Therefore，whenitwasknownatWashingtonadayortwolaterthatPortPickenswasinimminentdangerofbeingtakenbytheConfederatesseenote24，LincolninstantlyconcentratedallhisenergiesonthereliefofSumter。Allalonghehadbelievedthatoneofthefortsmustbeheldforthepurposeof“aclearindicationofpolicy，“eveniftheothershouldbegivenup“asamilitarynecessity。“Lincoln，VI，301。Hispurpose，therefore，indecidingontheostentatiousdemonstrationtowardSumterwastogivenoticetothewholecountrythathemadenoconcessionsonthematterofsovereignty。InawayitwashisanswertotheVirginiacompromise。
　　AtlasttheUnionpartyinVirginiasentadelegationtoconferwithLincoln。ItdidnotarriveuntilSumterhadbeenfiredupon。Lincolnreadtothemapreparedstatementofpolicywhichannouncedhisresolutiontomakewar，ifnecessary，toassertthenationalsovereignty。Lincoln，VI，243-245。
　　ThepartofMontgomeryinthistangledepisodeisleastunderstoodofthethree。WithWashingtonMontgomeryhadnoofficialcommunication。BothLincolnandSewardrefusedtorecognizecommissionersoftheConfederategovernmentWhetherSewardasanindividualwentbehindthebackofhimselfasanofficialandpersonallydeceivedthecommissionersisaproblemofhispersonalbiographyandhisprivatemoralsthathasnoplaceinthisdiscussion。BetweenMontgomeryandRichmondtherewasintimateandcordialcommunicationfromthestart。
　　AtfirstMontgomeryappearstohavetakenforgrantedthattheSecessionistpartyatRichmondwassopowerfulthattherewaslittleneedforthenewgovernmenttodoanythingbutwaitButasurprisewasinstoreforitDuringFebruaryandMarchitsagentsreportedawide-spreaddesireintheSouthtocompromiseonprettynearlyanytermsthatwouldnotsurrenderthecentralSouthernideaofstatesovereignty。Thusanillusionofthatday——asofthis——wasexploded，namelytheirresistibilityofeconomicsolidarity。Sentimentalandconstitutionalforceswereprovingmorepowerfulthaneconomics。ThereuponMontgomery’sproblemwastransformed。ItspurposewastobuildaSouthernnationandithadbelievedhithertothateconomicforceshadputintoitshandsthenecessarytools。Nowitmustthrowthemasideandgetpossessionofothers。Itmustevokethosesentimentalandconstitutionalforcesthatsomanyrashstatesmenhavealwaysconsiderednegligible。Consequently，fortheSouthnolessthanfortheNorth，theissuewasspeedilyshiftedfromslaverytosovereignty。Justhowthiswasbroughtaboutwedonotyetknow。Whetheraltogetherthroughforesightandstatesmanlikedeliberation，orinpartatleastthroughwhatmightalmostbecalledaccidentalinfluences，isstillalittleuncertain。Thequestionnarrowsitselftothis：whywasSumterfireduponpreciselywhenitwas？Thereareatleastthreepossibleanswers。
　　1Thatthefiringwasdictatedpurelybymilitarynecessity。
　　AbeliefthatLincolnintendedtoreinforceaswellastosupplySumter，thatifnottakennowitcouldneverbetaken，mayhavebeentheover-masteringideaintheConfederateCabinet。ThereportsoftheCommissionersatWashingtonweretingedthroughoutbythebeliefthatSewardandLincolnwerebothdouble-dealers。Beauregard，incommandatCharleston，reportedthatpilotshadcomeinfromtheseaandtoldhimofFederalwar-shipssightedofftheCarolinacoast。O。R。
　　2Apoliticalmotivewhichto-dayisnotsogenerallyintelligibleasonceitwas，hadgreatweightin1861。Thiswasthesenseofhonorinpolitics。Thosehistorianswhobrushitasideasafigmentlackhistoricalpsychology。ItispossiblethatbothGovernorPickensandtheConfederateCabinetwereanimatedfirstofallbythebeliefthatthehonorofSouthCarolinarequiredthemtowithstandtheattemptofwhattheyheldtobeanalienpower。
　　3Andyet，neitheroftheseexplanations，howevermucheitherorbothmayhavecountedforinmanyminds，givesaconvincingexplanationoftheagitationofToornbsintheCabinetcouncilwhichdecidedtofireuponSumter。Neitherofthesecouldwellbemattersofdebate。Everybodyhadtobeeitherfororagainst，andthatwouldbeanend。TheToombsofthatdaywasadifferentmanfromtheToombsofthreemonthsearlier。SomeradicalchangehadtakenplaceinhisthoughtWhatcouldithavebeenifitwasnottheperceptionthattheVirginiaprogramhadputthewholematterinanewlight，thattheissuehadindeedbeenchangedfromslaverytosovereignty，andthattojoinbattleonthelatterissuewasafarmoreseriousmatterthantojoinbattleontheformer。AndifToombsreasonedinthisfearfulway，itiseasytobelievethatthemorebuoyantnaturesinthatcouncilmaywellhavereasonedinpreciselytheoppositeway。VirginiahadliftedtheSoutherncausetoitshighestplane。ButtherewasdangerthattheVirginiacompromisemightprevail。IfthatshouldhappentheseenthusiastsforaseparateSouthernnationalitymightfindalltheirworkundoneattheeleventhhour。VirginianswhosharedMontgomery’senthusiasmshadseenthisbeforethen。
　　ThatwaswhyRogerPryor，forexample，hadgonetoCharlestonasavolunteermissionary。InaspeechtoaCharlestoncrowdhebesoughtthem，asawayofprecipitatingVirginiaintothelists，tostrikeblow。CharlestonMercury，April11，1861。
　　TheonlywaytogetanycluetothesediplomatictanglesisbydiscardingtheoldnotionthattherewerebuttwopoliticalidealsclashingtogetherinAmericain1861。Therewerethree。
　　TheVirginianswiththeirdevotiontotheideaofaleagueofnationsinthiscountrywerescarcelyfurtherawayfromLincolnandhisconceptionofaFederalunitthantheywerefromthoseSouthernerswhofromonecauseoranotherwerepossessedwiththedesiretocreateaseparateSouthernnation。TheVirginiaprogramwasasdeadlytooneastotheotherofthesetwoforceswhichwiththeupperSouthmadeupthetriangleoftheday。TherealeventofMarch，1861，wastheperceptionbothbyWashingtonandMontgomerythattheVirginiaprogramspelledruinforitsown。BythemiddleofAprilitwouldbedifficulttosaywhichhadthebetterreasontodesirethedefeatofthatprogram，WashingtonorMontgomery。
　　24。Lincoln，VI，240，301，302；N。R。，firstseries，IV，109，235，239；Welles，I，16，22-23，25；Bancroft，II，127，129-130，138，139，144；N。andH。，III，Chap。XI，IV，Chap。I。
　　EnemiesofLincolnhaveaccusedhimofbadfaithwithregardtothereliefofFortPickens。Thefactsappeartobeasfollows：
　　InJanuary，1861，whenFortPickenswasindangerofbeingseizedbytheforcesoftheStateofFlorida，Buchananorderedanavalexpeditiontoproceedtoitsrelief。Shortlyafterward——January2——SenatorMalloryonbehalfofFloridapersuadedhimtoorderthereliefexpeditionnottolandanytroopssolongastheFloridaforcesrefrainedfromattackingthefort。ThisunderstandingbetweenBuchananandMalloryissome-timescalled“thePickenstruce，“sometimes“thePickensArmistice。“N。andH。，III，Chap。XI；N。R。，firstseries，1，74；Scott，II，624-625。ThenewAdministrationhadnodefiniteknowledgeofit。Lincoln，VI，302。Lincolndespatchedamessengertothereliefexpedition，whichwasstillhoveringofftheFloridacoast，andordereditstroopstobelanded。
　　ThecommanderrepliedthathefeltboundbythepreviousorderswhichhadbeenissuedinthenameoftheSecretaryoftheNavywhilethenewordersissuedfromtheDepartmentofWar；headdedthatrelievingPickenswouldproducewarandwishedtobesurethatsuchwasthePresident’sintention；healsoinformedLincoln’smessengerofthetermsofBuchanan’sagreementwithMallory。ThemessengerreturnedtoWashingtonforamplerinstructions。N。andH。，IV，Chap。I；N。R。，firstseries，I，109-110，110-111。
　　TwodaysbeforehisarrivalatWashingtonalarmingnewsfromCharlestonbroughtLincolnverynearly，ifnotquite，tothepointofissuingsailingorderstotheSumterexpedition。
　　Lincoln，VI，240。Adaylater，Wellesissuedsuchorders。N。
　　IL，firstseries，I，235；Bancroft，II，138-139。OnAprilsixth，thePickensmessengerreturnedtoWashington。N。andH。，IV，7。Lincolnwasnowinfullpossessionofallthefacts。Inhisownwords，“TonowreinforceFortPickensbeforeacrisiswouldbereachedatFortSumterwasimpossible，renderedsobytheexhaustionofprovisionsatthelatternamedfort……ThestrongestanticipatedcaseforusingittheSumterexpeditionwasnowpresented，anditwasresolvedtosenditforward。“Lincoln，VI，302。HealsoissuedperemptoryordersforthePickensexpeditiontolanditsforce，whichwasdoneApriltwelfth。N。R。，firstseries，I，110-111，115。Howhereasoneduponthequestionofamoralobligationdevolving，ornotdevolving，uponhimselfasaconsequenceoftheBuchanan-Malloryagreement，hedidnotmakepublic。Thefactoftheagreementwaspublishedinthefirstmessage。ButwhenCongressdemandedinformationonthesubject，LincolntransmittedtoitareportfromWellesdecliningtosubmittheinformationonaccountofthestateofthecountry。10。
　　5。ThefamiliarversionoftheretirementofaffairiscontainedintheLifeofChandlerissuedbytheDetroitPostandTribunewithoutanauthor’sname。ThisbookthroughoutisanapologyforChandler。Insubstanceitsstoryofthisepisodeisasfollows：ChandlerbeheldwithachinghearttheestrangementbetweenLincolnandWade；hesettoworktobringthemtogether；ataconferencewhichhehadwithWade，inOhio，aworkingunderstandingwaseffected；ChandlerhurriedtoWashington；withinfinitepainsheaccomplishedapartydeal，thethreeelementsofwhichwereLincoln’sremovalofBlair，Fremont’sresignation，andWade’sappearanceintheAdministrationranks。Whatevermaybesaidofthephysicalfactsofthisnarrative，itsmentalfacts，itstoneandatmosphere，arehistoricalfiction。AndIhavetoprotestthatthesignificanceoftheepisodehasbeengreatlyexaggerated。
　　TheseriesofdatesgiveninthetextcannotbereconciledwithanytheorywhichmakestheturnofthetidetowardLincolnatalldependentonaBlair-Fremontdeal。SpeakingofthetraditionthatChandlercalleduponLincolnandmadeadefiniteagreementwithhimlookingtowardtheremovalofBlair，ColonelW。O。Stoddardwritesmethathis“opinion，orhalfmemory，wouldbethatthetraditionisamyth。“Seealso，Welles，
　　4。OneofthetraditionsthathasgrownuparoundLincolnmakesthepassageoftheThirteenthAmendmentamatterofthreats。Twovoteswereneeded。Itwasdiscoveredaccordingtothissimplemindedbitofartthattwomembersoftheoppositionhadbeenguiltyofillegalpractices，theprecisenatureofwhichisconvenientlyleftvague。Lincoln，eveninsomehighlyreputablebiographies，sentforthesesecretcriminals，toldthemthatthepowerofthePresidentoftheUnitedStateswasverygreat，andthatheexpectedthemtovotefortheamendment。TheauthorityforthestoryappearstobeamemberofCongress，JohnB。Aley。Reminiscences，585-586；LordCharnwood，AbrahamLincoln，335-336。Toagreatmanymindsithasalwaysseemedoutofkey。Fortunately，thereisarivalversion。Shrewd，carefulRiddlehasavastlydifferenttaleinwhichLincolndoesnotfigureatall，inwhichthreenecessaryvoteswereboughtfortheamendmentbyAshley。Riddleissocarefultomakeplainjustwhathecanvouchforandjustwhathehasatsecondhandthathismeremodeofnarrationcreatesconfidence。Riddle，324-325。Partsofhisversionaretobefoundinvariousplaces。
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