TheThoughtsoutlinedaschemeofpolicy，themoststartlingfeatureofwhichwasaninstant，predatory，foreignwar。Therearetwocluestothisastoundingproposal。OnewasapoliticalmaximinwhichSewardhadunwaveringfaith。“Afundamentalprincipleofpolitics，“hesaid，“isalwaystobeonthesideofyourcountryinawar。Itkillsanypartytoopposeawar。
　　WhenMr。BuchanangotuphisMormonWar，ourpeople，WadeandFremont，andTheTribune，ledofffuriouslyagainstit。I
　　supportedittotheimmensedisgustofenemiesandfriends。Ifyouwanttosickenyouropponentswiththeirownwar，goinforittilltheygiveitup。“[19]Hewasnotaloneamongthepoliticiansofhistime，andsomeothertimes，inthesecynicalviews。LincolnhasastoryofapoliticianwhowasaskedtoopposetheMexicanWar，andwhoreplied，“Iopposedonewar；
　　thatwasenoughforme。Iamnowperpetuallyinfavorofwar，pestilenceandfamine。“
　　ThesecondcluetoSeward’snewpolicyofinternationalbrigandagewastheneed，asheconceivedit，topropitiatethoseSouthernexpansionistswhointhelowerSouthatleastformedsolargeapartofthepoliticalmachine，whomustsomehowbeluredbackintotheUnion；towhomtheVirginiaCompromise，aswellaseveryotherschemeofreadjustmentyetsuggested，offerednoallurement。LikeLincolndefeatingtheCrittendenCompromise，liketheVirginiansplanningthelastcompromise，Sewardrememberedthefilibustersandthedreamsoftheexpansionists，annexationofCuba，annexationofNicaraguaandalltherest，andhelookedaboutforawaytoreachthemalongthatline。Chancehadplayedintohishands。AlreadyNapoleonIIIhadbegunhisill-fatedinterferencewiththeaffairsofMexico。ArebellionhadjusttakenplaceinSanDomingoandSpainwassupposedtohavedesignsontheisland。
　　Here，foranyonewhobelievedinpredatorywarasaninfalliblelastrecoursetorousethepatriotismofacountry，werepretextsenough。AlongwiththesewouldgoaragingassertionoftheMonroeDoctrineandabellicoseattitudetowardotherEuropeanpowersonlesssubstantialgrounds。Andamiditall，betweenthelinesofitall，couldnotanyoneglimpseaschemefortheexpansionoftheUnitedStatessouthward？WarwithSpainoverSanDomingo!Andwho，pray，heldtheIslandofCuba!AndwhatmightnotadefeatedSpainbewillingtodowithCuba？AndifFranceweredrivenoutofMexicobyourconqueringarms，didnottheshadowsofthefutureveilbutdimlyagratefulMexicowhereAmericancapitalshouldfindgreatopportunities？AndwouldnotSoutherncapitalinthenatureofthings，havealargeshareinallthatwastocome？Surely，grantingSeward’spoliticalcreed，rememberingtheproblemhewishedtosolve，thereisnothingtobewonderedatinhisproposaltoLincoln：“IwoulddemandexplanationsfromSpainandFrance，categorically，atonce。“……AndifsatisfactoryexplanationswerenotreceivedfromSpainandFrance，“wouldconveneCongressanddeclarewaragainstthem。“
　　Hispurpose，hesaid，wastochangethequestionbeforethepublic，fromoneuponslavery，oraboutslavery，foraquestionuponUnionorDisunion。Sumterwastobeevacuated“asasafemeansforchangingtheissue，“butatthesametime，preparationsweretobemadeforablockadeoftheSoutherncoast。[20]ThisextraordinarydocumentadministeredmildbutfirmcorrectiontothePresident。Hewastoldthathehadnopolicy，althoughunderthecircumstances，thiswas“notculpable“；thattheremustbeasingleheadtothegovernment；
　　thatthePresident，ifnotequaltothetask，shoulddevolveituponsomememberoftheCabinet。TheThoughtsclosedwiththesewords，“Ineitherseektoevadenorassumeresponsibility。“
　　LikeSeward’spreviousmove，whenhesentWeedtoSpringfield，thisotherbroughtLincolntoapointofcrisis。Forthesecondtimehemustrenderadecisionthatwouldturnthescale，thatwouldhaveforhiscountrytheforceofdestiny。
　　Inonerespecthedidnothesitate。ThemostessentialpartoftheThoughtswasthepredatoryspirit。ThisclashedwithLincoln’scharacter。Sereneunscrupulousnessmetunwaveringintegrity。HerewasoneofthosesubjectsonwhichLincolnwasnotaskingadvice。Astowaysandmeans，hewaspliabletoadegreeinthehandsofricherandwiderexperience；astoprinciples，hewasarock。Seward’swholeschemeofaggrandizement，hismagnificentpiracy，wascalmlywavedasideasathingofnoconcern。ThemoststrikingcharacteristicofLincoln’sreplywasitsdignity。Hedidnot，indeed，laybarehispurposes。HewascontenttopointoutcertaininconsistenciesinSeward’sargument；toprotestthatwhateveractionmightbetakenwithregardtothesinglefortress，Sumter，thequestionbeforethepubliccouldnotbechangedbythatoneevent；andtosaythatwhileheexpectedadvicefromallhisCabinet，hewasnonethelessPresident，andinlastresorthewouldhimselfdirectthepolicyofthegovernment。[21]
　　OnlyastrongmancouldhaveputupwiththepatronizingcondescensionoftheThoughtsandbetrayednoirritation。NotawordinLincoln’sreplygivestheleasthintthatcondescensionhadbeendisplayed。Heiswhollyunruffled，distant，objective。Thereisalsoaquiettoneoffinality，almostthetoneonemightuseingentlybutfirmlycorrectingachild。TheOlympianimpertinenceoftheThoughtshadstruckoutofLincolnthefirstflashofthatapproachingmasterfulnessbymeansofwhichhewastorideoutsuccessfullysuchfuriousstorms。Sewardwastoomuchthemanoftheworldnottoseewhathadhappened。HenevertouchedupontheThoughtsagain。NordidLincoln。TheincidentwassecretuntilLincoln’ssecretariestwenty-fiveyearsafterwardpublishedittotheworld。
　　ButLincoln’sloftydignityonthefirstofAprilwasofamomentonly。WhentheSecretaryoftheNavy，GideonWelles，thatsamedaycalledonhiminhisoffices，hewastheeasy-going，jovialLincolnwhowasalwaysreadyhalf-humorouslytotakereprooffromsubordinates——aswasevincedbyhisgreetingtotheSecretary。Lookingupfromhiswriting，hesaidcheerfully，“WhathaveIdonewrong？“[22]GideonWelleswasapugnaciousman，andatthatmomentanangryman。Therecanbelittledoubtthathislipsweretightlyshut，thatasternfrowndarkenedhisbrows。GrimlyconscientiouswasGideonWelles，likewiseprosaic；amasterpieceofliteralness，theveryoppositeinalmosteveryrespectoftheSecretaryofStatewhomhecordiallydetested。ThathehadalreadyfoundoccasiontoprotestagainstthePresident’scarelessmodeofconductingbusinessmaybeguessed——correctly——fromthewayhewasreceived。Doubtlesstheverycordiality，thewhimsicaladmissionofloosemethods，irritatedtheaustereSecretary。
　　WelleshadinhishandacommunicationdatedthatsamedayandsignedbythePresident，makingradicalchangesintheprogramoftheNavyDepartment。Hehadcometoprotest。
　　“ThePresident，“saidWelles，“expressedasmuchsurpriseasI
　　felt，thathehadsentmesuchadocument。HesaidthatMr。
　　SewardwithtwoorthreeyoungmenhadbeenthereduringthedayonasubjectwhichheSewardhadinhandandwhichhehadbeensometimematuring；thatitwasSeward’sspecialty，towhichhe，thePresident，hadyielded，butasitinvolvedconsiderabledetails，hehadleftMr。Sewardtopreparethenecessarypapers。Thesepapershehadsigned，manyofthemwithoutreading，forhehadnottime，andifhecouldnottrusttheSecretaryofState，heknewnotwhomhecouldtrust。I
　　askedwhowereassociatedwithMr。Seward。’Noone，’saidthePresident，’buttheseyoungmenwhowerehereasclerkstowritedownhisplansandorders。’Mostoftheworkwasdone，hesaid，intheotherroom。
　　“ThePresidentreiteratedthatthey[thechangesintheNavy]
　　werenothisinstructions，thoughsignedbyhim；thatthepaperwasanimproperone；thathewishedmetogiveitnomoreconsiderationthanIthoughtproper；totreatitascancelled，orasifithadneverbeenwritten。IcouldgetnosatisfactoryexplanationfromthePresidentoftheoriginofthisstrangeinterferencewhichmystifiedhimandwhichhecensuredandcondemnedmoreseverelythanmyself……Althoughverymuchdisturbedbythedisclosure，hewasanxioustoavoiddifficulty，andtoshieldMr。Seward，tooktohimselfthewholeblame。
　　ThusLincolnbeganarolethatheneverafterwardabandoned。
　　ItwastheroleofscapegoatWhateverwentwronganywherecouldalwaysbeloadeduponthePresident。HeappearedtoconsideritapartofhisdutytobethescapegoatforthewholeAdministration。Itwashiswayofmaintainingtrust，courage，efficiency，amonghissubordinates。
　　OfthosepaperswhichhehadsignedwithoutreadingonAprilfirst，Lincolnwastohearagaininstillmoresurprisingfashionsixdaysthereafter。
　　Hewasnowattheveryedgeofhissecondcrucialdecision。
　　Thoughthenavalexpeditionwasinpreparation，hestillhesitatedoverissuingorderstosail。ThereplytotheThoughtshadnotcommittedhimtoanyspecificlineofconduct。
　　Whatwasitthatkepthimwaveringatthiseleventhhour？
　　Again，thatimpenetrabletaciturnitywhichalwaysshroudedhisprogresstowardaconclusion，forbidsdogmaticassertion。Buttwothingsareobvious：hispositionasaminoritypresident，ofwhichhewasperhapsundulyconscious，causedhimtodelay，andtodelayagainandagain，seekingdefiniteevidencehowmuchsupporthecouldcommandintheNorth；thechangeinhiscomprehensionoftheproblembeforehim-hisperceptionthatitwasnotan“artificialcrisis“involvingslaveryalone，butanirreconcilableclashofsocial-politicalidealism——thisdisturbedhisspirit，distressed，evenappalledhim。HavingatruerinsightintohumannaturethanSewardhad，hesawthatherewasanissueimmeasurablylesssusceptibleofcompromisethanwasslavery。Whether，themomentheperceivedthis，heatoncelosthopeofanypeaceablesolution，wedonotknow。JustwhathethoughtabouttheVirginiaCompromiseisstilltoseek。However，thenatureofhismind，thewayitwentstraighttothehumanelementinaproblemoncehiseyeswereopenedtotheproblem’sreality，forbidustoconcludethathetookhopefromVirginia。Henowsawwhat，haditnotbeenforhisnearhorizon，hewouldhaveseensolongbefore，that，invulgarparlance，hehadbeen“barkingupthewrongtree。“Nowthathehadlocatedtherighttree，hadtheknowledgecometoolate？
　　ItisknownthatSeward，possiblyatLincoln’srequest，madeanattempttobringtogethertheVirginiaUnionistsandtheAdministration。HesentaspecialrepresentativetoRichmondurgingthedespatchofacommitteetoconferwiththePresident。
　　ThestrengthofthepartyintheConventionwasshownonAprilfourthwhenaproposedOrdinanceofSecessionwasvoteddown，eighty-ninetoforty-five。Onthesameday，theConventionbyastilllargermajorityformallydeniedtherightoftheFederalgovernmenttocoerceaState。Twodayslater，JohnB。
　　Baldwin，representingtheVirginiaUnionists，hadaconfidentialtalkwithLincoln。Onlyfragmentsoftheirtalk，drawnforthoutofmemorylongafterward——someofthereportingbeingatsecondhand，therecollectionsoftherecollectionsoftheparticipants——areknowntoexist。TheonefactclearlydiscernibleisthatBaldwinstatedfullytheVirginiaposition：
　　thatherUnionistswerenotnationalists；thatthecoercionofanyState，byimpugningthesovereigntyofall，wouldautomaticallydriveVirginiaoutoftheUnion。[23]
　　Lincolnhadnowreachedhisdecision。Thefearthathaddoggedhimallalong——thefearthatinevacuatingSumterhewouldbegivingsomethingfornothing，that“itwoulddiscouragethefriendsoftheUnion，emboldenitsadversaries“——wasinpossessionofhiswill。OnemayhazardtheguessthatthisfearwouldhavedeterminedLincolnsoonerthanitdid，exceptforthefactthattheSecretaryofState，despitehisfaults，wassoincomparablythestrongestpersonalityintheCabinet。
　　WehaveLincoln’sownwordforthemomentandthedetailthatformedtheveryendofhisperiodofvacillation。AllalonghehadintendedtorelieveandholdFortPickens，offthecoastofFlorida。Tothis，Sewardsawnoobjection。Infact，heurgedthereliefofPickens，hoping，ascompensation，togethiswayaboutSumter。AssumingashedidthattheSouthernleaderswereopportunists，hebelievedthattheywouldnotmakeanissueoverPickens，merelybecauseithadnotinthepubliceyebecomeapoliticalsymbol。OrdershadbeensenttoasquadroninSouthernwaterstorelievePickens。EarlyinAprilnewswasreceivedatWashingtonthattheattempthadfailedduetomisunderstandingsamongtheFederalcommanders。FearfulthatPickenswasabouttofall，reasoningthatwhateverhappenedhedarednotlosebothforts，LincolnbecameperemptoryonthesubjectoftheSumterexpedition。ThiswasonAprilsixth。OnthenightofAprilsixth，Lincoln’ssignaturestotheunreaddespatchesofthefirstofApril，camehometoroost。Andatlast，WellesfoundoutwhatSewardwasdoingonthedayofAllFools。[24]
　　WhiletheSumterexpeditionwasbeinggotready，stillwithoutsailingorders，asupplementalexpeditionwasalsopreparingforthereliefofPickens。ThiswasthebusinessthatSewardwascontriving，thatLincolnwouldnotexplain，onAprilfirst。