WhileSocrateswasspeaking，PythodorusthoughtthatParmenidesandZenowerenotaltogetherpleasedatthesuccessivestepsoftheargument;butstilltheygavetheclosestattentionandoftenlookedatoneanother，andsmiledasifinadmirationofhim。Whenhehadfinished，Parmenidesexpressedtheirfeelingsinthefollowingwords:—
　　Socrates，hesaid，Iadmirethebentofyourmindtowardsphilosophy;tellmenow，wasthisyourowndistinctionbetweenideasinthemselvesandthethingswhichpartakeofthem？anddoyouthinkthatthereisanideaoflikenessapartfromthelikenesswhichwepossess，andoftheoneandmany，andoftheotherthingswhichZenomentioned？
　　Ithinkthattherearesuchideas，saidSocrates。
　　Parmenidesproceeded:Andwouldyoualsomakeabsoluteideasofthejustandthebeautifulandthegood，andofallthatclass？
　　Yes，hesaid，Ishould。
　　Andwouldyoumakeanideaofmanapartfromusandfromallotherhumancreatures，oroffireandwater？
　　Iamoftenundecided，Parmenides，astowhetherIoughttoincludethemornot。
　　Andwouldyoufeelequallyundecided，Socrates，aboutthingsofwhichthementionmayprovokeasmile？—Imeansuchthingsashair，mud，dirt，oranythingelsewhichisvileandpaltry;wouldyousupposethateachofthesehasanideadistinctfromtheactualobjectswithwhichwecomeintocontact，ornot？
　　Certainlynot，saidSocrates;visiblethingslikethesearesuchastheyappeartous，andIamafraidthattherewouldbeanabsurdityinassuminganyideaofthem，althoughIsometimesgetdisturbed，andbegintothinkthatthereisnothingwithoutanidea;butthenagain，whenIhavetakenupthisposition，Irunaway，becauseIamafraidthatImayfallintoabottomlesspitofnonsense，andperish;andsoIreturntotheideasofwhichIwasjustnowspeaking，andoccupymyselfwiththem。
　　Yes，Socrates，saidParmenides;thatisbecauseyouarestillyoung;
　　thetimewillcome，ifIamnotmistaken，whenphilosophywillhaveafirmergraspofyou，andthenyouwillnotdespiseeventhemeanestthings;atyourage，youaretoomuchdisposedtoregardopinionsofmen。ButIshouldliketoknowwhetheryoumeanthattherearecertainideasofwhichallotherthingspartake，andfromwhichtheyderivetheirnames;thatsimilars，forexample，becomesimilar，becausetheypartakeofsimilarity;andgreatthingsbecomegreat，becausetheypartakeofgreatness;andthatjustandbeautifulthingsbecomejustandbeautiful，becausetheypartakeofjusticeandbeauty？
　　Yes，certainly，saidSocratesthatismymeaning。
　　Theneachindividualpartakeseitherofthewholeoftheideaorelseofapartoftheidea？Cantherebeanyothermodeofparticipation？
　　Therecannotbe，hesaid。
　　Thendoyouthinkthatthewholeideaisone，andyet，beingone，isineachoneofthemany？
　　Whynot，Parmenides？saidSocrates。
　　Becauseoneandthesamethingwillexistasawholeatthesametimeinmanyseparateindividuals，andwillthereforebeinastateofseparationfromitself。
　　Nay，buttheideamaybelikethedaywhichisoneandthesameinmanyplacesatonce，andyetcontinuouswithitself;inthiswayeachideamaybeone;andthesameinallatthesametime。
　　Ilikeyourway，Socrates，ofmakingoneinmanyplacesatonce。Youmeantosay，thatifIweretospreadoutasailandcoveranumberofmen，therewouldbeonewholeincludingmany—isnotthatyourmeaning？
　　Ithinkso。
　　Andwouldyousaythatthewholesailincludeseachman，orapartofitonly，anddifferentpartsdifferentmen？
　　Thelatter。
　　Then，Socrates，theideasthemselveswillbedivisible，andthingswhichparticipateinthemwillhaveapartofthemonlyandnotthewholeideaexistingineachofthem？
　　Thatseemstofollow。
　　Thenwouldyouliketosay，Socrates，thattheoneideaisreallydivisibleandyetremainsone？
　　Certainlynot，hesaid。
　　Supposethatyoudivideabsolutegreatness，andthatofthemanygreatthings，eachoneisgreatinvirtueofaportionofgreatnesslessthanabsolutegreatness—isthatconceivable？
　　No。
　　Orwilleachequalthing，ifpossessingsomesmallportionofequalitylessthanabsoluteequality，beequaltosomeotherthingbyvirtueofthatportiononly？
　　Impossible。
　　Orsupposeoneofustohaveaportionofsmallness;thisisbutapartofthesmall，andthereforetheabsolutelysmallisgreater;iftheabsolutelysmallbegreater，thattowhichthepartofthesmallisaddedwillbesmallerandnotgreaterthanbefore。
　　Howabsurd！
　　Theninwhatway，Socrates，willallthingsparticipateintheideas，iftheyareunabletoparticipateinthemeitheraspartsorwholes？
　　Indeed，hesaid，youhaveaskedaquestionwhichisnoteasilyanswered。
　　Well，saidParmenides，andwhatdoyousayofanotherquestion？
　　Whatquestion？
　　Iimaginethatthewayinwhichyouareledtoassumeoneideaofeachkindisasfollows:—Youseeanumberofgreatobjects，andwhenyoulookatthemthereseemstoyoutobeoneandthesameidea（ornature）inthemall;henceyouconceiveofgreatnessasone。
　　Verytrue，saidSocrates。
　　Andifyougoonandallowyourmindinlikemannertoembraceinoneviewtheideaofgreatnessandofgreatthingswhicharenottheidea，and—tocomparethem，willnotanothergreatnessarise，whichwillappeartobethesourceofallthese？
　　Itwouldseemso。
　　Thenanotherideaofgreatnessnowcomesintoviewoverandaboveabsolutegreatness，andtheindividualswhichpartakeofit;andthenanother，overandaboveallthese，byvirtueofwhichtheywillallbegreat，andsoeachideainsteadofbeingonewillbeinfinitelymultiplied。
　　Butmaynottheideas，askedSocrates，bethoughtsonly，andhavenoproperexistenceexceptinourminds，Parmenides？Forinthatcaseeachideamaystillbeone，andnotexperiencethisinfinitemultiplication。
　　Andcantherebeindividualthoughtswhicharethoughtsofnothing？
　　Impossible，hesaid。
　　Thethoughtmustbeofsomething？
　　Yes。
　　Ofsomethingwhichisorwhichisnot？
　　Ofsomethingwhichis。
　　Mustitnotbeofasinglesomething，whichthethoughtrecognizesasattachingtoall，beingasingleformornature？
　　Yes。
　　Andwillnotthesomethingwhichisapprehendedasoneandthesameinall，beanidea？
　　Fromthat，again，thereisnoescape。
　　Then，saidParmenides，ifyousaythateverythingelseparticipatesintheideas，mustyounotsayeitherthateverythingismadeupofthoughts，andthatallthingsthink;orthattheyarethoughtsbuthavenothought？
　　Thelatterview，Parmenides，isnomorerationalthanthepreviousone。Inmyopinion，theideasare，asitwere，patternsfixedinnature，andotherthingsarelikethem，andresemblancesofthem—whatismeantbytheparticipationofotherthingsintheideas，isreallyassimilationtothem。