Butif，saidhe，theindividualisliketheidea，mustnottheideaalsobeliketheindividual，insofarastheindividualisaresemblanceoftheidea？Thatwhichislike，cannotbeconceivedofasotherthanthelikeoflike。
　　Impossible。
　　Andwhentwothingsarealike，musttheynotpartakeofthesameidea？
　　Theymust。
　　Andwillnotthatofwhichthetwopartake，andwhichmakesthemalike，betheideaitself？
　　Certainly。
　　Thentheideacannotbeliketheindividual，ortheindividualliketheidea;foriftheyarealike，somefurtherideaoflikenesswillalwaysbecomingtolight，andifthatbelikeanythingelse，another;andnewideaswillbealwaysarising，iftheidearesemblesthatwhichpartakesofit？
　　Quitetrue。
　　Thetheory，thenthatotherthingsparticipateintheideasbyresemblance，hastobegivenup，andsomeothermodeofparticipationdevised？
　　Itwouldseemso。
　　Doyouseethen，Socrates，howgreatisthedifficultyofaffirmingtheideastobeabsolute？
　　Yes，indeed。
　　And，further，letmesaythatasyetyouonlyunderstandasmallpartofthedifficultywhichisinvolvedifyoumakeofeachthingasingleidea，partingitofffromotherthings。
　　Whatdifficulty？hesaid。
　　Therearemany，butthegreatestofallisthis:—Ifanopponentarguesthattheseideas，beingsuchaswesaytheyoughttobe，mustremainunknown，noonecanprovetohimthatheiswrong，unlesshewhodeniestheirexistencebeamanofgreatabilityandknowledge，andiswillingtofollowalongandlaboriousdemonstration;hewillremainunconvinced，andstillinsistthattheycannotbeknown。
　　Whatdoyoumean，Parmenides？saidSocrates。
　　Inthefirstplace，Ithink，Socrates，thatyou，oranyonewhomaintainstheexistenceofabsoluteessences，willadmitthattheycannotexistinus。
　　No，saidSocrates;forthentheywouldbenolongerabsolute。
　　True，hesaid;andthereforewhenideasarewhattheyareinrelationtooneanother，theiressenceisdeterminedbyarelationamongthemselves，andhasnothingtodowiththeresemblances，orwhatevertheyaretobetermed，whichareinoursphere，andfromwhichwereceivethisorthatnamewhenwepartakeofthem。Andthethingswhicharewithinoursphereandhavethesamenameswiththem，arelikewiseonlyrelativetooneanother，andnottotheideaswhichhavethesamenameswiththem，butbelongtothemselvesandnottothem。
　　Whatdoyoumean？saidSocrates。
　　Imayillustratemymeaninginthisway，saidParmenides:—Amasterhasaslave;nowthereisnothingabsoluteintherelationbetweenthem，whichissimplyarelationofonemantoanother。Butthereisalsoanideaofmastershipintheabstract，whichisrelativetotheideaofslaveryintheabstract。Thesenatureshavenothingtodowithus，norwewiththem;theyareconcernedwiththemselvesonly，andwewithourselves。Doyouseemymeaning？
　　Yes，saidSocrates，Iquiteseeyourmeaning。
　　Andwillnotknowledge—Imeanabsoluteknowledge—answertoabsolutetruth？
　　Certainly。
　　Andeachkindofabsoluteknowledgewillanswertoeachkindofabsolutebeing？
　　Yes。
　　Buttheknowledgewhichwehave，willanswertothetruthwhichwehave;andagain，eachkindofknowledgewhichwehave，willbeaknowledgeofeachkindofbeingwhichwehave？
　　Certainly。
　　Buttheideasthemselves，asyouadmit，wehavenot，andcannothave？
　　No，wecannot。
　　Andtheabsolutenaturesorkindsareknownseverallybytheabsoluteideaofknowledge？
　　Yes。
　　Andwehavenotgottheideaofknowledge？
　　No。
　　Thennoneoftheideasareknowntous，becausewehavenoshareinabsoluteknowledge？
　　Isupposenot。
　　Thenthenatureofthebeautifulinitself，andofthegoodinitself，andallotherideaswhichwesupposetoexistabsolutely，areunknowntous？
　　Itwouldseemso。
　　Ithinkthatthereisastrangerconsequencestill。
　　Whatisit？
　　Wouldyou，orwouldyounotsay，thatabsoluteknowledge，ifthereissuchathing，mustbeafarmoreexactknowledgethanourknowledge;andthesameofbeautyandoftherest？
　　Yes。
　　Andiftherebesuchathingasparticipationinabsoluteknowledge，nooneismorelikelythanGodtohavethismostexactknowledge？
　　Certainly。
　　Butthen，willGod，havingabsoluteknowledge，haveaknowledgeofhumanthings？
　　Whynot？
　　Because，Socrates，saidParmenides，wehaveadmittedthattheideasarenotvalidinrelationtohumanthings;norhumanthingsinrelationtothem;therelationsofeitherarelimitedtotheirrespectivespheres。
　　Yes，thathasbeenadmitted。
　　AndifGodhasthisperfectauthority，andperfectknowledge，hisauthoritycannotruleus，norhisknowledgeknowus，oranyhumanthing;justasourauthoritydoesnotextendtothegods，norourknowledgeknowanythingwhichisdivine，sobyparityofreasonthey，beinggods，arenotourmasters，neitherdotheyknowthethingsofmen。
　　Yet，surely，saidSocrates，todepriveGodofknowledgeismonstrous。
　　These，Socrates，saidParmenides，areafew，andonlyafewofthedifficultiesinwhichweareinvolvedifideasreallyareandwedetermineeachoneofthemtobeanabsoluteunity。Hewhohearswhatmaybesaidagainstthemwilldenytheveryexistenceofthem—andeveniftheydoexist，hewillsaythattheymustofnecessitybeunknowntoman;andhewillseemtohavereasononhisside，andaswewereremarkingjustnow，willbeverydifficulttoconvince;amanmustbegiftedwithveryconsiderableabilitybeforehecanlearnthateverythinghasaclassandanabsoluteessence;andstillmoreremarkablewillhebewhodiscoversallthesethingsforhimself，andhavingthoroughlyinvestigatedthemisabletoteachthemtoothers。