Stewartconsidershimselftobeaninductivephilosopherappealingfranklytoexperienceandreason；andwasinpracticeamanofthoroughlyliberalandgenerousfeelings。Hewasheartilyinfavourofprogressasheunderstoodit。Onlyhewillnotsacrificecommonsense；thatistosay，thebeliefswhichareinfactprevalentandcongenialtoexistinginstitutions。Commonsense，ofcourse，condemnsextremes：andiflogicseemstobepushingamantowardsscepticisminphilosophyorrevolutioninpractice，hecanalwaysprotestbytheconvenientdeviceofintuitions。
　　IhavegonesofarinordertoillustratethenatureofthesystemwhichtheUtilitarianstooktobetheantithesisoftheirown。ItmaybefinallyremarkedthatatpresentbothsideswereequallyignorantofcontemporarydevelopmentsofGermanthought。WhenStewartbecameawarethattherewassuchathingasKant’sphilosophy，hetriedtoreaditinaLatinversion。
　　Parr，Imayobserve，apparentlydidnotknowofthisversion，andgaveupthetaskofreadingGerman。Stewart’sexamplewasnotencouraging。Hehadabandonedthe’undertakingindespair’partlyfromthescholasticbarbarismofthestyle，partly’myutterinabilitytocomprehendtheauthor’smeaning。’
　　HerecognisessimilaritybetweenKantandReid，butthinksReid’ssimplestatementofthefactthatspacecannotbederivedfromthesensesmorephilosophicalthanKant’s’superstructureoftechnicalmystery。’57*
　　IhavedweltuponthesideinwhichStewart’sphilosophyapproximatestotheempiricalschool，becausetheUtilitarianswereapttomisconceivetheposition。TheytookStewarttobetheadequaterepresentativeofallwhoacceptedonebranchofaninevitabledilemma。Theacceptanceof’intuitions，’
　　thatis，wastheonlyalternativetothorough-goingacceptanceof’experience。’
　　Theysupposed，too，thatpersonsvaguelydescribedas’KantandtheGermans’
　　taughtsimplyamodificationofthe’intuitionist’view。IhavenoticedhowemphaticallyStewartclaimedtorelyuponexperienceandtobasehisphilosophyuponinductivepsychology，andwassofaradmittingthefirstprinciplesandthegeneralmethodsofhisopponents。TheScottishphilosophy，however，naturallypresenteditselfasanantagonisticforcetotheUtilitarians。
　　The’intuitions’representedtheultimategroundtaken，especiallyinreligiousandethicalquestions，bymenwhowishedtobeatonceliberalphilosophersandyettoavoidrevolutionaryextremes。’Intuitions’hadinanycaseanegativevalue，asprotestsagainstthesufficiencyoftheempiricalanalysis。Itmightbequitetrue，forexample，thatHume’sanalysisofcertainprimarymentalphenomena——ofourbeliefintheexternalworldoroftherelationofcauseandeffect——wasradicallyinsufficient。Hehadnotgivenanadequateexplanationofthefacts。Therecognitionoftheinsufficiencyofhisreasoningwashighlyimportantifonlyasastimulustoinquiry。ItwasawarningtohisandtoHartley’sfollowersthattheyhadnotthoroughlyunravelledtheperplexitybutonlycuttheknot。Butwhentheinsufficiencyoftheexplanationwasinterpretedasademonstrationthatallexplanationwasimpossible，andthe’intuition’anultimate’self-evident’truth，itbecamearefusaltoinquirejustwhereinquirywaswanted；apositivecommandtostopanalysisatanarbitrarypoint；andaroundassertionthattheadversarycouldnothelpbelievingpreciselythedoctrinewhichhealtogetherdeclinedtobelieve。
　　Naturallytheempiricistsrefusedtobowtoanauthoritywhichwassimplysaying，’Don’tinquirefurther，’withoutanygroundfortheprohibitionexceptthe’ipsedixitism’whichdeclaredthatinquirymustbefruitless。Stewart，infact，reallyillustratedtheequivocationbetweenthetwomeaningsof’commonsense。’Ifbythatnameheunderstood，asheprofessedtounderstand，ultimate’lawsofthought，’hispositionwasjustifiableassoonashecouldspecifythelawsandprovethattheywereultimate。Butsofarashevirtuallytookforgrantedthattheaveragebeliefsofintelligentpeopleweresuchlaws，andonthatgroundrefundtoexaminetheevidenceoftheirvalidity，hewasinconsistent，andhispositiononlyinvitedassault。Asafact，I
　　believethathis’intuitions’coveredmanymostdisputablepropositions；
　　andthatthemoreclearlytheywerestated，themoretheyfailedtojustifyhisinterpretations。Hewasnotreallyansweringthemostvitalandcriticalquestions，butimplicitlyreservingthem，andputtinganarbitrarystoptoinvestigationsdesirableonhisownprinciples。
　　TheScottishphilosophywas，however，acceptedinEngland，andmadeaconsiderableimpressioninFrance，asaffordingatenablebarrieragainstscepticism。Itwas，asIhavesaid，inphilosophywhatWhiggismwasinpolitics。
　　LikepoliticalWhiggismitincludedalargeelementofenlightenedandliberalrationalism；butlikeWhiggismitcoveredanaversiontothorough-goinglogic。
　　TheEnglishpoliticianwassuspiciousofabstractprinciples，butcouldcoverhisacceptanceoftraditionandruleofthumbbygeneralphrasesaboutlibertyandtoleration。TheWhiginphilosophyequallyacceptedthetraditionalcreed，sufficientlypurifiedfromcruderelements，andshelteredhisdoctrinebyspeakingof’intuitionsandlawsofthought。’Inbothpositionstherewasreally，Itakeit，agreatdealofsoundpracticalwisdom；buttheyalsoimpliedamarkedreluctancetopushinquirytoofar，andatacitagreementtobecontentwithwhattheUtilitariansdenouncedas’vaguegeneralities’——
　　phrases，thatis，whichmightbeusedeithertoconcealanunderlyingscepticism，orreallytostopshortinthepathwhichledtoscepticism。
　　Inphilosophyasinpolitics，theUtilitariansboastedofbeingthorough-goingRadicals，andhatedcompromises，whichtothemappearedtobesimplyobstructive。
　　Ineednotelaborateapointwhichwillmeetusagain。IfIwerewritingahistoryofthoughtingeneralIshouldhavetonoticeotherwriters，thoughtherewerenoneofmuchdistinction，whofollowedtheteachingofStewartorofhisopponentsoftheHartleyandDarwinschool。Itwouldbenecessaryalsotoinsistuponthegrowinginterestinthephysicalsciences，whichwerebeginningnotonlytomakeenormousadvances，buttoattractpopularattention。Formypurpose，however，itisIthinksufficienttomentionthesewriters，eachofwhomhadaveryspecialrelationtotheUtilitarians。I
　　turn，therefore，toBentham。
　　NOTES：
　　1。Publishedoriginallyin1778；reprintedineditionof{EPSILONPIEPSILON
　　ALPHA}{PITAUEPSILONRHOOMICRONEPSILONNUTAUALPHA}orDiversionsofPurley，byRichardTaylor1829，towhichIrefer。ThefirstpartoftheDiversionsofPurleyappearedin1786；andthesecondpartwithaneweditionofthefirstin1798。
　　2。DiversionsofPurley1829，i，12，131。
　　3。Ibid。，ii，362。Locke’swork，saysProf。MaxMü；llerinhisScienceofThought，p。295，’is，asLangeinhisHistoryofMaterialismrightlyperceived，acritiqueoflanguagewhich，togetherwithKant’sCritiqueofthePureReason，formsthestartingpointofmodernphilosophy。’SeeLange’sMaterialism，1873i，271。
　　4。Ibid。，i，49。
　　5。DiversionsofPurley，i，36，42。
　　6。Ibid。，i，373。
　　7。Ibid。，i，374。
　　8。DiversionsofPurley，ii，18。Cf。Mill’sstatementinAnalysis，i，304，that’abstracttermsareconcretetermswiththeconnotationdropped。’
　　9。Ibid。ii，9，etc。
　　10。Ibid。ii，399。
　　11。Stephens，ii，497。
　　12。LifeofMackintosh，ii，235-57。
　　13。BegunfortheEncyclopediaMetropolitanain1818；andpublishedin1835-37。DugaldStewart’schiefcriticismisinhisEssaysWorks，v，149-188。
　　JohnFearnpublishedhisAnti-Tookein1820。
　　14。NinevolumesofDugaldStewart’sworks，editedbySirW。Hamilton，appearedfrom1854to1856；atenth，includingalifeofStewartbyJ。Veitch，appearedin1858，andaneleventh，withanindextothewhole，in1860。ThechiefbooksaretheElementsofthePhilosophyoftheHumanMindinvols。
　　ii，iiiandiv，originallyin1792，1814，1827；PhilosophicalEssaysinvol。v，originally1810；PhilosophyoftheActiveandMoralPowersofManyvolsviandvii，originallyin1828；DissertationontheProgressofPhilosophyinvol。i；originallyinEncyclopediaBritannica，in1815and1821。ThelecturesonPoliticalEconomyfirstappearedintheWorks，vols。viiiandix。
　　15。Works，vi。’Preface’。
　　16。WorksLifeofReid，x，304-8。
　　17。Reid’sWorksHamilton，p。302。
　　18。Reid’sWorksHamilton，p。88。
　　19。Ibid。206。
　　20。Ibid。267。
　　21。Stewart’sremarksonhislifeofReid。Reid’sWorks，p。12，etc。
　　22。TheWorldasWillandIdeaHaldane&；Kemp，ii，186。Reid’s”Inquiry’
　　headds，istentimesbetterworthreadingthanallthephilosophytogetherwhichhasbeenwrittensinceKant。
　　23。’Weareinspiredwiththesensation，asweareinspiredwiththecorrespondingperception，bymeansunknown。’——Reid’sWorks，188。’This，’saysStewart，’isaplainstatementoffact。’——Stewart’sWorks，ii，111-12。
　　24。SeeRosmini’sOriginofIdeasEnglishTranslationi，p。91，where，thoughsympathisingwithReid’saim，headmitsa’greatblunder。’
　　25。Stewart’sWorks，v。24-53。Hamiltonsaysinanotep。41thatJeffreycandidlyconfessedStewart’sreplytobesatisfactory。
　　26。Ibid。，ii。46。