。Itseemsthenthatthenotionof`ought’or`moralobligation’asusedinourcommonmoraljudgments，doesnotmerelyimport1thatthereexistsinthemindofthepersonjudgingaspecificemotionwhethercomplicatedornotbysympatheticrepresentationofsimilaremotionsinotherminds；nor2thatcertainrulesofconductaresupportedbypenaltieswhichwillfollowontheirviolationwhethersuchpenaltiesresultfromthegenerallikingoraversionfeltfortheconductprescribedorforbidden，orfromsomeothersource。Whatthen，itmaybeasked，doesitimport？Whatdefinitioncanwegiveof`ought’，`right’，andothertermsexpressingthesamefundamentalnotion？
　　TothisIshouldanswerthatthenotionwhichthesetermshaveincommonistooelementarytoadmitofanyformaldefinition。Insosaying，Idonotmeantoimplythatitbelongstothe``originalconstitutionofthemind’’；i。e。thatitspresenceinconsciousnessisnottheresultofaprocessofdevelopment。Idonotdoubtthatthewholefabricofhumanthought——includingtheconceptionsthatpresentthemselvesasmostsimpleandelementary——hasbeendeveloped，throughagradualprocessofpsychicalchange，outofsomelowerlifeinwhichthought，properlyspeaking，hadnoplace。Butitisnotthereforetobeinferred，asregardsthisoranyothernotion，thatithasnotreallythesimplicitywhichitappearstohavewhenwenowreflectuponit。Itissometimesassumedthatifwecanshowhowthoughtshavegrownup——ifwecanpointtothepsychicalantecedentsofwhichtheyarethenaturalconsequents——wemayconcludethatthethoughtsinquestionarereallycompoundscontainingtheirantecedentsaslatentelements。ButIknownojustificationforthistransferenceoftheconceptionsofchemistrytopsychology；IIknownoreasonforconsideringpsychicalantecedentsasreallyconstitutiveoftheirpsychicalconsequents，inspiteoftheapparentdissimilaritybetweenthetwo。Indefaultofsuchreasons，apsychologistmustacceptaselementarywhatintrospectioncarefullyperformeddeclarestobeso；and，usingthiscriterion，Ifindthatthenotionwehavebeenexamining，asitnowexistsinourthought，cannotberesolvedintoanymoresimplenotions:itcanonlybemadeclearerbydeterminingaspreciselyaspossibleitsrelationtoothernotionswithwhichitisconnectedinordinarythought，especiallytothosewithwhichitisliabletobeconfounded。
　　Inperformingthisprocessitisimportanttonoteanddistinguishtwodifferentimplicationswithwhichtheword``ought’’isused；inthenarrowestethicalsensewhatwejudge`oughttobe’done，isalwaysthoughtcapableofbeingbroughtaboutbythevolitionofanyindividualtowhomthejudgmentapplies。IcannotconceivethatI`ought’todoanythingwhichatthesametimeIjudgethatIcannotdo。Inawidersense，however，——whichcannotconvenientlybediscarded——IsometimesjudgethatI`ought’toknowwhatawisermanwouldknow，orfeelasabettermanwouldfeel，inmyplace，thoughImayknowthatIcouldnotdirectlyproduceinmyselfsuchknowledgeorfeelingbyanyeffortofwill。InthiscasethewordmerelyimpliesanidealorpatternwhichI`ought’——inthestrictersense——toseektoimitateasfaraspossible。AndthiswidersenseseemstobethatinwhichthewordisnormallyusedinthepreceptsofArtgenerally，andinpoliticaljudgments:whenIjudgethatthelawsandconstitutionofmycountry`oughttobe’otherthantheyare，Idonotofcourseimplythatmyownoranyotherindividual’ssinglevolitioncandirectlybringaboutthechange。Ineithercase，however，Iimplythatwhatoughttobeisapossibleobjectofknowledge:i。e。thatwhatIjudgeoughttobemust，unlessIaminerror，besimilarlyjudgedbyallrationalbeingswhojudgetrulyofthematter。
　　Inreferringsuchjudgmentstothe`Reason’，Idonotmeanheretoprejudgethequestionwhethervalidmoraljudgmentsarenormallyattainedbyaprocessofreasoningfromuniversalprinciplesoraxioms，orbydirectintuitionoftheparticulardutiesofindividuals。Itisnotuncommonlyheldthatthemoralfacultydealsprimarilywithindividualcasesastheyarise，applyingdirectlytoeachcasethegeneralnotionofduty，anddecidingintuitivelywhatoughttobedonebythispersonintheseparticularcircumstances。
　　AndIadmitthatonthisviewtheapprehensionofmoraltruthismoreanalogoustoSenseperceptionthantoRationalIntuitionascommonlyunderstood:
　　andhencethetermMoralSensemightseemmoreappropriate。ButthetermSensesuggestsacapacityforfeelingswhichmayvaryfromAtoBwithouteitherbeinginerror，ratherthanafacultyofcognition:anditappearstomefundamentallyimportanttoavoidthissuggestion。IhavethereforethoughtitbettertousethetermReasonwiththeexplanationabovegiven，todenotethefacultyofmoralcognitionadding，asafurtherjustificationofthisuse，thatevenwhenamoraljudgmentrelatesprimarilytosomeparticularactionwecommonlyregarditasapplicabletoanyotheractionbelongingtoacertaindefinableclass:sothatthemoraltruthapprehendedisimplicitlyconceivedtobeintrinsicallyuniversal，thoughparticularinourfirstapprehensionofit。
　　Further，whenIspeakofthecognitionorjudgmentthat`Xoughttobedone’——inthestricterethicalsenseofthetermought——asa`dictate’or`precept’ofreasontothepersonstowhomitrelates，Iimplythatinrationalbeingsassuchthiscognitiongivesanimpulseormotivetoaction:thoughinhumanbeings，ofcourse，thisisonlyonemotiveamongotherswhichareliabletoconflictwithit，andisnotalways——perhapsnotusually——apredominantmotive。
　　Infact，thispossibleconflictofmotivesseemstobeconnotedbytheterm`dictate’or`imperative’，whichdescribestherelationofReasontomereinclinationsornon-rationalimpulsesbycomparingittotherelationbetweenthewillofasuperiorandthewillsofhissubordinates。Thisconflictseemsalsotobeimpliedintheterms`ought’，`duty’，`moralobligation’，asusedinordinarymoraldiscourse:andhencethesetermscannotbeappliedtotheactionsofrationalbeingstowhomwecannotattributeimpulsesconflictingwithreason。Wemay，however，sayofsuchbeingsthattheiractionsare`reasonable’，orinanabsolutesense`right’。
　　M1amawarethatsomepersonswillbedisposedtoansweralltheprecedingargumentbyasimpledenialthattheycanfindintheirconsciousnessanysuchunconditionalorcategoricalimperativeasIhavebeentryingtoexhibit。Ifthisisreallythefinalresultofself-examinationinanycase，thereisnomoretobesaid。I，atleast，donotknowhowtoimpartthenotionofmoralobligationtoanyonewhoisentirelydevoidofit。Ithink，however，thatmanyofthosewhogivethisdenialonlymeantodenythattheyhaveanyconsciousnessofmoralobligationtoactionswithoutreferencetotheirconsequences；andwouldnotreallydenythattheyrecognisesomeuniversalendorends——whetheritbethegeneralhappiness，orwellbeingotherwiseunderstood——asthatatwhichitisultimatelyreasonabletoaim，subordinatingtoitsattainmentthegratificationofanypersonaldesiresthatmayconflictwiththisaim。
　　Butinthisview，asIhavebeforesaid，theunconditionalimperativeplainlycomesinasregardstheend，whichis——explicitlyorimplicitly——recognisedasanendatwhichallmen`ought’toaim；anditcallhardlybedeniedthattherecognitionofanendasultimatelyreasonableinvolvestherecognitionofanobligationtodosuchactsasmostconducetotheend。Theobligationisnotindeed``unconditional’’，butitdoesnotdependontheexistenceofanynon-rationaldesiresoraversions。AndnothingthathasbeensaidintheprecedingsectionisintendedasanargumentinfavourofIntuitionism，asagainstUtilitarianismoranyothermethodthattreatsmoralrulesasrelativetoGeneralGoodorWell-being。Forinstance，nothingthatIhavesaidisinconsistentwiththeviewthatTruthspeakingisonlyvaluableasameanstothepreservationofsociety:onlyifitbeadmittedthatitisvaluableonthisgroundIshouldsaythatitisimpliedthatthepreservationofsociety——orsomefurtherendtowhichthispreservation，again，isameans——mustbevaluableperse，andthereforesomethingatwhicharationalbeing，assuch，oughttoaim。Ifitbegrantedthatweneednotlookbeyondthepreservationofsociety，theprimary`dictateofreason’inthiscasewouldbe`thatsocietyoughttobepreserved’:
　　butreasonwouldalsodictatethattruthoughttobespoken，sofarastruthspeakingisrecognisedastheindispensableorfittestmeanstothisend:andthenotion``ought’’asusedineitherdictateisthatwhichI
　　havebeentryingtomakeclear。
　　Soagain，eventhosewhoboldthatmoralrulesareonlyobligatorybecauseitistheindividual’sinteresttoconformtothem——thusregardingthemasaparticularspeciesofprudentialrules——donottherebygetridofthe`dictateofreason’，sofarastheyrecogniseprivateinterestorhappinessasanendatwhichitisultimatelyreasonabletoaim。TheconflictofPracticalReasonwithirrationaldesireremainsanindubitablefactofourconsciousexperience，evenifpracticalreasonisinterpretedtomeanmerelyself-regardingPrudence。Itis，indeed，maintainedbyKantandothersthatitcannotproperlybesaidtobeaman’sdutytopromotehisownhappiness；since``whateveryoneinevitablywillscannotbebroughtunderthenotionofduty’’。Butevengrantingittobeinsomesensetruethataman’svolitionisalwaysdirectedtotheattainmentofhisownhappiness，itdoesnotfollowthatamanalwaysdoeswhathebelieveswillbeconducivetohisowngreatesthappiness。AsButlerurges，itisamatterofcommonexperiencethatmenindulgeappetiteorpassionevenwhen，intheirownview，theindulgenceisasclearlyopposedtowhattheyconceivetobetheirinterestasitistowhattheyconceivetobetheirduty。Thusthenotion`ought’——asexpressingtherelationofrationaljudgmenttonon-rationalimpulses——willfindaplaceinthepracticalrulesofanyegoisticsystem，nolessthanintherulesofordinarymorality，understoodasprescribingdutywithoutreferencetotheagent’sinterest。
　　Here，however，itmaybeheldthatEgoismdoesnotproperlyregardtheagent’sowngreatesthappinessaswhathe``ought’’toaimat:butonlyastheultimateendfortherealisationofwhichhehas，onthewhole，apredominantdesire；whichmaybetemporarilyovercomebyparticularpassionsandappetites，butordinarilyregainsitspredominancewhenthesetransientimpulseshavespenttheirforce。Iquiterecognisethatthisisaviewwidelytakenofegoisticaction，andIproposetoconsideritinasubsequentchapter。Butevenifwediscardthebelief，thatanyendofactionisunconditionallyor``categorically’’prescribedbyreason，thenotion`ought’asaboveexplainedisnottherebyeliminatedfromourpracticalreasonings:itstillremainsinthe``hypotheticalimperative’’
　　whichprescribesthefittestmeanstoanyendthatwemayhavedeterminedtoaimat。Whene。g。aphysiciansays，``Ifyouwishtobehealthyyououghttoriseearly’’，thisisnotthesamethingassaying``earlyrisingisanindispensableconditionoftheattainmentofhealth’’。Thislatterpropositionexpressestherelationofphysiologicalfactsonwhichtheformerisfounded；butitisnotmerelythisrelationoffactsthattheword`ought’imports:italsoimpliestheunreasonablenessofadoptinganendandrefusingtoadoptthemeansindispensabletoitsattainment。
　　Itmayperhapsbearguedthatthisisnotonlyunreasonablebutimpossible:
　　sinceadoptionofanendmeansthepreponderanceofadesireforit，andifaversiontotheindispensablemeanscausesthemnottobeadoptedalthoughrecognisedasindispensable，thedesirefortheendisnotpreponderantanditceasestobeadopted。Butthisviewisdue，inmyopinion，toadefectivepsychologicalanalysis。Accordingtomyobservationofconsciousness，theadoptionofanendasparamount——eitherabsolutelyorwithincertainlimits——isquiteadistinctpsychicalphenomenonfromdesire:itisakindofvolition，thoughitis，ofcourse，specificallydifferentfromavolitioninitiatingaparticularimmediateaction。Asaspeciesintermediatebetweenthetwo，wemayplaceresolutionstoactinacertainwayatsomefuturetime:wecontinuallymakesuchresolutions，andsometimeswhenthetimecomesforcarryingthemout，wedoinfactactotherwiseundertheinfluenceofpassionormerehabit，withoutconsciouslycancellingourpreviousresolve。Thisinconsistencyofwillourpracticalreasoncondemnsasirrational，evenapartfromanyjudgmentofapprobationordisapprobationoneithervolitionconsideredbyitself。Thereisasimilarinconsistency，betweentheadoptionofanendandageneralrefusaltotakewhatevermeanswemayseetobeindispensabletoitsattainment:andif，whenthetimecomes，wedonottakesuchmeanswhileyetwedonotconsciouslyretractouradoptionoftheend，itcanhardlybedeniedthatwe`ought’inconsistencytoactotherwisethanwedo。AndsuchacontradictionasIhavedescribed，betweenageneralresolutionandaparticularvolition，issurelyamatterofcommonexperience。