ChapterV
　　Ofthecauses，andfirstbeginingofcivillGovernmentI。Itisofitselfemanifest，thattheactionsofmenproceedfromthewill，andthewillfromhope，andfeare，insomuchaswhentheyshallseeagreatergood，orlesseevill，likelytohappentothembythebreach，thenobservationoftheLawes，they’lwittinglyviolatethem。Thehopethereforewhicheachmanhathofhissecurity，andself-preservation，consistsinthis，thatbyforceorcrafthemaydisappointhisneighbour，eitheropenly，orbystratagem。Whencewemayunderstand，thatthenaturalllawes，thoughwellunderstood，doenotinstantlysecureanymanintheirpractise，andconsequently，thataslongasthereisnocautionhadfromtheinvasionofothers，thereremainstoeverymanthatsameprimitiveRightofselfe-defence，bysuchmeansaseitherhecanorwillmakeuseof（thatis）aRighttoallthings，ortheRightofwarre;anditissufficientforthefulfilingofthenaturalllaw，thatamanbepreparedinmindtoembracePeacewhenitmaybehad。
　　II。Itisanoldsaying，Thatalllawesaresilentinthetimeofwarre，anditisatrueone，notonelyifwespeakofthecivill，butalsoofthenaturalllawes，providedtheybereferr’dnottothemind，buttotheactionsofmen，bythethirdChapter，Art。29。Andwemeansuchawarasisofallmenagainstallmen;
　　suchasisthemeerstateofnature;althoughinthewarreofnationagainstnationacertainmeanwaswonttobeobserved。Andthereforeinoldtimetherewasamannerofliving，andasitwereacertainoeconomy，whichtheycalledleotrikon，livingbyRapine，whichwasneitheragainstthelawofnature，（thingsthensostanding）norvoydofglorytothosewhoexerciseditwithvalour，notwithcruelty。Theircustomewas，takingawaytherest，tosparelife，andabstainfromOxenfitforplough，andeveryinstrumentserviceabletohusbandry，whichyetisnotsotobetaken，asiftheywereboundtodoethusbythelawofnature，butthattheyhadregardtotheirowngloryherein，lestbytoomuchcruelty，theymightbesuspectedguiltyoffeare。
　　III。SincethereforetheexerciseofthenaturalllawisnecessaryforthepreservationofPeace，andthatfortheexerciseofthenaturalllawsecurityisnolessenecessary，itisworththeconsideringwhatthatiswhichaffordssuchasecurity：forthismatternothingelsecanbeimagined，butthateachmanprovidehimselfeofsuchmeethelps，astheinvasionofoneontheothermaybeerenderedsodangerous，aseitherofthemmaythinkitbettertorefrain，thentomeddle。Butfirstitisplain，thattheconsentoftwoorthreecannotmakegoodsuchasecurity;becausethattheadditionbutofone，orsomefewontheotherside，issufficienttomakethevictoryundoubtedlysure，andhartenstheenemytoattacqueus。Itisthereforenecessary，totheendthesecuritysoughtformaybeobtained，thatthenumberofthemwhoconspireinamutuallassistancebesogreat，thattheaccessionofsomefewtotheenemiespartymaynotprovetothemamatterofmomentsufficienttoassurethevictory。
　　IV。Farthermore，howgreatsoeverthenumberofthemiswhomeetonselfe-defence，ifyettheyagreenotamongthemselvesofsomeexcellentmeanswherebytocompassethis，buteverymanafterhisownmannershallmakeuseofhisendeavours，nothingwillbedone;becausethatdividedintheiropinionstheywillbeanhinderancetoeachother，oriftheyagreewellenoughtosomeoneactionthroughhopeofvictory，spoyle，orrevenge，yetafterwardthroughdiversityofwits，andCounsels，oremulation，andenvy，withwhichmennaturallycontend，theywillbesotorneandrent，astheywillneithergivemutuallhelp，nordesirepeace，excepttheybeconstrainedtoitbysomecommonfeare。
　　Whenceitfollowes，thattheconsentofmany，（whichconsistsinthisonely，aswehavealreadydefinedintheforegoingsection，thattheydirectalltheiractionstothesameend，andthecommongood）thatistosay，thatthesocietyproceedingfrommutuallhelponely，yeeldsnotthatsecuritywhichtheyseekfor，whomeet，andagreeintheexerciseoftheabove-namedlawesofnature;butthatsomewhatelsemustbedone，thatthosewhohaveonceconsentedforthecommongood，topeaceandmutuallhelp，maybyfearberestrained，lestafterwardtheyagaindissent，whentheirprivateInterestshallappeardiscrepantfromthecommongood。
　　V。AristotlereckonsamongthoseanimalswhichhecallsPolitique，notmanonly，butdiversothers;astheAnt，theBee，&c。whichthoughtheybedestituteofreason，bywhichtheymaycontract，andsubmittogovernment，notwithstandingbyconsenting，（thatistosay）ensuing，oreschewingthesamethings，theysodirecttheiractionstoacommonend，thattheirmeetingsarenotobnoxiousuntoanyseditions。Yetisnottheirgatheringtogetheracivillgovernment，andthereforethoseanimalsnottobetermedpoliticall，becausetheirgovernmentisonelyaconsent，ormanywillsconcurringinoneobject，not（asisnecessaryincivillgovernment）onewill。Itisverytruethatinthosecreatures，livingonlybysenseandappetite，theirconsentofmindsissodurable，asthereisnoneedofanythingmoretosecureit，and（byconsequence）topreservepeaceamongthem，thenbarelytheirnaturallinclination。Butamongmenthecaseisotherwise。Forfirstamongthemthereisacontestationofhonourandpreferment;amongbeaststhereisnone：whencehatredandenvy，outofwhichariseseditionandwarre，isamongmen，amongbeastsnosuchmatter。Next，thenaturallappetiteofBees，andthelikecreatures，isconformable，andtheydesirethecommongoodwhichamongthemdiffersnotfromtheirprivate;butmanscarceesteemsanythinggoodwhichhathnotsomewhatofeminenceintheenjoyment，morethenthatwhichothersdoepossesse。Thirdly，thosecreatureswhicharevoydofreason，seenodefect，orthinktheyseenone，intheadministrationoftheirCommon-weales;butinamultitudeofmentherearemanywhosupposingthemselveswiserthenothers，endeavourtoinnovate，anddiversInnovatorsinnovatediverswayes，whichisameerdistraction，andcivillwarre。Fourthly，thesebrutecreatures，howsoevertheymayhavetheuseoftheirvoycetosignifytheiraffectionstoeachother，yetwanttheythatsameartofwordswhichisnecessarilyrequiredtothosemotionsinthemind，wherebygoodisrepresentedtoitasbeingbetter，andevillasworsethenintruthitis;Butthetongueofmanisatrumpetofwarre，andsedition;anditisreportedofPericles，thathesometimesbyhiselegantspeechesthundered，andlightened，andconfoundedwholeGreeceitselfe。Fiftly，theycannotdistinguishbetweeninjuryandharme;Thenceithappensthataslongasitiswellwiththem，theyblamenottheirfellowes：ButthosemenareofmosttroubletotheRepublique，whohavemostleasuretobeidle;fortheyusenottocontendforpubliqueplacesbeforetheyhavegottenthevictoryoverhunger，andcold。Lastofall，theconsentofthosebrutallcreaturesisnaturall，thatofmenbycompactonely，（thatistosay）artificiall;itisthereforenomatterofwonderifsomewhatmorebeneedfullformentotheendtheymayliveinpeace。Whereforeconsent，orcontractedsociety，withoutsomecommonpowerwherebyparticularmenmayberuledthroughfeareofpunishment，dothnotsufficetomakeupthatsecuritywhichisrequisitetotheexerciseofnaturalljustice。
　　VI。Sincethereforetheconspiringofmanywillstothesameenddothnotsufficetopreservepeace，andtomakealastingdefence，itisrequisitethatinthosenecessarymatterswhichconcernPeaceandselfe-defence，therebebutonewillofallmen。Butthiscannot。bedone，unlesseeverymanwillsosubjecthiswilltosomeotherone，towit，eitherManorCounsell，thatwhatsoeverhiswillisinthosethingswhicharenecessarytothecommonpeace，itbereceivedforthewillsofallmeningenerall，andofeveryoneinparticular。Nowthegatheringtogetherofmanymenwhodeliberateofwhatistobedone，ornottobedone，forthecommongoodofallmen，isthatwhichIcallaCOUNSELL。
　　VII。Thissubmissionofthewilsofallthosementothewillofoneman，oroneCounsell，isthenmade，wheneachoneofthemobligethhimselfbycontracttoeveryoneoftherest，nottoresistthewillofthatoneman，orcounsell，towhichhehathsubmittedhimselfe;thatis，thatherefusehimnottheuseofhiswealth，andstrength，againstanyotherswhatsoever（forheissupposedstilltoretainaRightofdefendinghimselfeagainstviolence）andthisiscalledUNION。Butweunderstandthattobethewillofthecounsell，whichisthewillofthemajorpartofthosemenofwhomtheCounsellconsists。
　　VIII。Butthoughthewillitselfbenotvoluntary，butonlythebeginningofvoluntaryactions（forwewillnottowill，buttoact）andthereforefallsleastofallunderdeliberation，andcompact;yethewhosubmitshiswilltothewillofanother，conveighstothatothertheRightofhisstrength，andfaculties;
　　insomuchaswhentheresthavedonethesame，hetowhomtheyhavesubmittedhathsomuchpower，asbytheterrourofitheecanconformethewillsofparticularmenuntounity，andconcord。
　　IX。NowunionthusmadeiscalledaCity，orcivillsociety，andalsoacivillPerson;forwhenthereisonewillofallmen，itistobeesteemedforonePerson，andbytheword（one）itistobeknowne，anddistinguishedfromallparticularmen，ashavingitsownRightsandproperties;insomuchasneitheranyoneCitizen，norallofthemtogether（ifweexcepthimwhosewillstandsforthewillofall）istobeaccountedtheCity。ACITY
　　therefore（thatwemaydefineit）isonePerson，whosewill，bythecompactofmanymen，istobereceivedforthewillofthemall;soashemayuseallthepowerandfacultiesofeachparticularperson，tothemaintenanceofpeace，andforcommondefence。
　　X。ButalthougheveryCitybeacivillPerson，yeteverycivillPersonisnotaCity;foritmayhappenthatmanyCitizens，bythepermissionoftheCity，mayjoynetogetherinonePerson，forthedoingofcertainthings。ThesenowwillbecivillPersons，asthecompaniesofMerchants，andmanyotherConvents;butCitiestheyarenot，becausetheyhavenotsubmittedthemselvestothewillofthecompanysimply，andinallthings，butincertainthingsonelydeterminedbytheCity;
　　andonsuchtermesasitislawfullforanyoneofthemtocontendinjudgementagainstthebodyitselfeofthesodality;
　　whichisbynomeansallowabletoaCitizenagainsttheCity;
　　suchlikesocietiesthereforearecivillPersonssubordinatetotheCity。
　　XI。Ineverycity，ThatMan，orCounsell，towhosewilleachparticularmanhathsubjectedhiswill（soashathbeendeclared）
　　issaidtohavetheSUPREMEPOWER，orCHIEFECOMMAND，orDOMINION;whichPower，andRightofcommanding，consistsinthis，thateachCitizenhathconveighedallhisstrengthandpowertothatman，orCounsell;whichtohavedone（becausenomancantransferrehispowerinanaturallmanner）isnothingelsethentohavepartedwithhisRightofresisting。EachCitizen，asalsoeverysubordinatecivillPerson，iscalledtheSUBJECTofhimwhohaththechiefecommand。
　　XII。Bywhathathbeensayed，itissufficientlyshewed，inwhatmanner，andbywhatdegreesmanynaturallPersons，throughdesireofpreservingthemselves，andbymutuallfeare，havegrownetogetherintoacivillPerson，whomwehavecalledaCity。
　　Buttheywhosubmitthemselvestoanotherforfeare，eithersubmittohimwhomtheyfeare，orsomeotherwhomtheyconfideinforprotection;Theyactaccordingtothefirstmannerwhoarevanquishedinwarre，thattheymaynotbeslain;theyaccordingtothesecond，whoarenotyetovercome，thattheymaynotbeovercome。ThefirstmannerreceivesitsbeginningfromnaturallPower，andmaybecalledthenaturallbeginningofaCity;thelatterfromtheCounsell，andconstitutionofthosewhomeettogether，whichisabeginningbyinstitution。Henceitis，thattherearetwokindsofCities，theonenaturall，suchasisthepaternall，anddespoticall;theotherinstitutive，whichmaybealsocalledpoliticall。InthefirsttheLordacquirestohimselfesuchCitizensashewill;intheothertheCitizensbytheirownwillsappointaLordoverthemselves，whetherhebeoneman，oronecompanyofmenenduedwiththecommandinchiefe。ButwewillspeakinthefirstplaceofaCitypoliticallorbyinstitution，andnextofaCitynaturall。
　　Chap。VI
　　Oftherightofhim，whetherCounsell，oroneManonely，whohaththesupremepowerintheCityI。Wemustconsiderfirstofallwhatamultitudeofmen（gatheringthemselvesoftheirownefreewillsintosociety）is，namely，thatitisnotanyonebody，butmanymen，whereofeachonehathhisownewill，andhispeculiarjudgmentconcerningallthingsthatmaybepropos’d。AndthoughbyparticularContractseachsinglemanmayhavehisownRight，andPropriety，soasonemaysayThisismine，theother，Thatishis;yetwilltherenotbeanythingofwhichthewholemultitude，asaPersondistinctfromasingleman，canrightlysay，Thisismine，morethenanothers。Neithermustweascribeanyactiontothemultitude，asit’sone，but（ifall，ormoreofthemdoeagree）itwillnotbeanAction，butasmanyactions，asMen。ForalthoughinsomegreatSedition，it’scommonlysaid，ThatthePeopleofthatCityhavetakenupArmes;yetisittrueofthoseonelywhoareinArmes，orwhoconsenttothem。FortheCity，whichisonePerson，cannottakeupArmesagainstitselfe。Whatsoeverthereforeisdonebythemultitude，mustbeunderstoodtobedonebyeveryoneofthosebywhomitismadeup;andthathe，whobeingintheMultitude，andyetconsentednot，norgaveanyhelpstothethingsthatweredonebyit，mustbejudg’dtohavedonenothing。
　　Besides，inamultitudenotyetreduc’dintoonePerson，inthatmannerashathbeensaid，thereremainesthatsamestateofnatureinwhichallthingsbelongtoallmenandthereisnoplaceforMeum&Tuum，whichiscall’dDominion，andPropriety，byreasonthatthatsecurityisnotyetextantwhichwehavedeclar’dabovetobenecessarilyrequisiteforthepractiseoftheNaturallLaws。
　　Multitude，&c。]TheDoctrineofthePowerofaCityoverit’sCitizens，almostwhollydependsontheunderstandingofthedifferencewhichisbetweenamultitudeofmenruling，andamultituderuled：ForsuchisthenatureofaCity，Thatamultitude，orcompanyofCitizens，notonelymayhavecommand，butmayalsobesubjecttocommand，butindiversesenses;whichdifferenceIdidbeleevewasclearlyenoughexplainedinthisfirstArticle，，butbytheobjectionsofmanyagainstthosethingswhichfollow，Idiscernotherwise;whereforeitseemedgoodtome，totheendImightmakeafullerexplication，toaddethesefewthings。ByMultitude，becauseitisacollectiveword，weunderstandmorethenone，soasamultitudeofmenisthesamewithmanymen;Thesameword，becauseitisofthesingularnumber，signifiesonething，namely，onemultitude;butinneithersensecanamultitudebeunderstoodtohaveonewillgiventoitbynature，buttoeitheraseverall;andthereforeneitherisanyoneactionwhatsoevertobeattributedtoit：
　　thereforeaMultitudecannotpromise，contract，acquireRight，conveighRight，act，have，Possesse，andthelike，unlesseitbeeveryoneapart，andManbyMan;soastheremustbeasmanypromises，compacts，rights，andactions，asMen。thereforeaMultitudeisnonaturallPerson;butifthesameMultitudedoeContractonewithanother，thatthewillofoneman，ortheagreeingwillsofthemajorpartofthem，shallbereceivedforthewillofall，thenitbecomesonePerson;foritisendu’dwithawill，andthereforecandoevoluntaryactions，suchasareCommanding，makingLawes，acquiringandtransferringofRight，andsoforth;anditisoftnercall’dthePeople，thentheMultitude。Wemustthereforedistinguishthus。thenwesaythePeople，orMultitude，wills，commands，ordothanything，itisunderstoodthattheCitywhichCommands，tillsandActsbythewillofone，ortheconcurringwillsofmore，whichcannotbedone，butinanAssembly;ButasoftasanythingissaidtobedonebyaMultitudeofMen，whethergreat，orsmall，withoutthewillofthatman，orassemblyofmen，that’sunderstoodtobedonebyasubjectedPeople，thatis，bymanysingleCitizenstogether，andnotproceedingfromonetill，butfromdiversewillsofdiversemen，whoareCitizens，andSubjects，butnotaCity。
　　II。Next，wemustconsiderthateveryoneoftheMultitude（bywhosemeanestheremaybeabeginningtomakeuptheCity）
　　mustagreewiththerest，thatinthosematterswhichshallbepropoundedbyanyoneintheAssembly，thatbereceivedforthewillofallwhichthemajorpartshallapproveof;forotherwisetherewillbenowillatallofaMultitudeofMen，whoseWillsandVotesdiffersovariously。Nowifanyonewillnotconsent，therestnotwithstandingshallamongthemselvesconstitutetheCitywithouthim：Whenceitwillcometopasse，thattheCityretainesitsprimitiveRightagainsttheDissentour，thatis，theRightoftar，asagainstanEnemy。
　　III。ButbecausewesaidintheforegoingChapter，thesixthArticle，Thattherewasrequir’dtothesecurityofmen，notonelytheirConsent，butalsotheSubjectionoftheirwillsinsuchthingsaswerenecessarytoPeaceandDefence;andthatinthatUnion，andSubjection，thenatureofaCityconsisted;Wemustdiscernenowinthisplace，outofthosethingswhichmaybepropounded，discuss’d，andstatedinanAssemblyofmen，（allwhosewillsarecontain’dinthewillofthemajorpart）whatthingsarenecessarytoPeace，andcommondefence：Butfirstofall，itisnecessarytoPeace，thatamanbesofarreforthprotectedagainsttheviolenceofothers，thathemaylivesecurely，thatis，thathemayhavenojustcausetofearothers，solongashedoththemnoinjury。Indeed，tomakemenaltogethersafefrommutuallharmes，soastheycannotbehurt，orinjuriouslykill’d，isimpossible，andthereforecomesnotwithindeliberation。Butcaremaybehadtherebenojustcauseoffear;
　　forsecurityistheendwhereforemensubmitthemselvestoothers，whichifitbenothad，nomanissuppos’dtohavesubmittedhimselfetoought，ortohavequittedhisRighttoallthings，beforethattherewasacarehadofhissecurity。
　　IV。Itisnotenoughtoobtainthissecurity，thateveryoneofthosewhoarenowgrowingupintoaCity，doecovenantwiththerest，eitherbywords，orwriting，Nottosteal，nottokill，andtoobservethelikeLawes;forthepravityofhumanedispositionismanifesttoall，andbyexperiencetoowellknownhowlittle（removingthepunishment）menarekepttotheirduties，throughconscienceoftheirpromises。Wemustthereforeprovideforoursecurity，notbyCompacts，butbyPunishments;
　　andthereisthensufficientprovisionmade，whentherearesogreatpunishmentsappointedforeveryinjury，asapparentlyitproveagreaterevilltohavedoneit，thennottohavedoneit：
　　forallmen，byanecessityofnature，chusethatwhichtothemappearstobethelesseevill。
　　V。Nowtherightofpunishingisthenunderstoodtobegiventoanyone，wheneverymanContractsnottoassisthimwhoistobepunished。ButIwillcallthisRight，TheSwordofJustice。
　　Butthesekindofcontractsmenobservewellenough，forthemostpart，tilleitherthemselves，ortheirnearfriendsaretosuffer。
　　VI。Becausethereforeforthesecurityofparticularmen，and，byconsequenceforthecommonpeace，itisnecessarythattherightofusingtheSwordforpunishment，betransferredtosomeManorCounsell，thatManorCounsellisnecessarilyunderstoodbyRighttohavethesupremePowerintheCity。ForhethatbyRightpunishethathisowndiscretion，byRightcompellsallmentoallthingswhichhehimselfewills;thenwhichagreatercommandcannotbeimagined。
　　VII。Butinvaindoetheyworshippeaceathome，whocannotdefendthemselvesagainstforrainers;neitherisitpossibleforthemtoprotectthemselvesagainstforrainers，whoseforcesarenotunited;andthereforeitisnecessaryforthepreservationofparticulars，thattherebesomeoneCounsell，oroneman，whohaththeRighttoarm，togathertogether，tounitesomanyCitizensinalldangers，andonalloccasions，asshallbeneedfullforcommondefenceagainstthecertainnumber，andstrengthoftheenemy;andagain，（asoftenasheshallfindeitexpedient）tomakepeacewiththem。Wemustunderstandtherefore，thatparticularCitizenshaveconveighedtheirwholeRightofWarre，andPeace，untosomeoneManorCounsell;Andthatthisright（whichwemaycalltheSwordofWarre）belongstothesameMan，orCounsell，towhomtheSwordofJusticebelongs;fornoMancanbyRightcompellCitizenstotakeuparmes，andbeattheexpencesofWarre，buthewhobyRightcanpunishhimwhodothnotobey。BothSwordstherefore，aswellthisofWar，asthatofJustice，evenbytheconstitutionitselfeofaCity，andessentially，doebelongtothechiefecommand。
　　VIII。ButbecausetherightoftheSwordisnothingelsebuttohavepowerbyrighttousetheswordathisownwill，itfollowes，thatthejudgementofitsrightusepertainestothesameparty：forifthePowerofjudgingwereinone，andthepowerofexecutinginanother，nothingwouldbedone。Forinvainwouldhegivejudgement，whocouldnotexecutehiscommands;orifheexecutedthembythepowerofanother，hehimselfeisnotsaidtohavethePoweroftheSword，butthatother，towhomheisonelyanOfficer。AlljudgementthereforeinaCitybelongstohimwhohaththeswords，（i。e。）tohim，whohaththesupremeauthority。
　　IX。Furthermore，sinceitnolesse，nayitmuchmoreconducethtoPeacetopreventbrawlesfromarising，thentoappeasethembeingrisen;andthatallcontroversiesarebredfromhence，thattheopinionsofmendifferconcerningMeum&
　　Tuum，justandunjust，profitableandunprofitable，goodandevill，honestanddishonest，andthelike，whicheverymanesteemsaccordingtohisownjudgement;itbelongstothesamechiefepowertomakesomecommonRulesforallmen，andtodeclarethempubliquely，bywhicheverymanmayknowwhatmaybecalledhis，whatanothers，whatjust，whatunjust，whathonest，whatdishonest，whatgood，whatevill，thatissummarily，whatistobedone，whattobeavoydedinourcommoncourseoflife。ButthoseRulesandmeasuresareusuallycalledthecivillLawes，ortheLawesoftheCity，asbeingtheCommandsofhimwhohaththesupremepowerintheCity。AndtheCIVILLLAWES（thatwemaydefinethem）arenothingelsebutthecommandsofhimwhohaththechiefeauthorityintheCity，fordirectionofthefutureactionsofhisCitizens。
　　X。Furthermore，sincetheaffairesoftheCity，boththoseofWarre，andPeace，cannotpossiblybealladministredbyoneman，oroneCounsell，withoutOfficersandsubordinateMagistrates，andthatitappertainstoPeace，andcommondefence，thattheytowhomitbelongsjustlytojudgeofcontroversies，tosearchintoneighbouringcounsels，prudentlytowagewar，andonallhandswarilytoattendthebenefitoftheCity，shouldalsorightlyexercisetheiroffices;itisconsonanttoreason，thattheydependon，andbechosenbyhimwhohaththechiefecommandbothinWar，andinPeace。
　　XI。Itisalsomanifest，thatallvoluntaryactionshavetheirbeginningfrom，andnecessarilydependonthewill，andthatthewillofdoing，oromittingought，dependsontheopinionofthegoodandevillofthereward，orpunishment，whichamanconceivesheshallreceivebytheact，oromission;soastheactionsofallmenareruledbytheopinionsofeach;whereforebyevidentandnecessaryinference，wemayunderstandthatitverymuchconcernstheinterestofPeace，thatnoopinionsordoctrinesbedeliveredtoCitizens，bywhichtheymayimagine，thateitherbyRighttheymaynotobeytheLawesoftheCity，thatis，thecommandsofthatman，orCounsell，towhomthesupremepoweriscommitted，orthatitislawfullfortoresisthim，orthatalessepunishmentremainesforhimthatdenies，thenhimthatyeeldsobedience。Forifonecommandsomewhattobedoneunderpenaltyofnaturalldeath，anotherforbidsitunderpainofeternalldeath，andbothbytheirownRight，itwillfollowthattheCitizens，althoughinnocent，arenotonelybyRightpunishable，butthattheCityitselfeisaltogetherdissolved;fornomancanservetwoMasters：norishelesse，butrathermore，aMaster，whomwebelievewearetoobeyforfeareofdamnation，thenhewhomweobeyforfeareoftemporalldeath。
　　Itfollowestherefore，thatthisone，whetherMan，orCourt，towhomtheCityhathcommittedthesupremePower，havealsothisRight，Thathebothjudgewhatopinionsanddoctrinesareenemiesuntopeace，andalsothatheforbidthemtobetaught。
　　Judgewhatopinions，&c。]ThereisscarceanyPrinciple，neitherintheworshipofGod，norhumanesciences，fromwhencetheremaynotspringdissentions，discords，reproaches，andbydegreeswaritselfe;neitherdoththishappenbyreasonofthefalshoodofthePrinciple，butofthedispositionofmen，whoseemingwisetothemselves，willneedsappearsuchtoallothers：
　　Butthoughsuchdissentionscannotbehinderedfromarising，yetmaytheyberestrainedbytheexerciseofthesupremePower，thattheyProvenohinderancetothepubliquepeace。ofthesekindofopinionsthereforeIhavenotspokenofinthisplace。TherearecertaindoctrineswherewithSubjectsbeingtainted，theyverilybelievethatobediencemayberefusedtotheCity，andthatbyRighttheymay，nayought，tooppose，andfightagainstchiefePrinces，anddignities。Sucharethose，whichwhetherdirectly，andopenly，ormoreobscurely，andbyconsequencerequireobediencetobegiventoothersbesidethemtowhomthesupremeauthorityiscommitted。Idenynot，butthisreflectsonthatPowerwhichmanylivingunderothergovernment，ascribetothechiefeheadoftheChurchofRome，andalsoonthat，whichelsewhereoutofthatChurch，Bishopsrequireintheirs，tobegiventothem;andlastofall，onthatlibertywhichthelowersortofCitizensunderpretenceofReligiondoechallengetothemselves;forwhatcivillwarwasthereeverintheChristianworld，whichdidnoteithergrowfrom，orwasnourishtbythisRoot？Thejudgementthereforeofdoctrines，whethertheyberepugnanttocivillobedienceornot，andiftheyberepugnant，thePowerofprohibitingthemtobetaught，Idoehereattributetothecivillauthority;forsincethereisnomanwhograntsnottotheCitythejudgementofthosethingswhichbelongtoitsPeace，anddefence，anditismanifest，thattheopinionswhichI
　　havealreadyreciteddorelatetoitsPeace，itfollowesnecessarily，thattheexaminationofthoseopinions，whethertheybesuch，ornot，mustbereferredtotheCity，thatis，tohimwhohaththesupremeauthority。
　　XII。Lastofall，fromthisconsideration，thateachCitizenhathsubmittedhisWilltohiswhohaththeSupremeCommandintheCity，soashemaynotemployhisstrengthagainsthim;itfollowesmanifestly，thatwhatsoevershallbedonebyhimwhocommands，mustnotbepunisht;forashewhohathnotpowerenough，cannotpunishhimnaturally;soneithercanhepunishhimbyRight，whobyRighthathnotsufficientpower。
　　XIII。Itismostmanifestbywhathathbeensaid，ThatineveryperfectCity（thatis，wherenoCitizenhathRighttousehisfaculties，athisownediscretion，forthepreservationofhimselfe，orwheretheRightoftheprivateSwordisexcluded）
　　thereisaSupremePowerinsomeone，greaterthenwhichcannotbyRightbeconferr’dbymen，orgreaterthenwhichnomortallmancanhaveoverhimself。Butthatpower，greaterthenwhichcannotbymen，beconveigh’donaman，wecallABSOLUTE：forwhosoeverhathsosubmittedhiswilltothewilloftheCity，Thathecan，unpunisht，doeanything，makeLawes，judgeControversies，setPenalties，makeuse，athisownpleasure，ofthestrength，andwealthofmen，andallthisbyRight，trulyhehathgivenhimthegreatestdominionthatcanbegranted。Thissamemaybeconfirm’dbyexperienceinalltheCitieswhichare，oreverhavebeene;forthoughitbesometimesindoubt，whatMan，orCounsell，haththeChiefCommand，yeteverthereissuchaCommand，andalwayesexercis’d，exceptinthetimeofSedition，andCivillWar，andthentherearetwoChiefeCommandsmadeoutofone：NowthoseseditiouspersonswhodisputeagainstabsoluteAuthority，doenotsomuchcaretodestroyit，astoconveighitonothers;forremovingthispower，theytogethertakeawayCivillSociety，andaconfusionofallthingsreturnes。Thereissomuchobediencejoyn’dtothisabsoluteRightoftheChiefRuler，asisnecessarilyrequir’dfortheGovernmentoftheCity，thatistosay，somuchasthatRightofhismaynotbegrantedinvaine。Nowthiskindofobedience，althoughforsomereasonsitmaysometimes，byRight，bedeny’d，yetbecauseagreatercannotbeperform’d，wewillcallitSIMPLE。ButtheobligationtoperformethisgrowesnotimmediatelyfromthatContractbywhichwehaveconveigh’dallourRightontheCity，butmediatelyfromhence，That，withoutobedience，theCitiesRightwouldbefrustrate，andbyconsequencetherewouldbenoCityconstituted。
　　ForitisonethingifIsay，IgiveyouRighttoCommandwhatyouwill;another，ifIsay，IwilldoewhatsoeveryouCommand;
　　andtheCommandmaybesuch，asIwouldratherdiethendoeit;
　　forasmuchthereforeasnomancanbeboundtowillbeingkill’d，muchlesseishetyedtothat，whichtohimisworsethendeath：
　　ifthereforeIbecommandedtokillmyself，Iamnotboundtodoeit;forthoughIdenytodoeit，yettheRightofdominionisnotfrustrated，sinceothersmaybefound，whobeingcommanded，willnotrefusetodoeit;neitherdoeIrefusetodoethatwhichIhavecontractedtodoe。Inlikemanner，iftheChiefRulercommandanymantokillhim，heisnottyedtodoeit，becauseitcannotbeconceiv’dthathemadeanysuchCovenant;norifhecommandtoexecuteaParent，whetherhebeinnocent，orguilty，andcondemnedbytheLaw，sincethereareothers，who，beingcommanded，willdoethat，andaSonwillratherdie，thenliveinfamous，andhatedofalltheworld。Therearemanyothercases，inwhich，sincetheCommandsareshamefulltobedonebysome，andnotbyothers，Obediencemay，byRight，beperform’dbythese，andrefus’dbythose;andthis，withoutbreachofthatabsoluteRightwhichwasgiventotheChiefRuler。ForinnocaseistheRighttakenawayfromhim，ofslayingthosewhoshallrefusetoobeyhim。Buttheywhothuskillmen，althoughbyRightgiventhemfromhimthathathit，yetiftheyusethatRightotherwisethenrightReasonrequires，theysinagainsttheLawesofNature，（thatis）againstGod。
　　Absolute]Apopularstateopenlychallengethabsolutedominion，andtheCitizensopposeitnot，forinthegatheringtogetherofmanymen，theyacknowledgethefaceofaCity;andeventheunskilfullunderstand，thatmatterstherearerul’dbyCounsell。YetmonarchyisnolesseaCity，thenDemocraty，andabsoluteKingshavetheirCounsellours，fromwhomtheywilltakeadvice，andsuffertheirPower，inmattersofgreaterconsequence，tobeguided，butnotrecall’d。ButitappearsnottomostmenhowaCityiscontain’dinthepersonofaKing;andthereforetheyobjectagainstAbsoluteCommand：First，thatifanymanhadsuchaRight，theconditionoftheCitizenswouldbemiserable：Forthustheythink，hewilltakeall，spoilall，killall;andeverymancountsithisonelyhappinessethatheisnotalreadyspoil’dandkill’d。Butwhyshouldhedoethus？notbecausehecan;forunlessehehaveamindtoit，hewillnotdoeit。tillhe，topleaseone，orsomefew，spoilalltherest？
　　First，thoughbyRight，thatis，withoutinjurytothem，hemaydoeit，yetcanhenotdoeitjustly，thatis，withoutbreachoftheNaturallLawes，andinjuryagainstGod。AndthereforethereissomesecurityforSubjectsintheOathswhichprincestake。
　　Next，ifhecouldjustlydoeit，orthathemadenoaccountofhisOath，yetappearestherenoreasonwhyheshoulddesireit，sincehefindesnogoodinit。Butitcannotbedeny’dbutaprincemaysometimeshaveaninclinationtodoewickedly;butgrantthenthatthouhadstgivenhimapowerwhichwerenotabsolute，butsomuchonelyassuffic’dtodefendtheefromtheinjuriesofothers，which，ifthouwiltbesafe，isnecessaryfortheetogive;arenotallthesamethingstobefeared？forhethathathstrengthenoughtoprotectall，wantsnotsufficiencytooppresseall。Hereisnootherdifficultythen，butthathumaneaffairescannotbewithoutsomeinconvenience。AndthisinconvenienceitselfisintheCitizens，notintheGovernment;
　　forifmencouldrulethemselves，everymanbyhisowncommand，that’stosay，couldtheyliveaccordingtotheLawesofNature，therewouldbenoneedatallofaCity，norofacommoncoercivepower。Secondly，theyobject，ThatthereisnoDominionintheChristianworldAbsolute;whichindeedisnottrue，forallMonarchies，andallotherStates，areso;foralthoughthey，whohavethechiefCommand，doenotallthosethingstheywould，andwhattheyknowprofitabletotheCity，thereasonofthatisnotthedefectofRightinthem，buttheconsiderationoftheirCitizens，whobusiedabouttheirprivateinterest，andcarelesseofwhattendstothepublique，cannotsometimesbedrawntoperformetheirdutieswithoutthehazardoftheCity。thereforeprincessometimesforbeartheexerciseoftheirRight，andprudentlyremitsomewhatoftheact，butnothingoftheirRight。
　　XIV。Neithercananymangivesomewhattohimselfe;forheisalreadysuppos’dtohavewhathecangivehimself;norcanhebeoblig’dtohimselfe，forthesamepartybeingboththeobliged，andtheObliger，andtheObligerhavingpowertoreleasetheobliged，itweremeerlyinvainforamantobeobligedtohimselfe，becausehecanreleasehimselfathisownpleasure;andhethatcandoethis，isalreadyactuallyfree。Whenceitsplaine，thattheCityisnottyedtotheCivillLawes;fortheCivillLawesaretheLawesoftheCity，bywhich，ifshewereengag’d，sheshouldbeengag’dtoherselfe。NeithercantheCitybeoblig’dtoherCitizen，because，ifhewill，hecanfreeherfromherobligation;andhewill，asoftasshewills，（forthewillofeveryCitizenisinallthingscomprehendedinthewilloftheCity）;theCitythereforeisfreewhenshepleaseth，thatis，sheisnowactuallyfree;butthewillofaCouncell，oronewhohaththeSupremeAuthoritygivenhim，isthewilloftheCity;hethereforecontainesthewillsofallparticularCitizens：ThereforeneitherisheboundtotheCivillLawes（forthisistobeboundtohimself）nortoanyofhisCitizens。
　　XV。Nowbecause（ashathbeenshewnabove）beforetheconstitutionofaCityallthingsbelong’dtoallmen，noristherethatthingwhichanymancansocallhis，asanyothermaynot，bythesameRight，claimeashisown，（forwhereallthingsarecommon，therecanbenothingpropertoanyman）itfollowes，thatproprietyreceiv’ditsbeginningwhenCitiesreceiv’dtheirs，andthatthatonelyispropertoeachmanwhichhecankeepbytheLawes，andthepowerofthewholeCity，（thatis）ofhimonwhomitschiefcommandisconferr’d。Whenceweunderstand，thateachparticularCitizenhathapropriety，towhichnoneofhisfellow-CitizenshathRight，becausetheyaretyedtothesameLawes;buthehathnoproprietyinwhichtheChiefRuler（whoseCommandsaretheLawes，whosewillcontainsthewillofeachman，andwho，byeverysingleperson，isconstitutedtheSupremeJudge）hathnotaRight。ButalthoughtherebemanythingswhichtheCitypermitstoitsCitizens，andthereforetheymaysometimesgoetoLawagainsttheirChief;yetisnotthatactionbelongingtoCivillRight，buttoNaturallEquity;neitherisitconcerningwhatbyRighthemaydoewhohaththeSupremepower，butwhathehathbeenwillingshouLdbedone，andthereforeheshallbejudgehimself，asthough（theequityofthecausebeingwellunderstood）hecouldnotgivewrongjudgment。
　　Proprietyreceiv’ditsbeginning，&c。]What’sobjectedbysome，Thattheproprietyofgoods，evenbeforetheconstitutionofCities，wasfoundinFathersofFamilies，thatobjectionisvaine，becauseIhavealreadydeclar’d，ThataFamilyisalittleCity。FortheSonnesofaFamilyhaveaproprietyoftheirgoodsgrantedthembytheirFather，distinguishtindeedfromtherestoftheSonsofthesameFamily，butnotfromtheproprietyoftheFatherhimself;buttheFathersofdiverseFamilies，whoaresubjectneithertoanycommonFather，norLord，haveacommonRightinallthings。
　　WhatbyRighthemaydoe，&c。]AsoftenasaCitizenisgrantedtohaveanactionofLawagainsttheSupreme，i。e。
　　againsttheCity，thequestionisnotinthataction，whethertheCitymay，byRight，keeppossessionofthethingincontroversie，butwhetherbytheLawesformerlymadeshewouldkeepit;fortheLawisthedeclaredwilloftheSupreme：sincethentheCitymayraisemoneyfromtheCitizensundertwoTitles，eitherasTribute，orasDebt，intheformercasethereisnoactionofLawallowed;fortherecanbenoquestionwhethertheCityhaveRighttorequireTribute：inthelatteritisallowed，becausetheCitywilltakenothingfromitsCitizensbyfraud，orcunning，andyetifneedrequire，alltheyhave，openly;andthereforehethatcondemnesthisplace，saying，ThatbythisdoctrineitiseasieforprincestofreethemselvesfromtheirDebts，hedoesitimpertinently。
　　XVI。Theft，further，AduLtery，andallinjuriesareforbidbytheLawesofnature;butwhatistobecalledTheft，whatfurther，whatAdultery，whatinjuryinaCitizen，thisisnottobedeterminedbythenaturall，butbythecivillLaw：fornoteverytakingawayofthethingwhichanotherpossesseth，butonelyanothermansgoodsistheft;butwhatisours，andwhatanothers，isaquestionbelongingtothecivillLaw。Inlikemanner，noteverykillingofamanisfurther，butonelythatwhichthecivillLawforbids;neitherisallencounterwithwomenAdultery，butonelythatwhichthecivillLawprohibits。Lastly，allbreachofpromiseisaninjury，wherethepromiseitselfeislawfull，butwherethereisnoRighttomakeanycompact，therecanbenoconveighanceofit，andthereforetherecannoinjuryfollow，ashathbeensaidinthesecondChapter，Artic。17。Nowwhatwemaycontractfor，andwhatnot，dependswhollyuponthecivillLawes。TheCityofLacedoemonthereforerightlyorderedthatthoseyoungmenwhocouldsotakeawaycertaingoodsfromothersasnottobecaught，shouldgoeunpunisht;foritwasnothingelse，buttomakeaLawthatwhatwassoacquiredshouldbetheirown，andnotanothers。Rightlyalsoisthatmaneverywhereslain，whomwekillinwarre，orbythenecessityofselfe-defence。SoalsothatcopulationwhichinoneCityisMatrimony，inanotherwillbejudgedAdultery。AlsothosecontractswhichmakeupMarriageinoneCitizen，doenotsoinanother，althoughofthesameCity。becausethathewhoisforbiddenbytheCity（thatisbythatoneman，orCouncell，whosethesupremepoweris）tocontractought，hathnoRighttomakeanycontract，andthereforehavingmadeany，itisnotvalid，andbyconsequence，noMarriage。Buthiscontractwhichreceivednoprohibition，wasthereforeofforce，andsowasMatrimony：neitheraddesitanyforcetoanyunlawfullcontracts，thattheyweremadebyanOath，orSacrament，forthoseaddenothingtothestrengthningofthecontract，ashathbeensaidaboveChap。2。Artic。22。WhatthereforeTheft，whatMurther，whatAdultery，andingenerallwhatinjuryis，mustbeknownbythecivillLawes，thatis，thecommandsofhimwhohaththesupremeauthority。
　　ThattheyweremadebyanOathorSacrament，&c。]WhetherMatrimonybeeaSacrament（inwhichsensethatwordisusedbysomeDivines）ornot，itisnotmypurposetodispute：OnelyI
　　say，thatthelegitimatecontractofamanandwomantolivetogether，i。e。grantedbythecivillLaw，whetheritbeaSacrament，ornot，issurelyalegitimateMarriage;butthatcopulationwhichtheCityhathprohibitedisnomarriage，sinceitisoftheessenceofMarriagetobealegitimatecontract。
　　Therewerelegitimatemarriagesinmanyplaces，asamongtheJewes，theGrecians，theRomans，whichyetmightbedissolved。
　　Butwiththosewhopermitnosuchcontracts，butbyaLawthattheyshallneverbebroke，Wedlockcannotbedissolved;andthereasonis，becausetheCityhathcommandedittobeindissoluble，notbecauseMatrimonyisaSacrament。WhereforetheceremonieswhichatweddingsaretobeperformedintheTemple，toblesse，or（ifImaysayso）toconsecratethehusbandandwife，willperhapsbelongonlytotheofficeofClergy-men;alltherest，namelywho，when，andbywhatcontractsMarriagesmaybemade，pertainstotheLawesoftheCity。
　　XVII。Thissamesupremecommand，andabsolutepower，seemssoharshtothegreatestpartofmen，astheyhatetheverynamingofthem;whichhappenschieflythroughwantofknowledge，whathumanenature，andthecivillLawesare，andpartlyalsothroughtheirdefault，whowhentheyareinvestedwithsogreatauthority，abusetheirpowertotheirownlust。Thattheymaythereforeavoydthiskindofsupremeauthority，someofthemwillhaveaCitywellenoughconstituted，iftheywhoshallbetheCitizensconvening，doeagreeconcerningcertaineArticlespropounded，andinthatconventagitatedandapproved;anddoecommandthemtobeobserved，andpunishmentsprescribedtobeinflictedonthemwhoshallbreakthem：towhichpurpose，andalsototherepellingofaforraignenemy，theyappointacertainandlimitedreturn，withthiscondition，thatifthatsufficenot，theymaycallanewconventionofestates。WhoseesnotinaCitythusconstituted，thattheAssemblywhoprescribedthosethingshadanabsolutepower？Ifthereforetheassemblycontinue，orfromtimetotimehaveacertainday，andplaceofmeeting，thatpowerwillbeperpetuall。Butiftheywhollydissolve，eithertheCitydissolveswiththem，andsoallisreturnedtothestateofWar，orelsethereissomewhereapowerlefttopunishthosewhoshalltransgressetheLawes，whosoever，orhowmanysoevertheybethathaveit，whichcannotpossiblybewithoutanabsolutepower：forhethatbyrighthaththismightgiven，bypunishmentstorestrainwhatCitizenshepleaseth，hathsuchapower，asagreatercannotpossiblybegivenbyanyCitizens。
　　XVIII。Itisthereforemanifest，thatineveryCitythereissomeoneman，orCouncell，orCourt，whobyRighthathasgreatapowerovereachsingleCitizen，aseachmanhathoverhimselfeconsideredoutofthatcivillstate，thatis，supremeandabsolute，tobelimitedonelybythestrengthandforcesoftheCityitselfe，andbynothingelseintheworld：forifhispowerwerelimited，thatlimitationmustnecessarilyproceedfromsomegreaterpower;Forhethatprescribeslimits，musthaveagreaterpowerthenhewhoisconfin’dbythem;nowthatconfiningpoweriseitherwithoutlimit，orisagainrestrainedbysomeothergreaterthenitselfe，andsoweshallatlengtharrivetoapowerwhichhathnootherlimit，butthatwhichistheterminusultimusoftheforcesofalltheCitizenstogether。Thatsameiscalledthesupremecommand，andifitbeecommittedtoacouncell，asupremecouncell，butiftooneman，thesupremeLordoftheCity。Nowthenotesofsupremecommandarethese，TomakeandabrogateLawes。TodetermineWarandpeace，toknow，andjudgeofallcontroversies，eitherbyhimselfe，orbyJudgesappointedbyhim;toelectallMagistrates;Ministers，andCounsellors。Lastly，iftherebeanymanwhobyRightcandoesomeoneactionwhichisnotlawfullforanyCitizenorCitizenstodoebesidehimselfe，thatmanhathobtainedthesupremepower：
　　ForthosethingswhichbyRightmaynotbedonebyanyoneormanyCitizens，theCityitselfecanonelydoe：HethereforethatdoththosethingsuseththeCitiesRight，whichisthesupremepower。
　　XIX。TheywhocompareaCityanditsCitizens，withamanandhismembers，almostallsay，thathewhohaththesupremepowerintheCity，isinrelationtothewholeCity，suchastheheadistothewholeman;Butitappearesbywhathathbeenalreadysaid，thathewhoisenduedwithsuchapower，（whetheritbeaman，oraCourt）hatharelationtotheCity，notasthatofthehead，butofthesouletothebody。Foritisthesoulebywhichamanhathawill，thatis，caneitherwill，ornill;sobyhimwhohaththesupremepower，andnootherwise，theCityhathawill，andcaneitherwillornill。ACourtofCounsellorsisrathertobecomparedwiththehead，oroneCounsellor，whoseonlyCounsell（ifofanyonealone）thechiefRulermakesuseofinmattersofgreatestmoment：fortheofficeoftheheadistocounsell，asthesoulesistocommand。
　　XX。ForasmuchasthesupremecommandisconstitutedbyvertueofthecompactswhicheachsingleCitizen，orsubject，mutuallymakeswiththeother。butallcontracts，astheyreceivetheirforcefromthecontractors，sobytheirconsenttheyloseitagain，andarebroken;perhapssomemayinferrehence，thatbytheconsentofallthesubjectstogether，thesupremeauthoritymaybewhollytakenaway。Whichinferenceifitweretrue，I
　　cannotdiscernewhatdangerwouldthencebyRightarisetothesupremeCommanders。Forsinceitissupposed，thateachonehathobligedhimselfetoeachother，ifanyoneofthemshallrefuse，whatsoevertherestshallagreetodoe，heisboundnotwithstanding;neithercananymanwithoutinjurytome，doethatwhichbycontractmadewithme，hehathobligedhimselfenottodoe。Butitisnottobeimaginedthateveritwillhappen，thatallthesubjectstogether，notsomuchasoneexcepted，willcombineagainstthesupremepower;whereforethereisnofeareforRulersinchiefe，thatbyanyRighttheycanbedespoyledoftheirauthority。Ifnotwithstandingitweregranted，thattheirRightdependedonelyonthatcontractwhicheachmanmakeswithhisfellow-citizen，itmightveryeasilyhappen，thattheymightberobbedofthatDominionunderpretenceofRight;forsubjectsbeingcalledeitherbythecommandoftheCity，orseditiouslyflockingtogether，mostmenthinkthattheconsentsofallarecontainedinthevotesofthegreaterpart。Whichintruthisfalse;foritisnotfromnaturethattheconsentofthemajorpartshouldbereceivedfortheconsentofall，neitherisittrueintumults，butitproceedsfromcivillinstitution，andisthenonelytrue，whenthatManorCourtwhichhaththesupremepower，assemblinghissubjects，byreasonofthegreatnesseoftheirnumber，allowesthosethatareelectedapowerofspeakingforthosewhoelectedthem，andwillhavethemajorpartofvoyces，insuchmattersasarebyhimpropoundedtobediscust，tobeaseffectuallasthewhole。Butwecannotimaginethathewhoischiefe，everconvenedhissubjectswithintentionthattheyshoulddisputehisRight，unlesse，wearyoftheburthenofhischarge，hedeclaredinplaintermes，thatherenouncesandabandonshisgovernment。NowbecausemostmenthroughignoranceesteemnottheconsentofthemajorpartofCitizensonly，butevenofaveryfew，providedtheybeoftheiropinion，fortheconsentofthewholeCity，itmayverywellseemtothem，thatthesupremeauthoritymaybyrightbeabrogated，soitbedoneinsomegreatAssemblyofCitizensbythevotesofthegreaternumber;Butthoughagovernmentbeconstitutedbythecontractsofparticularmenwithparticulars，yetitsRightdependsnotonthatobligationonely;thereisanothertyealsotowardhimwhocommands;foreachCitizencompactingwithhisfellow，sayesthus，IconveighmyRightonthisparty，uponcondition，thatyoupasseyourstothesame;bywhichmeans，thatRightwhicheverymanhadbeforetousehisfacultiestohisownadvantage，isnowwhollytranslatedonsomecertainman，orCouncell，forthecommonbenefit;whereforewhatbythemutuallcontractseachonehathmadewiththeother，whatbythedonationofRightwhicheverymanisboundtoratifietohimthatcommands，thegovernmentisupheldbyadoubleobligationfromtheCitizens，firstthatwhichisduetotheirfellowcitizens，nextthatwhichtheyowetotheirprince。Whereforenosubjectshowmanysoevertheybe，canwithanyRightdespoylehimwhobearsthechiefeRule，ofhisauthority，evenwithouthisownconsent。
　　Chap。VII
　　OfthethreekindesofGovernment，Democracy，Aristocracy，Monarchie。
　　I。WehavealreadyspokenofaCitybyinstitutioninitsGenus;wewillnowsaysomewhatofitsspecies。AsforthedifferenceofCities，itistakenfromthedifferenceofthePersons，towhomtheSupremePoweriscommitted;thisPoweriscommittedeithertooneMan，orCouncell，orsomeoneCourtconsistingofmanymen。Furthermore，aCouncellofmanymen，consistseitherofalltheCitizens，（insomuchaseverymanofthemhathaRighttoVote，andaninterestintheorderingofthegreatestaffaires，ifhewillhimselfe）orofapartonely;fromwhencetherearisethreesortsofGovernment：Theone，whenthePowerisinaCouncell，whereeveryCitizenhatharighttoVote，anditiscall’daDEMOCRATY。Theother，whenitisinaCouncell，wherenotall，butsomepartonelyhavetheirsuffrages，andwecallitanARISTOCRATY。Thethirdisthat，whentheSupremeAuthorityrestsonelyinone，anditisstiledaMONARCHY。Inthefirst，hethatgovernesiscalleddemos，ThePEOPLE。Inthesecond，theNOBLES。Inthethird，theMONARCH。
　　II。Now，althoughAncientWritersofPolitiqueshaveintroduc’dthreeotherkindesofGovernmentoppositetothese，towit，AnarchyorconfusiontoDemocraty，Oligarchy，thatis，thecommandofsomefew，toAristocraty，andTyrannytoMonarchy，yetarenotthesethreedistinctformesofGovernment，butthreediverseTitlesgivenbythosewhowereeitherdispleas’dwiththatpresentGovernment，orthosethatbareRule。Formen，bygivingnames，doeusually，notonelysignifiethethingsthemselves，butalsotheirownaffections，aslove，hatred，anger，andthelike，whenceithappensthatwhatonemancallsaDemocraty，anothercallsanAnarchy;whatonecountsanAristocraty，anotheresteemesanOligarchie。andwhomonetitlesaKing，anotherstileshimaTyrant;soasweseethesenamesbetokennotadiversekindeofGovernment，butthediverseopinionsoftheSubjectsconcerninghimwhohaththeSupremePower。Forfirst，whoseesnotthatAnarchyisequallyoppositetoalltheforenam’dFormes？ForthatwordsignifiesthatthereisnoGovernmentatall，thatis，notanyCity。ButhowisitpossiblethatnoCityshouldbethespeciesofaCity？
　　Farthermore，whatdifferenceistherebetweenanOligarchie，whichsignifiestheCommandofafew，orGrandees，oranAristocraty，whichisthatofthePrime，orChiefHeads，morethenthatmendiffersoamongthemselves，thatthesamethingsseemenotgoodtoallmen？Whenceithappens，thatthosepersons，whobysomearelook’donasthebest，arebyothersesteem’dtobetheworstofallmen。
　　III。Butmen，byreasonoftheirpassions，willveryhardlybeperswadedthataKingdome，andTyranny，arenotdiversekindesofCities，whothoughtheywouldratherhavetheCitysubjecttoone，thenmany，yetdoetheynotbeleeveittobewellgovern’dunlesseitaccordwiththeirjudgements：ButwemustdiscoverbyReason，andnotbyPassion，whatthedifferenceisbetweenaKing，andaTyrant：butfirst，theydiffernotinthis，ThataTyranthaththegreaterPower，forgreaterthentheSupremecannotbegranted;norinthis，Thatonehathalimitedpower，theothernot;forhe，whoseauthorityislimited，isnoKing，buthisSubjectthatlimitshim。Lastly，neitherdiffertheyintheirmannerofacquisition;forifinaDemocraticall，orAristocraticallGovernmentsomeoneCitizenshould，byforce，possessehimselfoftheSupremePower，ifhegaintheconsentofalltheCitizens，hebecomesalegitimateMonarch;ifnot，heisanEnemy，notaTyrant。Theydifferthereforeinthesoleexerciseoftheircommand，insomuchasheissaidtobeaKing，whogovernswel，andheaTyrantthatdothotherwise。Thecasethereforeisbroughttothispasse，ThataKinglegitimatelyconstitutedinhisGovernment，ifheseemetohisSubjectstoRulewell，andtotheirliking，theyaffordhimtheappellationofaKing，ifnot，theycounthimaTyrant。WhereforeweseeaKingdome，andTyranny，arenotdiverseFormesofGovernment，butoneandtheself-sameMonarchhaththenameofaKinggivenhiminpointofHonour，andReverencetohim，andofaTyrantinwayofcontumely，andreproach。ButwhatwefrequentlyfindeinbookessaidagainstTyrants，tookitsoriginallfromGreek，andRomanWriters，whoseGovernmentwaspartlyDemocraticall，andpartlyAristocraticall，andthereforenotTyrantsonely，butevenKingswereodioustothem。
　　IV。Thereare，whoindeeddoethinkitnecessary，ThataSupremeCommandshouldbesomewhereextantina，City。butifitshouldbeinanyone，eitherMan，orCouncell，itwouldfollow（theysay）thatalltheCitizensmustbeslaves。Avoidingthiscondition，theyimaginethattheremaybeacertaineFormofGovernmentcompoundedofthosethreekindswehavespokenof，yetdifferentfromeachparticular，whichtheycallamixtMonarchie，ormixtAristocraty，ormixtDemocraty，accordingasanyoneofthesethreesortsshallbemoreeminentthentherest：Forexample，ifthenamingofMagistrates，andthearbitrationofWar，andPeace，shouldbelongtotheKing，JudicaturetotheLords，andcontributionofMoniestothePeople，andthepowerofmakingLawestooaltogether，thiskindofStatewouldtheycallamixtMonarchieforsooth。ButifitwerepossiblethattherecouldbesuchaState，itwouldnowhitadvantagethelibertyofthesubject;foraslongastheyallagree，eachsingleCitizenisasmuchsubjectaspossiblyhecanbe;butiftheydisagree，theStatereturnstoaCivillWar，andtheRightoftheprivateSword，whichcertainlyismuchworsethenanysubjectionwhatsoever：ButthattherecanbenosuchkindofGovernmenthathbeensufficientlydemonstratedintheforegoingChapter，Artic：
　　6，7，8，9，10，11，12。
　　ButthattherecanbenosuchkindeofGovernment]Mostmengrant，ThataGovernmentoughtnottobedivided，buttheywouldhaveitmoderated，andboundedbysomelimits。Trulyitisveryreasonableitshouldbeso;butifthesemen，whentheyspeakofmoderating，andlimiting，dounderstanddividingit，theymakeaveryfonddistinction。Truly，formypart，IwishthatnotonelyKings，butallotherPersonsenduedwithSupremeAuthoritywouldsotemperthemselvesastocommitnowrong，andonelymindingtheirchargescontainthemselveswithinthelimitsofthenaturall，anddivineLawes：Buttheywhodistinguishthus，theywouldhavethechiefPowerbounded，andrestrain’dbyothers;
　　which，becauseitcannotbedone，butthattheywhodoesetthelimits，mustneedshavesomepartofthePower，wherebytheymaybeenabledtodoeit，theGovernmentisproperlydivided，notmoderated。
　　V。LetusseealittlenowintheconstitutingofeachFormofGovernment，whattheconstitutoursdoe。ThosewhomettogetherwithintentiontoerectaCity，werealmostintheveryactofmeetingaDemocraty;forinthattheywillinglymet，theyaresuppos’doblig’dtotheobservationofwhatshallbedetermin’dbythemajorpart：which，whilethatconventlasts，orisadjourn’dtosomecertaindayes，andplaces，isaclearDemocraty;forthatconvent，whosewillisthewillofalltheCitizens，haththeSupremeAuthority;andbecauseinthisConventeverymanissuppos’dtohaveaRighttogivehisvoice，itfollowes，thatitisaDemocratybythedefinitiongiveninthefirstArticleofthisChap。Butiftheydepart，andbreakuptheConvent，andappointnotime，orplace，where，andwhentheyshallmeetagain，thepublickwealreturnstoAnarchy，andthesamestateitstoodinbeforetheirmeeting，thatis，tothestateofallmenwarringagainstall。ThePeoplethereforeretainsthesupremepowernolongerthenthereisacertaindayandplacepubliquelyappointed，andknown，towhichwhosoeverwill，mayresort。Forexceptthatbeknownanddetermined，theymayeithermeetatdiverstimes，andplaces，thatisinfactions，ornotatall;andthenitisnolongerdemos，thePeople，butadissolutemultitude，towhomwecanneitherattributesanyAction，orRight：TwothingsthereforeframeaDemocratie，whereofone（towittheperpetuallprescriptionofConvents）
　　makesdemos，thePeople，theother（whichisapluralityofvoyces）tokratosorthepower。