoteanotherman’swordsormeaningwrong。Hethathasbuteversolittleexaminedthecitationsofwriters，cannotdoubthowlittlecreditthequotationsdeserve，wheretheoriginalsarewanting；andconsequentlyhowmuchlessquotationsofquotationscanbereliedon。Thisiscertain，thatwhatinoneagewasaffirmeduponslightgrounds，canneveraftercometobemorevalidinfutureagesbybeingoftenrepeated。Butthefurtherstillitisfromtheoriginal，thelessvaliditis，andhasalwayslessforceinthemouthorwritingofhimthatlastmadeuseofitthaninhisfromwhomhereceivedit。
　　12。Inthingswhichsensecannotdiscover，analogyisthegreatruleofprobability。[Secondly]，Theprobabilitieswehavehithertomentionedareonlysuchasconcernmatteroffact，andsuchthingsasarecapableofobservationandtestimony。Thereremainsthatothersort，concerningwhichmenentertainopinionswithvarietyofassent，thoughthethingsbesuch，thatfallingnotunderthereachofoursenses，theyarenotcapableoftestimony。Suchare，1。Theexistence，natureandoperationsoffiniteimmaterialbeingswithoutus；asspirits，angels，devils，&c。Ortheexistenceofmaterialbeingswhich，eitherfortheirsmallnessinthemselvesorremotenessfromus，oursensescannottakenoticeof-as，whethertherebeanyplants，animals，andintelligentinhabitantsintheplanets，andothermansionsofthevastuniverse。2。Concerningthemannerofoperationinmostpartsoftheworksofnature:wherein，thoughweseethesensibleeffects，yettheircausesareunknown，andweperceivenotthewaysandmannerhowtheyareproduced。Weseeanimalsaregenerated，nourished，andmove；theloadstonedrawsiron；andthepartsofacandle，successivelymelting，turnintoflame，andgiveusbothlightandheat。Theseandthelikeeffectsweseeandknow:
　　butthecausesthatoperate，andthemannertheyareproducedin，wecanonlyguessandprobablyconjecture。Fortheseandthelike，comingnotwithinthescrutinyofhumansenses，cannotbeexaminedbythem，orbeattestedbyanybody；andthereforecanappearmoreorlessprobable，onlyastheymoreorlessagreetotruthsthatareestablishedinourminds，andastheyholdproportiontootherpartsofourknowledgeandobservation。Analogyinthesemattersistheonlyhelpwehave，anditisfromthatalonewedrawallourgroundsofprobability。Thus，observingthatthebarerubbingoftwobodiesviolentlyoneuponanother，producesheat，andveryoftenfireitself，wehavereasontothink，thatwhatwecallheatandfireconsistsinaviolentagitationoftheimperceptibleminutepartsoftheburningmatter。Observinglikewisethatthedifferentrefractionsofpellucidbodiesproduceinoureyesthedifferentappearancesofseveralcolours；andalso，thatthedifferentrangingandlayingthesuperficialpartsofseveralbodies，asofvelvet，wateredsilk，&c。，doesthelike，wethinkitprobablethatthecolourandshiningofbodiesisinthemnothingbutthedifferentarrangementandrefractionoftheirminuteandinsensibleparts。Thus，findinginallpartsofthecreation，thatfallunderhumanobservation，thatthereisagradualconnexionofonewithanother，withoutanygreatordiscerniblegapsbetween，inallthatgreatvarietyofthingsweseeintheworld，whicharesocloselylinkedtogether，that，intheseveralranksofbeings，itisnoteasytodiscovertheboundsbetwixtthem；wehavereasontobepersuadedthat，bysuchgentlesteps，thingsascendupwardsindegreesofperfection。Itisahardmattertosaywheresensibleandrationalbegin，andwhereinsensibleandirrationalend:andwhoistherequick-sightedenoughtodeterminepreciselywhichisthelowestspeciesoflivingthings，andwhichthefirstofthosewhichhavenolife？Things，asfaraswecanobserve，lessenandaugment，asthequantitydoesinaregularcone；
　　where，thoughtherebeamanifestoddsbetwixtthebignessofthediameterataremotedistance，yetthedifferencebetweentheupperandunder，wheretheytouchoneanother，ishardlydiscernible。Thedifferenceisexceedinggreatbetweensomemenandsomeanimals:butifwewillcomparetheunderstandingandabilitiesofsomemenandsomebrutes，weshallfindsolittledifference，thatitwillbehardtosay，thatthatofthemaniseitherclearerorlarger。
　　Observing，Isay，suchgradualandgentledescentsdownwardsinthosepartsofthecreationthatarebeneathman，theruleofanalogymaymakeitprobable，thatitissoalsointhingsaboveusandourobservation；andthatthereareseveralranksofintelligentbeings，excellingusinseveraldegreesofperfection，ascendingupwardstowardstheinfiniteperfectionoftheCreator，bygentlestepsanddifferences，thatareeveryoneatnogreatdistancefromthenexttoit。Thissortofprobability，whichisthebestconductofrationalexperiments，andtheriseofhypothesis，hasalsoitsuseandinfluence；andawaryreasoningfromanalogyleadsusoftenintothediscoveryoftruthsandusefulproductions，whichwouldotherwiselieconcealed。
　　13。Onecasewherecontraryexperiencelessensnotthetestimony。
　　Thoughthecommonexperienceandtheordinarycourseofthingshavejustlyamightyinfluenceonthemindsofmen，tomakethemgiveorrefusecredittoanythingproposedtotheirbelief；yetthereisonecase，whereinthestrangenessofthefactlessensnottheassenttoafairtestimonygivenofit。ForwheresuchsupernaturaleventsaresuitabletoendsaimedatbyHimwhohasthepowertochangethecourseofnature，there，undersuchcircumstances，thatmaybethefittertoprocurebelief，byhowmuchthemoretheyarebeyondorcontrarytoordinaryobservation。Thisisthepropercaseofmiracles，which，wellattested，donotonlyfindcreditthemselves，butgiveitalsotoothertruths，whichneedsuchconfirmation。
　　14。Thebaretestimonyofdivinerevelationisthehighestcertainty。Besidesthosewehavehithertomentioned，thereisonesortofpropositionsthatchallengethehighestdegreeofourassent，uponbaretestimony，whetherthethingproposedagreeordisagreewithcommonexperience，andtheordinarycourseofthings，orno。Thereasonwhereofis，becausethetestimonyisofsuchanoneascannotdeceivenorbedeceived:andthatisofGodhimself。Thiscarrieswithitanassurancebeyonddoubt，evidencebeyondexception。Thisiscalledbyapeculiarname，revelation，andourassenttoit，faith，whichasabsolutelydeterminesourminds，andasperfectlyexcludesallwavering，asourknowledgeitself；andwemayaswelldoubtofourownbeing，aswecanwhetheranyrevelationfromGodbetrue。Sothatfaithisasettledandsureprincipleofassentandassurance，andleavesnomannerofroomfordoubtorhesitation。Onlywemustbesurethatitbeadivinerevelation，andthatweunderstanditright:elseweshallexposeourselvestoalltheextravagancyofenthusiasm，andalltheerrorofwrongprinciples，ifwehavefaithandassuranceinwhatisnotdivinerevelation。Andtherefore，inthosecases，ourassentcanberationallynohigherthantheevidenceofitsbeingarevelation，andthatthisisthemeaningoftheexpressionsitisdeliveredin。Iftheevidenceofitsbeingarevelation，orthatthisisitstruesense，beonlyonprobableproofs，ourassentcanreachnohigherthananassuranceordiffidence，arisingfromthemoreorlessapparentprobabilityoftheproofs。Butoffaith，andtheprecedencyitoughttohavebeforeotherargumentsofpersuasion，Ishallspeakmorehereafter；whereI
　　treatofitasitisordinarilyplaced，incontradistinctiontoreason；thoughintruthitbenothingelsebutanassentfoundedonthehighestreason。