IftheviewmaintainedintheprecedingchapterastothegeneralUtilitarianbasisoftheMoralityofCommonSensemayberegardedassufficientlyestablished，wearenowinapositiontoconsidermorecloselytowhatmethodofdeterminingrightconducttheacceptanceofUtilitarianismwillpracticallylead。Themostobviousmethod，ofcourse，isthatofEmpiricalHedonism，discussedinBookii。chap。iii。；accordingtowhichwehaveineachcasetocompareallthepleasuresandpainsthatcanbeforeseenasprobableresultsofthedifferentalternativesofconductpresentedtous，andtoadoptthealternativewhichseemslikelytoleadtothegreatesthappinessonthewhole。
　　InBookii。，however，itappearedthateventhemorerestrictedapplicationofthismethod，whichwetherehadtoconsider，wasinvolvedinmuchperplexityanduncertainty。Evenwhenanindividualisonlyoccupiedinforecastinghisownpleasures，itseemsdifficultorimpossibleforhimtoavoiderrorsofconsiderablemagnitude；
　　whetherinaccuratelycomparingthepleasantnessofhisownpastfeelings，asrepresentedinmemory，orinappropriatingtheexperienceofothers，orinarguingfromthepasttothefuture。Andthesedifficultiesareobviouslymuchincreasedwhenwehavetotakeintoaccountalltheeffectsofouractionsonallthesentientbeingswhomaybeaffectedbythem。Atthesametime，inBookii。wecouldnotfindanysatisfactorysubstituteforthismethodofempiricalcomparison。Itdidnotappearreasonabletotakerefugeintheuncriticisedbeliefsofmeningeneralastothesourcesofhappiness:indeed，itseemedimpossibletoextractanyadequatelyclearanddefiniteconsensusofopinionfromtheconfusedandvaryingutterancesofCommonsenseonthissubject。Noragaincoulditbeshownthattheindividualwouldbemorelikelytoattainthegreatesthappinessopentohimbypracticallyconfininghiseffortstotherealisationofanyscientificallyascertainablephysicalorpsychicalconditionsofhappiness:nordiditseempossibletoinferonempiricalgroundsthatthedesiredresultwouldbesecuredbyconformitytotheacceptedprinciplesofmorality。Butwhenweconsidertheselatterinrelation，nottothehappinessoftheindividual，buttothatofhumanorsentientbeingsgenerally，itisclearfromtheprecedingchapterthatthequestionofharmonybetweenHedonismandIntuitionismpresentsprimafacieanentirelydifferentaspect。IndeedfromtheconsiderationsthatwehavejustsurveyeditisbutashortandeasysteptotheconclusionthatintheMoralityofCommonSensewehavereadytohandabodyofUtilitariandoctrine；thatthe``rulesofmoralityforthemultitude’’aretoberegardedas``positivebeliefsofmankindastotheeffectsofactionsontheirhappiness’’，[1]sothattheapparentfirstprinciplesofCommonSensemaybeacceptedasthe``middleaxioms’’ofUtilitarianmethod；directreferencebeingonlymadetoutilitarianconsiderations，inordertosettlepointsuponwhichtheverdictofCommonSenseisfoundtobeobscureandconflicting。OnthisviewthetraditionalcontroversybetweentheadvocatesofVirtueandtheadvocatesofHappinesswouldseemtobeatlengthharmoniouslysettled。
　　Andtheargumentsforthisviewwhichhavebeenalreadyputforwardcertainlyreceivesupportfromthehypothesis，nowwidelyaccepted，thatthemoralsentimentsareultimatelyderived，byacomplexandgradualprocess，fromexperiencesofpleasureandpain。Thehypothesis，inasummaryform，wouldseemtobethis；1
　　intheexperienceofeachmemberofthehumancommunitythepainoralarmcausedtohimbyactionsofhimselfandofotherstendsbyassociationtoexciteinhimadislikeofsuchactions，andasimilarthoughfeeblereffectisproducedbyhisperceptionofpainordangercausedtootherswithwhomheisconnectedbyblood，orbycommunityofinterest，oranyspecialtieofsympathy:2experiencealsotendsmoreindirectlytoproduceinhimsentimentsrestraininghimfromactionspainfuloralarmingtoothers，throughhisdreadoftheirresentmentanditsconsequences，——especiallydreadofhischief’sanger，and，wherereligiousinfluencehasbecomestrong，oftheangerofsupernaturalbeings:3withtheselatterfeelingsblendsasympatheticaversiontothepainofothermengenerally，which——atfirstcomparativelyfeeble——tendstogrowinforceasmoralitydevelops。Inthesamewayexperiencesofpleasureandgratitude，anddesireofthegoodwillofothersanditsconsequences，tendtoproducelikingforactionsthatareperceivedtocausepleasuretoselfortoothers。Thesimilaraversionsandlikingsthatarethusproducedinthemajorityofthemembersofanysociety，throughthegeneralsimilarityoftheirnaturesandconditions，tendtobecomemoresimilarthroughcommunicationandimitation，——thedesireofeachtoretainthegoodwillofothersoperatingtorepressindividualdivergencies。Thuscommonlikingsforconductthataffectspleasurablythecommunitygenerallyorsomepartofit，andcommondislikesforconductcausingpainandalarm，cometobegraduallydeveloped；theyaretransmittedfromgenerationtogeneration，partlyperhapsbyphysicalinheritance，butchieflybytraditionfromparentstochildren，andimitationofadultsbytheyoung；inthiswaytheiroriginbecomesobscured，andtheyfinallyappearaswhatarecalledthemoralsentiments。Thistheorydoesnot，inmyview，accountadequatelyfortheactualresultsofthefacultyofmoraljudgmentandreasoning，sofarasIcanexaminethembyreflectiononmyownmoralconsciousness:forthis，asIhavebeforesaid，doesnotyieldanyapparentintuitionsthatstandthetestofrigorousexaminationexceptsuchas，fromtheirabstractandgeneralcharacter，havenocognisablerelationtoparticularexperiencesofanykind。Butthatthetheorygivesapartiallytrueexplanationofthehistoricaloriginofparticularmoralsentimentsandhabitsandcommonlyacceptedrules，Iseenoreasontodoubt；
　　andthusregardeditseemstosupplementtheargumentsoftheprecedingchapterthattendtoexhibitthemoralityofcommonsenseasunconsciouslyor`instinctively’utilitarian。
　　Butitisonethingtoholdthatthecurrentmoralityexpresses，partlyconsciouslybuttoalargerextentunconsciously，theresultsofhumanexperienceastotheeffectsofactions:itisquiteanotherthingtoacceptthismoralityenbloc，sofarasitisclearanddefinite，asthebestguidancewecangettotheattainmentofmaximumgeneralhappiness。HoweverattractivethissimplereconciliationofIntuitionalandUtilitarianmethodsmaybe，itisnot，Ithink，reallywarrantedbytheevidence。Inthefirstplace，Iholdthatinacompleteviewofthedevelopmentofthemoralsenseamoreprominentplaceshouldbegiventotheeffectofsympathywiththeimpulsesthatprompttoactions，aswellaswiththefeelingsthatresultfromthem。ItmaybeobservedthatAdamSmithassignstothisoperationofsympathy，——theechoasitwereofeachagent’spassioninthebreastofunconcernedspectators，——thefirstplaceindeterminingourapprovalanddisapprovalofactions；[4]sympathywiththeeffectofconductonothershetreatsasamerelysecondaryfactor，correctingandqualifyingtheformer。
　　Withoutgoingsofarasthis，Ithinkthattherearecertainlymanycaseswheretheresultingmoralconsciousnesswouldseemtoindicateabalanceorcompromisebetweenthetwokindsofsympathy；andthecompromisemayeasilybemanydegreesremovedfromtherulewhichUtilitarianismwouldprescribe。Forthoughthepassionsandotheractiveimpulsesaredoubtlessthemselvesinfluenced，nolessthanthemoralsentiments，byexperiencesofpleasureandpain；stillthisinfluenceisnotsufficienttomakethematalltrustworthyguidestogeneral，anymorethantoindividual，happiness——assomeofourmoralsentimentsthemselvesemphaticallyannounce。Butevenifweconsiderourcommonmoralsentimentsasentirelydue——directlyorindirectly——totheaccumulatedandtransmittedexperiencesofprimaryandsympatheticpainsandpleasures；itisobviousthatthedegreeofaccuracywithwhichsentimentsthusproducedwillguideustothepromotionofgeneralhappinessmustlargelydependuponthedegreeofaccuracywithwhichthewholesumofpleasurableandpainfulconsequences，resultingfromanycourseofaction，hasbeenrepresentedintheconsciousnessofanaveragememberofthecommunity。Anditisseenataglancethatthisrepresentationhasalwaysbeenliabletoerrorsofgreatmagnitude，fromcausesthatwerepartlynoticedinthepreviouschapter，whenwewereconsideringtheprogressofmorality。Wehavetoallow，first，forlimitationofsympathy；sinceineveryageandcountrythesympathyofanaveragemanwithothersentientbeings，andevenhisegoisticregardfortheirlikingsandaversions，hasbeenmuchmorelimitedthantheinfluenceofhisactionsonthefeelingsofothers。Wemustallowfurtherforlimitationofintelligence:forinallagesordinarymenhavehadaveryinadequateknowledgeofnaturalsequences；
　　sothatsuchindirectconsequencesofconductashavebeenfelthavebeenfrequentlytracedtowrongcauses，andbeenmetbywrongmoralremedies，owingtoimperfectapprehensionoftherelationofmeanstoends。Again，wherethehabitofobediencetoauthorityandrespectforrankhasbecomestrong，wemustallowforthepossiblypervertinginfluenceofadesiretowinthefavouroraverttheangerofsuperiors。Andsimilarlywemustallowagainfortheinfluencesoffalsereligions；andalsoforthepossibilitythatthesensibilitiesofreligiousteachershaveinfluencedthecodeofdutyacceptedbytheirfollowers，inpointswherethesesensibilitieswerenotnormalandrepresentative，butexceptionalandidiosyncratic。
　　Ontheotherhand，wemustsupposethatthesedeflectinginfluenceshavebeenmoreorlesslimitedandcounteractedbythestruggleforexistenceinpastagesamongdifferenthumanracesandcommunities；since，sofarasanymoralhabitorsentimentwasunfavourabletothepreservationofthesocialorganism，itwouldbeadisadvantageinthestruggleforexistence，andwouldthereforetendtoperishwiththecommunitythatadheredtoit。ButwehavenoreasontosupposethatthisforcewouldbeadequatetokeeppositivemoralityalwaysinconformitywithaUtilitarianideal。For1imperfectmoralitywouldbeonlyonedisadvantageamongmany，andnot，Iconceive，themostimportant，unlesstheimperfectionwereextreme，——especiallyintheearlierstagesofsocialandmoraldevelopment，inwhichthestruggleforexistencewasmostoperative:and2amoralityperfectlypreservativeofahumancommunitymightstillbeimperfectlyfelicific，andsorequireconsiderableimprovementfromaUtilitarianpointofview。[6]Further，analogywouldleadustoexpectthathowevercompletelyadaptedthemoralinstinctsofacommunitymaybeatsomeparticulartimetoitsconditionsofexistence，anyrapidchangeofcircumstanceswouldtendtoderangetheadaptation，fromsurvivalofinstinctsformerlyuseful，whichthroughthischangebecomeuselessorpernicious。Andindeed，apartfromanyapparentchangesinexternalcircumstances，itmightresultfromtheoperationofsomelawofhumandevelopment，thatthemostcompletelyorganisedexperienceofhumanhappinessinthepastwouldguideusbutimperfectlytotherightmeansofmakingitamaximuminthefuture。Forexample，aslightdecreaseintheaveragestrengthofsomecommonimpulsemightrenderthetraditionalrulesandsentiments，thatregulatethisimpulse，infelicificonthewhole。Andif，whenweturnfromtheseabstractconsiderationstohistory，andexaminetheactualmoralityofotheragesandcountries，weundoubtedlyfindthat，consideredasaninstrumentforproducinggeneralhappiness，itcontinuallyseemstoexhibitpalpableimperfections，——thereissurelyastrongpresumptionthattherearesimilarimperfectionstobediscoveredinourownmoralcode，thoughhabitandfamiliaritypreventthemfrombeingobvious。
　　Finally，wemustnotoverlookthefactthatthedivergenceswhichwefindwhenwecomparethemoralitiesofdifferentagesandcountries，existtosomeextentsidebysideinthemoralityofanyonesocietyatanygiventime。Ithasalreadybeenobservedthatwheneverdivergentopinionsareentertainedbyaminoritysolarge，thatwecannotfairlyregardthedogmaofthemajorityastheplainutteranceofCommonSense，anappealisnecessarilymadetosomehigherprinciple，andverycommonlytoUtilitarianism。Butasmallerminoritythanthis，particularlyifcomposedofpersonsofenlightenmentandspecialacquaintancewiththeeffectsoftheconductjudged，mayreasonablyinspireuswithdistrustofCommonSense:justasinthemoretechnicalpartsofpracticewepreferthejudgmentoffewtrainedexpertstotheinstinctsofthevulgar。Yetagain，contemplationofthesedivergentcodesandtheirrelationtothedifferentcircumstancesinwhichmenlive，suggeststhatCommon-Sensemoralityisreallyonlyadaptedforordinarymeninordinarycircumstances——althoughitmaystillbeexpedientthattheseordinarypersonsshouldregarditasabsolutelyanduniversallyprescribed，sinceanyotherviewofitmaydangerouslyweakenitsholdovertheirminds。SofarasthisisthecasewemustusetheUtilitarianmethodtoascertainhowfarpersonsinspecialcircumstancesrequireamoralitymorespeciallyadaptedtothemthanCommonSenseiswillingtoconcede:andalsobowfarmenofpeculiarphysicalormentalconstitutionoughttobeexemptedfromordinaryrules，ashassometimesbeenclaimedformenofgenius，ormenofintenselyemotionalnature，ormengiftedwithmorethanusualprudenceandself-control。
　　Further，itisimportanttonotice，thatbesidesthelargeamountofdivergencethatexistsbetweenthemoralinstinctsofdifferentclassesandindividuals，thereisoftenapalpablediscrepancybetweenthemoralinstinctsofanyclassorindividual，andsuchUtilitarianreasoningsastheiruntrainedintellectsareinthehabitofconducting。
　　Therearemanythingsinconductwhichmanypeoplethinkrightbutnotexpedient，oratleastwhichtheywouldnotthinkexpedientiftheyhadnotfirstjudgedthemtoberight；insofarastheyreasonfromexperienceonly，theirconclusionsastowhatconducestothegeneralhappinessareopposedtotheirmoralintuitions。Itmaybesaidthatthisresultsgenerallyfromahastyandsuperficialconsiderationofexpediency；andthatthediscrepancywoulddisappearafteradeeperandcompleterexaminationoftheconsequencesofactions。AndIdonotdenythatthiswouldoftenturnouttobethecase:butaswecannottellapriorihowfaritwouldbeso，thisonlyconstitutesafurtherargumentforacomprehensiveandsystematicapplicationofapurelyUtilitarianmethod。
　　Wemustconclude，then，thatwecannottakethemoralrulesofCommonSenseasexpressingtheconsensusofcompetentjudges，uptothepresenttime，astothekindofconductwhichislikelytoproducethegreatestamountofhappinessonthewhole。ItwouldratherseemthatitistheunavoidabledutyofasystematicUtilitarianismtomakeathoroughrevisionoftheserules，inordertoascertainhowfarthecausespreviouslyenumeratedandperhapsothershaveactuallyoperatedtoproduceadivergencebetweenCommonSenseandaperfectlyUtilitariancodeofmorality。