OfthosewhohadvotedforitinJuly,somanynowabandonedtheAdministrationthatthisresolution,theclearembodimentofLincoln’spolicy,waslaidonthetable,seventy-onetosixty-five。[8]Lincoln’shopeforanall-partiesgovernmentwasreceivinglittleencouragementTheDemocratswerebreakingintofactions,whilethecontroloftheirpartyorganizationwasfallingintothehandsofagroupofinferiorpoliticianswhowerecontentto“playpolitics“inthemostunscrupulousfashion。BoththeSecretaryofWarandtheSecretaryofStatehadauthorizedarbitraryarrests。MeninNewYorkandNewEnglandhadbeenthrownintoprison。Theprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpushadbeendeniedthemonthemerebeliefofthegovernmentthattheywereconspiringwithitsenemies。Becauseofthesearrests,sharpcriticismwasbeingaimedattheAdministrationbothwithinandwithoutCongress。
Forallthesereasons,thegovernmentatWashingtonappearedtobetottering。Desperateremediesseemedimperative。Lincolndecidedtomakeeveryconcessionhecouldmakewithoutlettinggohiscentralpurpose。First,hethrewoverCameron;hecompelledhimtoresignthoughhesavedhisfacebyappointinghimministertoRussia。Butwhowastotakehisplace?Atthiscriticalmoment,thechoiceofanewSecretaryofWarwasapoliticalproblemofexactingdifficulty。JustwhyLincolnchoseasullen,dictatoriallawyerwhoseexperienceinnowaypreparedhimfortheoffice,hasneverbeendisclosed。Twofactsappeartoexplainit。EdwinM。StantonwastemperamentallyjustthemantobecomeagoodbrothertoChandlerandWade。BothofthemurgedhimuponLincolnassuccessortoCameron。[9]Furthermore,StantonhithertohadbeenaDemocrat。HisservicesinBuchanan’sCabinetasAttorney-Generalhadmadehimanationalfigure。WhoelselinkedtheDemocratsandtheJacobins?
However,foralmostanyonebutLincoln,therewasanobjectionthatitwouldhavebeenhardtoovercome。NoonehaseverchargedStantonwithpoliteness。Agloomyexcitableman,ofuncertainhealth,temperamentallyanover-worker,chronicallyapprehensive,utterlywithoutthesavinggraceofhumor,hewascapableofinsufferablerudeness——onereason,perhaps,whyChandlerlikedhim。HeandLincolnhadmetbutonce。AsassociatecouncilinacaseatCincinnati,threeyearsbefore,LincolnhadbeentreatedsocontemptuouslybyStantonthathehadreturnedhomeinpainedhumiliation。Sincehisinauguration,Stantonhadbeenoneofhismostvituperativecritics。WasthisinsolentscoldtobeinvitedintotheCabinet?HadnotLincolnatthisjuncturebeeninthefulltideofselflessness,surelysomecompromisewouldhavebeenmadewiththeCommittee,asecretaryfoundlessoffensivepersonallytothePresident。Lincolndisregardedthepersonalconsideration。ThecandidateofChandlerandWadebecamesecretary。ItwasthebeginningofanintimatealliancebetweentheCommitteeandtheWarOffice。Lincolnhadlaidupforhimselfmuchtroublethathedidnotforesee。
ThedaythenewSecretarytookoffice,hereceivedfromtheCommitteeareportuponGeneralStone:[10]Subsequently,intheSenate,WadedeniedthattheCommitteehadadvisedthearrestofStone。[11]Doubtlessthestatementwastechnicallycorrect。
Nevertheless,therecanbenodoubtthattheinquisitorswerewhollyinsympathywiththeSecretarywhen,shortlyafterward,StonewasseizeduponStanton’sorder,conveyedtoafortressandimprisonedwithouttrial。
ThiswastheDreyfuscaseoftheCivilWar。Stonewasnevertriedandnevervindicated。Hewaseventuallyreleaseduponparoleandaftermanytantalizingdisappointmentspermittedtorejointhearmy。Whatgivestheeventsignificanceisitsevidenceofthepower,atthatmoment,oftheCommittee,andoftherelativeweaknessofthePresident。Lincoln’seagernesstoprotectcondemnedsoldierssurvivesinmanyanecdotes。Hayconfidestohisdiarythathewassometimes“amusedattheeagernesswithwhichthePresidentcaughtatanyfactwhichwouldjustify“clemency。Andyet,whenStantoninformedhimofthearrestofStone,hegloomilyacquiesced。“Ihopeyouhavegoodreasonsforit,“hesaid。Laterheadmittedthatheknewverylittleaboutthecase。ButhedidnotorderStone’srelease。
Lincolnhadhisownformofruthlessness。Theselflessman,bydealingwithothersinthesameextraordinarywayinwhichhedealswithhimself,mayeasilyunderthepressureofextremeconditionsbecomeimpersonalinhisthinkinguponduty。Themoralityofsuchastateofmindisaquestionforthephilosopher。Thehistorianmustcontenthimselfwithpointingouttheonlyconditionthatredeemsit——ifanythingredeemsitTheleaderwhothinksimpersonallyaboutothersandpersonallyabouthimself-whatneedamongcivilizedpeopletocharacterizehim?Borgia,LouisXIV,Napoleon。Ifweareevertopardonimpersonalthinkingitisonlyinthecasesofmenwhobeginbyeffacingthemselves。TheLincolnwhoacceptedStantonasaCabinetofficer,whowasalwaysmoreorlessovershadowedbythebeliefthatinsavingthegovernmenthewashimselftoperish,isexplicable,atleast,whenindividualmenbecameforhim,asattimestheydid,impersonalfactorsinaterribledream。
ThereareotherconsiderationsintheattempttogiveamoralvaluetohisfailuretointerfereinbehalfofStone。Thefirstfourmonthsof1862arenotonlyhisfeeblestperiodasaruler,theperiodwhenhewasbarelyabletoholdhisown,butalsotheperiodwhenhewasleastdefiniteasapersonality,whenhiscourageandhisvitalityseemedebbingtides。Again,hisspiritwasineclipse。Singularlyenough,thiswasthedarknessbeforethedawn。Juneof1862sawtheemergence,withasuddennessdifficulttoexplain,ofthehistoricLincoln。
ButinJanuaryofthatyearhewasfacingdownwardintothemysteryofhislasteclipse。Allthedarkplacesofhishereditymustbesearchedforcluestothisstrangeexperience。
Therearemoments,especiallyunderstrainofapersonalbereavementthatfelluponhiminFebruary,whenhiswillseemedscarcelyareality;when,asadirectingforcehemaybesaidmomentarilytohavevanished;whenheishardlymorethanaghostamonghisadvisers。Thefar-offexistenceofweakoldThomascastitspartingshadowacrosshisson’scareer。
However,evenourDreyfuscasedrewfromLincolnanotherdisplayofthatsettledconvictionofhisthatpartofhisfunctionwastobescapegoat。“Iserve,“whichinawaymightbetakenashismottoalways,waspeculiarlyhismotto,andlikewisehisredemption,inthisperiodofhisweakness。TheenemiesoftheCommitteeinCongresstookthematterupanddenouncedStanton。Thereupon,Wadeflamedforth,criticizingLincolnforhisleniency,ventinghisfuryonallthosewhoweretenderoftheirenemies,stormingthat“mercytotraitorsiscrueltytoloyalmen。“[12]LincolnrepliedneithertoWadenortohisantagonists;but,withoutexplainingthecase,withoutawordupontherelationtoitoftheSecretaryandtheCommittee,heinformedtheSenatethatthePresidentwasaloneresponsibleforthearrestandimprisonmentofGeneralStone。[13]
TheperiodofLincoln’slasteclipseisaperiodofrelativesilence。Buthismindwasnotinactive。HedidnotceasethinkinguponthedeeptheoreticaldistinctionsthatwereseparatinghimbyasteadilywideningchasmfromthemostpowerfulfactioninCongress。Infact,hismentalpowerswere,ifanything,morekeenthaneverbefore。Probably,itwastheveryclearnessofthementalvisionthatenfeebledhimwhenitcametoaction。Hesawhisdifficultieswithsuchcrushingcertainty。DuringthistryingperiodthereisinhimsomethingofHamlet。
Thereactiontohisideas,towhatiseitherexpressedorimplied,inthefirstandsecondmessages,wasprompttoappear。TheJacobinsdidnotconfinetheiractivitieswithinthescopeoftheterribleCommittee。WadeandChandlerworkedassiduouslyundermininghisstrengthinCongress。Trumbull,thoughalwayslessextremethanthey,wasstillthevictimofhisdelusionthatLincolnwasapoorcreature,thattheonlywaytosavethecountrywastogoalongwiththosegrimmenofstrengthwhodominatedtheCommittee。InJanuary,aformidableadditionappearedintheranksofLincoln’sopponents。ThaddeusStevensmadeaspeechintheHousethatmarksachapter。ItbroughttoaheadacloudoffloatingoppositionanddearlydefinedanissueinvolvingthecentralpropositioninLincoln’stheoryofthegovernment。TheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates,initsdetailedprovisions,isdesignedchieflytomeettheexigenciesofpeace。Withregardtotheabnormalconditionsofwar,itisrelativelysilent。Certain“warpowers“arerecognizedbutnotclearlydefined;norisitmadeperfectlyplainwhatbranchofthegovernmentpossessesthem。Themachineryfortheirexecutionisassumedbutnotdescribed——aswhentheConstitutionprovidesthattheprivilegesofthewritofhabeascorpusaretobesuspendedonlyintimeofwar,butdoesnotspecifybywhom,orinwhatway,thesuspensionistobeeffected。Arethoseundefined“warpowers,“whicharethemostsovereignfunctionsofourgovernment,vestedinCongressorinthePresident?
Lincoln,fromthemomenthedefinedhispolicy,heldtenaciouslytothetheorythatalltheseextraordinarypowersarevestedinthePresident。Byimplication,atleast,thisideaisinthefirstmessage。Throughoutthelatterpartof1861,heputthetheoryintopractice。Whateverseemedtohimnecessaryinastateofwar,hedid,eventothearrestingofsuspectedpersons,refusingthemtheprivilege-ofthehabeascorpus,andretainingtheminprisonwithouttrial。During1861,helefttheexerciseofthissovereignauthoritytothediscretionofthetwoSecretariesofWarandofState。
Naturally,theAbolitionists,theJacobins,theDemocraticmachine,conscientiousbelieversinthecongressionaltheoryofthegovernment,everyonewhoforanyreason,wantedtohittheAdministration,unitedinachorusofwrathoverarbitraryarrests。Thegreatestoratorofthetime,WendellPhillips,thefinalvoiceofAbolition,flayedthegovernmentinpublicspeechesforreducingAmericatoanabsolutedespotism。
TrumbullintroducedintotheSenatearesolutioncallinguponthePresidentforastatementofthefactsastowhathehadactuallydone。[1]
Butthesubjectofarrestswasbutthepreludetotheplay。
Therealissuewasthetheoryofthegovernment。WhereinlastanalysisdoestheConstitutionplacetheultimatepowersofsovereignty,thewarpowers?InCongressorinthePresident?
Therefore,inconcreteterms,isCongressthePresident’smaster,orisitonlyonebranchofthegovernmentwithadefinitebutunitedactivityofitsown,withoutthatsweepingsovereignauthoritywhichincourseoftimehasbeenacquiredbyitsparentbody,theParliamentofGreatBritain?
OnthispointLincolnneverwavered。Fromfirsttolast,hewasdeterminednottoadmitthatCongresshadthepowersofParliament。Nosoonerhadthepoliticiansmadeoutthisattitudethantheirattackonitbegan。ItdidnotceaseuntilLincoln’sdeath。Itaddedasecondconstitutionalquestiontotheissuesofthewar。NotonlytheissuewhetheraStatehadarighttosecede,butalsotheissueofthePresident’spossessionofthewarpowersoftheConstitution。Timeandagaintheleadersofdisaffectioninhisownparty,tosaynothingoftheviolentDemocrats,exhaustedtheirrhetoricdenouncingLincoln’sposition。Theydidnotdenythemselvesthedelightsofthesneer。SenatorGrimesspokeofacallonthePresidentasanattempt“toapproachthefootstoolofpowerenthronedattheotherendoftheAvenue。“[2]Wadeexpandedtheidea:“Weoughttohaveacommitteetowaitonhimwheneverwesendhimabill,toknowwhathisroyalpleasureiswithregardtoit……Wearetoldthatsomegentlemen……havebeentoseethePresident。Somegentlemenareveryfortunateinthatrespect。
Nobodycanseehim,itseems,exceptsomeprivilegedgentlemenwhoarechargedwithhisconstitutionalconscience。“[3]AsLincolnkepthisdoorsopentoalltheworld,asnoonecameandwentwithgreaterfreedomthantheChairmanoftheCommittee,thesneerwas-whatonemightexpectoftheCommittee。Sumnersaid:“IclaimforCongressallthatbelongstoanygovernmentintheexerciseoftherightsofwar。“
Disagreementwithhim,hetreatedwithunspeakabledisdain:
“Borninignoranceandperniciousinconsequence,itoughttobereceivedwithhissingsofcontempt,andjustinproportionasitobtainsacceptance,withexecration。“[4]HenryWilsondeclaredthat,comewhatmight,thepolicyoftheAdministrationwouldbeshapedbythetwoHouses。“IhadrathergiveapolicytothePresidentoftheUnitedStatesthantakeapolicyfromthePresidentoftheUnitedStates。“[5]
TrumbullthunderedagainstthePresident’stheoryasthelastwordindespotism。[6]
SuchisthementalperspectiveinwhichtoregardthespeechofStevensofJanuary22,1862。Withmasterlyclearness,heputhisfingerontheheartofthematter:theexceptionalproblemsofatimeofwar,problemsthatcannotbeforeseenandpreparedforbyanticipatorylegislation,maybesolvedinbutoneway,bythetemporarycreationofthedictator;thisisastrueofmodernAmericaasofancientRome;sofar,mostpeopleareagreed;butthisextraordinaryfunctionmustnotbevestedintheExecutive;onthecontrary,itmustbe,itis,vestedintheLegislature。Stevensdidnothesitatetopushhistheorytoitslimit。HewasnotafraidofmakingtheLegislatureintimeofwartheirresponsiblejudgeofitsownacts。Congress,saidhe。hasallpossiblepowersofgovernment,eventhedictator’spower;itcoulddeclareitselfadictator;undercertaincircumstanceshewaswillingthatitshoulddoso。[7]
TheintellectualboldnessofLincolnwasmatchedbyanequalboldness。Betweenthem,heandStevenshadperfectlydefinedtheirissue。Grantedthatadictatorwasneeded,whichshoulditbe——thePresidentorCongress?