Itispossiblethatanindividualmaylaydownasystemofprinciples,onwhichgovernmentshallbeconstitutionallyestablishedtoanyextentofterritory。Thisisnomorethananoperationofthemind,actingbyitsownpowers。Butthepracticeuponthoseprinciples,asapplyingtothevariousandnumerouscircumstancesofanation,itsagriculture,manufacture,trade,commerce,etc。,etc。,aknowledgeofadifferentkind,andwhichcanbehadonlyfromthevariouspartsofsociety。Itisanassemblageofpracticalknowledge,whichnoindividualcanpossess;andthereforethemonarchicalformisasmuchlimited,inusefulpractice,fromtheincompetencyofknowledge,aswasthedemocraticalform,fromthemultiplicityofpopulation。Theonedegenerates,byextension,intoconfusion;theother,intoignoranceandincapacity,ofwhichallthegreatmonarchiesareanevidence。Themonarchicalform,therefore,couldnotbeasubstituteforthedemocratical,becauseithasequalinconveniences。
　　Muchlesscoulditwhenmadehereditary。Thisisthemosteffectualofallformstoprecludeknowledge。Neithercouldthehighdemocraticalmindhavevoluntarilyyieldeditselftobegovernedbychildrenandidiots,andallthemotleyinsignificanceofcharacter,whichattendssuchamereanimalsystem,thedisgraceandthereproachofreasonandofman。
　　Astothearistocraticalform,ithasthesamevicesanddefectswiththemonarchical,exceptthatthechanceofabilitiesisbetterfromtheproportionofnumbers,butthereisstillnosecurityfortherightuseandapplicationofthem。*[17]
　　Referringthemtotheoriginalsimpledemocracy,itaffordsthetruedatafromwhichgovernmentonalargescalecanbegin。Itisincapableofextension,notfromitsprinciple,butfromtheinconvenienceofitsform;andmonarchyandaristocracy,fromtheirincapacity。Retaining,then,democracyastheground,andrejectingthecorruptsystemsofmonarchyandaristocracy,therepresentativesystemnaturallypresentsitself;remedyingatoncethedefectsofthesimpledemocracyastoform,andtheincapacityoftheothertwowithrespecttoknowledge。
　　Simpledemocracywassocietygoverningitselfwithouttheaidofsecondarymeans。Byingraftingrepresentationupondemocracy,wearriveatasystemofgovernmentcapableofembracingandconfederatingallthevariousinterestsandeveryextentofterritoryandpopulation;andthatalsowithadvantagesasmuchsuperiortohereditarygovernment,astherepublicoflettersistohereditaryliterature。
　　ItisonthissystemthattheAmericangovernmentisfounded。Itisrepresentationingraftedupondemocracy。Ithasfixedtheformbyascaleparallelinallcasestotheextentoftheprinciple。
　　WhatAthenswasinminiatureAmericawillbeinmagnitude。
　　Theonewasthewonderoftheancientworld;theotherisbecomingtheadmirationofthepresent。Itistheeasiestofalltheformsofgovernmenttobeunderstoodandthemosteligibleinpractice;
　　andexcludesatoncetheignoranceandinsecurityofthehereditarymode,andtheinconvenienceofthesimpledemocracy。
　　Itisimpossibletoconceiveasystemofgovernmentcapableofactingoversuchanextentofterritory,andsuchacircleofinterests,asisimmediatelyproducedbytheoperationofrepresentation。
　　France,greatandpopulousasitis,isbutaspotinthecapaciousnessofthesystem。Itispreferabletosimpledemocracyeveninsmallterritories。Athens,byrepresentation,wouldhaveoutrivalledherowndemocracy。
　　Thatwhichiscalledgovernment,orratherthatwhichweoughttoconceivegovernmenttobe,isnomorethansomecommoncenterinwhichallthepartsofsocietyunite。Thiscannotbeaccomplishedbyanymethodsoconducivetothevariousinterestsofthecommunity,asbytherepresentativesystem。Itconcentratestheknowledgenecessarytotheinterestoftheparts,andofthewhole。Itplacesgovernmentinastateofconstantmaturity。Itis,ashasalreadybeenobserved,neveryoung,neverold。Itissubjectneithertononage,nordotage。Itisneverinthecradle,noroncrutches。Itadmitsnotofaseparationbetweenknowledgeandpower,andissuperior,asgovernmentalwaysoughttobe,toalltheaccidentsofindividualman,andisthereforesuperiortowhatiscalledmonarchy。
　　Anationisnotabody,thefigureofwhichistoberepresentedbythehumanbody;butislikeabodycontainedwithinacircle,havingacommoncenter,inwhicheveryradiusmeets;andthatcenterisformedbyrepresentation。Toconnectrepresentationwithwhatiscalledmonarchy,iseccentricgovernment。Representationisofitselfthedelegatedmonarchyofanation,andcannotdebaseitselfbydividingitwithanother。
　　Mr。Burkehastwoorthreetimes,inhisparliamentaryspeeches,andinhispublications,madeuseofajingleofwordsthatconveynoideas。Speakingofgovernment,hesays,"Itisbettertohavemonarchyforitsbasis,andrepublicanismforitscorrective,thanrepublicanismforitsbasis,andmonarchyforitscorrective。"—Ifhemeansthatitisbettertocorrectfollywithwisdom,thanwisdomwithfolly,Iwillnootherwisecontendwithhim,thanthatitwouldbemuchbettertorejectthefollyentirely。
　　ButwhatisthisthingwhichMr。Burkecallsmonarchy？Willheexplainit？Allmencanunderstandwhatrepresentationis;andthatitmustnecessarilyincludeavarietyofknowledgeandtalents。
　　Butwhatsecurityisthereforthesamequalitiesonthepartofmonarchy？or,whenthemonarchyisachild,wherethenisthewisdom？
　　Whatdoesitknowaboutgovernment？Whothenisthemonarch,orwhereisthemonarchy？Ifitistobeperformedbyregency,itprovestobeafarce。Aregencyisamockspeciesofrepublic,andthewholeofmonarchydeservesnobetterdescription。
　　Itisathingasvariousasimaginationcanpaint。
　　Ithasnoneofthestablecharacterthatgovernmentoughttopossess。
　　Everysuccessionisarevolution,andeveryregencyacounter—revolution。Thewholeofitisasceneofperpetualcourtcabalandintrigue,ofwhichMr。Burkeishimselfaninstance。
　　Torendermonarchyconsistentwithgovernment,thenextinsuccessionshouldnotbebornachild,butamanatonce,andthatmanaSolomon。Itisridiculousthatnationsaretowaitandgovernmentbeinterruptedtillboysgrowtobemen。
　　WhetherIhavetoolittlesensetosee,ortoomuchtobeimposedupon;
　　whetherIhavetoomuchortoolittlepride,orofanythingelse,Ileaveoutofthequestion;butcertainitis,thatwhatiscalledmonarchy,alwaysappearstomeasilly,contemptiblething。Icompareittosomethingkeptbehindacurtain,aboutwhichthereisagreatdealofbustleandfuss,andawonderfulairofseemingsolemnity;butwhen,byanyaccident,thecurtainhappenstobeopen—andthecompanyseewhatitis,theyburstintolaughter。
　　Intherepresentativesystemofgovernment,nothingofthiscanhappen。
　　Likethenationitself,itpossessesaperpetualstamina,aswellofbodyasofmind,andpresentsitselfontheopentheatreoftheworldinafairandmanlymanner。Whateverareitsexcellencesordefects,theyarevisibletoall。Itexistsnotbyfraudandmystery;itdealsnotincantandsophistry;butinspiresalanguagethat,passingfromhearttoheart,isfeltandunderstood。
　　Wemustshutoureyesagainstreason,wemustbaselydegradeourunderstanding,nottoseethefollyofwhatiscalledmonarchy。Natureisorderlyinallherworks;butthisisamodeofgovernmentthatcounteractsnature。Itturnstheprogressofthehumanfacultiesupsidedown。Itsubjectsagetobegovernedbychildren,andwisdombyfolly。
　　Onthecontrary,therepresentativesystemisalwaysparallelwiththeorderandimmutablelawsofnature,andmeetsthereasonofmanineverypart。Forexample:
　　IntheAmericanFederalGovernment,morepowerisdelegatedtothePresidentoftheUnitedStatesthantoanyotherindividualmemberofCongress。Hecannot,therefore,beelectedtothisofficeundertheageofthirty—fiveyears。Bythistimethejudgmentofmanbecomesmorematured,andhehaslivedlongenoughtobeacquaintedwithmenandthings,andthecountrywithhim。—Butonthemonarchialplan（exclusiveofthenumerouschancesthereareagainsteverymanbornintotheworld,ofdrawingaprizeinthelotteryofhumanfaculties）,thenextinsuccession,whateverhemaybe,isputattheheadofanation,andofagovernment,attheageofeighteenyears。Doesthisappearlikeanactionofwisdom？Isitconsistentwiththeproperdignityandthemanlycharacterofanation？Whereistheproprietyofcallingsuchaladthefatherofthepeople？—Inallothercases,apersonisaminoruntiltheageoftwenty—oneyears。
　　Beforethisperiod,heisnottrustedwiththemanagementofanacreofland,orwiththeheritablepropertyofaflockofsheep,oranherdofswine;but,wonderfultotell！hemay,attheageofeighteenyears,betrustedwithanation。
　　Thatmonarchyisallabubble,amerecourtartificetoprocuremoney,isevident（atleasttome）ineverycharacterinwhichitcanbeviewed。Itwouldbeimpossible,ontherationalsystemofrepresentativegovernment,tomakeoutabillofexpensestosuchanenormousamountasthisdeceptionadmits。Governmentisnotofitselfaverychargeableinstitution。ThewholeexpenseofthefederalgovernmentofAmerica,founded,asIhavealreadysaid,onthesystemofrepresentation,andextendingoveracountrynearlytentimesaslargeasEngland,isbutsixhundredthousanddollars,oronehundredandthirty—fivethousandpoundssterling。
　　IpresumethatnomaninhissobersenseswillcomparethecharacterofanyofthekingsofEuropewiththatofGeneralWashington。Yet,inFrance,andalsoinEngland,theexpenseofthecivillistonly,forthesupportofoneman,iseighttimesgreaterthanthewholeexpenseofthefederalgovernmentinAmerica。
　　Toassignareasonforthis,appearsalmostimpossible。
　　ThegeneralityofpeopleinAmerica,especiallythepoor,aremoreabletopaytaxes,thanthegeneralityofpeopleeitherinFranceorEngland。
　　Butthecaseis,thattherepresentativesystemdiffusessuchabodyofknowledgethroughoutanation,onthesubjectofgovernment,astoexplodeignoranceandprecludeimposition。Thecraftofcourtscannotbeactedonthatground。Thereisnoplaceformystery;nowhereforittobegin。Thosewhoarenotintherepresentation,knowasmuchofthenatureofbusinessasthosewhoare。Anaffectationofmysteriousimportancewouldtherebescouted。Nationscanhavenosecrets;andthesecretsofcourts,likethoseofindividuals,arealwaystheirdefects。
　　Intherepresentativesystem,thereasonforeverythingmustpubliclyappear。Everymanisaproprietoringovernment,andconsidersitanecessarypartofhisbusinesstounderstand。Itconcernshisinterest,becauseitaffectshisproperty。Heexaminesthecost,andcomparesitwiththeadvantages;andaboveall,hedoesnotadopttheslavishcustomoffollowingwhatinothergovernmentsarecalledLeaders。
　　Itcanonlybebyblindingtheunderstandingofman,andmakinghimbelievethatgovernmentissomewonderfulmysteriousthing,thatexcessiverevenuesareobtained。Monarchyiswellcalculatedtoensurethisend。Itisthepoperyofgovernment;athingkeptuptoamusetheignorant,andquietthemintotaxes。
　　Thegovernmentofafreecountry,properlyspeaking,isnotinthepersons,butinthelaws。Theenactingofthoserequiresnogreatexpense;andwhentheyareadministered,thewholeofcivilgovernmentisperformed—therestisallcourtcontrivance。
　　CHAPTERIV
　　OfConstitutionsThatmenmeandistinctandseparatethingswhentheyspeakofconstitutionsandofgovernments,isevident;orwhyarethosetermsdistinctlyandseparatelyused？Aconstitutionisnottheactofagovernment,butofapeopleconstitutingagovernment;
　　andgovernmentwithoutaconstitution,ispowerwithoutaright。
　　Allpowerexercisedoveranation,musthavesomebeginning。Itmusteitherbedelegatedorassumed。Therearenoothersources。Alldelegatedpoweristrust,andallassumedpowerisusurpation。
　　Timedoesnotalterthenatureandqualityofeither。
　　Inviewingthissubject,thecaseandcircumstancesofAmericapresentthemselvesasinthebeginningofaworld;andourenquiryintotheoriginofgovernmentisshortened,byreferringtothefactsthathaveariseninourownday。Wehavenooccasiontoroamforinformationintotheobscurefieldofantiquity,norhazardourselvesuponconjecture。Wearebroughtatoncetothepointofseeinggovernmentbegin,asifwehadlivedinthebeginningoftime。Therealvolume,notofhistory,butoffacts,isdirectlybeforeus,unmutilatedbycontrivance,ortheerrorsoftradition。
　　IwillhereconciselystatethecommencementoftheAmericanconstitutions;
　　bywhichthedifferencebetweenconstitutionsandgovernmentswillsufficientlyappear。
　　ItmaynotappearimpropertoremindthereaderthattheUnitedStatesofAmericaconsistofthirteenseparatestates,eachofwhichestablishedagovernmentforitself,afterthedeclarationofindependence,donethe4thofJuly,1776。Eachstateactedindependentlyoftherest,informingitsgovernments;butthesamegeneralprinciplepervadesthewhole。Whentheseveralstategovernmentswereformed,theyproceededtoformthefederalgovernment,thatactsoverthewholeinallmatterswhichconcerntheinterestofthewhole,orwhichrelatetotheintercourseoftheseveralstateswitheachother,orwithforeignnations。Iwillbeginwithgivinganinstancefromoneofthestategovernments（thatofPennsylvania）andthenproceedtothefederalgovernment。
　　ThestateofPennsylvania,thoughnearlyofthesameextentofterritoryasEngland,wasthendividedintoonlytwelvecounties。
　　EachofthosecountieshadelectedacommitteeatthecommencementofthedisputewiththeEnglishgovernment;andasthecityofPhiladelphia,whichalsohaditscommittee,wasthemostcentralforintelligence,itbecamethecenterofcommunicationtotheseveralcountrycommittees。Whenitbecamenecessarytoproceedtotheformationofagovernment,thecommitteeofPhiladelphiaproposedaconferenceofallthecommittees,tobeheldinthatcity,andwhichmetthelatterendofJuly,1776。
　　Thoughthesecommitteeshadbeendulyelectedbythepeople,theywerenotelectedexpresslyforthepurpose,norinvestedwiththeauthorityofformingaconstitution;andastheycouldnot,consistentlywiththeAmericanideaofrights,assumesuchapower,theycouldonlyconferuponthematter,andputitintoatrainofoperation。Theconferees,therefore,didnomorethanstatethecase,andrecommendtotheseveralcountiestoelectsixrepresentativesforeachcounty,tomeetinconventionatPhiladelphia,withpowerstoformaconstitution,andproposeitforpublicconsideration。
　　Thisconvention,ofwhichBenjaminFranklinwaspresident,havingmetanddeliberated,andagreeduponaconstitution,theynextorderedittobepublished,notasathingestablished,butfortheconsiderationofthewholepeople,theirapprobationorrejection,andthenadjournedtoastatedtime。Whenthetimeofadjournmentwasexpired,theconventionre—assembled;andasthegeneralopinionofthepeopleinapprobationofitwasthenknown,theconstitutionwassigned,sealed,andproclaimedontheauthorityofthepeopleandtheoriginalinstrumentdepositedasapublicrecord。Theconventionthenappointedadayforthegeneralelectionoftherepresentativeswhoweretocomposethegovernment,andthetimeitshouldcommence;andhavingdonethistheydissolved,andreturnedtotheirseveralhomesandoccupations。
　　Inthisconstitutionwerelaiddown,first,adeclarationofrights;
　　thenfollowedtheformwhichthegovernmentshouldhave,andthepowersitshouldpossess—theauthorityofthecourtsofjudicature,andofjuries—themannerinwhichelectionsshouldbeconducted,andtheproportionofrepresentativestothenumberofelectors—
　　thetimewhicheachsucceedingassemblyshouldcontinue,whichwasoneyear—themodeoflevying,andofaccountingfortheexpenditure,ofpublicmoney—ofappointingpublicofficers,etc。,etc。,etc。
　　Noarticleofthisconstitutioncouldbealteredorinfringedatthediscretionofthegovernmentthatwastoensue。Itwastothatgovernmentalaw。Butasitwouldhavebeenunwisetoprecludethebenefitofexperience,andinorderalsotopreventtheaccumulationoferrors,ifanyshouldbefound,andtopreserveanunisonofgovernmentwiththecircumstancesofthestateatalltimes,theconstitutionprovidedthat,attheexpirationofeverysevenyears,aconventionshouldbeelected,fortheexpresspurposeofrevisingtheconstitution,andmakingalterations,additions,orabolitionstherein,ifanysuchshouldbefoundnecessary。
　　Hereweseearegularprocess—agovernmentissuingoutofaconstitution,formedbythepeopleintheiroriginalcharacter;andthatconstitutionserving,notonlyasanauthority,butasalawofcontroltothegovernment。Itwasthepoliticalbibleofthestate。Scarcelyafamilywaswithoutit。Everymemberofthegovernmenthadacopy;andnothingwasmorecommon,whenanydebatearoseontheprincipleofabill,orontheextentofanyspeciesofauthority,thanforthememberstotaketheprintedconstitutionoutoftheirpocket,andreadthechapterwithwhichsuchmatterindebatewasconnected。
　　Havingthusgivenaninstancefromoneofthestates,IwillshowtheproceedingsbywhichthefederalconstitutionoftheUnitedStatesaroseandwasformed。
　　Congress,atitstwofirstmeetings,inSeptember1774,andMay1775,wasnothingmorethanadeputationfromthelegislaturesoftheseveralprovinces,afterwardsstates;andhadnootherauthoritythanwhatarosefromcommonconsent,andthenecessityofitsactingasapublicbody。IneverythingwhichrelatedtotheinternalaffairsofAmerica,congresswentnofurtherthantoissuerecommendationstotheseveralprovincialassemblies,whoatdiscretionadoptedthemornot。Nothingonthepartofcongresswascompulsive;yet,inthissituation,itwasmorefaithfullyandaffectionatelyobeyedthanwasanygovernmentinEurope。Thisinstance,likethatofthenationalassemblyinFrance,sufficientlyshows,thatthestrengthofgovernmentdoesnotconsistinanythingitself,butintheattachmentofanation,andtheinterestwhichapeoplefeelinsupportingit。Whenthisislost,governmentisbutachildinpower;
　　andthough,liketheoldgovernmentinFrance,itmayharassindividualsforawhile,itbutfacilitatesitsownfall。
　　Afterthedeclarationofindependence,itbecameconsistentwiththeprincipleonwhichrepresentativegovernmentisfounded,thattheauthorityofcongressshouldbedefinedandestablished。Whetherthatauthorityshouldbemoreorlessthancongressthendiscretionarilyexercisedwasnotthequestion。Itwasmerelytherectitudeofthemeasure。
　　Forthispurpose,theact,calledtheactofconfederation（whichwasasortofimperfectfederalconstitution）,wasproposed,and,afterlongdeliberation,wasconcludedintheyear1781。Itwasnottheactofcongress,becauseitisrepugnanttotheprinciplesofrepresentativegovernmentthatabodyshouldgivepowertoitself。Congressfirstinformedtheseveralstates,ofthepowerswhichitconceivedwerenecessarytobeinvestedintheunion,toenableittoperformthedutiesandservicesrequiredfromit;andthestatesseverallyagreedwitheachother,andconcentratedincongressthosepowers。
　　Itmaynotbeimpropertoobservethatinboththoseinstances（theoneofPennsylvania,andtheotheroftheUnitedStates）,thereisnosuchthingastheideaofacompactbetweenthepeopleononeside,andthegovernmentontheother。Thecompactwasthatofthepeoplewitheachother,toproduceandconstituteagovernment。Tosupposethatanygovernmentcanbeapartyinacompactwiththewholepeople,istosupposeittohaveexistencebeforeitcanhavearighttoexist。Theonlyinstanceinwhichacompactcantakeplacebetweenthepeopleandthosewhoexercisethegovernment,is,thatthepeopleshallpaythem,whiletheychoosetoemploythem。
　　Governmentisnotatradewhichanyman,oranybodyofmen,hasarighttosetupandexerciseforhisownemolument,butisaltogetheratrust,inrightofthosebywhomthattrustisdelegated,andbywhomitisalwaysresumeable。Ithasofitselfnorights;theyarealtogetherduties。
　　Havingthusgiventwoinstancesoftheoriginalformationofaconstitution,Iwillshowthemannerinwhichbothhavebeenchangedsincetheirfirstestablishment。
　　Thepowersvestedinthegovernmentsoftheseveralstates,bythestateconstitutions,werefound,uponexperience,tobetoogreat;andthosevestedinthefederalgovernment,bytheactofconfederation,toolittle。Thedefectwasnotintheprinciple,butinthedistributionofpower。
　　Numerouspublications,inpamphletsandinthenewspapers,appeared,ontheproprietyandnecessityofnewmodellingthefederalgovernment。Aftersometimeofpublicdiscussion,carriedonthroughthechannelofthepress,andinconversations,thestateofVirginia,experiencingsomeinconveniencewithrespecttocommerce,proposedholdingacontinentalconference;inconsequenceofwhich,adeputationfromfiveorsixstateassembliesmetatAnnapolis,inMaryland,in1786。Thismeeting,notconceivingitselfsufficientlyauthorisedtogointothebusinessofareform,didnomorethanstatetheirgeneralopinionsoftheproprietyofthemeasure,andrecommendthataconventionofallthestatesshouldbeheldtheyearfollowing。
　　TheconventionmetatPhiladelphiainMay,1787,ofwhichGeneralWashingtonwaselectedpresident。Hewasnotatthattimeconnectedwithanyofthestategovernments,orwithcongress。Hedelivereduphiscommissionwhenthewarended,andsincethenhadlivedaprivatecitizen。
　　Theconventionwentdeeplyintoallthesubjects;andhaving,afteravarietyofdebateandinvestigation,agreedamongthemselvesupontheseveralpartsofafederalconstitution,thenextquestionwas,themannerofgivingitauthorityandpractice。
　　Forthispurposetheydidnot,likeacabalofcourtiers,sendforaDutchStadtholder,oraGermanElector;buttheyreferredthewholemattertothesenseandinterestofthecountry。
　　Theyfirstdirectedthattheproposedconstitutionshouldbepublished。
　　Secondly,thateachstateshouldelectaconvention,expresslyforthepurposeoftakingitintoconsideration,andofratifyingorrejectingit;andthatassoonastheapprobationandratificationofanyninestatesshouldbegiven,thatthosestatesshallproceedtotheelectionoftheirproportionofmemberstothenewfederalgovernment;andthattheoperationofitshouldthenbegin,andtheformerfederalgovernmentcease。
　　Theseveralstatesproceededaccordinglytoelecttheirconventions。
　　Someofthoseconventionsratifiedtheconstitutionbyverylargemajorities,andtwoorthreeunanimously。Inothersthereweremuchdebateanddivisionofopinion。IntheMassachusettsconvention,whichmetatBoston,themajoritywasnotabovenineteenortwenty,inaboutthreehundredmembers;butsuchisthenatureofrepresentativegovernment,thatitquietlydecidesallmattersbymajority。AfterthedebateintheMassachusettsconventionwasclosed,andthevotetaken,theobjectingmembersroseanddeclared,"Thatthoughtheyhadarguedandvotedagainstit,becausecertainpartsappearedtotheminadifferentlighttowhattheyappearedtoothermembers;yet,asthevotehaddecidedinfavouroftheconstitutionasproposed,theyshouldgiveitthesamepracticalsupportasiftheyhadforit。"