PREFACE
　　AncientGreekphilosophywasdividedintothreesciences：physics，ethics，andlogic。Thisdivisionisperfectlysuitabletothenatureofthething；andtheonlyimprovementthatcanbemadeinitistoaddtheprincipleonwhichitisbased，sothatwemaybothsatisfyourselvesofitscompleteness，andalsobeabletodeterminecorrectlythenecessarysubdivisions。
　　Allrationalknowledgeiseithermaterialorformal：theformerconsiderssomeobject，thelatterisconcernedonlywiththeformoftheunderstandingandofthereasonitself，andwiththeuniversallawsofthoughtingeneralwithoutdistinctionofitsobjects。
　　Formalphilosophyiscalledlogic。Materialphilosophy，however，hastodowithdeterminateobjectsandthelawstowhichtheyaresubject，isagaintwofold；fortheselawsareeitherlawsofnatureoroffreedom。Thescienceoftheformerisphysics，thatofthelatter，ethics；theyarealsocallednaturalphilosophyandmoralphilosophyrespectively。
　　Logiccannothaveanyempiricalpart；thatis，apartinwhichtheuniversalandnecessarylawsofthoughtshouldrestongroundstakenfromexperience；otherwiseitwouldnotbelogic，i。e。，acanonfortheunderstandingorthereason，validforallthought，andcapableofdemonstration。Naturalandmoralphilosophy，onthecontrary，caneachhavetheirempiricalpart，sincetheformerhastodeterminethelawsofnatureasanobjectofexperience；thelatterthelawsofthehumanwill，sofarasitisaffectedbynature：theformer，however，beinglawsaccordingtowhicheverythingdoeshappen；thelatter，lawsaccordingtowhicheverythingoughttohappen。Ethics，however，mustalsoconsidertheconditionsunderwhichwhatoughttohappenfrequentlydoesnot。
　　Wemaycallallphilosophyempirical，sofarasitisbasedongroundsofexperience：ontheotherband，thatwhichdeliversitsdoctrinesfromaprioriprinciplesalonewemaycallpurephilosophy。Whenthelatterismerelyformalitislogic；ifitisrestrictedtodefiniteobjectsoftheunderstandingitismetaphysic。
　　Inthiswaytherearisestheideaofatwofoldmetaphysic—ametaphysicofnatureandametaphysicofmorals。Physicswillthushaveanempiricalandalsoarationalpart。ItisthesamewithEthics；butheretheempiricalpartmighthavethespecialnameofpracticalanthropology，thenamemoralitybeingappropriatedtotherationalpart。
　　Alltrades，arts，andhandiworkshavegainedbydivisionoflabour，namely，when，insteadofonemandoingeverything，eachconfineshimselftoacertainkindofworkdistinctfromothersinthetreatmentitrequires，soastobeabletoperformitwithgreaterfacilityandinthegreatestperfection。Wherethedifferentkindsofworkarenotdistinguishedanddivided，whereeveryoneisajack—of—all—trades，theremanufacturesremainstillinthegreatestbarbarism。Itmightdeservetobeconsideredwhetherpurephilosophyinallitspartsdoesnotrequireamanspeciallydevotedtoit，andwhetheritwouldnotbebetterforthewholebusinessofscienceifthosewho，topleasethetastesofthepublic，arewonttoblendtherationalandempiricalelementstogether，mixedinallsortsofproportionsunknowntothemselves，andwhocallthemselvesindependentthinkers，givingthenameofminutephilosopherstothosewhoapplythemselvestotherationalpartonly—ifthese，Isay，werewarnednottocarryontwoemploymentstogetherwhichdifferwidelyinthetreatmenttheydemand，foreachofwhichperhapsaspecialtalentisrequired，andthecombinationofwhichinonepersononlyproducesbunglers。ButIonlyaskherewhetherthenatureofsciencedoesnotrequirethatweshouldalwayscarefullyseparatetheempiricalfromtherationalpart，andprefixtoPhysicsproper（orempiricalphysics）
　　ametaphysicofnature，andtopracticalanthropologyametaphysicofmorals，whichmustbecarefullyclearedofeverythingempirical，sothatwemayknowhowmuchcanbeaccomplishedbypurereasoninbothcases，andfromwhatsourcesitdrawsthisitsaprioriteaching，andthatwhetherthelatterinquiryisconductedbyallmoralists（whosenameislegion），oronlybysomewhofeelacallingthereto。
　　Asmyconcernhereiswithmoralphilosophy，Ilimitthequestionsuggestedtothis：Whetheritisnotoftheutmostnecessitytoconstructapurethingwhichisonlyempiricalandwhichbelongstoanthropology？forthatsuchaphilosophymustbepossibleisevidentfromthecommonideaofdutyandofthemorallaws。Everyonemustadmitthatifalawistohavemoralforce，i。e。，tobethebasisofanobligation，itmustcarrywithitabsolutenecessity；that，forexample，theprecept，"Thoushaltnotlie，"isnotvalidformenalone，asifotherrationalbeingshadnoneedtoobserveit；andsowithalltheothermorallawsproperlysocalled；that，therefore，thebasisofobligationmustnotbesoughtinthenatureofman，orinthecircumstancesintheworldinwhichheisplaced，butapriorisimplyintheconceptionofpurereason；andalthoughanyotherpreceptwhichisfoundedonprinciplesofmereexperiencemaybeincertainrespectsuniversal，yetinasfarasitrestsevenintheleastdegreeonanempiricalbasis，perhapsonlyastoamotive，suchaprecept，whileitmaybeapracticalrule，canneverbecalledamorallaw。
　　Thusnotonlyaremorallawswiththeirprinciplesessentiallydistinguishedfromeveryotherkindofpracticalknowledgeinwhichthereisanythingempirical，butallmoralphilosophyrestswhollyonitspurepart。Whenappliedtoman，itdoesnotborrowtheleastthingfromtheknowledgeofmanhimself（anthropology），butgiveslawsaprioritohimasarationalbeing。Nodoubttheselawsrequireajudgementsharpenedbyexperience，inorderontheonehandtodistinguishinwhatcasestheyareapplicable，andontheothertoprocureforthemaccesstothewillofthemanandeffectualinfluenceonconduct；sincemanisactedonbysomanyinclinationsthat，thoughcapableoftheideaofapracticalpurereason，heisnotsoeasilyabletomakeiteffectiveinconcretoinhislife。
　　Ametaphysicofmoralsisthereforeindispensablynecessary，notmerelyforspeculativereasons，inordertoinvestigatethesourcesofthepracticalprincipleswhicharetobefoundaprioriinourreason，butalsobecausemoralsthemselvesareliabletoallsortsofcorruption，aslongaswearewithoutthatclueandsupremecanonbywhichtoestimatethemcorrectly。Forinorderthatanactionshouldbemorallygood，itisnotenoughthatitconformtothemorallaw，butitmustalsobedoneforthesakeofthelaw，otherwisethatconformityisonlyverycontingentanduncertain；sinceaprinciplewhichisnotmoral，althoughitmaynowandthenproduceactionsconformabletothelaw，willalsooftenproduceactionswhichcontradictit。Nowitisonlyapurephilosophythatwecanlookforthemorallawinitspurityandgenuineness（and，inapracticalmatter，thisisoftheutmostconsequence）：wemust，therefore，beginwithpurephilosophy（metaphysic），andwithoutittherecannotbeanymoralphilosophyatall。Thatwhichminglesthesepureprincipleswiththeempiricaldoesnotdeservethenameofphilosophy（forwhatdistinguishesphilosophyfromcommonrationalknowledgeisthatittreatsinseparatescienceswhatthelatteronlycomprehendsconfusedly）；muchlessdoesitdeservethatofmoralphilosophy，sincebythisconfusionitevenspoilsthepurityofmoralsthemselves，andcounteractsitsownend。
　　Letitnotbethought，however，thatwhatisheredemandedisalreadyextantinthepropaedeuticprefixedbythecelebratedWolftohismoralphilosophy，namely，hisso—calledgeneralpracticalphilosophy，andthat，therefore，wehavenottostrikeintoanentirelynewfield。justbecauseitwastobeageneralpracticalphilosophy，ithasnottakenintoconsiderationawillofanyparticularkind—sayonewhichshouldbedeterminedsolelyfromaprioriprincipleswithoutanyempiricalmotives，andwhichwemightcallapurewill，butvolitioningeneral，withalltheactionsandconditionswhichbelongtoitinthisgeneralsignification。Bythisitisdistinguishedfromametaphysicofmorals，justasgenerallogic，whichtreatsoftheactsandcanonsofthoughtingeneral，isdistinguishedfromtranscendentalphilosophy，whichtreatsoftheparticularactsandcanonsofpurethought，i。e。，thatwhosecognitionsarealtogetherapriori。Forthemetaphysicofmoralshastoexaminetheideaandtheprinciplesofapossiblepurewill，andnottheactsandconditionsofhumanvolitiongenerally，whichforthemostpartaredrawnfrompsychology。Itistruethatmorallawsanddutyarespokenofinthegeneralmoralphilosophy（contraryindeedtoallfitness）。Butthisisnoobjection，forinthisrespectalsotheauthorsofthatscienceremaintruetotheirideaofit；theydonotdistinguishthemotiveswhichareprescribedassuchbyreasonalonealtogetherapriori，andwhichareproperlymoral，fromtheempiricalmotiveswhichtheunderstandingraisestogeneralconceptionsmerelybycomparisonofexperiences；but，withoutnoticingthedifferenceoftheirsources，andlookingonthemallashomogeneous，theyconsideronlytheirgreaterorlessamount。Itisinthiswaytheyframetheirnotionofobligation，which，thoughanythingbutmoral，isallthatcanbeattainedinaphilosophywhichpassesnojudgementatallontheoriginofallpossiblepracticalconcepts，whethertheyareapriori，oronlyaposteriori。
　　Intendingtopublishhereafterametaphysicofmorals，Iissueinthefirstinstancethesefundamentalprinciples。IndeedthereisproperlynootherfoundationforitthanthecriticalexaminationofapurepracticalReason；justasthatofmetaphysicsisthecriticalexaminationofthepurespeculativereason，alreadypublished。Butinthefirstplacetheformerisnotsoabsolutelynecessaryasthelatter，becauseinmoralconcernshumanreasoncaneasilybebroughttoahighdegreeofcorrectnessandcompleteness，eveninthecommonestunderstanding，whileonthecontraryinitstheoreticbutpureuseitiswhollydialectical；andinthesecondplaceifthecritiqueofapurepracticalreasonistobecomplete，itmustbepossibleatthesametimetoshowitsidentitywiththespeculativereasoninacommonprinciple，foritcanultimatelybeonlyoneandthesamereasonwhichhastobedistinguishedmerelyinitsapplication。Icouldnot，however，bringittosuchcompletenesshere，withoutintroducingconsiderationsofawhollydifferentkind，whichwouldbeperplexingtothereader。OnthisaccountIhaveadoptedthetitleofFundamentalPrinciplesoftheMetaphysicofMoralsinsteadofthatofaCriticalExaminationofthepurepracticalreason。
　　Butinthethirdplace，sinceametaphysicofmorals，inspiteofthediscouragingtitle，isyetcapableofbeingpresentedinpopularform，andoneadaptedtothecommonunderstanding，Ifinditusefultoseparatefromitthispreliminarytreatiseonitsfundamentalprinciples，inorderthatImaynothereafterhaveneedtointroducethesenecessarilysubtlediscussionsintoabookofamoresimplecharacter。
　　Thepresenttreatiseis，however，nothingmorethantheinvestigationandestablishmentofthesupremeprincipleofmorality，andthisaloneconstitutesastudycompleteinitselfandonewhichoughttobekeptapartfromeveryothermoralinvestigation。
　　Nodoubtmyconclusionsonthisweightyquestion，whichhashithertobeenveryunsatisfactorilyexamined，wouldreceivemuchlightfromtheapplicationofthesameprincipletothewholesystem，andwouldbegreatlyconfirmedbytheadequacywhichitexhibitsthroughout；butImustforegothisadvantage，whichindeedwouldbeafterallmoregratifyingthanuseful，sincetheeasyapplicabilityofaprincipleanditsapparentadequacygivenoverycertainproofofitssoundness，butratherinspireacertainpartiality，whichpreventsusfromexaminingandestimatingitstrictlyinitselfandwithoutregardtoconsequences。
　　IhaveadoptedinthisworkthemethodwhichIthinkmostsuitable，proceedinganalyticallyfromcommonknowledgetothedeterminationofitsultimateprinciple，andagaindescendingsyntheticallyfromtheexaminationofthisprincipleanditssourcestothecommonknowledgeinwhichwefinditemployed。Thedivisionwill，therefore，beasfollows：
　　1FIRSTSECTION。Transitionfromthecommonrationalknowledgeofmoralitytothephilosophical。
　　2SECONDSECTION。Transitionfrompopularmoralphilosophytothemetaphysicofmorals。
　　3THIRDSECTION。Finalstepfromthemetaphysicofmoralstothecritiqueofthepurepracticalreason。
　　FIRSTSECTION
　　TRANSITIONFROMTHECOMMONRATIONALKNOWLEDGE
　　OFMORALITYTOTHEPHILOSOPHICAL
　　Nothingcanpossiblybeconceivedintheworld，orevenoutofit，whichcanbecalledgood，withoutqualification，exceptagoodwill。
　　Intelligence，wit，judgement，andtheothertalentsofthemind，howevertheymaybenamed，orcourage，resolution，perseverance，asqualitiesoftemperament，areundoubtedlygoodanddesirableinmanyrespects；butthesegiftsofnaturemayalsobecomeextremelybadandmischievousifthewillwhichistomakeuseofthem，andwhich，therefore，constituteswhatiscalledcharacter，isnotgood。Itisthesamewiththegiftsoffortune。Power，riches，honour，evenhealth，andthegeneralwell—beingandcontentmentwithone’sconditionwhichiscalledhappiness，inspirepride，andoftenpresumption，ifthereisnotagoodwilltocorrecttheinfluenceoftheseonthemind，andwiththisalsotorectifythewholeprincipleofactingandadaptittoitsend。Thesightofabeingwhoisnotadornedwithasinglefeatureofapureandgoodwill，enjoyingunbrokenprosperity，cannevergivepleasuretoanimpartialrationalspectator。Thusagoodwillappearstoconstitutetheindispensableconditionevenofbeingworthyofhappiness。
　　Thereareevensomequalitieswhichareofservicetothisgoodwillitselfandmayfacilitateitsaction，yetwhichhavenointrinsicunconditionalvalue，butalwayspresupposeagoodwill，andthisqualifiestheesteemthatwejustlyhaveforthemanddoesnotpermitustoregardthemasabsolutelygood。Moderationintheaffectionsandpassions，self—control，andcalmdeliberationarenotonlygoodinmanyrespects，butevenseemtoconstitutepartoftheintrinsicworthoftheperson；buttheyarefarfromdeservingtobecalledgoodwithoutqualification，althoughtheyhavebeensounconditionallypraisedbytheancients。Forwithouttheprinciplesofagoodwill，theymaybecomeextremelybad，andthecoolnessofavillainnotonlymakeshimfarmoredangerous，butalsodirectlymakeshimmoreabominableinoureyesthanhewouldhavebeenwithoutit。
　　Agoodwillisgoodnotbecauseofwhatitperformsoreffects，notbyitsaptnessfortheattainmentofsomeproposedend，butsimplybyvirtueofthevolition；thatis，itisgoodinitself，andconsideredbyitselfistobeesteemedmuchhigherthanallthatcanbebroughtaboutbyitinfavourofanyinclination，nayevenofthesumtotalofallinclinations。Evenifitshouldhappenthat，owingtospecialdisfavouroffortune，ortheniggardlyprovisionofastep—motherlynature，thiswillshouldwhollylackpowertoaccomplishitspurpose，ifwithitsgreatesteffortsitshouldyetachievenothing，andthereshouldremainonlythegoodwill（not，tobesure，amerewish，butthesummoningofallmeansinourpower），then，likeajewel，itwouldstillshinebyitsownlight，asathingwhichhasitswholevalueinitself。Itsusefulnessorfruitfulnesscanneitheraddnortakeawayanythingfromthisvalue。Itwouldbe，asitwere，onlythesettingtoenableustohandleitthemoreconvenientlyincommoncommerce，ortoattracttoittheattentionofthosewhoarenotyetconnoisseurs，butnottorecommendittotrueconnoisseurs，ortodetermineitsvalue。
　　Thereis，however，somethingsostrangeinthisideaoftheabsolutevalueofthemerewill，inwhichnoaccountistakenofitsutility，thatnotwithstandingthethoroughassentofevencommonreasontotheidea，yetasuspicionmustarisethatitmayperhapsreallybetheproductofmerehigh—flownfancy，andthatwemayhavemisunderstoodthepurposeofnatureinassigningreasonasthegovernorofourwill。
　　Thereforewewillexaminethisideafromthispointofview。
　　Inthephysicalconstitutionofanorganizedbeing，thatis，abeingadaptedsuitablytothepurposesoflife，weassumeitasafundamentalprinciplethatnoorganforanypurposewillbefoundbutwhatisalsothefittestandbestadaptedforthatpurpose。Nowinabeingwhichhasreasonandawill，iftheproperobjectofnaturewereitsconservation，itswelfare，inaword，itshappiness，thennaturewouldhavehituponaverybadarrangementinselectingthereasonofthecreaturetocarryoutthispurpose。Foralltheactionswhichthecreaturehastoperformwithaviewtothispurpose，andthewholeruleofitsconduct，wouldbefarmoresurelyprescribedtoitbyinstinct，andthatendwouldhavebeenattainedtherebymuchmorecertainlythanitevercanbebyreason。Shouldreasonhavebeencommunicatedtothisfavouredcreatureoverandabove，itmustonlyhaveservedittocontemplatethehappyconstitutionofitsnature，toadmireit，tocongratulateitselfthereon，andtofeelthankfulforittothebeneficentcause，butnotthatitshouldsubjectitsdesirestothatweakanddelusiveguidanceandmeddlebunglinglywiththepurposeofnature。Inaword，naturewouldhavetakencarethatreasonshouldnotbreakforthintopracticalexercise，norhavethepresumption，withitsweakinsight，tothinkoutforitselftheplanofhappiness，andofthemeansofattainingit。Naturewouldnotonlyhavetakenonherselfthechoiceoftheends，butalsoofthemeans，andwithwiseforesightwouldhaveentrustedbothtoinstinct。
　　And，infact，wefindthatthemoreacultivatedreasonappliesitselfwithdeliberatepurposetotheenjoymentoflifeandhappiness，somuchthemoredoesthemanfailoftruesatisfaction。Andfromthiscircumstancetherearisesinmany，iftheyarecandidenoughtoconfessit，acertaindegreeofmisology，thatis，hatredofreason，especiallyinthecaseofthosewhoaremostexperiencedintheuseofit，becauseaftercalculatingalltheadvantagestheyderive，Idonotsayfromtheinventionofalltheartsofcommonluxury，butevenfromthesciences（whichseemtothemtobeafterallonlyaluxuryoftheunderstanding），theyfindthattheyhave，infact，onlybroughtmoretroubleontheirshoulders。ratherthangainedinhappiness；
　　andtheyendbyenvying，ratherthandespising，themorecommonstampofmenwhokeepclosertotheguidanceofmereinstinctanddonotallowtheirreasonmuchinfluenceontheirconduct。Andthiswemustadmit，thatthejudgementofthosewhowouldverymuchlowertheloftyeulogiesoftheadvantageswhichreasongivesusinregardtothehappinessandsatisfactionoflife，orwhowouldevenreducethembelowzero，isbynomeansmoroseorungratefultothegoodnesswithwhichtheworldisgoverned，butthatthereliesattherootofthesejudgementstheideathatourexistencehasadifferentandfarnoblerend，forwhich，andnotforhappiness，reasonisproperlyintended，andwhichmust，therefore，beregardedasthesupremeconditiontowhichtheprivateendsofmanmust，forthemostpart，bepostponed。
　　Forasreasonisnotcompetenttoguidethewillwithcertaintyinregardtoitsobjectsandthesatisfactionofallourwants（whichittosomeextentevenmultiplies），thisbeinganendtowhichanimplantedinstinctwouldhaveledwithmuchgreatercertainty；andsince，nevertheless，reasonisimpartedtousasapracticalfaculty，i。e。，asonewhichistohaveinfluenceonthewill，therefore，admittingthatnaturegenerallyinthedistributionofhercapacitieshasadaptedthemeanstotheend，itstruedestinationmustbetoproduceawill，notmerelygoodasameanstosomethingelse，butgoodinitself，forwhichreasonwasabsolutelynecessary。Thiswillthen，thoughnotindeedthesoleandcompletegood，mustbethesupremegoodandtheconditionofeveryother，evenofthedesireofhappiness。Underthesecircumstances，thereisnothinginconsistentwiththewisdomofnatureinthefactthatthecultivationofthereason，whichisrequisiteforthefirstandunconditionalpurpose，doesinmanywaysinterfere，atleastinthislife，withtheattainmentofthesecond，whichisalwaysconditional，namely，happiness。Nay，itmayevenreduceittonothing，withoutnaturetherebyfailingofherpurpose。Forreasonrecognizestheestablishmentofagoodwillasitshighestpracticaldestination，andinattainingthispurposeiscapableonlyofasatisfactionofitsownproperkind，namelythatfromtheattainmentofanend，whichendagainisdeterminedbyreasononly，notwithstandingthatthismayinvolvemanyadisappointmenttotheendsofinclination。
　　Wehavethentodevelopthenotionofawillwhichdeservestobehighlyesteemedforitselfandisgoodwithoutaviewtoanythingfurther，anotionwhichexistsalreadyinthesoundnaturalunderstanding，requiringrathertobeclearedupthantobetaught，andwhichinestimatingthevalueofouractionsalwaystakesthefirstplaceandconstitutestheconditionofalltherest。Inordertodothis，wewilltakethenotionofduty，whichincludesthatofagoodwill，althoughimplyingcertainsubjectiverestrictionsandhindrances。These，however，farfromconcealingit，orrenderingitunrecognizable，ratherbringitoutbycontrastandmakeitshineforthsomuchthebrighter。
　　Iomithereallactionswhicharealreadyrecognizedasinconsistentwithduty，althoughtheymaybeusefulforthisorthatpurpose，forwiththesethequestionwhethertheyaredonefromdutycannotariseatall，sincetheyevenconflictwithit。Ialsosetasidethoseactionswhichreallyconformtoduty，buttowhichmenhavenodirectinclination，performingthembecausetheyareimpelledtheretobysomeotherinclination。Forinthiscasewecanreadilydistinguishwhethertheactionwhichagreeswithdutyisdonefromduty，orfromaselfishview。Itismuchhardertomakethisdistinctionwhentheactionaccordswithdutyandthesubjecthasbesidesadirectinclinationtoit。Forexample，itisalwaysamatterofdutythatadealershouldnotoverchargeaninexperiencedpurchaser；andwhereverthereismuchcommercetheprudenttradesmandoesnotovercharge，butkeepsafixedpriceforeveryone，sothatachildbuysofhimaswellasanyother。Menarethushonestlyserved；butthisisnotenoughtomakeusbelievethatthetradesmanhassoactedfromdutyandfromprinciplesofhonesty：hisownadvantagerequiredit；itisoutofthequestioninthiscasetosupposethathemightbesideshaveadirectinclinationinfavourofthebuyers，sothat，asitwere，fromloveheshouldgivenoadvantagetooneoveranother。Accordinglytheactionwasdoneneitherfromdutynorfromdirectinclination，butmerelywithaselfishview。
　　Ontheotherhand，itisadutytomaintainone’slife；and，inaddition，everyonehasalsoadirectinclinationtodoso。Butonthisaccounttheofanxiouscarewhichmostmentakeforithasnointrinsicworth，andtheirmaximhasnomoralimport。Theypreservetheirlifeasdutyrequires，nodoubt，butnotbecausedutyrequires。Ontheotherband，ifadversityandhopelesssorrowhavecompletelytakenawaytherelishforlife；iftheunfortunateone，stronginmind，indignantathisfateratherthandespondingordejected，wishesfordeath，andyetpreserveshislifewithoutlovingit—notfrominclinationorfear，butfromduty—thenhismaximhasamoralworth。
　　Tobebeneficentwhenwecanisaduty；andbesidesthis，therearemanymindssosympatheticallyconstitutedthat，withoutanyothermotiveofvanityorself—interest，theyfindapleasureinspreadingjoyaroundthemandcantakedelightinthesatisfactionofotherssofarasitistheirownwork。ButImaintainthatinsuchacaseanactionofthiskind，howeverproper，howeveramiableitmaybe，basneverthelessnotruemoralworth，butisonalevelwithotherinclinations，e。g。，theinclinationtohonour，which，ifitishappilydirectedtothatwhichisinfactofpublicutilityandaccordantwithdutyandconsequentlyhonourable，deservespraiseandencouragement，butnotesteem。Forthemaximlacksthemoralimport，namely，thatsuchactionsbedonefromduty，notfrominclination。Putthecasethatthemindofthatphilanthropistwerecloudedbysorrowofhisown，extinguishingallsympathywiththelotofothers，andthat，whilehestillhasthepowertobenefitothersindistress，heisnottouchedbytheirtroublebecauseheisabsorbedwithhisown；
　　andnowsupposethathetearshimselfoutofthisdeadinsensibility，andperformstheactionwithoutanyinclinationtoit，butsimplyfromduty，thenfirsthashisactionitsgenuinemoralworth。Furtherstill；ifnaturebasputlittlesympathyintheheartofthisorthatman；ifhe，supposedtobeanuprightman，isbytemperamentcoldandindifferenttothesufferingsofothers，perhapsbecauseinrespectofhisownheisprovidedwiththespecialgiftofpatienceandfortitudeandsupposes，orevenrequires，thatothersshouldhavethesame—andsuchamanwouldcertainlynotbethemeanestproductofnature—butifnaturehadnotspeciallyframedhimforaphilanthropist，wouldhenotstillfindinhimselfasourcefromwhencetogivehimselfafarhigherworththanthatofagood—naturedtemperamentcouldbe？Unquestionably。Itisjustinthisthatthemoralworthofthecharacterisbroughtoutwhichisincomparablythehighestofall，namely，thatheisbeneficent，notfrominclination，butfromduty。
　　Tosecureone’sownhappinessisaduty，atleastindirectly；fordiscontentwithone’scondition，underapressureofmanyanxietiesandamidstunsatisfiedwants，mighteasilybecomeagreattemptationtotransgressionofduty。Buthereagain，withoutlookingtoduty，allmenhavealreadythestrongestandmostintimateinclinationtohappiness，becauseitisjustinthisideathatallinclinationsarecombinedinonetotal。Butthepreceptofhappinessisoftenofsuchasortthatitgreatlyinterfereswithsomeinclinations，andyetamancannotformanydefiniteandcertainconceptionofthesumofsatisfactionofallofthemwhichiscalledhappiness。Itisnotthentobewonderedatthatasingleinclination，definitebothastowhatitpromisesandastothetimewithinwhichitcanbegratified，isoftenabletoovercomesuchafluctuatingidea，andthatagoutypatient，forinstance，canchoosetoenjoywhathelikes，andtosufferwhathemay，since，accordingtohiscalculation，onthisoccasionatleast，behasnotsacrificedtheenjoymentofthepresentmomenttoapossiblymistakenexpectationofahappinesswhichissupposedtobefoundinhealth。Buteveninthiscase，ifthegeneraldesireforhappinessdidnotinfluencehiswill，andsupposingthatinhisparticularcasehealthwasnotanecessaryelementinthiscalculation，thereyetremainsinthis，asinallothercases，thislaw，namely，thatheshouldpromotehishappinessnotfrominclinationbutfromduty，andbythiswouldhisconductfirstacquiretruemoralworth。
　　Itisinthismanner，undoubtedly，thatwearetounderstandthosepassagesofScripturealsoinwhichwearecommandedtoloveourneighbour，evenourenemy。Forlove，asanaffection，cannotbecommanded，butbeneficenceforduty’ssakemay；eventhoughwearenotimpelledtoitbyanyinclination—nay，areevenrepelledbyanaturalandunconquerableaversion。Thisispracticalloveandnotpathological—alovewhichisseatedinthewill，andnotinthepropensionsofsense—inprinciplesofactionandnotoftendersympathy；anditisthislovealonewhichcanbecommanded。
　　Thesecondpropositionis：Thatanactiondonefromdutyderivesitsmoralworth，notfromthepurposewhichistobeattainedbyit，butfromthemaximbywhichitisdetermined，andthereforedoesnotdependontherealizationoftheobjectoftheaction，butmerelyontheprincipleofvolitionbywhichtheactionhastakenplace，withoutregardtoanyobjectofdesire。Itisclearfromwhatprecedesthatthepurposeswhichwemayhaveinviewinouractions，ortheireffectsregardedasendsandspringsofthewill，cannotgivetoactionsanyunconditionalormoralworth。Inwhat，then，cantheirworthlie，ifitisnottoconsistinthewillandinreferencetoitsexpectedeffect？Itcannotlieanywherebutintheprincipleofthewillwithoutregardtotheendswhichcanbeattainedbytheaction。
　　Forthewillstandsbetweenitsaprioriprinciple，whichisformal，anditsaposteriorispring，whichismaterial，asbetweentworoads，andasitmustbedeterminedbysomething，itthatitmustbedeterminedbytheformalprincipleofvolitionwhenanactionisdonefromduty，inwhichcaseeverymaterialprinciplehasbeenwithdrawnfromit。
　　Thethirdproposition，whichisaconsequenceofthetwopreceding，IwouldexpressthusDutyisthenecessityofactingfromrespectforthelaw。Imayhaveinclinationforanobjectastheeffectofmyproposedaction，butIcannothaverespectforit，justforthisreason，thatitisaneffectandnotanenergyofwill。
　　SimilarlyIcannothaverespectforinclination，whethermyownoranother’s；Icanatmost，ifmyown，approveit；ifanother’s，sometimesevenloveit；i。e。，lookonitasfavourabletomyowninterest。Itisonlywhatisconnectedwithmywillasaprinciple，bynomeansasaneffect—whatdoesnotsubservemyinclination，butoverpowersit，oratleastincaseofchoiceexcludesitfromitscalculation—inotherwords，simplythelawofitself，whichcanbeanobjectofrespect，andhenceacommand。Nowanactiondonefromdutymustwhollyexcludetheinfluenceofinclinationandwithiteveryobjectofthewill，sothatnothingremainswhichcandeterminethewillexceptobjectivelythelaw，andsubjectivelypurerespectforthispracticallaw，andconsequentlythemaxim*thatIshouldfollowthislaweventothethwartingofallmyinclinations。
　　*Amaximisthesubjectiveprincipleofvolition。Theobjectiveprinciple（i。e。，thatwhichwouldalsoservesubjectivelyasapracticalprincipletoallrationalbeingsifreasonhadfullpoweroverthefacultyofdesire）isthepracticallaw。
　　Thusthemoralworthofanactiondoesnotlieintheeffectexpectedfromit，norinanyprincipleofactionwhichrequirestoborrowitsmotivefromthisexpectedeffect。Foralltheseeffects—
　　agreeablenessofone’sconditionandeventhepromotionofthehappinessofothers—couldhavebeenalsobroughtaboutbyothercauses，sothatforthistherewouldhavebeennoneedofthewillofarationalbeing；whereasitisinthisalonethatthesupremeandunconditionalgoodcanbefound。Thepre—eminentgoodwhichwecallmoralcanthereforeconsistinnothingelsethantheconceptionoflawinitself，whichcertainlyisonlypossibleinarationalbeing，insofarasthisconception，andnottheexpectedeffect，determinesthewill。Thisisagoodwhichisalreadypresentinthepersonwhoactsaccordingly，andwehavenottowaitforittoappearfirstintheresult。*
　　*ItmightbehereobjectedtomethatItakerefugebehindthewordrespectinanobscurefeeling，insteadofgivingadistinctsolutionofthequestionbyaconceptofthereason。Butalthoughrespectisafeeling，itisnotafeelingreceivedthroughinfluence，butisself—wroughtbyarationalconcept，and，therefore，isspecificallydistinctfromallfeelingsoftheformerkind，whichmaybereferredeithertoinclinationorfear，WhatI
　　recogniseimmediatelyasalawforme，Irecognisewithrespect。
　　Thismerelysignifiestheconsciousnessthatmywillissubordinatetoalaw，withouttheinterventionofotherinfluencesonmysense。Theimmediatedeterminationofthewillbythelaw，andtheconsciousnessofthis，iscalledrespect，sothatthisisregardedasaneffectofthelawonthesubject，andnotasthecauseofit。
　　Respectisproperlytheconceptionofaworthwhichthwartsmyself—love。Accordinglyitissomethingwhichisconsideredneitherasanobjectofinclinationnoroffear，althoughithassomethinganalogoustoboth。Theobjectofrespectisthelawonly，andthatthelawwhichweimposeonourselvesandyetrecogniseasnecessaryinitself。Asalaw，wearesubjectedtooitwithoutconsultingself—love；asimposedbyusonourselves，itisaresultofourwill。Intheformeraspectithasananalogytofear，inthelattertoinclination。Respectforapersonisproperlyonlyrespectforthelaw（ofhonesty，etc。）ofwhichhegivesusanexample。Sincewealsolookontheimprovementofourtalentsasaduty，weconsiderthatweseeinapersonoftalents，asitwere，theexampleofalaw（viz。，tobecomelikehiminthisbyexercise），andthisconstitutesourrespect。Allso—calledmoralinterestconsistssimplyinrespectforthelaw。
　　Butwhatsortoflawcanthatbe，theconceptionofwhichmustdeterminethewill，evenwithoutpayinganyregardtotheeffectexpectedfromit，inorderthatthiswillmaybecalledgoodabsolutelyandwithoutqualification？AsIhavedeprivedthewillofeveryimpulsewhichcouldarisetoitfromobediencetoanylaw，thereremainsnothingbuttheuniversalconformityofitsactionstolawingeneral，whichaloneistoservethewillasaprinciple，i。e。，I
　　amnevertoactotherwisethansothatIcouldalsowillthatmymaximshouldbecomeauniversallaw。Here，now，itisthesimpleconformitytolawingeneral，withoutassuminganyparticularlawapplicabletocertainactions，thatservesthewillasitsprincipleandmustsoserveit，ifdutyisnottobeavaindelusionandachimericalnotion。Thecommonreasonofmeninitspracticaljudgementsperfectlycoincideswiththisandalwayshasinviewtheprincipleheresuggested。Letthequestionbe，forexample：MayIwhenindistressmakeapromisewiththeintentionnottokeepit？I
　　readilydistinguishherebetweenthetwosignificationswhichthequestionmayhave：Whetheritisprudent，orwhetheritisright，tomakeafalsepromise？Theformermayundoubtedlyofbethecase。Iseeclearlyindeedthatitisnotenoughtoextricatemyselffromapresentdifficultybymeansofthissubterfuge，butitmustbewellconsideredwhethertheremaynothereafterspringfromthisliemuchgreaterinconveniencethanthatfromwhichInowfreemyself，andas，withallmysupposedcunning，theconsequencescannotbesoeasilyforeseenbutthatcreditoncelostmaybemuchmoreinjurioustomethananymischiefwhichIseektoavoidatpresent，itshouldbeconsideredwhetheritwouldnotbemoreprudenttoacthereinaccordingtoauniversalmaximandtomakeitahabittopromisenothingexceptwiththeintentionofkeepingit。Butitissooncleartomethatsuchamaximwillstillonlybebasedonthefearofconsequences。Nowitisawhollydifferentthingtobetruthfulfromdutyandtobesofromapprehensionofinjuriousconsequences。Inthefirstcase，theverynotionoftheactionalreadyimpliesalawforme；inthesecondcase，Imustfirstlookaboutelsewheretoseewhatresultsmaybecombinedwithitwhichwouldaffectmyself。Fortodeviatefromtheprincipleofdutyisbeyondalldoubtwicked；buttobeunfaithfultomymaximofprudencemayoftenbeveryadvantageoustome，althoughtoabidebyitiscertainlysafer。Theshortestway，however，andanunerringone，todiscovertheanswertothisquestionwhetheralyingpromiseisconsistentwithduty，istoaskmyself，"ShouldIbecontentthatmymaxim（toextricatemyselffromdifficultybyafalsepromise）shouldholdgoodasauniversallaw，formyselfaswellasforothers？andshouldIbeabletosaytomyself，"Everyonemaymakeadeceitfulpromisewhenhefindshimselfinadifficultyfromwhichhecannototherwiseextricatehimself？"ThenIpresentlybecomeawarethatwhileIcanwillthelie，Icanbynomeanswillthatlyingshouldbeauniversallaw。Forwithsuchalawtherewouldbenopromisesatall，sinceitwouldbeinvaintoallegemyintentioninregardtomyfutureactionstothosewhowouldnotbelievethisallegation，oriftheyoverhastilydidsowouldpaymebackinmyowncoin。Hencemymaxim，assoonasitshouldbemadeauniversallaw，wouldnecessarilydestroyitself。
　　Idonot，therefore，needanyfar—reachingpenetrationtodiscernwhatIhavetodoinorderthatmywillmaybemorallygood。
　　Inexperiencedinthecourseoftheworld，incapableofbeingpreparedforallitscontingencies，Ionlyaskmyself：Canstthoualsowillthatthymaximshouldbeauniversallaw？Ifnot，thenitmustberejected，andthatnotbecauseofadisadvantageaccruingfromittomyselforeventoothers，butbecauseitcannotenterasaprincipleintoapossibleuniversallegislation，andreasonextortsfrommeimmediaterespectforsuchlegislation。Idonotindeedasyetdiscernonwhatthisrespectisbased（thisthephilosophermayinquire），butatleastIunderstandthis，thatitisanestimationoftheworthwhichfaroutweighsallworthofwhatisrecommendedbyinclination，andthatthenecessityofactingfrompurerespectforthepracticallawiswhatconstitutesduty，towhicheveryothermotivemustgiveplace，becauseitistheconditionofawillbeinggoodinitself，andtheworthofsuchawillisaboveeverything。
　　Thus，then，withoutquittingthemoralknowledgeofcommonhumanreason，wehavearrivedatitsprinciple。Andalthough，nodoubt，commonmendonotconceiveitinsuchanabstractanduniversalform，yettheyalwayshaveitreallybeforetheireyesanduseitasthestandardoftheirdecision。Hereitwouldbeeasytoshowhow，withthiscompassinhand，menarewellabletodistinguish，ineverycasethatoccurs，whatisgood，whatbad，conformablytodutyorinconsistentwithit，if，withoutintheleastteachingthemanythingnew，weonly，likeSocrates，directtheirattentiontotheprincipletheythemselvesemploy；andthat，therefore，wedonotneedscienceandphilosophytoknowwhatweshoulddotobehonestandgood，yea，evenwiseandvirtuous。Indeedwemightwellhaveconjecturedbeforehandthattheknowledgeofwhateverymanisboundtodo，andthereforealsotoknow，wouldbewithinthereachofeveryman，eventhecommonest。Herewecannotforbearadmirationwhenweseehowgreatanadvantagethepracticaljudgementhasoverthetheoreticalinthecommonunderstandingofmen。Inthelatter，ifcommonreasonventurestodepartfromthelawsofexperienceandfromtheperceptionsofthesenses，itfallsintomereinconceivabilitiesandself—contradictions，atleastintoachaosofuncertainty，obscurity，andinstability。Butinthepracticalsphereitisjustwhenthecommonunderstandingexcludesallsensiblespringsfrompracticallawsthatitspowerofjudgementbeginstoshowitselftoadvantage。Itthenbecomesevensubtle，whetheritbethatitchicaneswithitsownconscienceorwithotherclaimsrespectingwhatistobecalledright，orwhetheritdesiresforitsowninstructiontodeterminehonestlytheworthofactions；and，inthelattercase，itmayevenhaveasgoodahopeofhittingthemarkasanyphilosopherwhatevercanpromisehimself。Nay，itisalmostmoresureofdoingso，becausethephilosophercannothaveanyotherprinciple，whilehemayeasilyperplexhisjudgementbyamultitudeofconsiderationsforeigntothematter，andsoturnasidefromtherightway。Woulditnotthereforebewiserinmoralconcernstoacquiesceinthejudgementofcommonreason，oratmostonlytocallinphilosophyforthepurposeofrenderingthesystemofmoralsmorecompleteandintelligible，anditsrulesmoreconvenientforuse（especiallyfordisputation），butnotsoastodrawoffthecommonunderstandingfromitshappysimplicity，ortobringitbymeansofphilosophyintoanewpathofinquiryandinstruction？
　　Innocenceisindeedagloriousthing；only，ontheotherhand，itisverysadthatitcannotwellmaintainitselfandiseasilyseduced。Onthisaccountevenwisdom—whichotherwiseconsistsmoreinconductthaninknowledge—yethasneedofscience，notinordertolearnfromit，buttosecureforitspreceptsadmissionandpermanence。Againstallthecommandsofdutywhichreasonrepresentstomanassodeservingofrespect，hefeelsinhimselfapowerfulcounterpoiseinhiswantsandinclinations，theentiresatisfactionofwhichhesumsupunderthenameofhappiness。Nowreasonissuesitscommandsunyieldingly，withoutpromisinganythingtotheinclinations，and，asitwere，withdisregardandcontemptfortheseclaims，whicharesoimpetuous，andatthesametimesoplausible，andwhichwillnotallowthemselvestobesuppressedbyanycommand。Hencetherearisesanaturaldialectic，i。e。，adisposition，toargueagainstthesestrictlawsofdutyandtoquestiontheirvalidity，oratleasttheirpurityandstrictness；and，ifpossible，tomakethemmoreaccordantwithourwishesandinclinations，thatistosay，tocorruptthemattheirverysource，andentirelytodestroytheirworth—athingwhichevencommonpracticalreasoncannotultimatelycallgood。
　　Thusisthecommonreasonofmancompelledtogooutofitssphere，andtotakeastepintothefieldofapracticalphilosophy，nottosatisfyanyspeculativewant（whichneveroccurstoitaslongasitiscontenttobemeresoundreason），butevenonpracticalgrounds，inordertoattaininitinformationandclearinstructionrespectingthesourceofitsprinciple，andthecorrectdeterminationofitinoppositiontothemaximswhicharebasedonwantsandinclinations，sothatitmayescapefromtheperplexityofoppositeclaimsandnotruntheriskoflosingallgenuinemoralprinciplesthroughtheequivocationintowhichiteasilyfalls。
　　Thus，whenpracticalreasoncultivatesitself，thereinsensiblyarisesinitadialeticwhichforcesittoseekaidinphilosophy，justashappenstoitinitstheoreticuse；andinthiscase，therefore，aswellasintheother，itwillfindrestnowherebutinathoroughcriticalexaminationofourreason。
　　SECONDSECTION
　　TRANSITIONFROMPOPULARMORALPHILOSOPHY
　　TOTHEMETAPHYSICOFMORALS
　　Ifwehavehithertodrawnournotionofdutyfromthecommonuseofourpracticalreason，itisbynomeanstobeinferredthatwehavetreateditasanempiricalnotion。Onthecontrary，ifweattendtotheexperienceofmen’sconduct，wemeetfrequentand，asweourselvesallow，justcomplaintsthatonecannotfindasinglecertainexampleofthedispositiontoactfrompureduty。Althoughmanythingsaredoneinconformitywithwhatdutyprescribes，itisneverthelessalwaysdoubtfulwhethertheyaredonestrictlyfromduty，soastohaveamoralworth。Hencetherehaveatalltimesbeenphilosopherswhohavealtogetherdeniedthatthisdispositionactuallyexistsatallinhumanactions，andhaveascribedeverythingtoamoreorlessrefinedself—love。Notthattheyhaveonthataccountquestionedthesoundnessoftheconceptionofmorality；onthecontrary，theyspokewithsincereregretofthefrailtyandcorruptionofhumannature，which，thoughnobleenoughtotakeitsruleanideasoworthyofrespect，isyetweaktofollowitandemploysreasonwhichoughttogiveitthelawonlyforthepurposeofprovidingfortheinterestoftheinclinations，whethersinglyoratthebestinthegreatestpossibleharmonywithoneanother。
　　Infact，itisabsolutelyimpossibletomakeoutbyexperiencewithcompletecertaintyasinglecaseinwhichthemaximofanaction，howeverrightinitself，restedsimplyonmoralgroundsandontheconceptionofduty。Sometimesithappensthatwiththesharpestself—examinationwecanfindnothingbesidethemoralprincipleofdutywhichcouldhavebeenpowerfulenoughtomoveustothisorthatactionandtosogreatasacrifice；yetwecannotfromthisinferwithcertaintythatitwasnotreallysomesecretimpulseofself—love，underthefalseappearanceofduty，thatwastheactualdeterminingcauseofthewill。Welikethemtoflatterourselvesbyfalselytakingcreditforamorenoblemotive；whereasinfactwecannever，evenbythestrictestexamination，getcompletelybehindthesecretspringsofaction；since，whenthequestionisofmoralworth，itisnotwiththeactionswhichweseethatweareconcerned，butwiththoseinwardprinciplesofthemwhichwedonotsee。
　　Moreover，wecannotbetterservethewishesofthosewhoridiculeallmoralityasamerechimeraofhumanimaginationoversteppingitselffromvanity，thanbyconcedingtothemthatnotionsofdutymustbedrawnonlyfromexperience（asfromindolence，peoplearereadytothinkisalsothecasewithallothernotions）；fororistoprepareforthemacertaintriumph。Iamwillingtoadmitoutofloveofhumanitythatevenmostofouractionsarecorrect，butifwelookcloseratthemweeverywherecomeuponthedearselfwhichisalwaysprominent，anditisthistheyhaveinviewandnotthestrictcommandofdutywhichwouldoftenrequireself—denial。
　　Withoutbeinganenemyofvirtue，acoolobserver，onethatdoesnotmistakethewishforgood，howeverlively，foritsreality，maysometimesdoubtwhethertruevirtueisactuallyfoundanywhereintheworld，andthisespeciallyasyearsincreaseandthejudgementispartlymadewiserbyexperienceandpartly，also，moreacuteinobservation。Thisbeingso，nothingcansecureusfromfallingawayaltogetherfromourideasofduty，ormaintaininthesoulawell—groundedrespectforitslaw，buttheclearconvictionthatalthoughthereshouldneverhavebeenactionswhichreallysprangfromsuchpuresources，yetwhetherthisorthattakesplaceisnotatallthequestion；butthatreasonofitself，independentonallexperience，ordainswhatoughttotakeplace，thataccordinglyactionsofwhichperhapstheworldhashithertonevergivenanexample，thefeasibilityevenofwhichmightbeverymuchdoubtedbyonewhofoundseverythingonexperience，areneverthelessinflexiblycommandedbyreason；that，e。g。，eventhoughtheremightneveryethavebeenasincerefriend，yetnotawhitthelessispuresincerityinfriendshiprequiredofeveryman，because，priortoallexperience，thisdutyisinvolvedasdutyintheideaofareasondeterminingthewillbyaprioriprinciples。
　　Whenweaddfurtherthat，unlesswedenythatthenotionofmoralityhasanytruthorreferencetoanypossibleobject，wemustadmitthatitslawmustbevalid，notmerelyformenbutforallrationalcreaturesgenerally，notmerelyundercertaincontingentconditionsorwithexceptionsbutwithabsolutenecessity，thenitisclearthatnoexperiencecouldenableustoinfereventhepossibilityofsuchapodeicticlaws。Forwithwhatrightcouldwebringintounboundedrespectasauniversalpreceptforeveryrationalnaturethatwhichperhapsholdsonlyunderthecontingentconditionsofhumanity？Orhowcouldlawsofthedeterminationofourwillberegardedaslawsofthedeterminationofthewillofrationalbeingsgenerally，andforusonlyassuch，iftheyweremerelyempiricalanddidnottaketheiroriginwhollyapriorifrompurebutpracticalreason？
　　Norcouldanythingbemorefataltomoralitythanthatweshouldwishtoderiveitfromexamples。Foreveryexampleofitthatissetbeforememustbefirstitselftestedbyprinciplesofmorality，whetheritisworthytoserveasanoriginalexample，i。e。，asapattern；butbynomeanscanitauthoritativelyfurnishtheconceptionofmorality。EventheHolyOneoftheGospelsmustfirstbecomparedwithouridealofmoralperfectionbeforewecanrecogniseHimassuch；andsoHesaysofHimself，"WhycallyeMe（whomyousee）
　　good；noneisgood（themodelofgood）butGodonly（whomyedonotsee）？"ButwhencehavewetheconceptionofGodasthesupremegood？
　　Simplyfromtheideaofmoralperfection，whichreasonframesaprioriandconnectsinseparablywiththenotionofafreewill。Imitationfindsnoplaceatallinmorality，andexamplesserveonlyforencouragement，i。e。，theyputbeyonddoubtthefeasibilityofwhatthelawcommands，theymakevisiblethatwhichthepracticalruleexpressesmoregenerally，buttheycanneverauthorizeustosetasidethetrueoriginalwhichliesinreasonandtoguideourselvesbyexamples。
　　Ifthenthereisnogenuinesupremeprincipleofmoralitybutwhatmustrestsimplyonpurereason，independentofallexperience，I
　　thinkitisnotnecessaryeventoputthequestionwhetheritisgoodtoexhibittheseconceptsintheirgenerality（inabstracto）astheyareestablishedapriorialongwiththeprinciplesbelongingtothem，ifourknowledgeistobedistinguishedfromthevulgarandtobecalledphilosophical。
　　Inourtimesindeedthismightperhapsbenecessary；forifwecollectedvoteswhetherpurerationalknowledgeseparatedfromeverythingempirical，thatistosay，metaphysicofmorals，orwhetherpopularpracticalphilosophyistobepreferred，itiseasytoguesswhichsidewouldpreponderate。
　　Thisdescendingtopopularnotionsiscertainlyverycommendable，iftheascenttotheprinciplesofpurereasonhasfirsttakenplaceandbeensatisfactorilyaccomplished。Thisimpliesthatwefirstfoundethicsonmetaphysics，andthen，whenitisfirmlyestablished，procureahearingforitbygivingitapopularcharacter。Butitisquiteabsurdtotrytobepopularinthefirstinquiry，onwhichthesoundnessoftheprinciplesdepends。Itisnotonlythatthisproceedingcanneverlayclaimtotheveryraremeritofatruephilosophicalpopularity，sincethereisnoartinbeingintelligibleifonerenouncesallthoroughnessofinsight；butalsoitproducesadisgustingmedleyofcompiledobservationsandhalf—reasonedprinciples。Shallowpatesenjoythisbecauseitcanbeusedforevery—daychat，butthesagaciousfindinitonlyconfusion，andbeingunsatisfiedandunabletohelpthemselves，theyturnawaytheireyes，whilephilosophers，whoseequitewellthroughthisdelusion，arelittlelistenedtowhentheycallmenoffforatimefromthispretendedpopularity，inorderthattheymightberightfullypopularaftertheyhaveattainedadefiniteinsight。
　　Weneedonlylookattheattemptsofmoralistsinthatfavouritefashion，andweshallfindatonetimethespecialconstitutionofhumannature（including，however，theideaofarationalnaturegenerally），atonetimeperfection，atanotherhappiness，heremoralsense，therefearofGod。alittleofthis，andalittleofthat，inmarvellousmixture，withoutitsoccurringtothemtoaskwhethertheprinciplesofmoralityaretobesoughtintheknowledgeofhumannatureatall（whichwecanhaveonlyfromexperience）；or，ifthisisnotso，iftheseprinciplesaretobefoundaltogetherapriori，freefromeverythingempirical，inpurerationalconceptsonlyandnowhereelse，noteveninthesmallestdegree；thenrathertoadoptthemethodofmakingthisaseparateinquiry，aspurepracticalphilosophy，or（ifonemayuseanamesodecried）asmetaphysicofmorals，*tobringitbyitselftocompleteness，andtorequirethepublic，whichwishesforpopulartreatment，toawaittheissueofthisundertaking。
　　*Justaspuremathematicsaredistinguishedfromapplied，purelogicfromapplied，soifwechoosewemayalsodistinguishpurephilosophyofmorals（metaphysic）fromapplied（viz。，appliedtohumannature）。Bythisdesignationwearealsoatonceremindedthatmoralprinciplesarenotbasedonpropertiesofhumannature，butmustsubsistaprioriofthemselves，whilefromsuchprinciplespracticalrulesmustbecapableofbeingdeducedforeveryrationalnature，andaccordinglyforthatofman。
　　Suchametaphysicofmorals，completelyisolated，notmixedwithanyanthropology，theology，physics，orhyperphysics，andstilllesswithoccultqualities（whichwemightcallhypophysical），isnotonlyanindispensablesubstratumofallsoundtheoreticalknowledgeofduties，butisatthesametimeadesideratumofthehighestimportancetotheactualfulfilmentoftheirprecepts。Forthepureconceptionofduty，unmixedwithanyforeignadditionofempiricalattractions，and，inaword，theconceptionofthemorallaw，exercisesonthehumanheart，bywayofreasonalone（whichfirstbecomesawarewiththisthatitcanofitselfbepractical），aninfluencesomuchmorepowerfulthanallothersprings*whichmaybederivedfromthefieldofexperience，that，intheconsciousnessofitsworth，itdespisesthelatter，andcanbydegreesbecometheirmaster；whereasamixedethics，compoundedpartlyofmotivesdrawnfromfeelingsandinclinations，andpartlyalsoofconceptionsofreason，mustmakethemindwaverbetweenmotiveswhichcannotbebroughtunderanyprinciple，whichleadtogoodonlybymereaccidentandveryoftenalsotoevil。
　　*IhavealetterfromthelateexcellentSulzer，inwhichheasksmewhatcanbethereasonthatmoralinstruction，althoughcontainingmuchthatisconvincingforthereason，yetaccomplishessolittle？MyanswerwaspostponedinorderthatImightmakeitcomplete。Butitissimplythis：thattheteachersthemselveshavenotgottheirownnotionsclear，andwhentheyendeavourtomakeupforthisbyrakingupmotivesofmoralgoodnessfromeveryquarter，tryingtomaketheirphysicrightstrong，theyspoilit。Forthecommonestunderstandingshowsthatifweimagine，ontheonehand，anactofhonestydonewithsteadfastmind，apartfromeveryviewtoadvantageofanykindinthisworldoranother，andevenunderthegreatesttemptationsofnecessityorallurement，and，ontheotherhand，asimilaractwhichwasaffected，inhoweverlowadegree，byaforeignmotive，theformerleavesfarbehindandeclipsesthesecond；itelevatesthesoulandinspiresthewishtobeabletoactinlikemanneroneself。Evenmoderatelyyoungchildrenfeelthisimpression，anaoneshouldneverrepresentdutiestotheminanyotherlight。
　　Fromwhathasbeensaid，itisclearthatallmoralconceptionshavetheirseatandorigincompletelyaprioriinthereason，andthat，moreover，inthecommonestreasonjustastrulyasinthatwhichisinthehighestdegreespeculative；thattheycannotbeobtainedbyabstractionfromanyempirical，andthereforemerelycontingent，knowledge；thatitisjustthispurityoftheiroriginthatmakesthemworthytoserveasoursupremepracticalprinciple，andthatjustinproportionasweaddanythingempirical，wedetractfromtheirgenuineinfluenceandfromtheabsolutevalueofactions；thatitisnotonlyofthegreatestnecessity，inapurelyspeculativepointofview，butisalsoofthegreatestpracticalimportance，toderivethesenotionsandlawsfrompurereason，topresentthempureandunmixed，andeventodeterminethecompassofthispracticalorpurerationalknowledge，i。e。，todeterminethewholefacultyofpurepracticalreason；and，indoingso，wemustnotmakeitsprinciplesdependentontheparticularnatureofhumanreason，thoughinspeculativephilosophythismaybepermitted，ormayevenattimesbenecessary；
　　butsincemorallawsoughttoholdgoodforeveryrationalcreature，wemustderivethemfromthegeneralconceptofarationalbeing。Inthisway，althoughforitsapplicationtomanmoralityhasneedofanthropology，yet，inthefirstinstance，wemusttreatitindependentlyaspurephilosophy，i。e。，asmetaphysic，completeinitself（athingwhichinsuchdistinctbranchesofscienceiseasilydone）；knowingwellthatunlessweareinpossessionofthis，itwouldnotonlybevaintodeterminethemoralelementofdutyinrightactionsforpurposesofspeculativecriticism，butitwouldbeimpossibletobasemoralsontheirgenuineprinciples，evenforcommonpracticalpurposes，especiallyofmoralinstruction，soastoproducepuremoraldispositions，andtoengraftthemonmen’smindstothepromotionofthegreatestpossiblegoodintheworld。
　　Butinorderthatinthisstudywemaynotmerelyadvancebythenaturalstepsfromthecommonmoraljudgement（inthiscaseveryworthyofrespect）tothephilosophical，ashasbeenalreadydone，butalsofromapopularphilosophy，whichgoesnofurtherthanitcanreachbygropingwiththehelpofexamples，tometaphysic（whichdoesallowitselftobecheckedbyanythingempiricaland，asitmustmeasurethewholeextentofthiskindofrationalknowledge，goesasfarasidealconceptions，whereevenexamplesfailus），wemustfollowandclearlydescribethepracticalfacultyofreason，fromthegeneralrulesofitsdeterminationtothepointwherethenotionofdutyspringsfromit。
　　Everythinginnatureworksaccordingtolaws。Rationalbeingsalonehavethefacultyofactingaccordingtotheconceptionoflaws，thatisaccordingtoprinciples，i。e。，haveawill。Sincethedeductionofactionsfromprinciplesrequiresreason，thewillisnothingbutpracticalreason。Ifreasoninfalliblydeterminesthewill，thentheactionsofsuchabeingwhicharerecognisedasobjectivelynecessaryaresubjectivelynecessaryalso，i。e。，thewillisafacultytochoosethatonlywhichreasonindependentofinclinationrecognisesaspracticallynecessary，i。e。，asgood。Butifreasonofitselfdoesnotsufficientlydeterminethewill，ifthelatterissubjectalsotosubjectiveconditions（particularimpulses）whichdonotalwayscoincidewiththeobjectiveconditions；inaword，ifthewilldoesnotinitselfcompletelyaccordwithreason（whichisactuallythecasewithmen），thentheactionswhichobjectivelyarerecognisedasnecessaryaresubjectivelycontingent，andthedeterminationofsuchawillaccordingtoobjectivelawsisobligation，thatistosay，therelationoftheobjectivelawstoawillthatisnotthoroughlygoodisconceivedasthedeterminationofthewillofarationalbeingbyprinciplesofreason，butwhichthewillfromitsnaturedoesnotofnecessityfollow。
　　Theconceptionofanobjectiveprinciple，insofarasitisobligatoryforawill，iscalledacommand（ofreason），andtheformulaofthecommandiscalledanimperative。
　　Allimperativesareexpressedbythewordought[orshall]，andtherebyindicatetherelationofanobjectivelawofreasontoawill，whichfromitssubjectiveconstitutionisnotnecessarilydeterminedbyit（anobligation）。Theysaythatsomethingwouldbegoodtodoortoforbear，buttheysayittoawillwhichdoesnotalwaysdoathingbecauseitisconceivedtobegoodtodoit。Thatispracticallygood，however，whichdeterminesthewillbymeansoftheconceptionsofreason，andconsequentlynotfromsubjectivecauses，butobjectively，thatisonprincipleswhicharevalidforeveryrationalbeingassuch。Itisdistinguishedfromthepleasant，asthatwhichinfluencesthewillonlybymeansofsensationfrommerelysubjectivecauses，validonlyforthesenseofthisorthatone，andnotasaprincipleofreason，whichholdsforeveryone。*
　　*Thedependenceofthedesiresonsensationsiscalledinclination，andthisaccordinglyalwaysindicatesawant。Thedependenceofacontingentlydeterminablewillonprinciplesofreasoniscalledaninterest。Thistherefore，isfoundonlyinthecaseofadependentwillwhichdoesnotalwaysofitselfconformtoreason；intheDivinewillwecannotconceiveanyinterest。Butthehumanwillcanalsotakeaninterestinathingwithoutthereforeactingfrominterest。Theformersignifiesthepracticalinterestintheaction，thelatterthepathologicalintheobjectoftheaction。Theformerindicatesonlydependenceofthewillonprinciplesofreasoninthemselves；thesecond，dependenceonprinciplesofreasonforthesakeofinclination，reasonsupplyingonlythepracticalruleshowtherequirementoftheinclinationmaybesatisfied。Inthefirstcasetheactioninterestsme；inthesecondtheobjectoftheaction（becauseitispleasanttome）。Wehaveseeninthefirstsectionthatinanactiondonefromdutywemustlooknottotheinterestintheobject，butonlytothatintheactionitself，andinitsrationalprinciple（viz。，thelaw）。