Again，howeverwideascopewemayallowtothedoctrinethat
　　individualsaretheproperguardiansoftheirowninterests，and
　　thatgovernmentowesnothingtothembuttosavethemfrombeing
　　interferedwithbyotherpeople，thedoctrinecanneverbe
　　applicabletoanypersonsbutthosewhoarecapableofactingin
　　theirownbehalf。Theindividualmaybeaninfant，oralunatic，
　　orfallenintoimbecility。Thelawsurelymustlookafterthe
　　interestsofsuchpersons。Itdoesnotnecessarilydothis
　　throughofficersofitsown。Itoftendevolvesthetrustupon
　　somerelativeorconnexion。Butindoingsoisitsdutyended？
　　Canitmakeovertheinterestsofonepersontothecontrolof
　　another，andbeexcusedfromsupervision，orfromholdingthe
　　personthustrusted，responsibleforthedischargeofthetrust？
　　Thereisamultitudeofcasesinwhichgovernments，with
　　generalapprobation，assumepowersandexecutefunctionsfor
　　whichnoreasoncanbeassignedexceptthesimpleone，thatthey
　　conducetogeneralconvenience。Wemaytakeasanexample，the
　　function（whichisamonopolytoo）ofcoiningmoney。Thisis
　　assumedfornomorereconditepurposethanthatofsavingto
　　individualsthetrouble，delay，andexpenseofweighingand
　　assaying。Noone，however，evenofthosemostjealousofstate
　　interference，hasobjectedtothisasanimproperexerciseofthe
　　powersofgovernment。Prescribingasetofstandardweightsand
　　measuresisanotherinstance。Paving，lighting，andcleansingthe
　　streetsandthoroughfares，isanother;whetherdonebythe
　　generalgovernment，orasismoreusual，andgenerallymore
　　advisable，byamunicipalauthority。Makingorimproving
　　harbours，buildinglighthouses，makingsurveysinordertohave
　　accuratemapsandcharts，raisingdykestokeeptheseaout，and
　　embankmentstokeepriversin，arecasesinpoint。
　　Examplesmightbeindefinitelymultipliedwithoutintruding
　　onanydisputedground。Butenoughhasbeensaidtoshowthatthe
　　admittedfunctionsofgovernmentembraceamuchwiderfieldthan
　　caneasilybeincludedwithinthering—fenceofanyrestrictive
　　definition，andthatitishardlypossibletofindanygroundof
　　justificationcommontothemall，exceptthecomprehensiveoneof
　　generalexpediency;nortolimittheinterferenceofgovernment
　　byanyuniversalrule，savethesimpleandvagueone，thatit
　　shouldneverbeadmittedbutwhenthecaseofexpediencyis
　　strong。
　　3。Someobservations，however，maybeusefullybestowedon
　　thenatureoftheconsiderationsonwhichthequestionof
　　governmentinterferenceismostlikelytoturn，andonthemode
　　ofestimatingthecomparativemagnitudeoftheexpediencies
　　involved。Thiswillformthelastofthethreeparts，intowhich
　　ourdiscussionoftheprinciplesandeffectsofgovernment
　　interferencemayconvenientlybedivided。Thefollowingwillbe
　　ourdivisionofthesubject。
　　Weshallfirstconsidertheeconomicaleffectsarisingfrom
　　themannerinwhichgovernmentsperformtheirnecessaryand
　　acknowledgedfunctions。
　　Weshallthenpasstocertaingovernmentalinterferencesof
　　whatIhavetermedtheoptionalkind（i。e。oversteppingthe
　　boundariesoftheuniversallyacknowledgedfunctions）whichhave
　　heretoforetakenplace，andinsomecasesstilltakeplace，under
　　theinfluenceoffalsegeneraltheories。
　　Itwilllastlyremaintoinquirewhether，independentlyof
　　anyfalsetheory，andconsistentlywithacorrectviewofthe
　　lawswhichregulatehumanaffairs，therebeanycasesofthe
　　optionalclassinwhichgovernmentalinterferenceisreally
　　advisable，andwhatarethosecases。
　　Thefirstofthesedivisionsisofanextremelymiscellaneous
　　character:sincethenecessaryfunctionsofgovernment，andthose
　　whicharesomanifestlyexpedientthattheyhaveneverorvery
　　rarelybeenobjectedto，are，asalreadypointedout，toovarious
　　tobebroughtunderanyverysimpleclassification。Those，
　　however，whichareofprincipalimportance，whichaloneitis
　　necessaryheretoconsider，maybereducedtothefollowing
　　generalheads。
　　First，themeansadoptedbygovernmentstoraisetherevenue
　　whichistheconditionoftheirexistence。
　　Secondly，thenatureofthelawswhichtheyprescribeonthe
　　twogreatsubjectsofPropertyandContracts。
　　Thirdly，theexcellencesordefectsofthesystemofmeansby
　　whichtheyenforcegenerallytheexecutionoftheirlaws，namely，
　　theirjudicatureandpolice。
　　Wecommencewiththefirsthead，thatis，withthetheoryof
　　Taxation。
　　ThePrinciplesofPoliticalEconomy
　　byJohnStuartMill
　　Book5
　　Chapter2
　　OntheGeneralPrinciplesofTaxation
　　1。Thequalitiesdesirable，economicallyspeaking，ina
　　systemoftaxation，havebeenembodiedbyAdamSmithinfour
　　maximsorprinciples，which，havingbeengenerallyconcurredby
　　subsequentwriters，maybesaidtohavebecomeclassical，and
　　thischaptercannotbebettercommencedthanbyquotingthem。（1*）
　　’1。Thesubjectsofeverystateoughttocontributetothe
　　supportofthegovernment，asnearlyaspossibleinproportionto
　　theirrespectiveabilities:thatis，inproportiontotherevenue
　　whichtheyrespectivelyenjoyundertheprotectionofthestate。
　　Intheobservationorneglectofthismaximconsistswhatis
　　calledtheequalityorinequalityoftaxation。
　　’2。Thetaxwhicheachindividualisboundtopayoughttobe
　　certain，andnotarbitrary。Thetimeofpayment，themannerof
　　payment，thequantitytobepaid，oughtalltobeclearandplain
　　tothecontributor，andtoeveryotherperson。Whereitis
　　otherwise，everypersonsubjecttothetaxisputmoreorlessin
　　thepowerofthetax—gatherer，whocaneitheraggravatethetax
　　uponanyobnoxiouscontributor，orextortbytheterrorofsuch
　　aggravation，somepresentorperquisitetohimself。The
　　uncertaintyoftaxationencouragestheinsolenceandfavoursthe
　　corruptionofanorderofmenwhoarenaturallyunpopular，even
　　whentheyareneitherinsolentnorcorrupt。Thecertaintyofwhat
　　eachindividualoughttopayis，intaxation，amatterofso
　　greatimportance，thataveryconsiderabledegreeofinequality，
　　itappears，Ibelieve，fromtheexperienceofallnations，isnot
　　nearsogreatanevil，asaverysmalldegreeofuncertainty。
　　’3。Everytaxoughttobeleviedatthetime，orinthe
　　manner，inwhichitismostlikelytobeconvenientforthe
　　contributortopayit。Ataxupontherentoflandorofhouses，
　　payableatthesametermatwhichsuchrentsareusuallypaid，is
　　leviedatatimewhenitismostlikelytobeconvenientforthe
　　contributortopay;orwhenheismostlikelytohavewherewithal
　　topay。Taxesuponsuchconsumablegoodsasarearticlesof
　　luxury，areallfinallypaidbytheconsumer，andgenerallyina
　　mannerthatisveryconvenienttohim。Hepaysthembylittleand
　　little，ashehasoccasiontobuythegoods。Asheisatliberty，
　　too，eithertobuyornottobuy，ashepleases，itmustbehis
　　ownfaultifheeversuffersanyconsiderableinconveniencefrom
　　suchtaxes。
　　’4。Everytaxoughttobesocontrivedasbothtotakeout
　　andtokeepoutofthepocketsofthepeopleaslittleas
　　possibleoverandabovewhatitbringsintothepublictreasury
　　ofthestate。Ataxmayeithertakeoutorkeepoutofthe
　　pocketsofthepeopleagreatdealmorethanitbringsintothe
　　publictreasury，inthefourfollowingways。First，thelevying
　　ofitmayrequireagreatnumberofofficers，whosesalariesmay
　　eatupthegreaterpartoftheproduceofthetax，andwhose
　　perquisitesmayimposeanotheradditionaltaxuponthepeople。
　　Secondly，itmaydivertaportionofthelabourandcapitalof
　　thecommunityfromamoretoalessproductiveemployment。
　　Thirdly，bytheforfeituresandotherpenaltieswhichthose
　　unfortunateindividualsincurwhoattemptunsuccessfullytoevade
　　thetax，itmayfrequentlyruinthem，andtherebyputanendto
　　thebenefitwhichthecommunitymighthavederivedfromthe
　　employmentoftheircapitals。Aninjudicioustaxoffersagreat
　　temptationtosmuggling。Fourthly，bysubjectingthepeopleto
　　thefrequentvisitsandtheodiousexaminationofthe
　　tax—gatherers，itmayexposethemtomuchunnecessarytrouble，
　　vexation，andoppression’:towhichmaybeadded，thatthe
　　restrictiveregulationstowhichtradesandmanufacturesare
　　oftensubjectedtopreventevasionofatax，arenotonlyin
　　themselvestroublesomeandexpensive，butoftenoppose
　　insuperableobstaclestomakingimprovementsintheprocesses。
　　Thelastthreeofthesefourmaximsrequirelittleother
　　explanationorillustrationthaniscontainedinthepassage
　　itself。Howfaranygiventaxconformsto，orconflictswith
　　them，isamattertobeconsideredinthediscussionof
　　particulartaxes。Butthefirstofthefourpoints，equalityof
　　taxation，requirestobemorefullyexamined，beingathingoften
　　imperfectlyunderstood，andonwhichmanyfalsenotionshave
　　becometoacertaindegreeaccredited，throughtheabsenceofany
　　definiteprinciplesofjudgmentinthepopularmind。
　　2。Forwhatreasonoughtequalitytobetheruleinmatters
　　oftaxation？Forthereason，thatitoughttobesoinall
　　affairsofgovernment。Asagovernmentoughttomakeno
　　distinctionofpersonsorclassesinthestrengthoftheirclaims
　　onit，whateversacrificesitrequiresfromthemshouldbemade
　　tobearasnearlyaspossiblewiththesamepressureuponall，
　　which，itmustbeobserved，isthemodebywhichleastsacrifice
　　isoccasionedonthewhole。Ifanyonebearslessthanhisfair
　　shareoftheburthen，someotherpersonmustsuffermorethanhis
　　share，andthealleviationtotheoneisnot，caeterisparibus，
　　sogreatagoodtohim，astheincreasedpressureupontheother
　　isanevil。Equalityoftaxation，therefore，asamaximof
　　politics，meansequalityofsacrifice。Itmeansapportioningthe
　　contributionofeachpersontowardstheexpensesofgovernment，
　　sothatheshallfeelneithermorenorlessinconveniencefrom
　　hisshareofthepaymentthaneveryotherpersonexperiencesfrom
　　his。Thisstandard，likeotherstandardsofperfection，cannotbe
　　completelyrealized;butthefirstobjectineverypractical
　　discussionshouldbetoknowwhatperfectionis。
　　Therearepersons，however，whoarenotcontentwiththe
　　generalprinciplesofjusticeasabasistogroundaruleof
　　financeupon，butmusthavesomething，astheythink，more
　　specificallyappropriatetothesubject。Whatbestpleasesthem
　　is，toregardthetaxespaidbyeachmemberofthecommunityas
　　anequivalentforvaluereceived，intheshapeofserviceto
　　himself;andtheyprefertorestthejusticeofmakingeach
　　contributeinproportiontohismeans，upontheground，thathe
　　whohastwiceasmuchpropertytobeprotected，receives，onan
　　accuratecalculation，twiceasmuchprotection，andought，onthe
　　principlesofbargainandsale，topaytwiceasmuchforit。
　　Since，however，theassumptionthatgovernmentexistssolelyfor
　　theprotectionofproperty，isnotonetobedeliberatelyadhered
　　to;someconsistentadherentsofthequidproquoprinciplegoon
　　toobserve，thatprotectionbeingrequiredforpersonaswellas
　　property，andeverybody’spersonreceivingthesameamountof
　　protection，apoll—taxofafixedsumperheadisaproper
　　equivalentforthispartofthebenefitsofgovernment，whilethe
　　remainingpart，protectiontoproperty，shouldbepaidforin
　　proportiontoproperty。Thereisinthisadjustmentafalseair
　　ofniceadaptation，veryacceptabletosomeminds。Butinthe
　　firstplace，itisnotadmissiblethattheprotectionofpersons
　　andthatofpropertyarethesolepurposesofgovernment。The
　　endsofgovernmentareascomprehensiveasthoseofthesocial
　　union。Theyconsistofallthegood，andalltheimmunityfrom
　　evil，whichtheexistenceofgovernmentcanbemadeeither
　　directlyorindirectlytobestow。Inthesecondplace，the
　　practiceofsettingdefinitevaluesonthingsessentially
　　indefinite，andmakingthemagroundofpracticalconclusions，is
　　peculiarlyfertileinfalseviewsofsocialquestions。Itcannot
　　beadmitted，thattobeprotectedintheownershipoftentimes
　　asmuchproperty，istobetentimesasmuchprotected。Neither
　　canitbetrulysaidthattheprotectionof1000l。ayearcosts
　　thestatetentimesasmuchasthatof100l。ayear，ratherthan
　　twiceasmuch，orexactlyasmuch。Thesamejudges，soldiers，and
　　sailorswhoprotecttheoneprotecttheother，andthelarger
　　incomedoesnotnecessarily，thoughitmaysometimes，require
　　evenmorepolicemen。Whetherthelabourandexpenseofthe
　　protection，orthefeelingsoftheprotectedperson，oranyother
　　definitethingbemadethestandard，thereisnosuchproportion
　　astheonesupposed，noranyotherdefinableproportion。Ifwe
　　wantedtoestimatethedegreesofbenefitwhichdifferentpersons
　　derivefromtheprotectionofgovernment，weshouldhaveto
　　considerwhowouldsuffermostifthatprotectionwerewithdrawn:
　　towhichquestionifanyanswercouldbemade，itmustbe，that
　　thosewouldsuffermostwhowereweakestinmindorbody，either
　　bynatureorbyposition。Indeed，suchpersonswouldalmost
　　infalliblybeslaves。Iftherewereanyjustice，therefore，in
　　thetheoryofjusticenowunderconsideration，thosewhoare
　　leastcapableofhelpingordefendingthemselves，beingthoseto
　　whomtheprotectionofgovernmentisthemostindispensable，
　　oughttopaythegreatestshareofitsprice:thereverseofthe
　　trueideaofdistributivejustice，whichconsistsnotin
　　imitatingbutinredressingtheinequalitiesandwrongsof
　　nature。
　　Governmentmustberegardedassopre。eminentlyaconcernof
　　all，thattodeterminewhoaremostinterestedinitisofno
　　realimportance。Ifapersonorclassofpersonsreceivesosmall
　　ashareofthebenefitasmakesitnecessarytoraisethe
　　question，thereissomethingelsethantaxationwhichisamiss，
　　andthethingtobedoneistoremedythedefect，insteadof
　　recognizingitandmakingitagroundfordemandinglesstaxes。
　　As，inacaseofvoluntarysubscriptionforapurposeinwhich
　　allareinterested，allarethoughttohavedonetheirpart
　　fairlywheneachhascontributedaccordingtohismeans，thatis，
　　hasmadeanequalsacrificeforthecommonobject;inlikemanner
　　shouldthisbetheprincipleofcompulsorycontributions:andit
　　issuperfluoustolookforamoreingeniousorreconditeground
　　toresttheprincipleupon。
　　3。Settingout，then，fromthemaximthatequalsacrifices
　　oughttobedemandedfromall，wehavenexttoinquirewhether
　　thisisinfactdone，bymakingeachcontributethesame
　　percentageonhispecuniarymeans。Manypersonsmaintainthe
　　negative，sayingthatatenthparttakenfromasmallincomeisa
　　heavierburthenthanthesamefractiondeductedfromonemuch
　　larger:andonthisisgroundedtheverypopularschemeofwhat
　　iscalledagraduatedpropertytax，viz。anincometaxinwhich
　　thepercentageriseswiththeamountoftheincome。
　　OnthebestconsiderationIamabletogivetothisquestion，
　　itappearstomethattheportionoftruthwhichthedoctrine
　　contains，arisesprincipallyfromthedifferencebetweenatax
　　whichcanbesavedfromluxuries，andonewhichtrenches，inever
　　sosmalladegree，uponthenecessariesoflife。Totakea
　　thousandayearfromthepossessoroftenthousand，wouldnot
　　deprivehimofanythingreallyconduciveeithertothesupportor
　　tothecomfortofexistence;andifsuchwouldbetheeffectof
　　takingfivepoundsfromonewhoseincomeisfifty，thesacrifice
　　requiredfromthelastisnotonlygreaterthan，butentirely
　　incommensurablewith，thatimposeduponthefirst。Themodeof
　　adjustingtheseinequalitiesofpressure，whichseemstobethe
　　mostequitable，isthatrecommendedbyBentham，ofleavinga
　　certainminimumofincome，sufficienttoprovidethenecessaries
　　oflife，untaxed。Suppose50l。ayeartobesufficienttoprovide
　　thenumberofpersonsordinarilysupportedfromasingleincome，
　　withtherequisitesoflifeandhealth，andwithprotection
　　againsthabitualbodilysuffering，butnotwithanyindulgence。
　　Thisthenshouldbemadetheminimum，andincomesexceedingit
　　shouldpaytaxesnotupontheirwholeamount，butuponthe
　　surplus。Ifthetaxbetenpercent，anincomeof60l。shouldbe
　　consideredasanetincomeof10l。，andchargedwith1l。ayear，
　　whileanincomeof1000l。shouldbechargedasoneof950l。Each
　　wouldthenpayafixedproportion，notofhiswholemeans，butof
　　hissuperfluities。（2*）Anincomenotexceeding50l。shouldnotbe
　　taxedatall，eitherdirectlyorbytaxesonnecessaries;foras
　　bysuppositionthisisthesmallestincomewhichlabouroughtto
　　beabletocommand，thegovernmentoughtnottobeapartyto
　　makingitsmaller。Thisarrangementhoweverwouldconstitutea
　　reason，inadditiontootherswhichmightbestated，for
　　maintainingtaxesonarticlesofluxuryconsumedbythepoor。The
　　immunityextendedtotheincomerequiredfornecessaries，should
　　dependonitsbeingactuallyexpendedforthatpurpose;andthe
　　poorwho，nothavingmorethanenoughfornecessaries，divertany
　　partofittoindulgences，shouldlikeotherpeoplecontribute
　　theirquotaoutofthoseindulgencestotheexpensesofthe
　　state。
　　Theexemptioninfavourofthesmallerincomesshouldnot，I
　　think，bestretchedfurtherthantotheamountofincomeneedful
　　forlife，health，andimmunityfrombodilypain。If50l。ayear
　　issufficient（whichmaybedoubted）forthesepurposes，an
　　incomeof100l。ayearwould，asitseemstome，obtainal1the
　　reliefitisentitledto，comparedwithoneof1000l。，bybeing
　　taxedonlyon50l。ofitsamount。Itmaybesaid，indeed，thatto
　　take100l。from1000l。（evengivingbackfivepounds）isa
　　heavierimpostthan1000l。takenfrom10，000l。（givingbackthe
　　samefivepounds）。Butthisdoctrineseemstometoodisputable
　　altogether，andeveniftrueatall，nottruetoasufficient
　　extent，tobemadethefoundationofanyruleoftaxation。
　　Whetherthepersonwith10，000l。ayearcareslessfor1000l。
　　thanthepersonwithonly1000l。ayearcaresfor100l。，andif
　　so，howmuchless，doesnotappeartomecapableofbeingdecided
　　withthedegreeofcertaintyonwhichalegislatororafinancier
　　oughttoact。
　　Someindeedcontendthattheruleofproportionaltaxation
　　bearsharderuponthemoderatethanuponthelargeincomes，
　　becausethesameproportionalpaymenthasmoretendencyinthe
　　formercasethaninthelatter，toreducethepayertoalower
　　gradeofsocialrank。Thefactappearstomemorethan
　　questionable。Butevenadmittingit，Iobjecttoitsbeing
　　consideredincumbentongovernmenttoshapeitscoursebysuch
　　considerations，ortorecognizethenotionthatsocialimportance
　　isorcanbedeterminedbyamountofexpenditure。Government
　　oughttosetanexampleofratingallthingsattheirtruevalue，
　　andriches，therefore，attheworth，forcomfortorpleasure，of
　　thethingswhichtheywillbuy:andoughtnottosanctionthe
　　vulgarityofprizingthemforthepitifulvanityofbeingknown
　　topossessthem，orthepaltryshameofbeingsuspectedtobe
　　withoutthem，thepresidingmotivesofthree—fourthsofthe
　　expenditureofthemiddleclasses。Thesacrificesofrealcomfort
　　orindulgencewhichgovernmentrequires，itisboundtoapportion
　　amongallpersonswithasmuchequalityaspossible;buttheir
　　sacrificesoftheimaginarydignitydependentonexpense，itmay
　　spareitselfthetroubleofestimating。
　　BothinEnglandandontheContinentagraduatedpropertytax
　　（l’impotprogressif）hasbeenadvocated，ontheavowedground
　　thatthestateshouldusetheinstrumentoftaxationasameans
　　ofmitigatingtheinequalitiesofwealth。Iamasdesirousasany
　　one，thatmeansshouldbetakentodiminishthoseinequalities，
　　butnotsoastorelievetheprodigalattheexpenseofthe
　　prudent。Totaxthelargerincomesatahigherpercentagethan
　　thesmaller，istolayataxonindustryandeconomy;toimposea
　　penaltyonpeopleforhavingworkedharderandsavedmorethan
　　theirneighbours。Itisnotthefortuneswhichareearned，but
　　thosewhichareunearned，thatitisforthepublicgoodtoplace
　　underlimitation。Ajustandwiselegislationwouldabstainfrom
　　holdingoutmotivesfordissipatingratherthansavingthe
　　earningsofhonestexertion。Itsimpartialitybetweencompetitors
　　wouldconsistinendeavouringthattheyshouldallstartfair，
　　andnotinhangingaweightupontheswifttodiminishthe
　　distancebetweenthemandtheslow。Many，indeed，failwith
　　greatereffortsthanthosewithwhichotherssucceed，notfrom
　　differenceofmerits，butdifferenceofopportunities;butifall
　　weredonewhichitwouldbeinthepowerofagoodgovernmentto
　　do，byinstructionandbylegislation，todiminishthis
　　inequalityofopportunities，thedifferencesoffortunearising
　　frompeople’sownearningscouldnotjustlygiveumbrage。With
　　respecttothelargefortunesacquiredbygiftorinheritance，
　　thepowerofbequeathingisoneofthoseprivilegesofproperty
　　whicharefitsubjectsforregulationongroundsofgeneral
　　expediency;andIhavealreadysuggested，asapossiblemodeof
　　restrainingtheaccumulationoflargefortunesinthehandsof
　　thosewhohavenotearnedthembyexertion，alimitationofthe
　　amountwhichanyonepersonshouldbepermittedtoacquireby
　　gift，bequest，orinheritance。Apartfromthis，andfromthe
　　proposalofBentham（alsodiscussedinaformerchapter）that
　　collateralinheritanceabintestatoshouldcease，andthe
　　propertyescheattothestate，Iconceivethatinheritancesand
　　legacies，exceedingacertainamount，arehighlypropersubjects
　　fortaxation:andthattherevenuefromthemshouldbeasgreat
　　asitcanbemadewithoutgivingrisetoevasions，bydonation
　　intervivosorconcealmentofproperty，suchasitwouldbe
　　impossibleadequatelytocheck。Theprincipleofgraduation（as
　　itiscalled，）thatis，oflevyingalargerpercentageona
　　largersum，thoughitsapplicationtogeneraltaxationwouldbe
　　inmyopinionobjectionable，seemstomebothjustandexpedient
　　asappliedtolegacyandinheritanceduties。
　　Theobjectiontoagraduatedpropertytaxappliesinan
　　aggravateddegreetothepropositionofanexclusivetaxonwhat
　　iscalled’realizedproperty’，thatis，propertynotforminga
　　partofanycapitalengagedinbusiness，orratherinbusiness
　　underthesuperintendenceoftheowner:asland，thepublic
　　funds，moneylentonmortgage，andshares（Ipresume）in
　　joint—stockcompanies。Excepttheproposalofapplyingasponge
　　tothenationaldebt，nosuchpalpableviolationofcommon
　　honestyhasfoundsufficientsupportinthiscountry，duringthe
　　presentgeneration，toberegardedaswithinthedomainof
　　discussion。Ithasnotthepalliationofagraduatedproperty
　　tax，thatoflay。ingtheburthenonthosebestabletobearit;
　　for’realizedproperty’includesthefarlargerportionofthe
　　provisionmadeforthosewhoareunabletowork，andconsists，in
　　greatpart，ofextremelysmallfractions。Icanhardlyconceivea
　　moreshamelesspretension，thanthatthemajorpartofthe
　　propertyofthecountry，thatofmerchants，manufacturers，
　　farmers，andshopkeepers，shouldbeexemptedfromitsshareof
　　taxation;thattheseclassesshouldonlybegintopaytheir
　　proportionafterretiringfrombusiness，andiftheyneverretire
　　shouldbeexcusedfromitaltogether。Buteventhisdoesnotgive
　　anadequateideaoftheinjusticeoftheproposition。Theburthen
　　thusexclusivelythrownontheownersofthesmallerportionof
　　thewealthofthecommunity，wouldnotevenbeaburthenonthat
　　classofpersonsinperpetualsuccession，butwouldfall
　　exclusivelyonthosewhohappenedtocomposeitwhenthetaxwas
　　laidon。Aslandandthoseparticularsecuritieswould
　　thenceforthyieldasmallernetincome，relativelytothegeneral
　　interestofcapitalandtotheprofitsoftrade;thebalance
　　wouldrectifyitselfbyapermanentdepreciationofthosekinds
　　ofproperty。Futurebuyerswouldacquirelandandsecuritiesata
　　reductionofprice，equivalenttothepeculiartax，whichtax
　　theywould，therefore，escapefrompaying;whiletheoriginal
　　possessorswouldremainburthenedwithitevenafterpartingwith
　　theproperty，sincetheywouldhavesoldtheirlandorsecurities
　　atalossofvalueequivalenttothefee—simpleofthetax。Its
　　impositionwouldthusbetantamounttotheconfiscationfor
　　publicusesofapercentageoftheirproperty，equaltothe
　　percentagelaidontheirincomebythetax。Thatsucha
　　propositionshouldfindanyfavour，isastrikinginstanceofthe
　　wantofconscienceinmattersoftaxation，resultingfromthe
　　absenceofanyfixedprinciplesinthepublicmind，andofany
　　indicationofasenseofjusticeonthesubjectinthegeneral
　　conductofgovernments。Shouldtheschemeeverenlistalarge
　　partyinitssupport，thefactwouldindicatealaxityof
　　pecuniaryintegrityinnationalaffairs，scarcelyinferiorto
　　Americanrepudiation。
　　4。Whethertheprofitsoftrademaynotrightfullybetaxed
　　atalowerratethanincomesderivedfrominterestorrent，is
　　partofthemorecomprehensivequestion，sooftenmootedonthe
　　occasionofthepresentincometax，whetherlifeincomesshould
　　besubjectedtothesamerateoftaxationasperpetualincomes:
　　whethersalaries，forexample，orannuities，orthegainsof
　　professions，shouldpaythesamepercentageastheincomefrom
　　inheritableproperty。
　　Theexistingtaxtreatsallkindsofincomesexactlyalike，
　　takingitssevenpence（nowfourpence）inthepound，aswellfrom
　　thepersonwhoseincomedieswithhim，asfromthelandholder，
　　stockholder，ormortgagee，whocantransmithisfortune
　　undiminishedtohisdescendants。Thisisavisibleinjustice:yet
　　itdoesnotarithmeticallyviolatetherulethattaxationought
　　tobeinproportiontomeans。Whenitissaidthatatemporary
　　incomeoughttobetaxedlessthanapermanentone，thereplyis
　　irresistible，thatitistaxedless;fortheincomewhichlasts
　　onlytenyearspaysthetaxonlytenyears，whilethatwhich
　　lastsforeverpaysforever。Onthispointsomefinancial
　　reformersareguiltyofagreatfallacy。Theycontendthat
　　incomesoughttobeassessedtotheincometaxnotinproportion
　　totheirannualamount，buttotheircapitalizedvalue:that，for
　　example，ifthevalueofaperpetualannuityof100l。is3000l。，
　　andalifeannuityofthesameamount，beingworthonlyhalfthe
　　numberofyears’purchase，couldonlybesoldfor1500l。，the
　　perpetualincomeshouldpaytwiceasmuchpercentincometaxas
　　theterminableincome;iftheonepays10l。ayeartheother
　　shouldpayonly5l。Butinthisargumentthereistheobvious
　　oversight，thatitvaluestheincomesbyonestandardandthe
　　paymentsbyanother;itcapitalizestheincomes，butforgetsto
　　capitalizethepayments。Anannuityworth3000l。ought，itis
　　alleged，tobetaxedtwiceashighlyasonewhichisonlyworth
　　1500l。，andnoassertioncanbemoreunquestionable;butitis
　　forgottenthattheincomeworth3000l。paystothesupposed
　　incometax10l。ayearinperpetuity，whichisequivalent，by
　　supposition，to300l。，whiletheterminableincomepaysthesame
　　10l。onlyduringthelifeofitsowner，whichonthesame
　　calculationisavalueof150l。，andcouldactuallybeboughtfor
　　thatsum。Already，therefore，theincomewhichisonlyhalfas
　　valuable，paysonlyhalfasmuchtothetax;andifinaddition
　　tothisitsannualquotawerereducedfrom10l。to5l。，itwould
　　pay，nothalf，butafourthpartonlyofthepaymentdemanded
　　fromtheperpetualincome。Tomakeitjustthattheoneincome
　　shouldpayonlyhalfasmuchperannumastheother，itwouldbe
　　necessarythatitshouldpaythathalfforthesameperiod，that
　　is，inperpetuity。
　　Theruleofpaymentwhichthisschooloffinancialreformers
　　contendfor，wouldbeveryproperifthetaxwereonlytobe
　　leviedonce，tomeetsomenationalemergency。Ontheprincipleof
　　requiringfromallpayersanequalsacrifice，everypersonwho
　　hadanythingbelongingtohim，reversionersincluded，wouldbe
　　calledonforapaymentproportionedtothepresentvalueofhis
　　property。Iwonderitdoesnotoccurtothereformersin
　　question，thatpreciselybecausethisprincipleofassessment
　　wouldbejustinthecaseofapaymentmadeonceforall，it
　　cannotpossiblybejustforapermanenttax。Wheneachpaysonly
　　once，onepersonpaysnooftenerthananother。andtheproportion
　　whichwouldbejustinthatcase，cannotalsobejustifone
　　personhastomakethepaymentonlyonce，andtheotherseveral
　　times。This，however，isthetypeofthecasewhichactually
　　occurs。Thepermanentincomespaythetaxasmuchoftenerthan
　　thetemporaryones，asaperpetuityexceedsthecertainor
　　uncertainlengthoftimewhichformsthedurationoftheincome
　　forlifeoryears。
　　Allattemptstoestablishaclaiminfavourofterminable
　　incomesonnumericalgrounds—tomakeout，inshort，thata
　　proportionaltaxisnotaproportionaltax—aremanifestly
　　absurd。Theclaimdoesnotrestongroundsofarithmetic，butof
　　humanwantsandfeelings。Itisnotbecausethetemporary
　　annuitanthassmallermeans，butbecausehehasgreater
　　necessities，thatheoughttobeassessedatalowerrate。
　　Inspiteofthenominalequalityofincome，A，anannuitant
　　of1000l。ayear，cannotsowellaffordtopay100l。outofit，
　　asBwhoderivesthesameannualsumfromheritableproperty;A
　　havingusuallyademandonhisincomewhichBhasnot，namely，to
　　providebysavingforchildrenorothers;towhich，inthecase
　　ofsalariesorprofessionalgains，mustgenerallybeaddeda
　　provisionforhisownlateryears;whileBmayexpendhiswhole
　　incomewithoutinjurytohisoldage，andstillhaveitallto
　　bestowonothersafterhisdeath。IfA，inordertomeetthese
　　exigencies，mustlayby300l。ofhisincome，totake100l。from
　　himasincometaxistotake100l。from700l。，sinceitmustbe
　　retrenchedfromthatpartonlyofhismeanswhichhecanafford
　　tospendonhisownconsumption。Werehetothrowitrateablyon
　　whathespendsandonwhathesaves，abating70l。fromhis
　　consumptionand30l。fromhisannualsaving，thenindeedhis
　　immediatesacrificewouldbeproportionatelythesameasB’s:but
　　thenhischildrenorhisoldagewouldbeworseprovidedforin
　　consequenceofthetax。Thecapitalsumwhichwouldbe
　　accumulatedforthemwouldbeone—tenthless，andonthereduced
　　incomeaffordedbythisreducedcapital，theywouldbeasecond
　　timechargedwithincometax;whileB’sheirswouldonlybe
　　chargedonce。
　　Theprinciple，therefore，ofequalityoftaxation，
　　interpretedinitsonlyjustsense，equalityofsacrifice，
　　requiresthatapersonwhohasnomeansofprovidingforoldage，
　　orforthoseinwhomheisinterested，exceptbysavingfrom
　　income，shouldhavethetaxremittedonallthatpartofhis
　　incomewhichisreallyandbonafideappliedtothatpurpose。
　　If，indeed，reliancecouldbeplacedontheconscienceofthe
　　contributors，orsufficientsecuritytakenforthecorrectnessof
　　theirstatementsbycollateralprecautions，thepropermodeof
　　assessinganincometaxwouldbetotaxonlythepartofincome
　　devotedtoexpenditure，exemptingthatwhichissaved。Forwhen
　　savedandinvested（andallsavings，speakinggenerally，are
　　invested）itthenceforthpaysincometaxontheinterestor
　　profitwhichitbrings，notwithstandingthatithasalreadybeen
　　taxedontheprincipal。Unless，therefore，savingsareexempted
　　fromincometax，thecontributorsaretwicetaxedonwhatthey
　　save，andonlyonceonwhattheyspend。Apersonwhospendsall
　　hereceives，pays7d。inthepound，orsaythreepercent，tothe
　　tax，andnomore;butifhesavespartoftheyear’sincomeand
　　buysstock，theninadditiontothethreepercentwhichhehas
　　paidontheprincipal，andwhichdiminishestheinterestinthe
　　sameratio，hepaysthreepercentannuallyontheinterest
　　itself，whichisequivalenttoanimmediatepaymentofasecond
　　threepercentontheprincipal。Sothatwhileunproductive
　　expenditurepaysonlythreepercent，savingspaysixpercent:
　　ormorecorrectly，threepercentonthewhole，andanotherthree
　　percentontheremainingninety—seven。Thedifferencethus
　　createdtothedisadvantageofprudenceandeconomy，isnotonly
　　impoliticbutunjust。Totaxthesuminvested，andafterwardstax
　　alsotheproceedsoftheinvestment，istotaxthesameportion
　　ofthecontributor’smeanstwiceover。Theprincipalandthe
　　interestcannotbothtogetherformpartofhisresources;they
　　arethesameportiontwicecounted:ifhehastheinterest，itis
　　becauseheabstainsfromusingtheprincipal;ifhespendsthe
　　principal，hedoesnotreceivetheinterest。Yetbecausehecan
　　doeitherofthetwo，heistaxedasifhecoulddoboth，and
　　couldhavethebenefitofthesavingandthatofthespending，
　　concurrentlywithoneanother。
　　Ithasbeenurgedasanobjectiontoexemptingsavingsfrom
　　taxation，thatthelawoughtnottodisturb，byartificial
　　interference，thenaturalcompetitionbetweenthemotivesfor
　　savingandthoseforspending。Butwehaveseenthatthelaw
　　disturbsthisnaturalcompetitionwhenittaxessavings，notwhen
　　itsparesthem;forasthesavingspayatanyratethefulltax
　　assoonastheyareinvested，theirexemptionfrompaymentinthe
　　earlierstageisnecessarytopreventthemfrompayingtwice，
　　whilemoneyspentinunproductiveconsumptionpaysonlyonce。It
　　hasbeenfurtherobjected，thatsincetherichhavethegreatest
　　meansofsaving，anyprivilegegiventosavingsisanadvantage
　　bestowedontherichattheexpenseofthepoor。Ianswer，that
　　itisbestowedonthemonlyinproportionastheyabdicatethe
　　personaluseoftheirriches;inproportionastheydiverttheir
　　incomefromthesupplyoftheirownwants，toaproductive
　　investment，throughwhich，insteadofbeingconsumedby
　　themselves，itisdistributedinwagesamongthepoor。Ifthisbe
　　favouringtherich，Ishouldliketohaveitpointedout，what
　　modeofassessingtaxationcandeservethenameoffavouringthe
　　poor。
　　Noincometaxisreallyjust，fromwhichsavingsarenot
　　exempted;andnoincometaxoughttobevotedwithoutthat
　　provision，iftheformofthereturns，andthenatureofthe
　　evidencerequired，couldbesoarrangedastopreventthe
　　exemptionfrombeingtakenfraudulentadvantageof，bysaving
　　withonehandandgettingintodebtwiththeother，orby
　　spendinginthefollowingyearwhathadbeenpassedtax—freeas
　　savingintheyearpreceding。Ifthisdifficultycouldbe
　　surmounted，thedifficultiesandcomplexitiesarisingfromthe
　　comparativeclaimsoftemporaryandpermanentincomes，would
　　disappear;for，sincetemporaryincomeshavenojustclaimto
　　lightertaxationthanpermanentincomes，exceptinsofaras
　　theirpossessorsaremorecalledupontosave，theexemptionof
　　whattheydosavewouldfullysatisfytheclaim。Butifnoplan
　　canbedevisedfortheexemptionofactualsavings，sufficiently
　　freefromliabilitytofraud，itisnecessary，asthenextthing
　　inpointofjustice，totakeintoaccountinassessingthetax，
　　whatthedifferentclassesofcontributorsoughttosave。And
　　therewouldprobablybenoothermodeofdoingthisthanthe
　　roughexpedientoftwodifferentratesofassessment。Therewould
　　begreatdifficultyintakingintoaccountdifferencesof
　　durationbetweenoneterminableincomeandanother;andinthe
　　mostfrequentcase，thatofincomesdependentonlife，
　　differencesofageandhealthwouldconstitutesuchextreme
　　diversityasitwouldbeimpossibletotakepropercognizanceof。
　　Itwouldprobablybenecessarytobecontentwithoneuniform
　　rateforallincomesofinheritance，andanotheruniformratefor
　　allthosewhichnecessarilyterminatewiththelifeofthe
　　individual。Infixingtheproportionbetweenthetworates，there
　　mustinevitablybesomethingarbitrary;perhapsadeductionof
　　one—fourthinfavouroflife—incomeswouldbeaslittle
　　objectionableasanywhichcouldbemade，itbeingthusassumed
　　thatone—fourthofalife—incomeis，ontheaverageofallages
　　andstatesofhealth，asuitableproportiontobelaidbyasa
　　provisionforsuccessorsandforoldage。（3*）
　　Ofthenetprofitsofpersonsinbusiness，apart，asbefore
　　observed，maybeconsideredasinterestoncapital，andofa
　　perpetualcharacter，andtheremainingpartasremunerationfor
　　theskillandlabourofsuperintendence。Thesurplusbeyond
　　interestdependsonthelifeoftheindividual，andevenonhis
　　continuanceinbusiness，andisentitledtothefullamountof
　　exemptionallowedtoterminableincomes。Ithasalso，Iconceive，
　　ajustclaimtoafurtheramountofexemptioninconsiderationof
　　itsprecariousness。Anincomewhichsomenotunusualvicissitude
　　mayreducetonothing，orevenconvertintoaloss，isnotthe
　　samethingtothefeelingsofthepossessorasapermanentincome
　　of1000l。ayear，eventhoughonanaverageofyearsitmayyield
　　1000l。ayear。Iflife。incomeswereassessedatthree—fourthsof
　　theiramount，theprofitsofbusiness，afterdeductinginterest
　　oncapital，shouldnotonlybeassessedatthree—fourths，but
　　shouldpay，onthatassessment，alowerrate。Orperhapsthe
　　claimsofjusticeinthisrespectmightbesufficientlymetby
　　allowingthedeductionofafourthontheentireincome，interest
　　included。
　　Thesearethechiefcases，ofordinaryoccurrence，inwhich
　　anydifficultyarisesininterpretingthemaximofequalityof
　　taxation。Thepropersensetobeputuponit，aswehaveseenin
　　theprecedingexample，is，thatpeopleshouldbetaxed，notin
　　proportiontowhattheyhave，buttowhattheycanaffordto
　　spend。Itisnoobjectiontothisprinciplethatwecannotapply
　　itconsistentlytoallcases。Apersonwithalife—incomeand
　　precarioushealth，orwhohasmanypersonsdependingonhis
　　exertions，must，ifhewishestoprovideforthemafterhis
　　death，bemorerigidlyeconomicalthanonewhohasalife—income
　　ofequalamount，withastrongconstitution，andfewclaimsupon
　　him;andifitbeconcededthattaxationcannotaccommodate
　　itselftothesedistinctions，itisarguedthatthereisnouse
　　inattendingtoanydistinctions，wheretheabsoluteamountof
　　incomeisthesame。Butthedifficultyofdoingperfectjustice
　　isnoreasonagainstdoingasmuchaswecan。Thoughitmaybea
　　hardshiptoanannuitantwhoselifeisonlyworthfiveyears’
　　purchase，tobeallowednogreaterabatementthanisgrantedto
　　onewhoselifeisworthtwenty，itisbetterforhimevenso，
　　thanifneitherofthemwereallowedanyabatementatall。
　　5。BeforeleavingthesubjectofEqualityofTaxation，Imust
　　remarkthattherearecasesinwhichexceptionsmaybemadeto
　　it，consistentlywiththatequaljusticewhichisthegroundwork
　　oftherule。Supposethatthereisakindofincomewhich
　　constantlytendstoincrease，withoutanyexertionorsacrifice
　　onthepartoftheowners:thoseownersconstitutingaclassin
　　thecommunity，whomthenaturalcourseofthingsprogressively
　　enriches，consistentlywithcompletepassivenessontheirown
　　part。Insuchacaseitwouldbenoviolationoftheprinciples
　　onwhichprivatepropertyisgrounded，ifthestateshould
　　appropriatethisincreaseofwealth，orpartofit，asitarises。
　　Thiswouldnotproperlybetakinganythingfromanybody;itwould
　　merelybeapplyinganaccessionofwealth，createdby
　　circumstances，tothebenefitofsociety，insteadofallowingit
　　tobecomeanunearnedappendagetotherichesofaparticular
　　class。
　　Nowthisisactuallythecasewithrent。Theordinary
　　progressofasocietywhichincreasesinwealth，isatalltimes
　　tendingtoaugmenttheincomesoflandlords;togivethembotha
　　greateramountandagreaterproportionofthewealthofthe
　　community，independentlyofanytroubleoroutlayincurredby
　　themselves。Theygrowricher，asitwereintheirsleep，without
　　working，risking，oreconomizing。Whatclaimhavethey，onthe
　　generalprincipleofsocialjustice，tothisaccessionofriches？
　　Inwhatwouldtheyhavebeenwrongedifsocietyhad，fromthe
　　beginning，reservedtherightoftaxingthespontaneousincrease
　　ofrent，tothehighestamountrequiredbyfinancialexigencies？
　　Iadmitthatitwouldbeunjusttocomeuponeachindividual
　　estate，andlayholdoftheincreasewhichmightbefoundtohave
　　takenplaceinitsrental;becausetherewouldbenomeansof
　　distinguishinginindividualcases，betweenanincreaseowing
　　solelytothegeneralcircumstancesofsociety，andonewhichwas
　　theeffectofskillandexpenditureonthepartofthe
　　proprietor。Theonlyadmissiblemodeofproceedingwouldbebya
　　generalmeasure。Thefirststepshouldbeavaluationofallthe
　　landinthecountry。Thepresentvalueofalllandshouldbe
　　exemptfromthetax;butafteranintervalhadelapsed，during
　　whichsocietyhadincreasedinpopulationandcapital，arough
　　estimatemightbemadeofthespontaneousincreasewhichhad
　　accruedtorentsincethevaluationwasmade。Ofthistheaverage
　　priceofproducewouldbesomecriterion:ifthathadrisen，it
　　wouldbecertainthatrenthadincreased，and（asalreadyshown）
　　eveninagreaterratiothantheriseofprice。Onthisandother
　　data，anapproximateestimatemightbemade，howmuchvaluehad
　　beenaddedtothelandofthecountrybynaturalcauses;andin
　　layingonageneralland—tax，whichforfearofmiscalculation
　　shouldbeconsiderablywithintheamountthusindicated，there
　　wouldbeanassuranceofnottouchinganyincreaseofincome
　　whichmightbetheresultofcapitalexpendedorindustryexerted
　　bytheproprietor。
　　Butthoughtherecouldbenoquestionastothejusticeof
　　taxingtheincreaseofrent，ifsocietyhadavowedlyreservedthe
　　right，hasnotsocietywaivedthatrightbynotexercisingit？In
　　England，forexample，havenotallwhoboughtlandforthelast
　　centuryormore，givenvaluenotonlyfortheexistingincome，
　　butfortheprospectsofincrease，underanimpliedassuranceof
　　beingonlytaxedinthesameproportionwithotherincomes？This
　　objection，insofarasvalid，hasadifferentdegreeofvalidity
　　indifferentcountries;dependingonthedegreeofdesuetudeinto
　　whichsocietyhasallowedarighttofall，which，asnoonecan
　　doubt，itoncefullypossessed。InmostcountriesofEurope，the
　　righttotakebytaxation，asexigencymightrequire，an
　　indefiniteportionoftherentofland，hasneverbeenallowedto
　　slumber。InseveralpartsoftheContinent，theland—taxformsa
　　largeproportionofthepublicrevenues，andhasalwaysbeen
　　confessedlyliabletoberaisedorloweredwithoutreferenceto
　　othertaxes。Inthesecountriesnoonecanpretendtohavebecome
　　theowneroflandonthefaithofneverbeingcalledupontopay
　　anincreasedland—tax。InEnglandtheland—taxhasnotvaried
　　sincetheearlypartofthelastcentury。Thelastactofthe
　　legislatureinrelationtoitsamount，wastodiminishit;and
　　thoughthesubsequentincreaseintherentalofthecountryhas
　　beenimmense，notonlyfromagriculture，butfromthegrowthof
　　townsandtheincreaseofbuildings，theascendancyof
　　landholdersinthelegislaturehaspreventedanytaxfrombeing
　　imposed，asitsojustlymight，upontheverylargeportionof
　　thisincreasewhichwasunearned，and，asitwere，accidental。
　　Fortheexpectationsthusraised，itappearstomethatanamply
　　sufficientallowanceismade，ifthewholeincreaseofincome
　　whichhasaccruedduringthislongperiodfromamerenatural
　　law，withoutexertionorsacrifice，isheldsacredfromany
　　peculiartaxation。Fromthepresentdate，oranysubsequenttime
　　atwhichthelegislaturemaythinkfittoasserttheprinciple，I
　　seenoobjectiontodeclaringthatthefutureincrementofrent
　　shouldbeliabletospecialtaxation;indoingwhichall
　　injusticetothelandlordswouldbeobviated，ifthepresent
　　market—priceoftheirlandweresecuredtothem;sincethat
　　includesthepresentvalueofallfutureexpectations。With
　　referencetosuchatax，perhapsasafercriterionthaneithera
　　riseofrentsorariseofthepriceofcorn，wouldbeageneral
　　riseinthepriceofland。Itwouldbeeasytokeepthetax
　　withintheamountwhichwouldreducethemarketvalueofland
　　belowtheoriginalvaluation:anduptothatpoint，whateverthe
　　amountofthetaxmightbe，noinjusticewouldbedonetothe
　　proprietors。
　　6。Butwhatevermaybethoughtofthelegitimacyofmaking
　　theStateasharerinallfutureincreaseofrentfromnatural
　　causes，theexistingland—tax（whichinthiscountry
　　unfortunatelyisverysmall）oughtnottoberegardedasatax，
　　butasarent—chargeinfavourofthepublic;aportionofthe
　　rent，reservedfromthebeginningbytheState，whichhasnever
　　belongedtoorformedpartoftheincomeofthelandlords，and
　　shouldnotthereforebecountedtothemaspartoftheir
　　taxation，soastoexemptthemfromtheirfairshareofevery
　　othertax。Aswellmightthetitheberegardedasataxonthe
　　landlords:aswell，inBengal，wheretheState，thoughentitled
　　tothewholerentoftheland，gaveawayone—tenthofitto
　　individuals，retainingtheothernine—tenths，mightthose
　　nine—tenthsbeconsideredasanunequalandunjusttaxonthe
　　granteesofthetenth。Thatapersonownspartoftherent，does
　　notmaketherestofithisjustright，injuriouslywithheldfrom
　　him。Thelandlordsoriginallyheldtheirestatessubjectto
　　feudalburthens，forwhichthepresentland—taxisanexceedingly
　　smallequivalent，andfortheirrelieffromwhichtheyshould
　　havebeenrequiredtopayamuchhigherprice。Allwhohave
　　boughtlandsincethetaxexistedhaveboughtitsubjecttothe
　　tax。Thereisnotthesmallestpretenceforlookinguponitasa
　　paymentexactedfromtheexistingraceoflandlords。
　　Theseobservationsareapplicabletoaland—tax，onlyinso
　　farasitisapeculiartax，andnotwhenitismerelyamodeof
　　levyingfromthelandlordstheequivalentofwhatistakenfrom
　　otherclasses。InFrance，forexample，therearepeculiartaxes
　　onotherkindsofpropertyandincome（themobilierandthe
　　patente），andsupposingtheland—taxtobenotmorethan
　　equivalenttothese，therewouldbenogroundforcontendingthat
　　theStatehadreservedtoitselfarent—chargeontheland。But
　　whereverandinsofarasincomederivedfromlandis
　　prescriptivelysubjecttoadeductionforpublicpurposes，beyond
　　therateoftaxationleviedonotherincomes，thesurplusisnot
　　properlytaxation，butashareofthepropertyinthesoil，
　　reservedbythestate。Inthiscountrytherearenopeculiar
　　taxesonotherclasses，correspondingto，orintendedto
　　countervail，theland—tax。Thewholeofit，therefore，isnot
　　taxation，butarent—charge，andisasifthestatehadretained，
　　notaportionoftherent，butaportionoftheland。Itisno
　　moreaburthenonthelandlord，thantheshareofonejoint
　　tenantisaburthenontheother。Thelandlordsareentitledto
　　nocompensationforit，norhavetheyanyclaimtoitsbeing
　　allowedfor，aspartoftheirtaxes。Itscontinuanceonthe
　　existingfootingisnoinfringementoftheprincipleofEqual
　　Taxation。（4*）
　　Weshallhereafterconsider，intreatingofIndirect
　　Taxation，howfar，andwithwhatmodifications，theruleof
　　equalityisapplicabletothatdepartment。
　　7。Inadditiontotheprecedingrules，anothergeneralrule
　　oftaxationissometimeslaiddown，namely，thatitshouldfall
　　onincome，andnotoncapital。Thattaxationshouldnotencroach
　　upontheamountofthenationalcapital，isindeedofthe
　　greatestimportance;butthisencroachment，whenitoccurs，is
　　notsomuchaconsequenceofanyparticularmodeoftaxation，as
　　ofitsexcessiveamount。Over—taxation，carriedtoasufficient
　　extent，isquitecapableofruiningthemostindustrious
　　community，especiallywhenitisinanydegreearbitrary，sothat
　　thepayerisnevercertainhowmuchorhowlittleheshallbe
　　allowedtokeep;orwhenitissolaidonastorenderindustry
　　andeconomyabadcalculation。Butiftheseerrorsbeavoided，
　　andtheamountoftaxationbenotgreaterthanitisatpresent
　　eveninthemostheavilytaxedcountryofEurope，thereisno
　　dangerlestitshoulddeprivethecountryofaportionofits
　　capital。