InnationsinwhichtheprincipleofelectionextendstoeveryplaceintheStatenopoliticalcareercan，properlyspeaking，besaidtoexist。Menarepromotedasifbychancetotherankwhichtheyenjoy，andtheyarebynomeanssureofretainingit。Theconsequenceisthatintranquiltimespublicfunctionsofferbutfewlurestoambition。IntheUnitedStatesthepersonswhoengageintheperplexitiesofpoliticallifeareindividualsofverymoderatepretensions。Thepursuitofwealthgenerallydivertsmenofgreattalentsandofgreatpassionsfromthepursuitofpower，anditveryfrequentlyhappensthatamandoesnotundertaketodirectthefortuneoftheStateuntilhehasdiscoveredhisincompetencetoconducthisownaffairs。Thevastnumberofveryordinarymenwhooccupypublicstationsisquiteasattributabletothesecausesastothebadchoiceofthedemocracy。IntheUnitedStates，Iamnotsurethatthepeoplewouldreturnthemenofsuperiorabilitieswhomightsolicititssupport，butitiscertainthatmenofthisdescriptiondonotcomeforward。
　　ArbitraryPowerOfMagistratesUnderTheRuleOfTheAmericanDemocracyForwhatreasonthearbitrarypowerofMagistratesisgreaterinabsolutemonarchiesandindemocraticrepublicsthanitisinlimitedmonarchies—ArbitrarypoweroftheMagistratesinNewEngland。
　　Intwodifferentkindsofgovernmentthemagistrates*aexerciseaconsiderabledegreeofarbitrarypower;namely，undertheabsolutegovernmentofasingleindividual，andunderthatofademocracy。Thisidenticalresultproceedsfromcauseswhicharenearlyanalogous。
　　[Footnotea:Ihereusethewordmagistratesinthewidestsenseinwhichitcanbetaken;Iapplyittoalltheofficerstowhomtheexecutionofthelawsisintrusted。]
　　IndespoticStatesthefortuneofnocitizenissecure;andpublicofficersarenotmoresafethanprivateindividuals。Thesovereign，whohasunderhiscontrolthelives，theproperty，andsometimesthehonorofthemenwhomheemploys，doesnotscrupletoallowthemagreatlatitudeofaction，becauseheisconvincedthattheywillnotuseittohisprejudice。IndespoticStatesthesovereignissoattachedtotheexerciseofhispower，thathedislikestheconstraintevenofhisownregulations;andheiswellpleasedthathisagentsshouldfollowasomewhatfortuitouslineofconduct，providedhebecertainthattheiractionswillnevercounteracthisdesires。
　　Indemocracies，asthemajorityhaseveryyeartherightofdeprivingtheofficerswhomithasappointedoftheirpower，ithasnoreasontofearanyabuseoftheirauthority。AsthepeopleisalwaysabletosignifyitswishestothosewhoconducttheGovernment，itprefersleavingthemtomaketheirownexertionstoprescribinganinvariableruleofconductwhichwouldatoncefettertheiractivityandthepopularauthority。
　　Itmayevenbeobserved，onattentiveconsideration，thatundertheruleofademocracythearbitrarypowerofthemagistratemustbestillgreaterthanindespoticStates。Inthelatterthesovereignhasthepowerofpunishingallthefaultswithwhichhebecomesacquainted，butitwouldbevainforhimtohopetobecomeacquaintedwithallthosewhicharecommitted。Intheformerthesovereignpowerisnotonlysupreme，butitisuniversallypresent。TheAmericanfunctionariesare，inpointoffact，muchmoreindependentinthesphereofactionwhichthelawtracesoutforthemthananypublicofficerinEurope。Veryfrequentlytheobjectwhichtheyaretoaccomplishissimplypointedouttothem，andthechoiceofthemeansislefttotheirowndiscretion。
　　InNewEngland，forinstance，theselectmenofeachtownshipareboundtodrawupthelistofpersonswhoaretoserveonthejury;theonlyrulewhichislaiddowntoguidethemintheirchoiceisthattheyaretoselectcitizenspossessingtheelectivefranchiseandenjoyingafairreputation。*bInFrancethelivesandlibertiesofthesubjectswouldbethoughttobeindangerifapublicofficerofanykindwasentrustedwithsoformidablearight。InNewEnglandthesamemagistratesareempoweredtopostthenamesofhabitualdrunkardsinpublic—houses，andtoprohibittheinhabitantsofatownfromsupplyingthemwithliquor。*cAcensorialpowerofthisexcessivekindwouldberevoltingtothepopulationofthemostabsolutemonarchies;here，however，itissubmittedtowithoutdifficulty。
　　[Footnoteb:SeetheActofFebruary27，1813。"GeneralCollectionoftheLawsofMassachusetts，"vol。ii。p。331。Itshouldbeaddedthatthejurorsareafterwardsdrawnfromtheselistsbylot。]
　　[Footnotec:SeeActofFebruary28，1787。"GeneralCollectionoftheLawsofMassachusetts，"vol。i。p。302。]
　　Nowherehassomuchbeenleftbythelawtothearbitrarydeterminationofthemagistrateasindemocraticrepublics，becausethisarbitrarypowerisunattendedbyanyalarmingconsequences。Itmayevenbeassertedthatthefreedomofthemagistrateincreasesastheelectivefranchiseisextended，andasthedurationofthetimeofofficeisshortened。Hencearisesthegreatdifficultywhichattendstheconversionofademocraticrepublicintoamonarchy。Themagistrateceasestobeelective，butheretainstherightsandthehabitsofanelectedofficer，whichleaddirectlytodespotism。
　　Itisonlyinlimitedmonarchiesthatthelaw，whichprescribesthesphereinwhichpublicofficersaretoact，superintendsalltheirmeasures。Thecauseofthismaybeeasilydetected。InlimitedmonarchiesthepowerisdividedbetweentheKingandthepeople，bothofwhomareinterestedinthestabilityofthemagistrate。TheKingdoesnotventuretoplacethepublicofficersunderthecontrolofthepeople，lesttheyshouldbetemptedtobetrayhisinterests;ontheotherhand，thepeoplefearslestthemagistratesshouldservetooppressthelibertiesofthecountry，iftheywereentirelydependentupontheCrown;
　　theycannotthereforebesaidtodependoneitheroneortheother。Thesamecausewhichinducesthekingandthepeopletorenderpublicofficersindependentsuggeststhenecessityofsuchsecuritiesasmaypreventtheirindependencefromencroachingupontheauthorityoftheformerandthelibertiesofthelatter。
　　Theyconsequentlyagreeastothenecessityofrestrictingthefunctionarytoalineofconductlaiddownbeforehand，andtheyareinterestedinconfininghimbycertainregulationswhichhecannotevade。
　　ChapterXIII:GovernmentOfTheDemocarcyInAmerica—PartII
　　InstabilityOfTheAdministrationInTheUnitedStatesInAmericathepublicactsofacommunityfrequentlyleavefewertracesthantheoccurrencesofafamily—Newspaperstheonlyhistoricalremains—Instabilityoftheadministrationprejudicialtotheartofgovernment。
　　TheauthoritywhichpublicmenpossessinAmericaissobrief，andtheyaresosooncommingledwiththeever—changingpopulationofthecountry，thattheactsofacommunityfrequentlyleavefewertracesthantheoccurrencesofaprivatefamily。Thepublicadministrationis，sotospeak，oralandtraditionary。Butlittleiscommittedtowriting，andthatlittleiswaftedawayforever，liketheleavesoftheSibyl，bythesmallestbreeze。
　　TheonlyhistoricalremainsintheUnitedStatesarethenewspapers;butifanumberbewanting，thechainoftimeisbroken，andthepresentisseveredfromthepast。IamconvincedthatinfiftyyearsitwillbemoredifficulttocollectauthenticdocumentsconcerningthesocialconditionoftheAmericansatthepresentdaythanitistofindremainsoftheadministrationofFranceduringtheMiddleAges;andiftheUnitedStateswereeverinvadedbybarbarians，itwouldbenecessarytohaverecoursetothehistoryofothernationsinordertolearnanythingofthepeoplewhichnowinhabitsthem。
　　Theinstabilityoftheadministrationhaspenetratedintothehabitsofthepeople:itevenappearstosuitthegeneraltaste，andnoonecaresforwhatoccurredbeforehistime。Nomethodicalsystemispursued;noarchivesareformed;andnodocumentsarebroughttogetherwhenitwouldbeveryeasytodoso。Wheretheyexist，littlestoreissetuponthem;andIhaveamongstmypapersseveraloriginalpublicdocumentswhichweregiventomeinanswertosomeofmyinquiries。InAmericasocietyseemstolivefromhandtomouth，likeanarmyinthefield。Nevertheless，theartofadministrationmayundoubtedlyberankedasascience，andnosciencescanbeimprovedifthediscoveriesandobservationsofsuccessivegenerationsarenotconnectedtogetherintheorderinwhichtheyoccur。Oneman，intheshortspaceofhisliferemarksafact;anotherconceivesanidea;theformerinventsameansofexecution，thelatterreducesatruthtoafixedproposition;andmankindgathersthefruitsofindividualexperienceuponitswayandgraduallyformsthesciences。ButthepersonswhoconducttheadministrationinAmericacanseldomaffordanyinstructiontoeachother;andwhentheyassumethedirectionofsociety，theysimplypossessthoseattainmentswhicharemostwidelydisseminatedinthecommunity，andnoexperiencepeculiartothemselves。Democracy，carriedtoitsfurthestlimits，isthereforeprejudicialtotheartofgovernment;andforthisreasonitisbetteradaptedtoapeoplealreadyversedintheconductofanadministrationthantoanationwhichisuninitiatedinpublicaffairs。
　　Thisremark，indeed，isnotexclusivelyapplicabletothescienceofadministration。Althoughademocraticgovernmentisfoundeduponaverysimpleandnaturalprinciple，italwayspresupposestheexistenceofahighdegreeofcultureandenlightenmentinsociety。*dAtthefirstglanceitmaybeimaginedtobelongtotheearliestagesoftheworld;butmaturerobservationwillconvinceusthatitcouldonlycomelastinthesuccessionofhumanhistory。
　　[Footnoted:ItisneedlesstoobservethatIspeakhereofthedemocraticformofgovernmentasappliedtoapeople，notmerelytoatribe。]
　　ChargesLeviedByTheStateUnderTheRuleOfTheAmericanDemocracyInallcommunitiescitizensdivisibleintothreeclasses—Habitsofeachoftheseclassesinthedirectionofpublicfinances—
　　Whypublicexpendituremusttendtoincreasewhenthepeoplegoverns—WhatrenderstheextravaganceofademocracylesstobefearedinAmerica—Publicexpenditureunderademocracy。
　　Beforewecanaffirmwhetherademocraticformofgovernmentiseconomicalornot，wemustestablishasuitablestandardofcomparison。Thequestionwouldbeoneofeasysolutionifweweretoattempttodrawaparallelbetweenademocraticrepublicandanabsolutemonarchy。Thepublicexpenditurewouldbefoundtobemoreconsiderableundertheformerthanunderthelatter;
　　suchisthecasewithallfreeStatescomparedtothosewhicharenotso。Itiscertainthatdespotismruinsindividualsbypreventingthemfromproducingwealth，muchmorethanbydeprivingthemofthewealththeyhaveproduced;itdriesupthesourceofriches，whilstitusuallyrespectsacquiredproperty。
　　Freedom，onthecontrary，engendersfarmorebenefitsthanitdestroys;andthenationswhicharefavoredbyfreeinstitutionsinvariablyfindthattheirresourcesincreaseevenmorerapidlythantheirtaxes。
　　Mypresentobjectistocomparefreenationstoeachother，andtopointouttheinfluenceofdemocracyuponthefinancesofaState。
　　Communities，aswellasorganicbodies，aresubjecttocertainfixedrulesintheirformationwhichtheycannotevade。
　　Theyarecomposedofcertainelementswhicharecommontothematalltimesandunderallcircumstances。Thepeoplemayalwaysbementallydividedintothreedistinctclasses。Thefirstoftheseclassesconsistsofthewealthy;thesecond，ofthosewhoareineasycircumstances;andthethirdiscomposedofthosewhohavelittleornoproperty，andwhosubsistmoreespeciallybytheworkwhichtheyperformforthetwosuperiororders。Theproportionoftheindividualswhoareincludedinthesethreedivisionsmayvaryaccordingtotheconditionofsociety，butthedivisionsthemselvescanneverbeobliterated。
　　ItisevidentthateachoftheseclasseswillexerciseaninfluencepeculiartoitsownpropensitiesupontheadministrationofthefinancesoftheState。Ifthefirstofthethreeexclusivelypossessesthelegislativepower，itisprobablethatitwillnotbesparingofthepublicfunds，becausethetaxeswhichareleviedonalargefortuneonlytendtodiminishthesumofsuperfluousenjoyment，andare，inpointoffact，butlittlefelt。Ifthesecondclasshasthepowerofmakingthelaws，itwillcertainlynotbelavishoftaxes，becausenothingissoonerousasalargeimpostwhichislevieduponasmallincome。Thegovernmentofthemiddleclassesappearstometobethemosteconomical，thoughperhapsnotthemostenlightened，andcertainlynotthemostgenerous，offreegovernments。
　　Butletusnowsupposethatthelegislativeauthorityisvestedinthelowestorders:therearetwostrikingreasonswhichshowthatthetendencyoftheexpenditurewillbetoincrease，nottodiminish。Asthegreatmajorityofthosewhocreatethelawsarepossessedofnopropertyuponwhichtaxescanbeimposed，allthemoneywhichisspentforthecommunityappearstobespenttotheiradvantage，atnocostoftheirown;andthosewhoarepossessedofsomelittlepropertyreadilyfindmeansofregulatingthetaxessothattheyareburdensometothewealthyandprofitabletothepoor，althoughtherichareunabletotakethesameadvantagewhentheyareinpossessionoftheGovernment。
　　Incountriesinwhichthepoor*eshouldbeexclusivelyinvestedwiththepowerofmakingthelawsnogreateconomyofpublicexpenditureoughttobeexpected:thatexpenditurewillalwaysbeconsiderable;eitherbecausethetaxesdonotweighuponthosewholevythem，orbecausetheyareleviedinsuchamannerasnottoweighuponthoseclasses。Inotherwords，thegovernmentofthedemocracyistheonlyoneunderwhichthepowerwhichlaysontaxesescapesthepaymentofthem。
　　[Footnotee:Thewordpoorisusedhere，andthroughouttheremainderofthischapter，inarelative，notinanabsolutesense。PoormeninAmericawouldoftenappearrichincomparisonwiththepoorofEurope;buttheymaywithproprietybystyledpoorincomparisonwiththeirmoreaffluentcountrymen。]
　　Itmaybeobjected（buttheargumenthasnorealweight）
　　thatthetrueinterestofthepeopleisindissolublyconnectedwiththatofthewealthierportionofthecommunity，sinceitcannotbutsufferbytheseveremeasurestowhichitresorts。
　　Butisitnotthetrueinterestofkingstorendertheirsubjectshappy，andthetrueinterestofnoblestoadmitrecruitsintotheirorderonsuitablegrounds？Ifremoteadvantageshadpowertoprevailoverthepassionsandtheexigenciesofthemoment，nosuchthingasatyrannicalsovereignoranexclusivearistocracycouldeverexist。
　　Again，itmaybeobjectedthatthepoorareneverinvestedwiththesolepowerofmakingthelaws;butIreply，thatwhereveruniversalsuffragehasbeenestablishedthemajorityofthecommunityunquestionablyexercisesthelegislativeauthority;
　　andifitbeprovedthatthepooralwaysconstitutethemajority，itmaybeadded，withperfecttruth，thatinthecountriesinwhichtheypossesstheelectivefranchisetheypossessthesolepowerofmakinglaws。Butitiscertainthatinallthenationsoftheworldthegreaternumberhasalwaysconsistedofthosepersonswhoholdnoproperty，orofthosewhosepropertyisinsufficienttoexemptthemfromthenecessityofworkinginordertoprocureaneasysubsistence。Universalsuffragedoestherefore，inpointoffact，investthepoorwiththegovernmentofsociety。
　　ThedisastrousinfluencewhichpopularauthoritymaysometimesexerciseuponthefinancesofaStatewasveryclearlyseeninsomeofthedemocraticrepublicsofantiquity，inwhichthepublictreasurewasexhaustedinordertorelieveindigentcitizens，ortosupplythegamesandtheatricalamusementsofthepopulace。Itistruethattherepresentativesystemwasthenveryimperfectlyknown，andthat，atthepresenttime，theinfluenceofpopularpassionislessfeltintheconductofpublicaffairs;butitmaybebelievedthatthedelegatewillintheendconformtotheprinciplesofhisconstituents，andfavortheirpropensitiesasmuchastheirinterests。
　　Theextravaganceofdemocracyis，however，lesstobedreadedinproportionasthepeopleacquiresashareofproperty，becauseontheonehandthecontributionsofthericharethenlessneeded，and，ontheother，itismoredifficulttolayontaxeswhichdonotaffecttheinterestsofthelowerclasses。OnthisaccountuniversalsuffragewouldbelessdangerousinFrancethaninEngland，becauseinthelattercountrythepropertyonwhichtaxesmaybeleviedisvestedinfewerhands。America，wherethegreatmajorityofthecitizenspossesssomefortune，isinastillmorefavorablepositionthanFrance。
　　Therearestillfurthercauseswhichmayincreasethesumofpublicexpenditureindemocraticcountries。Whenthearistocracygoverns，theindividualswhoconducttheaffairsofStateareexemptedbytheirownstationinsocietyfromeverykindofprivation;theyarecontentedwiththeirposition;powerandrenownaretheobjectsforwhichtheystrive;and，astheyareplacedfarabovetheobscurerthrongofcitizens，theydonotalwaysdistinctlyperceivehowthewell—beingofthemassofthepeopleoughttoredoundtotheirownhonor。Theyarenotindeedcalloustothesufferingsofthepoor，buttheycannotfeelthosemiseriesasacutelyasiftheywerethemselvespartakersofthem。
　　Providedthatthepeopleappeartosubmittoitslot，therulersaresatisfied，andtheydemandnothingfurtherfromtheGovernment。Anaristocracyismoreintentuponthemeansofmaintainingitsinfluencethanuponthemeansofimprovingitscondition。
　　When，onthecontrary，thepeopleisinvestedwiththesupremeauthority，theperpetualsenseoftheirownmiseriesimpelstherulersofsocietytoseekforperpetualameliorations。
　　Athousanddifferentobjectsaresubjectedtoimprovement;themosttrivialdetailsaresoughtoutassusceptibleofamendment;
　　andthosechangeswhichareaccompaniedwithconsiderableexpensearemoreespeciallyadvocated，sincetheobjectistorendertheconditionofthepoormoretolerable，whocannotpayforthemselves。
　　Moreover，alldemocraticcommunitiesareagitatedbyanill—
　　definedexcitementandbyakindoffeverishimpatience，thatengenderamultitudeofinnovations，almostallofwhichareattendedwithexpense。
　　Inmonarchiesandaristocraciesthenaturaltastewhichtherulershaveforpowerandforrenownisstimulatedbythepromptingsofambition，andtheyarefrequentlyincitedbythesetemptationstoverycostlyundertakings。Indemocracies，wheretherulerslaborunderprivations，theycanonlybecourtedbysuchmeansasimprovetheirwell—being，andtheseimprovementscannottakeplacewithoutasacrificeofmoney。Whenapeoplebeginstoreflectuponitssituation，itdiscoversamultitudeofwantstowhichithadnotbeforebeensubject，andtosatisfytheseexigenciesrecoursemustbehadtothecoffersoftheState。Henceitarisesthatthepublicchargesincreaseinproportionascivilizationspreads，andthatimpostsareaugmentedasknowledgepervadesthecommunity。
　　Thelastcausewhichfrequentlyrendersademocraticgovernmentdearerthananyotheris，thatademocracydoesnotalwayssucceedinmoderatingitsexpenditure，becauseitdoesnotunderstandtheartofbeingeconomical。Asthedesignswhichitentertainsarefrequentlychanged，andtheagentsofthosedesignsarestillmorefrequentlyremoved，itsundertakingsareoftenillconductedorleftunfinished:intheformercasetheStatespendssumsoutofallproportiontotheendwhichitproposestoaccomplish;inthesecond，theexpenseitselfisunprofitable。*f[Footnotef:ThegrossreceiptsoftheTreasuryoftheUnitedStatesin1832wereabout$28，000，000;in1870theyhadrisento$411，000，000。Thegrossexpenditurein1832was$30，000，000;in1870，$309，000，000。]
　　TendenciesOfTheAmericanDemocracyAsRegardsTheSalariesOfPublicOfficersInthedemocraciesthosewhoestablishhighsalarieshavenochanceofprofitingbythem—TendencyoftheAmericandemocracytoincreasethesalariesofsubordinateofficersandtolowerthoseofthemoreimportantfunctionaries—Reasonofthis—
　　ComparativestatementofthesalariesofpublicofficersintheUnitedStatesandinFrance。
　　Thereisapowerfulreasonwhichusuallyinducesdemocraciestoeconomizeuponthesalariesofpublicofficers。Asthenumberofcitizenswhodispensetheremunerationisextremelylargeindemocraticcountries，sothenumberofpersonswhocanhopetobebenefitedbythereceiptofitiscomparativelysmall。Inaristocraticcountries，onthecontrary，theindividualswhofixhighsalarieshavealmostalwaysavaguehopeofprofitingbythem。Theseappointmentsmaybelookeduponasacapitalwhichtheycreatefortheirownuse，oratleastasaresourcefortheirchildren。
　　Itmust，however，beallowedthatademocraticStateismostparsimonioustowardsitsprincipalagents。InAmericathesecondaryofficersaremuchbetterpaid，andthedignitariesoftheadministrationmuchworse，thantheyareelsewhere。
　　Theseoppositeeffectsresultfromthesamecause;thepeoplefixesthesalariesofthepublicofficersinbothcases;
　　andthescaleofremunerationisdeterminedbytheconsiderationofitsownwants。Itisheldtobefairthattheservantsofthepublicshouldbeplacedinthesameeasycircumstancesasthepublicitself;*gbutwhenthequestionturnsuponthesalariesofthegreatofficersofState，thisrulefails，andchancealonecanguidethepopulardecision。Thepoorhavenoadequateconceptionofthewantswhichthehigherclassesofsocietymayfeel。Thesumwhichisscantytotherichappearsenormoustothepoormanwhosewantsdonotextendbeyondthenecessariesoflife;andinhisestimationtheGovernorofaState，withhistwelveorfifteenhundreddollarsayear，isaveryfortunateandenviablebeing。*hIfyouundertaketoconvincehimthattherepresentativeofagreatpeopleoughttobeabletomaintainsomeshowofsplendorintheeyesofforeignnations，hewillperhapsassenttoyourmeaning;butwhenhereflectsonhisownhumbledwelling，andonthehard—earnedproduceofhiswearisometoil，heremembersallthathecoulddowithasalarywhichyousayisinsufficient，andheisstartledoralmostfrightenedatthesightofsuchuncommonwealth。Besides，thesecondarypublicofficerisalmostonalevelwiththepeople，whilsttheothersareraisedaboveit。Theformermaythereforeexcitehisinterest，butthelatterbeginstoarousehisenvy。
　　[Footnoteg:TheeasycircumstancesinwhichsecondaryfunctionariesareplacedintheUnitedStatesresultalsofromanothercause，whichisindependentofthegeneraltendenciesofdemocracy;everykindofprivatebusinessisverylucrative，andtheStatewouldnotbeservedatallifitdidnotpayitsservants。Thecountryisinthepositionofacommercialundertaking，whichisobligedtosustainanexpensivecompetition，notwithstandingitstastesforeconomy。]
　　[Footnoteh:TheStateofOhio，whichcontainsamillionofinhabitants，givesitsGovernorasalaryofonly$1，200ayear。]
　　ThisisveryclearlyseenintheUnitedStates，wherethesalariesseemtodecreaseastheauthorityofthosewhoreceivethemaugments*i[Footnotei:Torenderthisassertionperfectlyevident，itwillsufficetoexaminethescaleofsalariesoftheagentsoftheFederalGovernment。IhaveaddedthesalariesattachedtothecorrespondingofficersinFranceundertheconstitutionalmonarchytocompletethecomparison。
　　UnitedStatesTreasuryDepartmentMessenger……$700
　　Clerkwithlowestsalary……1，000
　　Clerkwithhighestsalary……1，600
　　ChiefClerk……2，000
　　SecretaryofState……6，000
　　ThePresident……25，000
　　FranceMinisteredesFinancesHussier……1，500fr。
　　Clerkwithlowestsalary，1，000to1，800fr。
　　Clerkwithhighestsalary3，200to8，600fr。
　　Secretaire—general……20，000fr。
　　TheMinister……80，000fr。
　　TheKing……12，000，000fr。
　　IhaveperhapsdonewronginselectingFranceasmystandardofcomparison。InFrancethedemocratictendenciesofthenationexerciseanever—increasinginfluenceupontheGovernment，andtheChambersshowadispositiontoraisethelowsalariesandtolowertheprincipalones。Thus，theMinisterofFinance，whoreceived160，000fr。undertheEmpire，receives80，000fr。in1835:theDirecteurs—generauxofFinance，whothenreceived50，000fr。nowreceiveonly20，000fr。[ThiscomparisonisbasedonthestateofthingsexistinginFranceandtheUnitedStatesin1831。Ithassincemateriallyalteredinbothcountries，butnotsomuchastoimpugnthetruthoftheauthor’sobservation。]]
　　Undertheruleofanaristocracyitfrequentlyhappens，onthecontrary，thatwhilstthehighofficersarereceivingmunificentsalaries，theinferioroneshavenotmorethanenoughtoprocurethenecessariesoflife。ThereasonofthisfactiseasilydiscoverablefromcausesveryanalogoustothosetowhichIhavejustalluded。Ifademocracyisunabletoconceivethepleasuresoftherichortowitnessthemwithoutenvy，anaristocracyisslowtounderstand，or，tospeakmorecorrectly，isunacquaintedwith，theprivationsofthepoor。Thepoormanisnot（ifweusethetermaright）thefellowoftherichone;
　　butheisabeingofanotherspecies。Anaristocracyisthereforeapttocarebutlittleforthefateofitssubordinateagents;andtheirsalariesareonlyraisedwhentheyrefusetoperformtheirservicefortooscantyaremuneration。
　　Itistheparsimoniousconductofdemocracytowardsitsprincipalofficerswhichhascountenancedasuppositionoffarmoreeconomicalpropensitiesthananywhichitreallypossesses。
　　Itistruethatitscarcelyallowsthemeansofhonorablesubsistencetotheindividualswhoconductitsaffairs;butenormoussumsarelavishedtomeettheexigenciesortofacilitatetheenjoymentsofthepeople。*jThemoneyraisedbytaxationmaybebetteremployed，butitisnotsaved。Ingeneral，democracygiveslargelytothecommunity，andverysparinglytothosewhogovernit。Thereverseisthecaseinaristocraticcountries，wherethemoneyoftheStateisexpendedtotheprofitofthepersonswhoareattheheadofaffairs。
　　[Footnotej:SeetheAmericanbudgetsforthecostofindigentcitizensandgratuitousinstruction。In1831$250，000werespentintheStateofNewYorkforthemaintenanceofthepoor，andatleast$1，000，000weredevotedtogratuitousinstruction。
　　（William’s"NewYorkAnnualRegister，"1832，pp。205and243。）
　　TheStateofNewYorkcontainedonly1，900，000inhabitantsintheyear1830，whichisnotmorethandoubletheamountofpopulationintheDepartmentduNordinFrance。]
　　DifficultyofDistinguishingTheCausesWhichContributeToTheEconomyOfTheAmericanGovernmentWeareliabletofrequenterrorsintheresearchofthosefactswhichexerciseaseriousinfluenceuponthefateofmankind，sincenothingismoredifficultthantoappreciatetheirrealvalue。Onepeopleisnaturallyinconsistentandenthusiastic;anotherissoberandcalculating;andthesecharacteristicsoriginateintheirphysicalconstitutionorinremotecauseswithwhichweareunacquainted。
　　Thesearenationswhicharefondofparadeandthebustleoffestivity，andwhichdonotregretthecostlygaietiesofanhour。Others，onthecontrary，areattachedtomoreretiringpleasures，andseemalmostashamedofappearingtobepleased。
　　Insomecountriesthehighestvalueissetuponthebeautyofpublicedifices;inotherstheproductionsofartaretreatedwithindifference，andeverythingwhichisunproductiveislookeddownuponwithcontempt。Insomerenown，inothersmoney，istherulingpassion。
　　Independentlyofthelaws，allthesecausesconcurtoexerciseaverypowerfulinfluenceupontheconductofthefinancesoftheState。IftheAmericansneverspendthemoneyofthepeopleingalas，itisnotonlybecausetheimpositionoftaxesisunderthecontrolofthepeople，butbecausethepeopletakesnodelightinpublicrejoicings。Iftheyrepudiateallornamentfromtheirarchitecture，andsetnostoreonanybutthemorepracticalandhomelyadvantages，itisnotonlybecausetheyliveunderdemocraticinstitutions，butbecausetheyareacommercialnation。Thehabitsofprivatelifearecontinuedinpublic;andweoughtcarefullytodistinguishthateconomywhichdependsupontheirinstitutionsfromthatwhichisthenaturalresultoftheirmannersandcustoms。
　　WhetherTheExpenditureOfTheUnitedStatesCanBeComparedToThatOfFranceTwopointstobeestablishedinordertoestimatetheextentofthepubliccharges，viz。，thenationalwealthandtherateoftaxation—ThewealthandthechargesofFrancenotaccuratelyknown—WhythewealthandchargesoftheUnioncannotbeaccuratelyknown—ResearchesoftheauthorwithaviewtodiscovertheamountoftaxationofPennsylvania—Generalsymptomswhichmayservetoindicatetheamountofthepublicchargesinagivennation—ResultofthisinvestigationfortheUnion。
　　ManyattemptshaverecentlybeenmadeinFrancetocomparethepublicexpenditureofthatcountrywiththeexpenditureoftheUnitedStates;alltheseattemptshave，however，beenunattendedbysuccess，andafewwordswillsufficetoshowthattheycouldnothavehadasatisfactoryresult。
　　Inordertoestimatetheamountofthepublicchargesofapeopletwopreliminariesareindispensable:itisnecessary，inthefirstplace，toknowthewealthofthatpeople;andinthesecond，tolearnwhatportionofthatwealthisdevotedtotheexpenditureoftheState。Toshowtheamountoftaxationwithoutshowingtheresourceswhicharedestinedtomeetthedemand，istoundertakeafutilelabor;foritisnottheexpenditure，buttherelationoftheexpendituretotherevenue，whichitisdesirabletoknow。
　　Thesamerateoftaxationwhichmayeasilybesupportedbyawealthycontributorwillreduceapooronetoextrememisery。
　　Thewealthofnationsiscomposedofseveraldistinctelements，ofwhichpopulationisthefirst，realpropertythesecond，andpersonalpropertythethird。Thefirstofthesethreeelementsmaybediscoveredwithoutdifficulty。Amongstcivilizednationsitiseasytoobtainanaccuratecensusoftheinhabitants;butthetwootherscannotbedeterminedwithsomuchfacility。Itisdifficulttotakeanexactaccountofallthelandsinacountrywhichareundercultivation，withtheirnaturalortheiracquiredvalue;anditisstillmoreimpossibletoestimatetheentirepersonalpropertywhichisatthedisposalofanation，andwhicheludesthestrictestanalysisbythediversityandthenumberofshapesunderwhichitmayoccur。And，indeed，wefindthatthemostancientcivilizednationsofEurope，includingeventhoseinwhichtheadministrationismostcentral，havenotsucceeded，asyet，indeterminingtheexactconditionoftheirwealth。