amusementatthefurious。CouldamanwholaughedwhenyoupreachedonthebeautyofthehewingofAgag,couldsuchamanbesincere?AndthatSewardinsomerespectswasnotsincere,historygenerallyadmits。Helovedtopokefunathisopponentsbyappearingtosneerathimself,byridiculingtheideathathewaseverserious。Hisscaleofpoliticalvalueswasdifferentfromthatofmostofhisfollowers。Nineteentimesoutoftwenty,hewouldtreatwhattheytermed“principles“asmerepoliticalcounters,aslegitimatesubjectsofbargain。Ifbyanydealhecouldtradeoffanyorallofthesenineteeninordertosecurethetwentieth,whichforhimwastheonlyvitalone,heneverscrupledtodoso。Againstaluridbackgroundofpoliticalferocity,thisamused,ironicfigurecametoberatedbytheextremists,bothinhisownandintheenemycampasMephistopheles。
NoqualitycouldhaveendearedhimmorecertainlytoLincolnthantheveryonewhichthebigotsmisunderstood。FromhisearliestyouthLincolnhadbeengovernedbythissamequality。
Withhisnon-censoriousmind,whichacceptedsomuchoflifeashefoundit,whichwasforeverstrippingprinciplesoftheiraccretions,whatcouldbemoreinevitablethanhiswarmingtotheonegreatmanatWashingtonwholikehimheldthatsuchapointofviewwastheonlyrationalone。Seward’sironicpeacefulnessinthemidstofthestormgainedinlusterbecauseallabouthimragedatempestofferocity,mitigated,atleastsofarasthedistractedPresidentcouldsee,onlybyself-
interestorpacifism。
AsLincolncameintooffice,hecouldseeandhearmanysignsofarisingfiercenessofsectionalhatred。HissecretaryrecordswithdisgustaproposaltoconquertheGulfStates,expeltheirwhitepopulation,andreducetheregiontoagiganticstatepreserve,wherenegroesshouldgrowcottonundernationalsupervision。[1]“WeoftheNorth,“saidSenatorBakerofOregon,“areamajorityoftheUnion,andwewillgovernourUnioninourownway。“[2]AttheotherextremewasthehystericalpacifismoftheAbolitionists。PartofLincoln’sabidingquarrelwiththeAbolitionistswastheirlackofnationalfeeling。Theirpeculiarformofintrospectionhadinjectedintopoliticstheideaofpersonalsin。Theirpersonalresponsibilityforslavery——theybeingpartofacountrythattoleratedit——wastheirbasalinspiration。
Consequently,themostdistinctiveAbolitionistswelcomedthisopportunitytocastofftheirresponsibility。Ifwarhadbeenproposedasacrusadetoabolishslavery,theirattitudemighthavebeendifferentButinMarch,1860,noonebutthefewultra-extremists,whomscarcelyanybodyheeded,dreamedofsuchawar。AwartorestoretheUnionwastheonlysortthatwasconsideredseriously。Suchawar,theAbolitionistsbitterlycondemned。Theyseizeduponpacifismastheirdefense。SaidWhittieroftheSecedingStates:
TheybreakthelinksofUnion:shallwelightThefiresofhelltoweldanewthechain,Onthatredanvilwhereeachblowispain?
ThefuryandthefearoffendedLincolninequalmeasure。Afterlongyearsopposingthepoliticaltemperoftheextremists,hewasnotthemannowtochangefront。Toonewhobelievedhimselfmarkedoutforatragicend,thecowardiceattheheartofthepacifismofhistimewasrevolting。ItwasfortunateforhisownpeaceofmindthathecouldherecountontheSecretaryofState。NoargumentbasedonfearofpainwouldmeetinSewardwithanythingbutderision。“Theytellus,“hehadoncesaid,andthewordsexpressedhisconstantattitude,“thatwearetoencounteropposition。Why,blessmysoul,didanybodyeverexpecttoreachafortune,orfame,orhappinessonearthoracrowninheaven,withoutencounteringresistanceandopposition?Whatarewemademenforbuttoencounterandovercomeoppositionarrayedagainstusinthelineofourduty?“[3]
Butiftheferocityandthecowardicewereoffensiveanddisheartening,therewassomethingelsethatwasbeneathcontempt。Neverwasself-interestmoreshockinglydisplayed。
Itwasrevealedinmanyways,butimpingeduponthenewPresidentinonlyone。Ahordeofoffice-seekersbesiegedhimintheWhiteHouse。Theparalleltothisamazingpicturecanhardlybefoundinhistory。Itwastakenforgrantedthatthenewpartywouldmakeacleansweepofthewholecivillist,thateverygovernmentemployeedowntothehumblestmessengerboytooyoungtohavepoliticalideaswastobearthelabelofthevictoriousparty。EveryCongressmanwhohadmadepromisestohisconstituents,everypoliticianofeverygradewhothoughthehadthepartyinhisdebt,everyadventurerwhoonanypretextcouldmakeashowingofpartyservicerendered,pouredintoWashington。Itwasamotleyhorde。
“Hark,hark,thedogsdobark,Thebeggarsarecomingtotown。“
TheyconvertedtheWhiteHouseintoaleaguer。Theyswarmedintothecorridorsandeventheprivatepassages。Sodensewastheswarmthatitwasdifficulttomakeone’swayeitherinorout。Lincolndescribedhimselfbytheimageofamanrentingroomsatoneendofhishousewhiletheotherendwasonfire。[4]
AndallthiswhiletheexistenceoftheRepublicwasatstake!
Itdidnotoccurtohimthatitwassafetodefythehorde,tosenditaboutitsbusiness。Hereagain,thefigureofSewardstoodoutinbrilliantlightagainstthesomberbackground。
OneofSeward’sfacultieswashispowertoformdevotedlieutenants。Hehadthatsureandnimblejudgmentwhichenablessomementoinspiretheirlieutenantsratherthancategoricallytoinstructthem。Allthesordidsideofhispoliticalgameshemanagedinthisway。Hedidnotappearhimselfasthebargainer。Intheshamefuleagernessofmostofthepoliticianstofindofficesfortheirretainers,Sewardwasconspicuousbycontrast。EventheCabinetwasnotfreefromthisviceofcateringtothethirstyhorde。[5]Alone,atthisjuncture,Sewarddetachedhimselffromthepettyaffairsofthehourandgavehiswholeattentiontostatecraft。
Hehadadefinitepolicy。AnotherpointofcontactwithLincolnwastheattitudeofbothtowardtheUnion,supplementedasitwasbytheirviewsoftheplaceofslaveryintheproblemtheyconfronted。Bothwerenationalistsreadytomakeanysacrificesforthenationalidea。Bothregardedslaveryasanissueofsecondimportance。Bothwerepreparedforgreatconcessionsifconvincedthat,ultimately,theirconcessionswouldstrengthenthetrendofAmericanlifetowardageneralexaltationofnationality。
Ontheotherhand,theirdifferences——
Sewardapproachedtheprobleminthesametemper,withthesameassumptions,thatwerehisinthepreviousDecember。Hestillbelievedthathismainpurposewastoenableagroupofpoliticianstosavetheirfacesbyeffectingastrategicretreat。ImputingtotheSouthernleadersanattitudeofpureself-interest,hebelievedthatifallowedtoplaythegameastheydesired,theywouldmarktimeuntilcircumstancesrevealedtothemwhethertherewasmoreprofitforthemintheUnionorout;healsobelievedthatifsufficienttimecouldbegiven,andifnoarmedclashtookplace,itwouldbedemonstratedfirst,thattheydidnothavesostrongaholdontheSouthastheyhadthoughttheyhad;andsecond,thatonthewhole,itwastotheirintereststopatchupthequarrelandcomebackintotheUnion。Buthealsosawthattheyhadaseriousproblemofleadership,which,ifrudelyhandled,mightmakeitimpossibleforthemtostandstill。Theyhadinflamedthesentimentofstate-patriotism。InSouthCarolina,particularly,thepopulardemandwasforindependence。WiththiswentthedemandthatFortSumterinCharlestonHarbor,garrisonedbyFederaltroops,shouldbesurrendered,orifnotsurrendered,takenforciblyfromtheUnitedStates。AfewcannonshotsatSumterwouldmeanwar。AnarticleinSeward’screedofstatecraftassertedthatthepopulacewillalwaysgowildoverawar。TopreventawarfeverintheNorthwasthefirstconditionofhispolicyathome。Therefore,inordertopreventit,thefirststepinsavinghisenemies’faceswastosafeguardthemagainstthesamedangerintheirowncalm。HemusthelpthemtopreventawarfeverintheSouth。Hesawbutonewaytodothis。Theconclusionwhichbecamethebedrockofhispolicywasinevitable。Sumtermustbeevacuated。
Evenbeforetheinauguration,hehadbroachedthisideatoLincoln。HehadtriedtokeepLincolnfrominsertingintheinauguralthewords,“Thepowerconfidedtomewillbeusedtohold,occupyandpossessthepropertyandplacesbelongingtothegovernment。“Hehadproposedinstead,“Thepowerconfidedinmeshallbeusedindeedwithefficacy,butalsowithdiscretion,ineverycaseandexigency,accordingtothecircumstancesactuallyexisting,andwithaviewandahopeofapeacefulsolutionofthenationaltroubles,andtherestorationoffraternalsympathiesandaffections。“[6]WiththerejectionofSeward’sprofferedrevision,adifferencebetweentheminpolicybegantodevelop。Lincoln,saysoneofhissecretaries,acceptedSeward’smainpurposebutdidnotsharehis“optimism。“[7]Itwouldbetruertosaythatinthisstageofhisdevelopment,hewaslackinginaudacity。Inhiseagersearchforadvice,hehadtostrikeabalancebetweenthedaringSewardwhoatthismomentbuiltentirelyonhisownpowerofpoliticaldevination,andthecautiousremainderoftheCabinetwhohadtheirearstothegroundtryingtheirbesttocatchthenoteofauthorityintherumblingsofvoxpopuli。
Forhisownpart,Lincolnbeganwithtworesolves:togoverycautiously,——andnotgivesomethingfornothing。Farfromhim,asyet,wasthatplungingmoodwhichinSewardpushedaudacitytothevergeofagamble。However,justprevioustotheinauguration,hetookacautiousstepinSeward’sdirection。
Virginia,likealltheotherStatesoftheupperSouth,wastornbythequestionwhichsidetotake。Therewasa“Union“
partyinVirginia,anda“Secession“party。AcommitteeofleadingUnionistsconferredwithLincoln。TheysawtheimmediateproblemverymuchasSewarddid。Theybelievedthatiftimewereallowed,thecrisiscouldbetidedoverandtheUnionrestored;butthefirstbreathofwarwouldwrecktheirhopes。TheconditionofbringingaboutanadjustmentwastheevacuationofSumter。LincolntoldthemthatifVirginiacouldbekeptintheUnionbytheevacuationofSumter,hewouldnothesitatetorecallthegarrison。[8]Afewdayslater,despitewhathehadsaidintheinaugural,herepeatedthisoffer。A
conventionwasthensittingatRichmondindebateupontherelationsofVirginiatotheUnion。Ifitwoulddropthematteranddissolve——soLincolntoldanothercommittee——hewouldevacuateSumterandtrusttherecoveryofthelowerSouthtonegotiation。[9]Noresults,sofarasisknown,cameofeitherofthoseoffers。
DuringthefirsthalfofMarch,theWashingtongovernmentmarkedtime。Theoffice-seekerscontinuedtobesiegethePresident。SouthCarolinacontinuedtoclamorforpossessionofSumter。TheConfederacysentcommissionerstoWashingtonwhomLincolnrefusedtorecognize。TheVirginiaConventionswayedthiswayandthat。
Sewardwentserenelyabouthisbusiness,confidentthateverythingwascertaintocomehiswaysoonorlate。HewentsofarastoadviseanintermediarytotelltheConfederateCommissionersthatalltheyhadtodotogetpossessionofSumterwastowait。TherestoftheCabinetpressedtheirearsmoretightlythanevertotheground。Therumblingsofvoxpopuliwerehardtointerpret。TheNorthappearedtobeintwominds。Thiswasrevealedthedayfollowingtheinauguration,whenaRepublicanClubinNewYorkheldahighdebateupontheconditionofthecountry。OnefactionwantedLincolntodeclareforawar-policy;anotherwishedtheClubtocontentitselfwithavoteofconfidenceintheAdministration。Eachfactionputitsviewsintoaresolutionandasahappydeviceformaintainingharmony,bothresolutionswerepassed。[10]Thefragmentary,miscellaneousevidenceofnewspapers,politicalmeetings,thetalkofleaders,localelections,formedaconfusedclamorwhicheachlistenerinterpretedaccordingtohispredisposition。ThemembersoftheCabinetintheirrelativeisolationatWashingtonfounditexceedinglydifficulttomakeuptheirmindswhatthepeoplewerereallysaying。Ofbutonethingtheywerecertain,andthatwasthattheyrepresentedaminorityparty。Beforecommittingthemselvesanyway,itwaslifeanddeathtoknowwhatportionoftheNorthwouldstandbythem。[11]
AtthispointbeganaperplexitythatwastotormentthePresidentalmosttothevergeofdistraction。Howfarcouldhetrusthismilitaryadvisers?OldGeneralScottwasattheheadofthearmy。Hehadoncebeenastriking,ifnotagreatfigure。Shouldhismilitaryadvicebeacceptedasfinal?
ScottinformedLincolnthatSumterwasshortoffoodandthatanyattempttorelieveitwouldcallforamuchlargerforcethanthegovernmentcouldmuster。Scotturgedhimtowithdrawthegarrison。LincolnsubmittedthemattertotheCabinet。Heaskedfortheiropinionsinwriting。[12]FiveadvisedtakingScottathiswordandgivingupallthoughtofrelievingSumter。Thereweretwodissenters。TheSecretaryoftheTreasury,SalmonPortlandChase,struckthekey-noteofhislaterpoliticalcareerbyanelaborateargumentonexpediency。
IfrelievingSumterwouldleadtocivilwar,Chasewasnotinfavorofrelief;butonthewholehedidnotthinkthatcivilwarwouldresult,andtherefore,onthewhole,hefavoredareliefexpedition。OnememberoftheCabinet,MontgomeryBlair,thePostmasterGeneral,animpetuous,fierceman,wasvehementforreliefatallcosts。LincolnwantedtoagreewithChaseandBlair。Hereasonedthatifthefortwasgivenup,thenecessityunderwhichitwasdonewouldnotbefullyunderstood;thatbymanyitwouldbeconstruedaspartofavoluntarypolicy,thatathomeitwoulddiscouragethefriendsoftheUnion,emboldenitsadversaries,andgofartoinsuretothematterarecognitionabroad。