wishheretorecordwhatIconsideraportentofeviltocome。
　　ThePresident，GovernorSewardandIwentovertoMcClellan’shousetonight。TheservantatthedoorsaidtheGeneralwasattheweddingofColonelWheatonatGeneralBuell’sandwouldsoonreturn。Wewentinandafterwehadwaitedaboutanhour，McClellancamein，andwithoutpayingparticularattentiontotheporterwhotoldhimthePresidentwaswaitingtoseehim，wentup-stairs，passingthedooroftheroomwherethePresidentandtheSecretaryofStatewereseated。Theywaitedabouthalfanhour，andsentoncemoreaservanttotelltheGeneraltheywerethere；andtheanswercamethattheGeneralhadgonetobed。
　　“ImerelyrecordthisunparalleledinsolenceofepauletteswithoutcommentItisthefirstindicationIhaveyetseenofthethreatenedsupremacyofthemilitaryauthorities。Cominghome，IspoketothePresidentaboutthematter，butheseemednottohavenoticeditspecially，sayingitwerebetteratthistimenottobemakingpointsofetiquetteandpersonaldignity。“[5]
　　Dideverasubordinate，evenageneral，administertoasuperioramoreastoundingsnub？ToLincolninhisselflesstemper，itwasOnlyadetailinhisproblemofgettingthearmyintoaction。Whatroomforpersonalaffrontshowevergrossinamoodlikehis？TobesureheceasedgoingtoMcClellan’shouse，andthereaftersummonedMcClellantocometohim，butnochangeappearedinthetoneofhisintercoursewiththeGeneral。“IwillholdMcClellan’shorse，“saidhe，“ifhewillwinmevictories。“[6]
　　Allthiswhile，thetwoweredebatingplansofcampaignandMcClellanwasrevealing-aswenowsee，thoughnoonesawitatthetime-thedeepdreadofresponsibilitythatwasdestinedtoparalyzehimasanactivegeneral。Hewasneverready。
　　Always，theremustbemorepreparation，moremen，morethis，morethat。
　　InJanuary，1862，Lincoln，growndesperatebecauseofhopedeferred，madethefirstmoveofasortthatwastobelamentablyfrequentthenextsixmonths。HewentovertheheadoftheCommandingGeneral，and，inordertoforcearesult，evokedapowernotrecognizedinthemilitaryschemeofthings。
　　BythistimethepopularadulationofMcClellanwasgivingplacetoageneralimitationofthegrowlingoftheJacobins，nowwellorganizedintheterribleCommitteeandgrowingeachdaymoreandmorehostiletotheAdministration。LincolnhadbesoughtMcClellantotakeintoaccounttheseriousnessofthisrisingtideofopposition。[7]Hisargumentsmadenoimpression。
　　McClellanwouldnotrecognizethepoliticalsideofwar。Atlast，partlytoallaythepopularclamor，partlytoforceMcClellanintoacorner，Lincolnpublishedtothecountryamilitaryprogram。HepubliclyinstructedtheCommandingGeneraltoputallhisforcesinmovementonallfronts，onWashington’sbirthday。[8]
　　FromthismomentthedebatebetweenthePresidentandtheGeneralwithregardtoplansofcampaignapproachedthenatureofadispute。McClellanrepeatedhisdemandformoretimeinwhichtoprepare。HeobjectedtothecourseofadvancewhichthePresidentwishedhimtopursue。Lincoln，seeingthesituationfirstofallasapoliticalproblem，groundedhisthoughtupontwoideasneitherofwhichwassharedbyMcClellan：theideathatthesupremeconsiderationwasthesafetyofWashington；theresultantideathatMcClellanshouldmovedirectlysouth，keepinghiswholearmyconstantlybetweenWashingtonandtheenemy。McClellanwishedtotreatWashingtonasbutoneimportantdetailinhisstrategy；hehadagrandioseschemeforawideflankingmovement，fortakingthebulkofhisarmybyseatothecoastofVirginia，andthustodrawtheConfederatearmyhomewardforadueltothedeathunderthewallsofRichmond。Lincoln，neitherthennorafterwardmorethananamateurinstrategy，wasdeeplyalarmedbythisboldmodeofprocedure。HispoliticalinstincttoldhimthatiftherewasanyslipandWashingtonwastaken，evenbriefly，bytheConfederates，thegamewasup。Hewasstillfurtheralarmedwhenhefoundthatsomeoftheeidergeneralsheldviewsresemblinghisown。[9]Tohismodest，stillgropingmind，thiswasatryingsituation。InthePresidentlaytheultimateresponsibilityforeverymovethearmyshouldmake。Andwhoseadviceshouldheacceptasauthoritative？Thefirsttimeheaskedhimselfthatquestion，suchpeaceofmindashadsurvivedtheharassingyear1861lefthim，nottoreturnformanyaday。
　　Atthismomentofcrises，occurredoneofhiskeenestpersonalafflictions。HislittlesonWilliesickenedanddied。
　　Lincoln’srelationtohischildrenwasveryclose，verytender。
　　ManyanecdotesshowthisboyfrolickingabouttheWhiteHouse，alicensedintrudereverywhere。Anotherfloodofanecdotespreservethestupefyinggriefofhisfatherafterthechild’sdeath。Oftheselatter，themostextremewhichportrayLincolntowardthecloseofFebruarysounnervedastobeincapableofpublicduty，maybedismissedasapocryphal。Buttherecanbenodoubtthathisunhappinesswastoogreatforthevainmeasurementofdescriptivewords；thatitintensifiedthenervousmoodwhichhadalreadypossessedhim；thatanxiety，deepeningattimesintoterriblealarm，becamehisconstantcompanion。
　　Inhisdreadandsorrow，hisdilemmagrewdailymoreintolerable。McClellanhadopposedsostoutlytheWashingtonbirthdayorderthatLincolnhadpermittedhimtoignoreit。Hewasstillwaveringwhichadvicetotake，McClellan’sortheeldergenerals’。ToremoveMcClellan，totryatthiscriticalmomentsomeothergeneral，didnotoccurtohimasarationalpossibility。ButsomehowhefelthemustjustifyhimselftohimselfforyieldingtoMcClellan’sviews。Inhiszealtosecuresomejudgmentmoreauthoritativethanhisown，hetookafurtherstepalongthedangerousroadofgoingovertheCommander’shead，ofbringingtobearuponhiminfluencesnotstrictlyincludedinthemilitarysystem。HerequiredMcClellantosubmithisplantoacouncilofhisgeneralofficers。Lincolnattendedthiscouncilandtoldthegenerals“hewasnotamilitarymanandthereforewouldbegovernedbytheopinionofamajority。“[10]ThecouncildecidedinMcClellan’sfavorbyavoteofeighttofour。ThiswasadisappointmenttoLincoln。Sofirmwashisaddictiontotheoverlandroutethathecouldnotrestcontentwiththecouncil’sdecision。Stantonurgedhimtodisregardit，sneeringthattheeightwhovotedagainsthimwereMcClellan’screatures，his“pets。“ButLincolnwouldnotriskgoingagainstthemajorityofthecouncil。“Wearecivilians，“saidhe，“weshouldjustlybeheldresponsibleforanydisasterifwesetupouropinionsagainstthoseofexperiencedmilitarymeninthepracticalmanagementofacampaign。“[11]
　　Nevertheless，fromthisquandary，inwhichhisreasonforcedhimtodoonethingwhileallhissensibilitiesprotested，heextricatedhimselfinacuriousway。ThroughoutthelatewinterhehadbeentheobjectofaconcertedattackfromStantonandtheCommittee。TheCommitteehadtacitlyannexedStanton。Heconferredwiththemconfidentially。Ateachimportantturnofevents，heandtheyalwaysgottogetherinasecretpowwow。AsearlyasFebruarytwentieth，whenLincolnseemedtobebreakingdownwithgriefandanxiety，oneofthosesecretconferencesofthehighconspiratorsendedinadeterminationtoemployalltheirforces，directandindirect，tobringaboutMcClellan’sretirement。Theywereallvictimsofthatmaniaofsuspicionwhichwastheorderoftheday。“A
　　majorityoftheCommittee，“wroteitsbestmember，longafterwardwhenhehadcometoseethingsinadifferentlight，“stronglysuspectedthatGeneralMcClellanwasatraitor。“Wadeventedhisspleeninfuriouswordsabout“KingMcClellan。“
　　UnrestrainedbyLincoln’sanguish，theCommitteedemandedaconferenceafewdaysafterhisson’sdeathandthreatenedanappealfromPresidenttoCongressifhedidnotquicklyforceMcClellantoadvance。[12]
　　AllthiswhiletheCommitteewasairinganothergrievance。
　　TheyclamoredtohavethetwelvedivisionsofthearmyofthePotomacgroupedintocorps。Theygaveastheirmotive，militaryefficiency。Andperhapstheythoughttheymeantit。
　　Buttherewasacatinthebagwhichtheycarefullytriedtoconceal。Thegeneralsofdivisionsformedtwodistinctgroups，theelderoneswhodidnotowetheirelevationtoMcClellanandtheyoungeroneswhodid。Theeldergenerals，ithappened，sympathizedgenerallywiththeCommitteeinpolitics，oratleastdidnotsympathizewithMcClellan。Theyoungergeneralsreflectedthepoliticsoftheirpatron。AndMcClellanwasaDemocrat，ahateroftheVindictives，unsympatheticwithAbolition。Therefore，themaniaofsuspicionbeinginfullflood，theCommitteewouldbelievenogoodofMcClellanwhenheopposedadvancingtheeldergeneralstotherankofcorpscommanders。Hisexplanationthathe“wishedtotesttheminthefield，“waspoohpoohed。CouldnotanygoodJacobinseethroughthat!Ofcourse，itwasbutanexcusetoholdbacktheplumsuntilhecoulddropthemintotheitchingpalmsofthosewickedDemocrats，his“pets。“Whyshouldnotthegoodmenandtrue，elderandthereforebettersoldiers，whoserighteousnesswassowellattestedbytheirpoliticalleanings，whyshouldnottheyhavetheplacesofpowertowhichtheirrankentitledthem？
　　Hitherto，however，LincolnhadheldoutagainsttheCommittee’sdemandandbadrefusedtocompelMcClellantoreorganizehisarmyagainsthiswill。Henowobservedthatinthecouncilwhichcastthedieagainsttheoverlandroute，thedivisionbetweenthetwogroupsofgenerals，whatwemaycalltheLincolngeneralsandtheMcClellangenerals，wassharplyevident。ThenextdayheissuedageneralorderwhichorganizedthearmyofthePotomacintocorps，andpromotedtotherankofcorpscommanders，thoseeldergeneralswhosepointofviewwassimilartohisown。[13]Thereafter，anyreferenceofcrucialmatterstoacouncilofgeneralofficers，wouldmeansubmittingit，nottoadozencommandersofdivisionswithMcClellanmeninthemajority，buttofourorfivecommandersofcorpsnoneofwhomwasdefinitelyoftheMcClellanfaction。
　　ThusMcClellanwasvirtuallyputundersurveillanceofaninformalwarcouncilscrutinizinghiscoursefromthePresident’spointofview。Itwasthisreducedcouncilofthesubordinates，aswillpresentlyappear，thatmadethecrucialdecisionofthecampaign。
　　OnthesamedayLincolnissuedanothergeneralorderacceptingMcClellan’splanforaflankingmovementtotheVirginiacoast。[14]TheConfederatelinesatthistimeranthroughManassas——thepointLincolnwishedMcClellantostrike。ItwastobeknownlaterthattheConfederateGeneralgavetoLincoln’sviewsthehighendorsementofassumingthattheyweretheinevitableviewsthattheNorthernCommander，ifheknewhisbusiness，wouldactupon。Therefore，hehadbeenquietlypreparingtowithdrawhisarmytomoredefensiblepositionsfartherSouth。Byacuriouscoincidence，his“strategicretreat“occurredimmediatelyafterMcClellanhadbeengivenauthoritytodowhatheliked。OntheninthofMarchitwasknownatWashingtonthatManassashadbeenevacuated。
　　Whereupon，McClellan’sfatallackofhumorpermittedhimtomakeagreatblunder。ThemanwhohadrefusedtogotoManassaswhiletheConfederateswerethere，marchedanarmytoManassasthemomentheheardthattheyweregone——andthenmarchedbackagain。ThisperformancewasinstantlyfixeduponforridiculeasMcClellan’s“promenadetoManassas。“
　　ToLincolnthenewsofthepromenadeseemedbothavindicationofhisownplanandcrushingevidencethatifhehadinsistedonhisplan，theConfederatearmywouldhavebeenannihilated，thewarinonecataclysmbroughttoanend。Hewasridden，asmostmenwere，bythedelusionofoneterrificbattlethatwastoendall。Inabitternessofdisappointment，hisslowlytorturedspiritburstintorage。TheCommitteewasdelighted。
　　Foronce，theyapprovedofhim。Thenextactofthisman，ordinarilysogentle，seemshardlycredible。Byastrokeofhispen，hestrippedMcClellanoftheofficeofCommandingGeneral，reducedhimtotherankofmereheadofalocalarmy，thearmyofthePotomac；furthermore，hepermittedhimtohearofhisdegradationthroughtheheartlessmediumofthedailypapers。[15]ThefunctionsofCommandingGeneralwereaddedtothedutiesoftheSecretaryofWar。Stanton，nowutterlymercilesstowardMcClellan，instantlytookpossessionofhisofficeandseizedhispapers，foralltheworldasifhewerepouncingupontheeffectsofamalefactor。ThatMcClellanwasnotyetwhollyspoiledwasshownbythewayhereceivedthisblow。ItwastheMcClellanoftheolddays，thegallantgentlemanoftheyear1860，nottheposeurof1861，whowroteatoncetoLincolnmakingnocomplaint，sayingthathisservicesbelongedtohiscountryinwhatevercapacitytheymightberequired。
　　Againacouncilofsubordinateswasinvokedtodeterminethenextmove。McClellancalledtogetherthenewlymadecorpscommandersandobtainedtheirapprovalofavariationofhisformerplan。HenowproposedtouseFortressMonroeasabase，andthenceconductanattackuponRichmond。Again，thoughwithatouchofsullennessveryrareinLincoln，thePresidentacquiesced。ButheaddedaconditiontoMcClellan’splanbyissuingpositiveorders，Marchthirteenth，thatitshouldnotbecarriedoutunlesssufficientforcewasleftatWashingtontorenderthecityimpregnable。