ChapterVIII
　　OfTriflingPropositions1。Somepropositionsbringnoincreasetoourknowledge。Whetherthemaximstreatedofintheforegoingchapterbeofthatusetorealknowledgeasisgenerallysupposed，Ileavetobeconsidered。This，Ithink，mayconfidentlybeaffirmed，Thatthereareuniversalpropositions，which，thoughtheybecertainlytrue，yettheyaddnolighttoourunderstanding；bringnoincreasetoourknowledge。Suchare-
　　2。I。Asidenticalpropositions。First，Allpurelyidenticalpropositions。Theseobviouslyandatfirstblushappeartocontainnoinstructioninthem；forwhenweaffirmthesaidtermofitself，whetheritbebarelyverbal，orwhetheritcontainsanyclearandrealidea，itshowsusnothingbutwhatwemustcertainlyknowbefore，whethersuchapropositionbeeithermadeby，orproposedtous。
　　Indeed，thatmostgeneralone，whatis，is，mayservesometimestoshowamantheabsurdityheisguiltyof，when，bycircumlocutionorequivocalterms，hewouldinparticularinstancesdenythesamethingofitself；becausenobodywillsoopenlybiddefiancetocommonsense，astoaffirmvisibleanddirectcontradictionsinplainwords；or，ifhedoes，amanisexcusedifhebreaksoffanyfurtherdiscoursewithhim。ButyetIthinkImaysay，thatneitherthatreceivedmaxim，noranyotheridenticalproposition，teachesusanything；andthoughinsuchkindofpropositionsthisgreatandmagnifiedmaxim，boastedtobethefoundationofdemonstration，maybeandoftenismadeuseoftoconfirmthem，yetallitprovesamountstonomorethanthis，Thatthesamewordmaywithgreatcertaintybeaffirmedofitself，withoutanydoubtofthetruthofanysuchproposition；andletmeadd，also，withoutanyrealknowledge。
　　3。Examples。For，atthisrate，anyveryignorantperson，whocanbutmakeaproposition，andknowswhathemeanswhenhesaysayorno，maymakeamillionofpropositionsofwhosetruthhemaybeinfalliblycertain，andyetnotknowonethingintheworldthereby；v。g。"whatisasoul，isasoul，"；or，"asoulisasoul"；"aspiritisaspirit"；"afeticheisafetiche，"&c。Theseallbeingequivalenttothisproposition，viz。whatis，is；i。e。whathathexistence，hathexistence；or，whohathasoul，hathasoul。Whatisthismorethantriflingwithwords？Itisbutlikeamonkeyshiftinghisoysterfromonehandtotheother:andhadhebutwords，mightnodoubthavesaid，"Oysterinrighthandissubject，andoysterinlefthandispredicate":andsomighthavemadeaself-evidentpropositionofoyster，i。e。oysterisoyster；andyet，withallthis，nothavebeenonewhitthewiserormoreknowing:andthatwayofhandlingthematterwouldmuchatoncehavesatisfiedthemonkey’shunger，oraman’sunderstanding，andtheywouldhaveimprovedinknowledgeandbulktogether。
　　Howidenticalpropositionsaretrifling。Iknowtherearesomewho，becauseidenticalpropositionsareself-evident，showagreatconcernforthem，andthinktheydogreatservicetophilosophybycryingthemup；asifinthemwascontainedallknowledge，andtheunderstandingwereledintoalltruthbythemonly。Igrantasforwardlyasanyone，thattheyarealltrueandself-evident。Igrantfurther，thatthefoundationofallourknowledgeliesinthefacultywehaveofperceivingthesameideatobethesame，andofdiscerningitfromthosethataredifferent；asIhaveshownintheforegoingchapter。Buthowthatvindicatesthemakinguseofidenticalpropositions，fortheimprovementofknowledge，fromtheimputationoftrifling，Idonotsee。Letanyonerepeat，asoftenashepleases，that"thewillisthewill，"orlaywhatstressonithethinksfit；
　　ofwhatuseisthis，andaninfinitethelikepropositions，fortheenlargingourknowledge？Letamanabound，asmuchastheplentyofwordswhichhehaswillpermit，insuchpropositionsasthese:"alawisalaw，"and"obligationisobligation"；"rightisright，"and"wrongiswrong":-willtheseandthelikeeverhelphimtoanacquaintancewithethics，orinstructhimorothersintheknowledgeofmorality？Thosewhoknownot，norperhapseverwillknow，whatisrightandwhatiswrong，northemeasuresofthem，canwithasmuchassurancemake，andinfalliblyknow，thetruthoftheseandallsuchpropositions，ashethatisbestinstructedinmoralitycando。Butwhatadvancedosuchpropositionsgiveintheknowledgeofanythingnecessaryorusefulfortheirconduct？
　　Hewouldbethoughttodolittlelessthantrifle，who，fortheenlighteningtheunderstandinginanypartofknowledge，shouldbebusywithidenticalpropositionsandinsistonsuchmaximsasthese:
　　"substanceissubstance，"and"bodyisbody"；"avacuumisavacuum，"and"avortexisavortex"；"acentaurisacentaur，"and"achimeraisachimera，"&c。Fortheseandallsuchareequallytrue，equallycertain，andequallyself-evident。Butyettheycannotbutbecountedtrifling，whenmadeuseofasprinciplesofinstruction，andstresslaidonthemashelpstoknowledge；sincetheyteachnothingbutwhateveryonewhoiscapableofdiscourseknowswithoutbeingtold，viz。thatthesametermisthesameterm，andthesameideathesameidea。AnduponthisaccountitwasthatIformerlydid，anddostillthink，theofferingandinculcatingsuchpropositions，inordertogivetheunderstandinganynewlight，orinletintotheknowledgeofthings，nobetterthantrifling。
　　Instructionliesinsomethingverydifferent；andhethatwouldenlargehisownoranother’smindtotruthshedoesnotyetknow，mustfindoutintermediateideas，andthenlaytheminsuchorderonebyanother，thattheunderstandingmayseetheagreementordisagreementofthoseinquestion。Propositionsthatdothisareinstructive；buttheyarefarfromsuchasaffirmthesametermofitself；whichisnowaytoadvanceone’sselforothersinanysortofknowledge。Itnomorehelpstothatthanitwouldhelpanyoneinhislearningtoread，tohavesuchpropositionsastheseinculcatedtohim-"AnAisanA，"and"aBisaB"；whichamanmayknowaswellasanyschoolmaster，andyetneverbeabletoreadawordaslongashelives。Nordothese，oranysuchidenticalpropositionshelphimonejotforwardsintheskillofreading，lethimmakewhatuseofthemhecan。
　　IfthosewhoblamemycallingthemtriflingpropositionshadbutreadandbeenatthepainstounderstandwhatIhaveabovewritinveryplainEnglish，theycouldnotbuthaveseenthatbyidenticalpropositionsImeanonlysuchwhereinthesameterm，importingthesameidea，isaffirmedofitself:whichItaketobethepropersignificationofidenticalpropositions；andconcerningallsuch，I
　　thinkImaycontinuesafelytosay，thattoproposethemasinstructiveisnobetterthantrifling。Fornoonewhohastheuseofreasoncanmissthem，whereitisnecessarytheyshouldbetakennoticeof；nordoubtoftheirtruthwhenhedoestakenoticeofthem。
　　Butifmenwillcallpropositionsidentical，whereinthesametermisnotaffirmedofitself，whethertheyspeakmoreproperlythanI，othersmustjudge；thisiscertain，allthattheysayofpropositionsthatarenotidenticalinmysense，concernsnotmenorwhatIhavesaid；allthatIhavesaidrelatingtothosepropositionswhereinthesametermisaffirmedofitself。AndI
　　wouldfainseeaninstancewhereinanysuchcanbemadeuseof，totheadvantageandimprovementofanyone’sknowledge。Instancesofotherkinds，whateverusemaybemadeofthem，concernnotme，asnotbeingsuchasIcallidentical。
　　4。II。Secondly，propositionsinwhichapartofanycomplexideaispredicatedofthewhole。Anothersortoftriflingpropositionsis，whenapartofthecomplexideaispredicatedofthenameofthewhole；apartofthedefinitionoftheworddefined。Suchareallpropositionswhereinthegenusispredicatedofthespecies，ormorecomprehensiveoflesscomprehensiveterms。Forwhatinformation，whatknowledge，carriesthispropositioninit，viz。"Leadisametal"
　　toamanwhoknowsthecomplexideathenameleadstandsfor？Allthesimpleideasthatgotothecomplexonesignifiedbythetermmetal，beingnothingbutwhathebeforecomprehendedandsignifiedbythenamelead。Indeed，toamanthatknowsthesignificationofthewordmetal，andnotofthewordlead，itisashorterwaytoexplainthesignificationofthewordlead，bysayingitisametal，whichatonceexpressesseveralofitssimpleideas，thantoenumeratethemonebyone，tellinghimitisabodyveryheavy，fusible，andmalleable。
　　5。Aspartofthedefinitionofthetermdefined。Aliketriflingitistopredicateanyotherpartofthedefinitionofthetermdefined，ortoaffirmanyoneofthesimpleideasofacomplexoneofthenameofthewholecomplexidea；as，"Allgoldisfusible。"
　　Forfusibilitybeingoneofthesimpleideasthatgoestothemakingupthecomplexonethesoundgoldstandsfor，whatcanitbebutplayingwithsounds，toaffirmthatofthenamegold，whichiscomprehendedinitsreceivedsignification？Itwouldbethoughtlittlebetterthanridiculoustoaffirmgravely，asatruthofmoment，thatgoldisyellow；andIseenothowitisanyjotmorematerialtosayitisfusible，unlessthatqualitybeleftoutofthecomplexidea，ofwhichthesoundgoldisthemarkinordinaryspeech。Whatinstructioncanitcarrywithit，totellonethatwhichhehathbeentoldalready，orheissupposedtoknowbefore？ForIamsupposedtoknowthesignificationofthewordanotherusestome，orelseheistotellme。AndifIknowthatthenamegoldstandsforthiscomplexideaofbody，yellow，heavy，fusible，malleable，itwillnotmuchinstructmetoputitsolemnlyafterwardsinaproposition，andgravelysay，allgoldisfusible。Suchpropositionscanonlyservetoshowthedisingenuityofonewhowillgofromthedefinitionofhisownterms，byremindinghimsometimesofit；butcarrynoknowledgewiththem，butofthesignificationofwords，howevercertaintheybe。
　　6。Instance，manandpalfrey。"Everymanisananimal，orlivingbody，"isascertainapropositionascanbe；butnomoreconducingtotheknowledgeofthingsthantosay，apalfreyisanamblinghorse，oraneighing，amblinganimal，bothbeingonlyaboutthesignificationofwords，andmakemeknowbutthis-Thatbody，sense，andmotion，orpowerofsensationandmoving，arethreeofthoseideasthatI
　　alwayscomprehendandsignifybythewordman:andwheretheyarenottobefoundtogether，thenamemanbelongsnottothatthing:
　　andsooftheother-Thatbody，sense，andacertainwayofgoing，withacertainkindofvoice，aresomeofthoseideaswhichIalwayscomprehendandsignifybythewordpalfrey；andwhentheyarenottobefoundtogether，thenamepalfreybelongsnottothatthing。Itisjustthesame，andtothesamepurpose，whenanytermstandingforanyoneormoreofthesimpleideas，thataltogethermakeupthatcomplexideawhichiscalledman，isaffirmedofthetermman:-v。g。
　　supposeaRomansignifiedbythewordhomoallthesedistinctideasunitedinonesubject，corporietas，sensibilitas，potentiasemovendirationalitas，risibilitas；hemight，nodoubt，withgreatcertainty，universallyaffirmone，more，orallofthesetogetherofthewordhomo，butdidnomorethansaythatthewordhomo，inhiscountry，comprehendedinitssignificationalltheseideas。Muchlikearomanceknight，whobythewordpalfreysignifiedtheseideas:-
　　bodyofacertainfigure，four-legged，withsense，motion，ambling，neighing，white，usedtohaveawomanonhisback-mightwiththesamecertaintyuniversallyaffirmalsoanyoralloftheseofthewordpalfrey:butdidtherebyteachnomore，butthatthewordpalfrey，inhisorromancelanguage，stoodforallthese，andwasnottobeappliedtoanythingwhereanyofthesewaswanting。Buthethatshalltellme，thatinwhateverthingsense，motion，reason，andlaughter，wereunited，thatthinghadactuallyanotionofGod，orwouldbecastintoasleepbyopium，madeindeedaninstructiveproposition:becauseneitherhavingthenotionofGod，norbeingcastintosleepbyopium，beingcontainedintheideasignifiedbythewordman，wearebysuchpropositionstaughtsomethingmorethanbarelywhatthewordmanstandsfor:andthereforetheknowledgecontainedinitismorethanverbal。
　　7。Forthisteachesbutthesignificationofwords。Beforeamanmakesanyproposition，heissupposedtounderstandthetermsheusesinit，orelsehetalkslikeaparrot，onlymakinganoisebyimitation，andframingcertainsounds，whichhehaslearntofothers；butnotasarationalcreature，usingthemforsignsofideaswhichhehasinhismind。Theheareralsoissupposedtounderstandthetermsasthespeakerusesthem，orelsehetalksjargon，andmakesanunintelligiblenoise。Andthereforehetrifleswithwordswhomakessuchaproposition，which，whenitismade，containsnomorethanoneofthetermsdoes，andwhichamanwassupposedtoknowbefore:v。g。atrianglehaththreesides，orsaffronisyellow。Andthisisnofurthertolerablethanwhereamangoestoexplainhistermstoonewhoissupposedordeclareshimselfnottounderstandhim；andthenitteachesonlythesignificationofthatword，andtheuseofthatsign。
　　8。Butaddsnorealknowledge。Wecanknowthenthetruthoftwosortsofpropositionswithperfectcertainty。Theoneis，ofthosetriflingpropositionswhichhaveacertaintyinthem，butitisonlyaverbalcertainty，butnotinstructive。And，secondly，wecanknowthetruth，andsomaybecertaininpropositions，whichaffirmsomethingofanother，whichisanecessaryconsequenceofitsprecisecomplexidea，butnotcontainedinit:asthattheexternalangleofalltrianglesisbiggerthaneitheroftheoppositeinternalangles。Whichrelationoftheoutwardangletoeitheroftheoppositeinternalangles，makingnopartofthecomplexideasignifiedbythenametriangle，thisisarealtruth，andconveyswithitinstructiverealknowledge。
　　9。Generalpropositionsconcerningsubstancesareoftentrifling。Wehavinglittleornoknowledgeofwhatcombinationstherebeofsimpleideasexistingtogetherinsubstances，butbyoursenses，wecannotmakeanyuniversalcertainpropositionsconcerningthem，anyfurtherthanournominalessencesleadus。Whichbeingtoaveryfewandinconsiderabletruths，inrespectofthosewhichdependontheirrealconstitutions，thegeneralpropositionsthataremadeaboutsubstances，iftheyarecertain，areforthemostpartbuttrifling；
　　andiftheyareinstructive，areuncertain，andsuchaswecanhavenoknowledgeoftheirrealtruth，howmuchsoeverconstantobservationandanalogymayassistourjudgmentinguessing。Henceitcomestopass，thatonemayoftenmeetwithveryclearandcoherentdiscourses，thatamountyettonothing。Foritisplainthatnamesofsubstantialbeings，aswellasothers，asfarastheyhaverelativesignificationsaffixedtothem，may，withgreattruth，bejoinednegativelyandaffirmativelyinpropositions，astheirrelativedefinitionsmakethemfittobesojoined；andpropositionsconsistingofsuchterms，may，withthesameclearness，bededucedonefromanother，asthosethatconveythemostrealtruths:andallthiswithoutanyknowledgeofthenatureorrealityofthingsexistingwithoutus。Bythismethodonemaymakedemonstrationsandundoubtedpropositionsinwords，andyettherebyadvancenotonejotintheknowledgeofthetruthofthings:v。g。hethathavinglearntthesefollowingwords，withtheirordinarymutualrelativeacceptationsannexedtothem:v。g。substance，man，animal，form，soul，vegetative，sensitive，rational，maymakeseveralundoubtedpropositionsaboutthesoul，withoutknowingatallwhatthesoulreallyis:andofthissort，amanmayfindaninfinitenumberofpropositions，reasonings，andconclusions，inbooksofmetaphysics，school-divinity，andsomesortofnaturalphilosophy:and，afterall，knowaslittleofGod，spirits，orbodies，ashedidbeforehesetout。
　　10。Andwhy。Hethathathlibertytodefine，i。e。todeterminethesignificationofhisnamesofsubstancesascertainlyeveryonedoesineffect，whomakesthemstandforhisownideas，andmakestheirsignificationsataventure，takingthemfromhisownorothermen’sfancies，andnotfromanexaminationorinquiryintothenatureofthingsthemselves；maywithlittletroubledemonstratethemoneofanother，accordingtothoseseveralrespectsandmutualrelationshehasgiventhemonetoanother；wherein，howeverthingsagreeordisagreeintheirownnature，heneedsmindnothingbuthisownnotions，withthenameshehathbestoweduponthem:buttherebynomoreincreasesinhisownknowledgethanhedoeshisriches，who，takingabagofcounters，callsoneinacertainplaceapound，anotherinanotherplaceashilling，andathirdinathirdplaceapenny；andsoproceeding，mayundoubtedlyreckonright，andcastupagreatsum，accordingtohiscounterssoplaced，andstandingformoreorlessashepleases，withoutbeingonejotthericher，orwithoutevenknowinghowmuchapound，shilling，orpennyis，butonlythatoneiscontainedintheothertwentytimes，andcontainstheothertwelve:whichamanmayalsodointhesignificationofwords，bymakingthem，inrespectofoneanother，moreorless，orequallycomprehensive。
　　11。Thirdly，usingwordsvariouslyistriflingwiththem。Thoughyetconcerningmostwordsusedindiscourses，equallyargumentativeandcontroversial，thereisthismoretobecomplainedof，whichistheworstsortoftrifling，andwhichsetsusyetfurtherfromthecertaintyofknowledgewehopetoattainbythem，orfindinthem；
　　viz。thatmostwritersaresofarfrominstructingusinthenatureandknowledgeofthings，thattheyusetheirwordslooselyanduncertainly，anddonot。byusingthemconstantlyandsteadilyinthesamesignifications，makeplainandcleardeductionsofwordsonefromanother，andmaketheirdiscoursescoherentandclear，howlittlesoevertheywereinstructive；whichwerenotdifficulttodo，didtheynotfinditconvenienttosheltertheirignoranceorobstinacyundertheobscurityandperplexednessoftheirterms:towhich，perhaps，inadvertencyandillcustomdoinmanymenmuchcontribute。
　　12。Marksofverbalpropositions。Toconclude。Barelyverbalpropositionsmaybeknownbythesefollowingmarks:
　　Predicationinabstract。First，Allpropositionswhereintwoabstracttermsareaffirmedoneofanother，arebarelyaboutthesignificationofsounds。Forsincenoabstractideacanbethesamewithanyotherbutitself，whenitsabstractnameisaffirmedofanyotherterm，itcansignifynomorebutthis，thatitmay，oroughttobecalledbythatname；orthatthesetwonamessignifythesameidea。Thus，shouldanyonesaythatparsimonyisfrugality，thatgratitudeisjustice，thatthisorthatactionisorisnottemperate:
　　howeverspecioustheseandthelikepropositionsmayatfirstsightseem，yetwhenwecometopressthem，andexaminenicelywhattheycontain，weshallfindthatitallamountstonothingbutthesignificationofthoseterms。
　　13。Apartofthedefinitionpredicatedofanyterm。Secondly，Allpropositionswhereinapartofthecomplexideawhichanytermstandsforispredicatedofthatterm，areonlyverbal:v。g。tosaythatgoldisametal，orheavy。Andthusallpropositionswhereinmorecomprehensivewords，calledgenera，areaffirmedofsubordinateorlesscomprehensive，calledspecies，orindividuals，arebarelyverbal。
　　Whenbythesetworuleswehaveexaminedthepropositionsthatmakeupthediscoursesweordinarilymeetwith，bothinandoutofbooks，weshallperhapsfindthatagreaterpartofthemthanisusuallysuspectedarepurelyaboutthesignificationofwords，andcontainnothinginthembuttheuseandapplicationofthesesigns。
　　ThisIthinkImaylaydownforaninfalliblerule，That，whereverthedistinctideaanywordstandsforisnotknownandconsidered，andsomethingnotcontainedintheideaisnotaffirmedordeniedofit，thereourthoughtsstickwhollyinsounds，andareabletoattainnorealtruthorfalsehood。This，perhaps，ifwellheeded，mightsaveusagreatdealofuselessamusementanddispute；andverymuchshortenourtroubleandwanderinginthesearchofrealandtrueknowledge。
　　ChapterIX
　　OfourThreefoldKnowledgeofExistence1。Generalpropositionsthatarecertainconcernnotexistence。
　　Hithertowehaveonlyconsideredtheessencesofthings；whichbeingonlyabstractideas，andtherebyremovedinourthoughtsfromparticularexistence，thatbeingtheproperoperationofthemind，inabstraction，toconsideranideaundernootherexistencebutwhatithasintheunderstanding，givesusnoknowledgeofrealexistenceatall。Where，bytheway，wemaytakenotice，thatuniversalpropositionsofwhosetruthorfalsehoodwecanhavecertainknowledgeconcernnotexistence:andfurther，thatallparticularaffirmationsornegationsthatwouldnotbecertainiftheyweremadegeneral，areonlyconcerningexistence；theydeclaringonlytheaccidentalunionorseparationofideasinthingsexisting，which，intheirabstractnatures，havenoknownnecessaryunionorrepugnancy。
　　2。Athreefoldknowledgeofexistence。But，leavingthenatureofpropositions，anddifferentwaysofpredicationtobeconsideredmoreatlargeinanotherplace，letusproceednowtoinquireconcerningourknowledgeoftheexistenceofthings，andhowwecomebyit。Isay，then，thatwehavetheknowledgeofourownexistencebyintuition；oftheexistenceofGodbydemonstration；andofotherthingsbysensation。
　　3。Ourknowledgeofourownexistenceisintuitive。Asforourownexistence，weperceiveitsoplainlyandsocertainly，thatitneitherneedsnoriscapableofanyproof。Fornothingcanbemoreevidenttousthanourownexistence。Ithink，Ireason，Ifeelpleasureandpain:cananyofthesebemoreevidenttomethanmyownexistence？IfIdoubtofallotherthings，thatverydoubtmakesmeperceivemyownexistence，andwillnotsuffermetodoubtofthat。ForifI
　　knowIfeelpain，itisevidentIhaveascertainperceptionofmyownexistence，asoftheexistenceofthepainIfeel:orifIknowI
　　doubt，Ihaveascertainperceptionoftheexistenceofthethingdoubting，asofthatthoughtwhichIcalldoubt。Experiencethenconvincesus，thatwehaveanintuitiveknowledgeofourownexistence，andaninternalinfallibleperceptionthatweare。Ineveryactofsensation，reasoning，orthinking，weareconscioustoourselvesofourownbeing；and，inthismatter，comenotshortofthehighestdegreeofcertainty。
　　ChapterX
　　OfourKnowledgeoftheExistenceofaGod1。WearecapableofknowingcertainlythatthereisaGod。ThoughGodhasgivenusnoinnateideasofhimself；thoughhehasstampednooriginalcharactersonourminds，whereinwemayreadhisbeing；
　　yethavingfurnisheduswiththosefacultiesourmindsareendowedwith，hehathnotlefthimselfwithoutwitness:sincewehavesense，perception，andreason，andcannotwantaclearproofofhim，aslongaswecarryourselvesaboutus。Norcanwejustlycomplainofourignoranceinthisgreatpoint；sincehehassoplentifullyprovideduswiththemeanstodiscoverandknowhim；sofarasisnecessarytotheendofourbeing，andthegreatconcernmentofourhappiness。But，thoughthisbethemostobvioustruththatreasondiscovers，andthoughitsevidencebeifImistakenotequaltomathematicalcertainty:yetitrequiresthoughtandattention；andthemindmustapplyitselftoaregulardeductionofitfromsomepartofourintuitiveknowledge，orelseweshallbeasuncertainandignorantofthisasofotherpropositions，whichareinthemselvescapableofcleardemonstration。Toshow，therefore，thatwearecapableofknowing，i。e。beingcertainthatthereisaGod，andhowwemaycomebythiscertainty，Ithinkweneedgonofurtherthanourselves，andthatundoubtedknowledgewehaveofourownexistence。
　　2。Formanknowsthathehimselfexists。Ithinkitisbeyondquestion，thatmanhasaclearideaofhisownbeing；heknowscertainlyheexists，andthatheissomething。Hethatcandoubtwhetherhebeanythingorno，Ispeaknotto；nomorethanIwouldarguewithpurenothing，orendeavourtoconvincenonentitythatitweresomething。Ifanyonepretendstobesoscepticalastodenyhisownexistence，forreallytodoubtofitismanifestlyimpossible，lethimformeenjoyhisbelovedhappinessofbeingnothing，untilhungerorsomeotherpainconvincehimofthecontrary。
　　This，then，IthinkImaytakeforatruth，whicheveryone’scertainknowledgeassureshimof，beyondthelibertyofdoubting，viz。
　　thatheissomethingthatactuallyexists。
　　3Heknowsalsothatnothingcannotproduceabeing；thereforesomethingmusthaveexistedfrometernity。Inthenextplace，manknows，byanintuitivecertainty，thatbarenothingcannomoreproduceanyrealbeing，thanitcanbeequaltotworightangles。Ifamanknowsnotthatnonentity，ortheabsenceofallbeing，cannotbeequaltotworightangles，itisimpossibleheshouldknowanydemonstrationinEuclid。If，therefore，weknowthereissomerealbeing，andthatnonentitycannotproduceanyrealbeing，itisanevidentdemonstration，thatfrometernitytherehasbeensomething；
　　sincewhatwasnotfrometernityhadabeginning；andwhathadabeginningmustbeproducedbysomethingelse。
　　4。AndthateternalBeingmustbemostpowerful。Next，itisevident，thatwhathaditsbeingandbeginningfromanother，mustalsohaveallthatwhichisinandbelongstoitsbeingfromanothertoo。
　　Allthepowersithasmustbeowingtoandreceivedfromthesamesource。Thiseternalsource，then，ofallbeingmustalsobethesourceandoriginalofallpower；andsothiseternalBeingmustbealsothemostpowerful。
　　5。Andmostknowing。Again，amanfindsinhimselfperceptionandknowledge。Wehavethengotonestepfurther；andwearecertainnowthatthereisnotonlysomebeing，butsomeknowing，intelligentbeingintheworld。Therewasatime，then，whentherewasnoknowingbeing，andwhenknowledgebegantobe；orelsetherehasbeenalsoaknowingbeingfrometernity。Ifitbesaid，therewasatimewhennobeinghadanyknowledge，whenthateternalbeingwasvoidofallunderstanding；Ireply，thatthenitwasimpossiblethereshouldeverhavebeenanyknowledge:itbeingasimpossiblethatthingswhollyvoidofknowledge，andoperatingblindly，andwithoutanyperception，shouldproduceaknowingbeing，asitisimpossiblethatatriangleshouldmakeitselfthreeanglesbiggerthantworightones。
　　Foritisasrepugnanttotheideaofsenselessmatter，thatitshouldputintoitselfsense，perception，andknowledge，asitisrepugnanttotheideaofatriangle，thatitshouldputintoitselfgreateranglesthantworightones。
　　6。AndthereforeGod。Thus，fromtheconsiderationofourselves，andwhatweinfalliblyfindinourownconstitutions，ourreasonleadsustotheknowledgeofthiscertainandevidenttruth，-Thatthereisaneternal，mostpowerful，andmostknowingBeing；whichwhetheranyonewillpleasetocallGod，itmattersnot。Thethingisevident；
　　andfromthisideadulyconsidered，willeasilybededucedallthoseotherattributes，whichweoughttoascribetothiseternalBeing。If，nevertheless，anyoneshouldbefoundsosenselesslyarrogant，astosupposemanaloneknowingandwise，butyettheproductofmereignoranceandchance；andthatalltherestoftheuniverseactedonlybythatblindhaphazard；IshallleavewithhimthatveryrationalandemphaticalrebukeofTullyI。ii。DeLeg。，tobeconsideredathisleisure:"Whatcanbemoresillilyarrogantandmisbecoming，thanforamantothinkthathehasamindandunderstandinginhim，butyetinalltheuniversebesidethereisnosuchthing？Orthatthosethings，whichwiththeutmoststretchofhisreasonhecanscarcecomprehend，shouldbemovedandmanagedwithoutanyreasonatall？"
　　Quidestenimverius，quamneminemesseoporteretamstultearrogantem，utinsementemetrationemputetinesse，incaelomundoquenonputet？Auteaquaevixsummaingeniirationecomprehendat，nullarationemoveriputet？
　　Fromwhathasbeensaid，itisplaintomewehaveamorecertainknowledgeoftheexistenceofaGod，thanofanythingoursenseshavenotimmediatelydiscoveredtous。Nay，IpresumeImaysay，thatwemorecertainlyknowthatthereisaGod，thanthatthereisanythingelsewithoutus。WhenIsayweknow，Imeanthereissuchaknowledgewithinourreachwhichwecannotmiss，ifwewillbutapplyourmindstothat，aswedotoseveralotherinquiries。
　　7。OurideaofamostperfectBeing，notthesoleproofofaGod。
　　Howfartheideaofamostperfectbeing，whichamanmayframeinhismind，doesordoesnotprovetheexistenceofaGod，Iwillnothereexamine。Forinthedifferentmakeofmen’stempersandapplicationoftheirthoughts，someargumentsprevailmoreonone，andsomeonanother，fortheconfirmationofthesametruth。Butyet，Ithink，thisImaysay，thatitisanillwayofestablishingthistruth，andsilencingatheists，tolaythewholestressofsoimportantapointasthisuponthatsolefoundation:andtakesomemen’shavingthatideaofGodintheirminds，foritisevidentsomemenhavenone，andsomeworsethannone，andthemostverydifferent，fortheonlyproofofaDeity；andoutofanoverfondnessofthatdarlinginvention，cashier，oratleastendeavourtoinvalidateallotherarguments；andforbidustohearkentothoseproofs，asbeingweakorfallacious，whichourownexistence，andthesensiblepartsoftheuniverseoffersoclearlyandcogentlytoourthoughts，thatI
　　deemitimpossibleforaconsideringmantowithstandthem。ForI
　　judgeitascertainandclearatruthascananywherebedelivered，that"theinvisiblethingsofGodareclearlyseenfromthecreationoftheworld，beingunderstoodbythethingsthataremade，evenhiseternalpowerandGodhead。"Thoughourownbeingfurnishesus，asI
　　haveshown，withanevidentandincontestableproofofaDeity；andIbelievenobodycanavoidthecogencyofit，whowillbutascarefullyattendtoit，astoanyotherdemonstrationofsomanyparts:yetthisbeingsofundamentalatruth，andofthatconsequence，thatallreligionandgenuinemoralitydependthereon，IdoubtnotbutIshallbeforgivenbymyreaderifIgooversomepartsofthisargumentagain，andenlargealittlemoreuponthem。
　　8。Recapitulation-somethingfrometernity。Thereisnotruthmoreevidentthanthatsomethingmustbefrometernity。Ineveryetheardofanyonesounreasonable，orthatcouldsupposesomanifestacontradiction，asatimewhereintherewasperfectlynothing。Thisbeingofallabsurditiesthegreatest，toimaginethatpurenothing，theperfectnegationandabsenceofallbeings，shouldeverproduceanyrealexistence。
　　Itbeing，then，unavoidableforallrationalcreaturestoconclude，thatsomethinghasexistedfrometernity；letusnextseewhatkindofthingthatmustbe。
　　9。Twosortsofbeings，cogitativeandincogitative。Therearebuttwosortsofbeingsintheworldthatmanknowsorconceives。
　　First，suchasarepurelymaterial，withoutsense，perception，orthought，astheclippingsofourbeards，andparingsofournails。
　　Secondly，sensible，thinking，perceivingbeings，suchaswefindourselvestobe。Which，ifyouplease，wewillhereaftercallcogitativeandincogitativebeings；whichtoourpresentpurpose，iffornothingelse，areperhapsbettertermsthanmaterialandimmaterial。
　　10。Incogitativebeingcannotproduceacogitativebeing。If，then，theremustbesomethingeternal，letusseewhatsortofbeingitmustbe。Andtothatitisveryobvioustoreason，thatitmustnecessarilybeacogitativebeing。Foritisasimpossibletoconceivethateverbareincogitativemattershouldproduceathinkingintelligentbeing，asthatnothingshouldofitselfproducematter。
　　Letussupposeanyparcelofmattereternal，greatorsmall，weshallfindit，initself，abletoproducenothing。Forexample:letussupposethematterofthenextpebblewemeetwitheternal，closelyunited，andthepartsfirmlyatresttogether；iftherewerenootherbeingintheworld，mustitnoteternallyremainso，adeadinactivelump？Isitpossibletoconceiveitcanaddmotiontoitself，beingpurelymatter，orproduceanything？Matter，then，byitsownstrength，cannotproduceinitselfsomuchasmotion:themotionithasmustalsobefrometernity，orelsebeproduced，andaddedtomatterbysomeotherbeingmorepowerfulthanmatter；matter，asisevident，havingnotpowertoproducemotioninitself。Butletussupposemotioneternaltoo:yetmatter，incogitativematterandmotion，whateverchangesitmightproduceoffigureandbulk，couldneverproducethought:knowledgewillstillbeasfarbeyondthepowerofmotionandmattertoproduce，asmatterisbeyondthepowerofnothingornonentitytoproduce。AndIappealtoeveryone’sownthoughts，whetherhecannotaseasilyconceivematterproducedbynothing，asthoughttobeproducedbypurematter，when，before，therewasnosuchthingasthoughtoranintelligentbeingexisting？
　　Dividematterintoasmanypartsasyouwill，whichweareapttoimagineasortofspiritualizing，ormakingathinkingthingofit，
　　varythefigureandmotionofitasmuchasyouplease-aglobe，cube，cone，prism，cylinder，&c。，whosediametersarebut100，000thpartofagry，willoperatenootherwiseuponotherbodiesofproportionablebulk，thanthoseofaninchorfootdiameter；andyoumayasrationallyexpecttoproducesense，thought，andknowledge，byputtingtogether，inacertainfigureandmotion，grossparticlesofmatter，asbythosethataretheveryminutestthatdoanywhereexist。Theyknock，impel，andresistoneanother，justasthegreaterdo；andthatisalltheycando。Sothat，ifwewillsupposenothingfirstoreternal，mattercanneverbegintobe:ifwesupposebarematterwithoutmotion，eternal，motioncanneverbegintobe:ifwesupposeonlymatterandmotionfirst，oreternal，thoughtcanneverbegintobe。Foritisimpossibletoconceivethatmatter，eitherwithorwithoutmotion，couldhave，originally，inandfromitself，sense，perception，andknowledge；asisevidentfromhence，thatthensense，perception，andknowledge，mustbeapropertyeternallyinseparablefrommatterandeveryparticleofit。Nottoadd，that，thoughourgeneralorspecificconceptionofmattermakesusspeakofitasonething，yetreallyallmatterisnotoneindividualthing，neitheristhereanysuchthingexistingasonematerialbeing，oronesinglebodythatweknoworcanconceive。Andtherefore，ifmatterweretheeternalfirstcogitativebeing，therewouldnotbeoneeternal，infinite，cogitativebeing，butaninfinitenumberofeternal，finite，cogitativebeings，independentoneofanother，oflimitedforce，anddistinctthoughts，whichcouldneverproducethatorder，harmony，andbeautywhicharetobefoundinnature。Since，therefore，whatsoeveristhefirsteternalbeingmustnecessarilybecogitative；andwhatsoeverisfirstofallthingsmustnecessarilycontaininit，andactuallyhave，atleast，alltheperfectionsthatcaneverafterexist；norcanitevergivetoanotheranyperfectionthatithathnoteitheractuallyinitself，or，atleast，inahigherdegree；itnecessarilyfollows，thatthefirsteternalbeingcannotbematter。
　　11。Therefore，therehasbeenaneternalcogitativeBeing。If，therefore，itbeevident，thatsomethingnecessarilymustexistfrometernity，itisalsoasevident，thatthatsomethingmustnecessarilybeacogitativebeing:foritisasimpossiblethatincogitativemattershouldproduceacogitativebeing，asthatnothing，orthenegationofallbeing，shouldproduceapositivebeingormatter。
　　12。TheattributesoftheeternalcogitativeBeing。ThoughthisdiscoveryofthenecessaryexistenceofaneternalMinddoessufficientlyleadusintotheknowledgeofGod；sinceitwillhencefollow，thatallotherknowingbeingsthathaveabeginningmustdependonhim，andhavenootherwaysofknowledgeorextentofpowerthanwhathegivesthem；andtherefore，ifhemadethose，hemadealsothelessexcellentpiecesofthisuniverse，-allinanimatebeings，wherebyhisomniscience，power，andprovidencewillbeestablished，andallhisotherattributesnecessarilyfollow:yet，toclearupthisalittlefurther，wewillseewhatdoubtscanberaisedagainstit。
　　13。WhethertheeternalMindmayhealsomaterialorno。First，Perhapsitwillbesaid，that，thoughitbeasclearasdemonstrationcanmakeit，thattheremustbeaneternalBeing，andthatBeingmustalsobeknowing:yetitdoesnotfollowbutthatthinkingBeingmayalsobematerial。Letitbeso，itequallystillfollowsthatthereisaGod。Foriftherebeaneternal，omniscient，omnipotentBeing，itiscertainthatthereisaGod，whetheryouimaginethatBeingtobematerialorno。Butherein，Isuppose，liesthedangeranddeceitofthatsupposition:-therebeingnowaytoavoidthedemonstration，thatthereisaneternalknowingBeing，men，devotedtomatter，wouldwillinglyhaveitgranted，thatthisknowingBeingismaterial；andthen，lettingslideoutoftheirminds，orthediscourse，thedemonstrationwherebyaneternalknowingBeingwasprovednecessarilytoexist，wouldarguealltobematter，andsodenyaGod，thatis，aneternalcogitativeBeing:wherebytheyaresofarfromestablishing，thattheydestroytheirownhypothesis。For，iftherecanbe，intheiropinion，eternalmatter，withoutanyeternalcogitativeBeing，theymanifestlyseparatematterandthinking，andsupposenonecessaryconnexionoftheonewiththeother，andsoestablishthenecessityofaneternalSpirit，butnotofmatter；sinceithasbeenprovedalready，thataneternalcogitativeBeingisunavoidablytobegranted。Now，ifthinkingandmattermaybeseparated，theeternalexistenceofmatterwillnotfollowfromtheeternalexistenceofacogitativeBeing，andtheysupposeittonopurpose。
　　14。Notmaterial:first，becauseeachparticleofmatterisnotcogitative。Butnowletusseehowtheycansatisfythemselves，orothers，thatthiseternalthinkingBeingismaterial。
　　I。Iwouldaskthem，whethertheyimaginethatallmatter，everyparticleofmatter，thinks？This，Isuppose，theywillscarcesay；
　　sincethentherewouldbeasmanyeternalthinkingbeingsasthereareparticlesofmatter，andsoaninfinityofgods。Andyet，iftheywillnotallowmatterasmatter，thatis，everyparticleofmatter，tobeaswellcogitativeasextended，theywillhaveashardatasktomakeouttotheirownreasonsacogitativebeingoutofincogitativeparticles，asanextendedbeingoutofunextendedparts，ifImaysospeak。
　　15。II。Secondly，becauseoneparticlealoneofmattercannotbecogitative。Ifallmatterdoesnotthink，Inextask，Whetheritbeonlyoneatomthatdoesso？Thishasasmanyabsurditiesastheother；
　　forthenthisatomofmattermustbealoneeternalornot。Ifthisalonebeeternal，thenthisalone，byitspowerfulthoughtorwill，madealltherestofmatter。Andsowehavethecreationofmatterbyapowerfulthought，whichisthatthematerialistsstickat；foriftheysupposeonesinglethinkingatomtohaveproducedalltherestofmatter，theycannotascribethatpre-eminencytoituponanyotheraccountthanthatofitsthinking，theonlysupposeddifference。Butallowittobebysomeotherwaywhichisaboveourconception，itmuststillbecreation；andthesemenmustgiveuptheirgreatmaxim，Exnihilonilfit。Ifitbesaid，thatalltherestofmatterisequallyeternalasthatthinkingatom，itwillbetosayanythingatpleasure，thougheversoabsurd。Fortosupposeallmattereternal，andyetonesmallparticleinknowledgeandpowerinfinitelyabovealltherest，iswithoutanytheleastappearanceofreasontoframeanhypothesis。Everyparticleofmatter，asmatter，iscapableofallthesamefiguresandmotionsofanyother；andIchallengeanyone，inhisthoughts，toaddanythingelsetooneaboveanother。
　　16。III。Thirdly，becauseasystemofincogitativemattercannotbecogitative。Ifthenneitheronepeculiaratomalonecanbethiseternalthinkingbeing；norallmatter，asmatter，i。e。everyparticleofmatter，canbeit；itonlyremains，thatitissomecertainsystemofmatter，dulyputtogether，thatisthisthinkingeternalBeing。Thisisthatwhich，Iimagine，isthatnotionwhichmenareaptesttohaveofGod；whowouldhavehimamaterialbeing，asmostreadilysuggestedtothembytheordinaryconceittheyhaveofthemselvesandothermen，whichtheytaketobematerialthinkingbeings。Butthisimagination，howevermorenatural，isnolessabsurdthantheother:fortosupposetheeternalthinkingBeingtobenothingelsebutacompositionofparticlesofmatter，eachwhereofisincogitative，istoascribeallthewisdomandknowledgeofthateternalBeingonlytothejuxta-positionofparts；thanwhichnothingcanbemoreabsurd。Forunthinkingparticlesofmatter，howeverputtogether，canhavenothingtherebyaddedtothem，butanewrelationofposition，whichitisimpossibleshouldgivethoughtandknowledgetothem。
　　17。Andthatwhetherthiscorporealsystemisinmotionoratrest。Butfurther:thiscorporealsystemeitherhasallitspartsatrest，oritisacertainmotionofthepartswhereinitsthinkingconsists。Ifitbeperfectlyatrest，itisbutonelump，andsocanhavenoprivilegesaboveoneatom。
　　Ifitbethemotionofitspartsonwhichitsthinkingdepends，allthethoughtstheremustbeunavoidablyaccidentalandlimited；
　　sincealltheparticlesthatbymotioncausethought，beingeachoftheminitselfwithoutanythought，cannotregulateitsownmotions，muchlessberegulatedbythethoughtofthewhole；sincethatthoughtisnotthecauseofmotion，forthenitmustbeantecedenttoit，andsowithoutit，buttheconsequenceofit；wherebyfreedom，power，choice，andallrationalandwisethinkingoracting，willbequitetakenaway:sothatsuchathinkingbeingwillbenobetternorwiserthanpureblindmatter；sincetoresolveallintotheaccidentalunguidedmotionsofblindmatter，orintothoughtdependingonunguidedmotionsofblindmatter，isthesamething:nottomentionthenarrownessofsuchthoughtsandknowledgethatmustdependonthemotionofsuchparts。Butthereneedsnoenumerationofanymoreabsurditiesandimpossibilitiesinthishypothesishoweverfullofthemitbethanthatbeforementioned；since，letthisthinkingsystembeallorapartofthematteroftheuniverse，itisimpossiblethatanyoneparticleshouldeitherknowitsown，orthemotionofanyotherparticle，orthewholeknowthemotionofeveryparticle；andsoregulateitsownthoughtsormotions，orindeedhaveanythoughtresultingfromsuchmotion。
　　18。Matternotco-eternalwithaneternalMind。Secondly，OtherswouldhaveMattertobeeternal，notwithstandingthattheyallowaneternal，cogitative，immaterialBeing。This，thoughittakenotawaythebeingofaGod，yet，sinceitdeniesoneandthefirstgreatpieceofhisworkmanship，thecreation，letusconsideritalittle。
　　Mattermustbeallowedeternal:Why？becauseyoucannotconceivehowitcanbemadeoutofnothing:whydoyounotalsothinkyourselfeternal？Youwillanswer，perhaps，Because，abouttwentyorfortyyearssince，youbegantobe。ButifIaskyou，whatthatyouis，whichbeganthentobe，youcanscarcetellme。Thematterwhereofyouaremadebegannotthentobe:forifitdid，thenitisnoteternal:butitbegantobeputtogetherinsuchafashionandframeasmakesupyourbody；butyetthatframeofparticlesisnotyou，itmakesnotthatthinkingthingyouare；forIhavenowtodowithonewhoallowsaneternal，immaterial，thinkingBeing，butwouldhaveunthinkingMattereternaltoo；therefore，whendidthatthinkingthingbegintobe？Ifitdidneverbegintobe，thenhaveyoualwaysbeenathinkingthingfrometernity；theabsurditywhereofIneednotconfute，tillImeetwithonewhoissovoidofunderstandingastoownit。If，therefore，youcanallowathinkingthingtobemadeoutofnothing，asallthingsthatarenoteternalmustbe，whyalsocanyounotallowitpossibleforamaterialbeingtobemadeoutofnothingbyanequalpower，butthatyouhavetheexperienceoftheoneinview，andnotoftheother？Though，whenwellconsidered，creationofaspiritwillbefoundtorequirenolesspowerthanthecreationofmatter。Nay，possibly，ifwewouldemancipateourselvesfromvulgarnotions，andraiseourthoughts，asfarastheywouldreach，toaclosercontemplationofthings，wemightbeabletoaimatsomedimandseemingconceptionhowmattermightatfirstbemade，andbegintoexist，bythepowerofthateternalfirstBeing:buttogivebeginningandbeingtoaspiritwouldbefoundamoreinconceivableeffectofomnipotentpower。Butthisbeingwhatwouldperhapsleadustoofarfromthenotionsonwhichthephilosophynowintheworldisbuilt，itwouldnotbepardonabletodeviatesofarfromthem；ortoinquire，sofarasgrammaritselfwouldauthorize，ifthecommonsettledopinionopposesit:especiallyinthisplace，wherethereceiveddoctrineserveswellenoughtoourpresentpurpose，andleavesthispastdoubt，thatthecreationorbeginningofanyoneSUBSTANCEoutofnothingbeingonceadmitted，thecreationofallotherbuttheCREATORhimself，may，withthesameease，besupposed。
　　19。Objection:"Creationoutofnothing。"Butyouwillsay，Isitnotimpossibletoadmitofthemakinganythingoutofnothing，sincewecannotpossiblyconceiveit？Ianswer，No。Becauseitisnotreasonabletodenythepowerofaninfinitebeing，becausewecannotcomprehenditsoperations。Wedonotdenyothereffectsuponthisground，becausewecannotpossiblyconceivethemanneroftheirproduction。Wecannotconceivehowanythingbutimpulseofbodycanmovebody；andyetthatisnotareasonsufficienttomakeusdenyitpossible，againsttheconstantexperiencewehaveofitinourselves，inallourvoluntarymotions；whichareproducedinusonlybythefreeactionorthoughtofourownminds，andarenot，norcanbe，theeffectsoftheimpulseordeterminationofthemotionofblindmatterinoruponourownbodies；forthenitcouldnotbeinourpowerorchoicetoalterit。Forexample:myrighthandwrites，whilstmylefthandisstill:Whatcausesrestinone，andmotionintheother？Nothingbutmywill，-athoughtofmymind；mythoughtonlychanging，therighthandrests，andthelefthandmoves。Thisismatteroffact，whichcannotbedenied:explainthisandmakeitintelligible，andthenthenextstepwillbetounderstandcreation。
　　Forthegivinganewdeterminationtothemotionoftheanimalspiritswhichsomemakeuseoftoexplainvoluntarymotionclearsnotthedifficultyonejot。Toalterthedeterminationofmotion，beinginthiscasenoeasiernorless，thantogivemotionitself:sincethenewdeterminationgiventotheanimalspiritsmustbeeitherimmediatelybythought，orbysomeotherbodyputintheirwaybythoughtwhichwasnotintheirwaybefore，andsomustoweitsmotiontothought:eitherofwhichleavesvoluntarymotionasunintelligibleasitwasbefore。Inthemeantime，itisanovervaluingourselvestoreducealltothenarrowmeasureofourcapacities，andtoconcludeallthingsimpossibletobedone，whosemannerofdoingexceedsourcomprehension。Thisistomakeourcomprehensioninfinite，orGodfinite，whenwhatHecandoislimitedtowhatwecanconceiveofit。Ifyoudonotunderstandtheoperationsofyourownfinitemind，thatthinkingthingwithinyou，donotdeemitstrangethatyoucannotcomprehendtheoperationsofthateternalinfiniteMind，whomadeandgovernsallthings，andwhomtheheavenofheavenscannotcontain。
　　ChapterXI
　　OfourKnowledgeoftheExistenceofOtherThings1。Knowledgeoftheexistenceofotherfinitebeingsistobehadonlybyactualsensation。Theknowledgeofourownbeingwehavebyintuition。TheexistenceofaGod，reasonclearlymakesknowntous，ashasbeenshown。
　　Theknowledgeoftheexistenceofanyotherthingwecanhaveonlybysensation:fortherebeingnonecessaryconnexionofrealexistencewithanyideaamanhathinhismemory；norofanyotherexistencebutthatofGodwiththeexistenceofanyparticularman:noparticularmancanknowtheexistenceofanyotherbeing，butonlywhen，byactualoperatinguponhim，itmakesitselfperceivedbyhim。For，thehavingtheideaofanythinginourmind，nomoreprovestheexistenceofthatthing，thanthepictureofamanevidenceshisbeingintheworld，orthevisionsofadreammaketherebyatruehistory。
　　2。Instance:whitenessofthispaper。Itisthereforetheactualreceivingofideasfromwithoutthatgivesusnoticeoftheexistenceofotherthings，andmakesusknow，thatsomethingdothexistatthattimewithoutus，whichcausesthatideainus；thoughperhapsweneitherknownorconsiderhowitdoesit。Forittakesnotfromthecertaintyofoursenses，andtheideaswereceivebythem，thatweknownotthemannerwhereintheyareproduced:v。g。
　　whilstIwritethis，Ihave，bythepaperaffectingmyeyes，thatideaproducedinmymind，which，whateverobjectcauses，Icallwhite；bywhichIknowthatthatqualityoraccidenti。e。whoseappearancebeforemyeyesalwayscausesthatideadothreallyexist，andhathabeingwithoutme。Andofthis，thegreatestassuranceIcanpossiblyhave，andtowhichmyfacultiescanattain，isthetestimonyofmyeyes，whicharetheproperandsolejudgesofthisthing；whosetestimonyIhavereasontorelyonassocertain，thatIcannomoredoubt，whilstIwritethis，thatIseewhiteandblack，andthatsomethingreallyexiststhatcausesthatsensationinme，thanthatIwriteormovemyhand；whichisacertaintyasgreatashumannatureiscapableof，concerningtheexistenceofanything，butaman’sselfalone，andofGod。
　　3。Thisnoticebyoursenses，thoughnotsocertainasdemonstration，yetmaybecalledknowledge，andprovestheexistenceofthingswithoutus。Thenoticewehavebyoursensesoftheexistingofthingswithoutus，thoughitbenotaltogethersocertainasourintuitiveknowledge，orthedeductionsofourreasonemployedabouttheclearabstractideasofourownminds；yetitisanassurancethatdeservesthenameofknowledge。Ifwepersuadeourselvesthatourfacultiesactandinformusrightconcerningtheexistenceofthoseobjectsthataffectthem，itcannotpassforanill-groundedconfidence:forIthinknobodycan，inearnest，besoscepticalastobeuncertainoftheexistenceofthosethingswhichheseesandfeels。Atleast，hethatcandoubtsofar，whateverhemayhavewithhisownthoughts，willneverhaveanycontroversywithme；sincehecanneverbesureIsayanythingcontrarytohisownopinion。Astomyself，IthinkGodhasgivenmeassuranceenoughoftheexistenceofthingswithoutme:since，bytheirdifferentapplication，Icanproduceinmyselfbothpleasureandpain，whichisonegreatconcernmentofmypresentstate。Thisiscertain:theconfidencethatourfacultiesdonothereindeceiveus，isthegreatestassurancewearecapableofconcerningtheexistenceofmaterialbeings。Forwecannotactanythingbutbyourfaculties；nortalkofknowledgeitself，butbythehelpofthosefacultieswhicharefittedtoapprehendevenwhatknowledgeis。
　　Butbesidestheassurancewehavefromoursensesthemselves，thattheydonoterrintheinformationtheygiveusoftheexistenceofthingswithoutus，whentheyareaffectedbythem，wearefurtherconfirmedinthisassurancebyotherconcurrentreasons:-
　　4。I。Confirmedbyconcurrentreasons:-First，becausewecannothaveideasofsensationbutbytheinletofthesenses。Itisplainthoseperceptionsareproducedinusbyexteriorcausesaffectingoursenses:becausethosethatwanttheorgansofanysense，nevercanhavetheideasbelongingtothatsenseproducedintheirminds。Thisistooevidenttobedoubted:andthereforewecannotbutbeassuredthattheycomeinbytheorgansofthatsense，andnootherway。Theorgansthemselves，itisplain，donotproducethem:forthentheeyesofamaninthedarkwouldproducecolours，andhisnosesmellrosesinthewinter:butweseenobodygetstherelishofapineapple，tillhegoestotheIndies，whereitis，andtastesit。
　　5。II。Secondly，Becausewefindthatanideafromactualsensation，andanotherfrommemory，areverydistinctperceptions。BecausesometimesIfindthatIcannotavoidthehavingthoseideasproducedinmymind。Forthough，whenmyeyesareshut，orwindowsfast，I
　　canatpleasurerecalltomymindtheideasoflight，orthesun，whichformersensationshadlodgedinmymemory；soIcanatpleasurelaybythatidea，andtakeintomyviewthatofthesmellofarose，ortasteofsugar。But，ifIturnmyeyesatnoontowardsthesun，Icannotavoidtheideaswhichthelightorsunthenproducesinme。Sothatthereisamanifestdifferencebetweentheideaslaidupinmymemory，overwhich，iftheywerethereonly，Ishouldhaveconstantlythesamepowertodisposeofthem，andlaythembyatpleasure，andthosewhichforcethemselvesuponme，andIcannotavoidhaving。Andthereforeitmustneedsbesomeexteriorcause，andthebriskactingofsomeobjectswithoutme，whoseefficacyI
　　cannotresist，thatproducesthoseideasinmymind，whetherIwillorno。Besides，thereisnobodywhodothnotperceivethedifferenceinhimselfbetweencontemplatingthesun，ashehaththeideaofitinhismemory，andactuallylookinguponit:ofwhichtwo，hisperceptionissodistinct，thatfewofhisideasaremoredistinguishableonefromanother。Andthereforehehathcertainknowledgethattheyarenotbothmemory，ortheactionsofhismind，andfanciesonlywithinhim；butthatactualseeinghathacausewithout。
　　6。III。Thirdly，becausepleasureorpain，whichaccompaniesactualsensation，accompaniesnotthereturningofthoseideaswithouttheexternalobjects。Addtothis，thatmanyofthoseideasareproducedinuswithpain，whichafterwardswerememberwithouttheleastoffence。Thus，thepainofheatorcold，whentheideaofitisrevivedinourminds，givesusnodisturbance；which，whenfelt，wasverytroublesome；andisagain，whenactuallyrepeated:whichisoccasionedbythedisordertheexternalobjectcausesinourbodieswhenappliedtothem:andwerememberthepainsofhunger，thirst，ortheheadache，withoutanypainatall；whichwouldeitherneverdisturbus，orelseconstantlydoit，asoftenaswethoughtofit，weretherenothingmorebutideasfloatinginourminds，andappearancesentertainingourfancies，withouttherealexistenceofthingsaffectingusfromabroad。Thesamemaybesaidofpleasure，accompanyingseveralactualsensations。Andthoughmathematicaldemonstrationdependsnotuponsense，yettheexaminingthembydiagramsgivesgreatcredittotheevidenceofoursight，andseemstogiveitacertaintyapproachingtothatofdemonstrationitself。
　　For，itwouldbeverystrange，thatamanshouldallowitforanundeniabletruth，thattwoanglesofafigure，whichhemeasuresbylinesandanglesofadiagram，shouldbebiggeronethantheother，andyetdoubtoftheexistenceofthoselinesandangles，whichbylookingonhemakesuseoftomeasurethatby。
　　7。IV。Fourthly，becauseoursensesassistoneanother’stestimonyoftheexistenceofoutwardthings，andenableustopredict。Oursensesinmanycasesbearwitnesstothetruthofeachother’sreport，concerningtheexistenceofsensiblethingswithoutus。Hethatseesafire，may，ifhedoubtwhetheritbeanythingmorethanabarefancy，feelittoo；andbeconvinced，byputtinghishandinit。Whichcertainlycouldneverbeputintosuchexquisitepainbyabareideaorphantom，unlessthatthepainbeafancytoo:whichyethecannot，whentheburniswell，byraisingtheideaofit，bringuponhimselfagain。
　　ThusIsee，whilstIwritethis，Icanchangetheappearanceofthepaper；andbydesigningtheletters，tellbeforehandwhatnewideaitshallexhibittheverynextmoment，bybarelydrawingmypenoverit:whichwillneitherappearletmefancyasmuchasIwillifmyhandsstandstill；orthoughImovemypen，ifmyeyesbeshut:nor，whenthosecharactersareoncemadeonthepaper，canIchooseafterwardsbutseethemastheyare；thatis，havetheideasofsuchlettersasIhavemade。Whenceitismanifest，thattheyarenotbarelythesportandplayofmyownimagination，whenIfindthatthecharactersthatweremadeatthepleasureofmyownthoughts，donotobeythem；noryetceasetobe，wheneverIshallfancyit，butcontinuetoaffectmysensesconstantlyandregularly，accordingtothefiguresImadethem。Towhichifwewilladd，thatthesightofthoseshall，fromanotherman，drawsuchsoundsasIbeforehanddesigntheyshallstandfor，therewillbelittlereasonlefttodoubtthatthosewordsIwritedoreallyexistwithoutme，whentheycausealongseriesofregularsoundstoaffectmyears，whichcouldnotbetheeffectofmyimagination，norcouldmymemoryretaintheminthatorder。
　　8。Thiscertaintyisasgreatasourconditionneeds。Butyet，ifafterallthisanyonewillbesoscepticalastodistrusthissenses，andtoaffirmthatallweseeandhear，feelandtaste，thinkanddo，duringourwholebeing，isbuttheseriesanddeludingappearancesofalongdream，whereofthereisnoreality；andthereforewillquestiontheexistenceofallthings，orourknowledgeofanything:
　　Imustdesirehimtoconsider，that，ifallbeadream，thenhedothbutdreamthathemakesthequestion，andsoitisnotmuchmatterthatawakingmanshouldanswerhim。Butyet，ifhepleases，hemaydreamthatImakehimthisanswer，Thatthecertaintyofthingsexistinginrerumnaturawhenwehavethetestimonyofoursensesforitisnotonlyasgreatasourframecanattainto，butasourconditionneeds。For，ourfacultiesbeingsuitednottothefullextentofbeing，nortoaperfect，clear，comprehensiveknowledgeofthingsfreefromalldoubtandscruple；buttothepreservationofus，inwhomtheyare；andaccommodatedtotheuseoflife:theyservetoourpurposewenenough，iftheywillbutgiveuscertainnoticeofthosethings，whichareconvenientorinconvenienttous。Forhethatseesacandleburning，andhathexperimentedtheforceofitsflamebyputtinghisfingerinit，willlittledoubtthatthisissomethingexistingwithouthim，whichdoeshimharm，andputshimtogreatpain；whichisassuranceenough，whennomanrequiresgreatercertaintytogovernhisactionsbythanwhatisascertainashisactionsthemselves。Andifourdreamerpleasestotrywhethertheglowingheatofaglassfurnacebebarelyawanderingimaginationinadrowsyman’sfancy，byputtinghishandintoit，hemayperhapsbewakenedintoacertaintygreaterthanhecouldwish，thatitissomethingmorethanbareimagination。Sothatthisevidenceisasgreataswecandesire，beingascertaintousasourpleasureorpain，i。e。happinessormisery；beyondwhichwehavenoconcernment，eitherofknowingorbeing。Suchanassuranceoftheexistenceofthingswithoutusissufficienttodirectusintheattainingthegoodandavoidingtheevilwhichiscausedbythem，whichistheimportantconcernmentwehaveofbeingmadeacquaintedwiththem。
　　9。Butreachesnofurtherthanactualsensation。Infine，then，whenoursensesdoactuallyconveyintoourunderstandingsanyidea，wecannotbutbesatisfiedthattheredothsomethingatthattimereallyexistwithoutus，whichdothaffectoursenses，andbythemgivenoticeofitselftoourapprehensivefaculties，andactuallyproducethatideawhichwethenperceive:andwecannotsofardistrusttheirtestimony，astodoubtthatsuchcollectionsofsimpleideasaswehaveobservedbyoursensestobeunitedtogether，doreallyexisttogether。Butthisknowledgeextendsasfarasthepresenttestimonyofoursenses，employedaboutparticularobjectsthatdothenaffectthem，andnofurther。ForifIsawsuchacollectionofsimpleideasasiswonttobecalledman，existingtogetheroneminutesince，andamnowalone，Icannotbecertainthatthesamemanexistsnow，sincethereisnonecessaryconnexionofhisexistenceaminutesincewithhisexistencenow:byathousandwayshemayceasetobe，sinceIhadthetestimonyofmysensesforhisexistence。AndifIcannotbecertainthatthemanI
　　sawlastto-dayisnowinbeing，Icanlessbecertainthatheissowhohathbeenlongerremovedfrommysenses，andIhavenotseensinceyesterday，orsincethelastyear:andmuchlesscanIbecertainoftheexistenceofmenthatIneversaw。And，therefore，thoughitbehighlyprobablethatmillionsofmendonowexist，yet，whilstIamalone，writingthis，Ihavenotthatcertaintyofitwhichwestrictlycallknowledge；thoughthegreatlikelihoodofitputsmepastdoubt，anditbereasonableformetodoseveralthingsupontheconfidencethattherearemenandmenalsoofmyacquaintance，withwhomIhavetodonowintheworld:butthisisbutprobability，notknowledge。
　　10。Follytoexpectdemonstrationineverything。Wherebyyetwemayobservehowfoolishandvainathingitisforamanofanarrowknowledge，whohavingreasongivenhimtojudgeofthedifferentevidenceandprobabilityofthings，andtobeswayedaccordingly；
　　howvain，Isay，itistoexpectdemonstrationandcertaintyinthingsnotcapableofit；andrefuseassenttoveryrationalpropositions，andactcontrarytoveryplainandcleartruths，becausetheycannotbemadeoutsoevident，astosurmounteverytheleastIwillnotsayreason，butpretenceofdoubting。Hethat，intheordinaryaffairsoflife，wouldadmitofnothingbutdirectplaindemonstration，wouldbesureofnothinginthisworld，butofperishingquickly。Thewholesomenessofhismeatordrinkwouldnotgivehimreasontoventureonit:andIwouldfainknowwhatitishecoulddouponsuchgroundsasarecapableofnodoubt，noobjection。
　　11。Pastexistenceofotherthingsisknownbymemory。Aswhenoursensesareactuallyemployedaboutanyobject，wedoknowthatitdoesexist；sobyourmemorywemaybeassured，thatheretoforethingsthataffectedoursenseshaveexisted。Andthuswehaveknowledgeofthepastexistenceofseveralthings，whereofoursenseshavinginformedus，ourmemoriesstillretaintheideas；andofthiswearepastalldoubt，solongaswerememberwell。Butthisknowledgealsoreachesnofurtherthanoursenseshaveformerlyassuredus。Thus，seeingwateratthisinstant，itisanunquestionabletruthtomethatwaterdothexist:andrememberingthatIsawityesterday，itwillalsobealwaystrue，andaslongasmymemoryretainsitalwaysanundoubtedpropositiontome，thatwaterdidexistthe10thofJuly，1688；asitwillalsobeequallytruethatacertainnumberofveryfinecoloursdidexist，whichatthesametimeIsawuponabubbleofthatwater:but，beingnowquiteoutofsightbothofthewaterandbubblestoo，itisnomorecertainlyknowntomethatthewaterdothnowexist，thanthatthebubblesorcoloursthereindoso:itbeingnomorenecessarythatwatershouldexistto-day，becauseitexistedyesterday，thanthatthecoloursorbubblesexistto-day，becausetheyexistedyesterday，thoughitbeexceedinglymuchmoreprobable；
　　becausewaterhathbeenobservedtocontinuelonginexistence，butbubbles，andthecoloursonthem，quicklyceasetobe。
　　12。Theexistenceofotherfinitespiritsnotknowable，andrestsonfaith。Whatideaswehaveofspirits，andhowwecomebythem，I
　　havealreadyshown。Butthoughwehavethoseideasinourminds，andknowwehavethemthere，thehavingtheideasofspiritsdoesnotmakeusknowthatanysuchthingsdoexistwithoutus，orthatthereareanyfinitespirits，oranyotherspiritualbeings，buttheEternalGod。Wehavegroundfromrevelation，andseveralotherreasons，tobelievewithassurancethattherearesuchcreatures:butoursensesnotbeingabletodiscoverthem，wewantthemeansofknowingtheirparticularexistences。Forwecannomoreknowthattherearefinitespiritsreallyexisting，bytheideawehaveofsuchbeingsinourminds，thanbytheideasanyonehasoffairiesorcentaurs，hecancometoknowthatthingsansweringthoseideasdoreallyexist。
　　Andthereforeconcerningtheexistenceoffinitespirits，aswellasseveralotherthings，wemustcontentourselveswiththeevidenceoffaith；butuniversal，certainpropositionsconcerningthismatterarebeyondourreach。Forhowevertrueitmaybe，v。g。，thatalltheintelligentspiritsthatGodevercreateddostillexist，yetitcannevermakeapartofourcertainknowledge。Theseandthelikepropositionswemayassentto，ashighlyprobable，butarenot，I
　　fear，inthisstatecapableofknowing。Wearenot，then，toputothersupondemonstrating，norourselvesuponsearchofuniversalcertaintyinallthosematters；whereinwearenotcapableofanyotherknowledge，butwhatoursensesgiveusinthisorthatparticular。
　　13。Onlyparticularpropositionsconcerningconcreteexistencesareknowable。Bywhichitappearsthattherearetwosortsofpropositions:-1Thereisonesortofpropositionsconcerningtheexistenceofanythinganswerabletosuchanidea:ashavingtheideaofanelephant，phoenix，motion，oranangel，inmymind，thefirstandnaturalinquiryis，Whethersuchathingdoesanywhereexist？
　　Andthisknowledgeisonlyofparticulars。Noexistenceofanythingwithoutus，butonlyofGod，cancertainlybeknownfurtherthanoursensesinformus。2Thereisanothersortofpropositions，whereinisexpressedtheagreementordisagreementofourabstractideas，andtheirdependenceononeanother。Suchpropositionsmaybeuniversalandcertain。So，havingtheideaofGodandmyself，offearandobedience，IcannotbutbesurethatGodistobefearedandobeyedbyme:andthispropositionwillbecertain，concerningmaningeneral，ifIhavemadeanabstractideaofsuchaspecies，whereofIamoneparticular。Butyetthisproposition，howcertainsoever，that"menoughttofearandobeyGod"provesnottometheexistenceofmenintheworld；butwillbetrueofallsuchcreatures，whenevertheydoexist:whichcertaintyofsuchgeneralpropositionsdependsontheagreementordisagreementtobediscoveredinthoseabstractideas。
　　14。Andallgeneralpropositionsthatareknowntobetrueconcernabstractideas。Intheformercase，ourknowledgeistheconsequenceoftheexistenceofthings，producingideasinourmindsbyoursenses:inthelatter，knowledgeistheconsequenceoftheideasbetheywhattheywillthatareinourminds，producingtheregeneralcertainpropositions。Manyofthesearecalledaeternaeveritates，andallofthemindeedareso；notfrombeingwritten，alloranyofthem，inthemindsofallmen；orthattheywereanyofthempropositionsinanyone’smind，tillhe，havinggottheabstractideas，joinedorseparatedthembyaffirmationornegation。Butwheresoeverwecansupposesuchacreatureasmanis，endowedwithsuchfaculties，andtherebyfurnishedwithsuchideasaswehave，wemustconclude，hemustneeds，whenheapplieshisthoughtstotheconsiderationofhisideas，knowthetruthofcertainpropositionsthatwillarisefromtheagreementordisagreementwhichhewillperceiveinhisownideas。
　　Suchpropositionsarethereforecalledeternaltruths，notbecausetheyareeternalpropositionsactuallyformed，andantecedenttotheunderstandingthatatanytimemakesthem；norbecausetheyareimprintedonthemindfromanypatternsthatareanywhereoutofthemind，andexistedbefore:butbecause，beingoncemadeaboutabstractideas，soastobetrue，theywill，whenevertheycanbesupposedtobemadeagainatanytime，pastortocome，byamindhavingthoseideas，alwaysactuallybetrue。Fornamesbeingsupposedtostandperpetuallyforthesameideas，andthesameideashavingimmutablythesamehabitudesonetoanother，propositionsconcerninganyabstractideasthatareoncetruemustneedsbeeternalverities。