Thoughthestandardbywhichcasuistsfrequentlydeterminewhatisrightorwronginhumanconduct，beitstendencytothewelfareordisorderofsociety，itdoesnotfollowthataregardtothewelfareofsocietyshouldbethesolevirtuousmotiveofaction，butonlythat，inanycompetition，itoughttocastthebalanceagainstallothermotives。
　　Benevolencemay，perhaps，bethesoleprincipleofactionintheDeity，andthereareseveral，notimprobable，argumentswhichtendtopersuadeusthatitisso。Itisnoteasytoconceivewhatothermotiveanindependentandall-perfectBeing，whostandsinneedofnothingexternal，andwhosehappinessiscompleteinhimself，canactfrom。ButwhatevermaybethecasewiththeDeity，soimperfectacreatureasman，thesupportofwhoseexistencerequiressomanythingsexternaltohim，mustoftenactfrommanyothermotives。Theconditionofhumannaturewerepeculiarlyhard，ifthoseaffections，which，bytheverynatureofourbeing，oughtfrequentlytoinfluenceourconduct，coulduponnooccasionappearvirtuous，ordeserveesteemandcommendationfromanybody。
　　Thosethreesystems，thatwhichplacesvirtueinpropriety，thatwhichplacesitinprudence，andthatwhichmakesitconsistinbenevolence，aretheprincipalaccountswhichhavebeengivenofthenatureofvirtue。Tooneorotherofthem，alltheotherdescriptionsofvirtue，howdifferentsoevertheymayappear，areeasilyreducible。
　　ThatsystemwhichplacesvirtueinobediencetothewilloftheDeity，maybecountedeitheramongthosewhichmakeitconsistinprudence，oramongthosewhichmakeitconsistinpropriety。Whenitisasked，whyweoughttoobeythewilloftheDeity，thisquestion，whichwouldbeimpiousandabsurdinthehighestdegree，ifaskedfromanydoubtthatweoughttoobeyhim，canadmitbutoftwodifferentanswers。ItmusteitherbesaidthatweoughttoobeythewilloftheDeitybecauseheisaBeingofinfinitepower，whowillrewarduseternallyifwedoso，andpunishuseternallyifwedootherwise:oritmustbesaid，thatindependentofanyregardtoourownhappiness，ortorewardsandpunishmentsofanykind，thereisacongruityandfitnessthatacreatureshouldobeyitscreator，thatalimitedandimperfectbeingshouldsubmittooneofinfiniteandincomprehensibleperfections。Besidesoneorotherofthesetwo，itisimpossibletoconceivethatanyotheranswercanbegiventothisquestion。Ifthefirstanswerbetheproperone，virtueconsistsinprudence，orintheproperpursuitofourownfinalinterestandhappiness；sinceitisuponthisaccountthatweareobligedtoobeythewilloftheDeity。Ifthesecondanswerbetheproperone，virtuemustconsistinpropriety，sincethegroundofourobligationtoobedienceisthesuitablenessorcongruityofthesentimentsofhumilityandsubmissiontothesuperiorityoftheobjectwhichexcitesthem。
　　Thatsystemwhichplacesvirtueinutility，coincidestoowiththatwhichmakesitconsistinpropriety。Accordingtothissystem，allthosequalitiesofthemindwhichareagreeableoradvantageous，eithertothepersonhimselfortoothers，areapprovedofasvirtuous，andthecontrarydisapprovedofasvicious。Buttheagreeablenessorutilityofanyaffectiondependsuponthedegreewhichitisallowedtosubsistin。Everyaffectionisusefulwhenitisconfinedtoacertaindegreeofmoderation；andeveryaffectionisdisadvantageouswhenitexceedstheproperbounds。Accordingtothissystemtherefore，virtueconsistsnotinanyoneaffection，butintheproperdegreeofalltheaffections。TheonlydifferencebetweenitandthatwhichIhavebeenendeavouringtoestablish，is，thatitmakesutility，andnotsympathy，orthecorrespondentaffectionofthespectator，thenaturalandoriginalmeasureofthisproperdegree。
　　OflicentiousSystemsAllthosesystems，whichIhavehithertogivenanaccountof，supposethatthereisarealandessentialdistinctionbetweenviceandvirtue，whateverthesequalitiesmayconsistin。Thereisarealandessentialdifferencebetweentheproprietyandimproprietyofanyaffection，betweenbenevolenceandanyotherprincipleofaction，betweenrealprudenceandshortsightedfollyorprecipitaterashness。Inthemaintooallofthemcontributetoencouragethepraise-worthy，andtodiscouragetheblamabledisposition。
　　Itmaybetrue，perhaps，ofsomeofthem，thattheytend，insomemeasure，tobreakthebalanceoftheaffections，andtogivethemindaparticularbiastosomeprinciplesofaction，beyondtheproportionthatisduetothem。Theancientsystems，whichplacevirtueinpropriety，seemchieflytorecommendthegreat，theawful，andtherespectablevirtues，thevirtuesofself-governmentandself-command；fortitude，magnanimity，independencyuponfortune，thecontemptofalloutwardaccidents，ofpain，poverty，exile，anddeath。Itisinthesegreatexertionsthatthenoblestproprietyofconductisdisplayed。Thesoft，theamiable，thegentlevirtues，allthevirtuesofindulgenthumanityare，incomparison，butlittleinsistedupon，andseem，onthecontrary，bytheStoicsinparticular，tohavebeenoftenregardedasmereweaknesseswhichitbehovedawisemannottoharbourinhisbreast。
　　Thebenevolentsystem，ontheotherhand，whileitfostersandencouragesallthosemildervirtuesinthehighestdegree，seemsentirelytoneglectthemoreawfulandrespectablequalitiesofthemind。Itevendeniesthemtheappellationofvirtues。Itcallsthemmoralabilities，andtreatsthemasqualitieswhichdonotdeservethesamesortofesteemandapprobation，thatisduetowhatisproperlydenominatedvirtue。
　　Allthoseprinciplesofactionwhichaimonlyatourowninterest，ittreats，ifthatbepossible，stillworse。Sofarfromhavinganymeritoftheirown，theydiminish，itpretends，themeritofbenevolence，whentheyco-operatewithit:andprudence，itisasserted，whenemployedonlyinpromotingprivateinterest，canneverevenbeimaginedavirtue。
　　Thatsystem，again，whichmakesvirtueconsistinprudenceonly，whileitgivesthehighestencouragementtothehabitsofcaution，vigilance，sobriety，andjudiciousmoderation，seemstodegradeequallyboththeamiableandrespectablevirtues，andtostriptheformerofalltheirbeauty，andthelatterofalltheirgrandeur。
　　Butnotwithstandingthesedefects，thegeneraltendencyofeachofthosethreesystemsistoencouragethebestandmostlaudablehabitsofthehumanmind:anditwerewellforsociety，if，eithermankindingeneral，oreventhosefewwhopretendtoliveaccordingtoanyphilosophicalrule，weretoregulatetheirconductbythepreceptsofanyoneofthem。Wemaylearnfromeachofthemsomethingthatisbothvaluableandpeculiar。Ifitwaspossible，bypreceptandexhortation，toinspirethemindwithfortitudeandmagnanimity，theancientsystemsofproprietywouldseemsufficienttodothis。Orifitwaspossible，bythesamemeans，tosoftenitintohumanity，andtoawakentheaffectionsofkindnessandgenerallovetowardsthosewelivewith，someofthepictureswithwhichthebenevolentsystempresentsus，mightseemcapableofproducingthiseffect。WemaylearnfromthesystemofEpicurus，thoughundoubtedlythemostimperfectofallthethree，howmuchthepracticeofboththeamiableandrespectablevirtuesisconducivetoourowninterest，toourowneaseandsafetyandquieteveninthislife。AsEpicurusplacedhappinessintheattainmentofeaseandsecurity，heexertedhimselfinaparticularmannertoshowthatvirtuewas，notmerelythebestandthesurest，buttheonlymeansofacquiringthoseinvaluablepossessions。Thegoodeffectsofvirtue，uponourinwardtranquillityandpeaceofmind，arewhatotherphilosophershavechieflycelebrated。Epicurus，withoutneglectingthistopic，haschieflyinsistedupontheinfluenceofthatamiablequalityonouroutwardprosperityandsafety。Itwasuponthisaccountthathiswritingsweresomuchstudiedintheancientworldbymenofalldifferentphilosophicalparties。ItisfromhimthatCicero，thegreatenemyoftheEpicureansystem，borrowshismostagreeableproofsthatvirtuealoneissufficienttosecurehappiness。Seneca，thoughaStoic，thesectmostoppositetothatofEpicurus，yetquotesthisphilosophermorefrequentlythananyother。
　　Thereis，however，anothersystemwhichseemstotakeawayaltogetherthedistinctionbetweenviceandvirtue，andofwhichthetendencyis，uponthataccount，whollypernicious:ImeanthesystemofDrMandeville。Thoughthenotionsofthisauthorareinalmosteveryrespecterroneous，thereare，however，someappearancesinhumannature，which，whenviewedinacertainmanner，seematfirstsighttofavourthem。These，describedandexaggeratedbythelivelyandhumorous，thoughcoarseandrusticeloquenceofDrMandeville，havethrownuponhisdoctrinesanairoftruthandprobabilitywhichisveryapttoimposeupontheunskilful。
　　DrMandevilleconsiderswhateverisdonefromasenseofpropriety，fromaregardtowhatiscommendableandpraise-worthy，asbeingdonefromaloveofpraiseandcommendation，orashecallsitfromvanity。Man，heobserves，isnaturallymuchmoreinterestedinhisownhappinessthaninthatofothers，anditisimpossiblethatinhishearthecaneverreallyprefertheirprosperitytohisown。Wheneverheappearstodoso，wemaybeassuredthatheimposesuponus，andthatheisthenactingfromthesameselfishmotivesasatallothertimes。
　　Amonghisotherselfishpassions，vanityisoneofthestrongest，andheisalwayseasilyflatteredandgreatlydelightedwiththeapplausesofthoseabouthim。Whenheappearstosacrificehisowninteresttothatofhiscompanions，heknowsthathisconductwillbehighlyagreeabletotheirself-love，andthattheywillnotfailtoexpresstheirsatisfactionbybestowinguponhimthemostextravagantpraises。Thepleasurewhichheexpectsfromthis，over-balances，inhisopinion，theinterestwhichheabandonsinordertoprocureit。Hisconduct，therefore，uponthisoccasion，isinrealityjustasselfish，andarisesfromjustasmeanamotive，asuponanyother。Heisflattered，however，andheflattershimself，withthebeliefthatitisentirelydisinterested；since，unlessthiswassupposed，itwouldnotseemtomeritanycommendationeitherinhisowneyesorinthoseofothers。Allpublicspirit，therefore，allpreferenceofpublictoprivateinterest，is，accordingtohim，amerecheatandimpositionuponmankind；andthathumanvirtuewhichissomuchboastedof，andwhichistheoccasionofsomuchemulationamongmen，isthemereoffspringofflatterybegotuponpride。
　　Whetherthemostgenerousandpublic-spiritedactionsmaynot，insomesense，beregardedasproceedingfromself-love，I
　　shallnotatpresentexamine。Thedecisionofthisquestionisnot，Iapprehend，ofanyimportancetowardsestablishingtherealityofvirtue，sinceself-lovemayfrequentlybeavirtuousmotiveofaction。Ishallonlyendeavourtoshowthatthedesireofdoingwhatishonourableandnoble，ofrenderingourselvestheproperobjectsofesteemandapprobation，cannotwithanyproprietybecalledvanity。Eventheloveofwell-groundedfameandreputation，thedesireofacquiringesteembywhatisreallyestimable，doesnotdeservethatname。Thefirstistheloveofvirtue，thenoblestandthebestpassioninhumannature。Thesecondistheloveoftrueglory，apassioninferiornodoubttotheformer，butwhichindignityappearstocomeimmediatelyafterit。Heisguiltyofvanitywhodesirespraiseforqualitieswhichareeithernotpraise-worthyinanydegree，ornotinthatdegreeinwhichheexpectstobepraisedforthemwhosetshischaracteruponthefrivolousornamentsofdressandequipage，orupontheequallyfrivolousaccomplishmentsofordinarybehaviour。