Wehavetoaskhow，onUtilitarianprinciples，thisinfluenceistobeexercised。HereIshallassumethat，forhumanbeingsgenerally，lifeontheaverageyieldsapositivebalanceofpleasureoverpain。Thishasbeendeniedbythoughtfulpersons:butthedenialseemstomeclearlyopposedtothecommonexperienceofmankind，asexpressedintheircommonlyacceptedprinciplesofaction。Thegreatmajorityofmen，inthegreatmajorityofconditionsunderwhichhumanlifeislived，certainlyactasifdeathwereoneoftheworstofevils，forthemselvesandforthosewhomtheylove:andtheadministrationofcriminaljusticeproceedsonasimilarassumption。
　　Assuming，then，thattheaveragehappinessofhumanbeingsisapositivequantity，itseemsclearthat，supposingtheaveragehappinessenjoyedremainsundiminished，Utilitarianismdirectsustomakethenumberenjoyingitasgreataspossible。Butifweforeseeaspossiblethatanincreaseinnumberswillbeaccompaniedbyadecreaseinaveragehappinessorviceversa，apointariseswhichhasnotonlyneverbeenformallynoticed，butwhichseemstohavebeensubstantiallyoverlookedbymanyUtilitarians。ForifwetakeUtilitarianismtoprescribe，astheultimateendofaction，happinessonthewhole，andnotanyindividual’shappiness，unlessconsideredasanelementofthewhole，itwouldfollowthat，iftheadditionalpopulationenjoyonthewholepositivehappiness，weoughttoweightheamountofhappinessgainedbytheextranumberagainsttheamountlostbytheremainder。Sothat，strictlyconceived，thepointuptowhich，onUtilitarianprinciples，populationoughttobeencouragedtoincrease，isnotthatatwhichaveragehappinessisthegreatestpossible，asappearstobeoftenassumedbypoliticaleconomistsoftheschoolofMalthus——butthatatwhichtheproductformedbymultiplyingthenumberofpersonslivingintotheamountofaveragehappinessreachesitsmaximum。
　　ItmaybewellheretomakearemarkwhichhasawideapplicationinUtilitariandiscussion。TheconclusionjustgivenwearsacertainairofabsurditytotheviewofCommonSense；becauseitsshowofexactnessisgrotesquelyincongruouswithourconsciousnessoftheinevitableinexactnessofallsuchcalculationsinactualpractice。
　　But，thatourpracticalUtilitarianreasoningsmustnecessarilyberough，isnoreasonfornotmakingthemasaccurateasthecaseadmits；andweshallbemorelikelytosucceedinthisifwekeepbeforeourmindasdistinctlyaspossiblethestricttypeofthecalculationthatweshouldhavetomake，ifalltherelevantconsiderationscouldbeestimatedwithmathematicalprecision。
　　Thereisonemorepointthatremainstobenoticed。Itisevidentthattheremaybemanydifferentwaysofdistributingthesamequantumofhappinessamongthesamenumberofpersons；inorder，therefore，thattheUtilitariancriterionofrightconductmaybeascompleteaspossible，weoughttoknowwhichofthesewaysistobepreferred。ThisquestionisoftenignoredinexpositionsofUtilitarianism。
　　Ithasperhapsseemedsomewhatidleassuggestingapurelyabstractandtheoreticalperplexity，thatcouldhavenopracticalexemplification；andnodoubt，ifalltheconsequencesofactionswerecapableofbeingestimatedandsummedupwithmathematicalprecision，weshouldprobablyneverfindtheexcessofpleasureoverpainexactlyequalinthecaseoftwocompetingalternativesofconduct。Buttheveryindefinitenessofallhedonisticcalculations，whichwassufficientlyshowninBookii。，rendersitbynomeansunlikelythattheremaybenocognisabledifferencebetweenthequantitiesofhappinessinvolvedintwosetsofconsequencesrespectively；themoreroughourestimatesnecessarilyare，thelesslikelyweshallbetocometoanycleardecisionbetweentwoapparentlybalancedalternatives。Inallsuchcases，therefore，itbecomespracticallyimportanttoaskwhetheranymodeofdistributingagivenquantumofhappinessisbetterthananyother。NowtheUtilitarianformulaseemstosupplynoanswertothisquestion:
　　atleastwehavetosupplementtheprincipleofseekingthegreatesthappinessonthewholebysomeprincipleofJustorRightdistributionofthishappiness。
　　TheprinciplewhichmostUtilitarianshaveeithertacitlyorexpresslyadoptedisthatofpureequality——asgiveninBentham’sformula，``everybodytocountforone，andnobodyformorethanone’’。Andthisprincipleseemstheonlyonewhichdoesnotneedaspecialjustification；for，aswesaw，itmustbereasonabletotreatanyonemaninthesamewayasanyother，iftherebenoreasonapparentfortreatinghimdifferently。[2]
　　InBookii。，wherewediscussedthemethodofEgoisticHedonism，wedidnottakeoccasiontoexamineanyproofofitsfirstprinciple:
　　andinthecaseofUniversalisticHedonismalso，whatprimarilyconcernsusisnothowitsprincipleistobeprovedtothosewhodonotacceptit，butwhatconsequencesarelogicallyinvolvedinitsacceptance。Atthesametimeitisimportanttoobservethattheprincipleofaimingatuniversalhappinessismoregenerallyfelttorequiresomeproof，oratleastasMillputsitsome``considerationsdeterminingthemindtoacceptit’’，thantheprincipleofaimingatone’sownhappiness。Fromthepointofview，indeed，ofabstractphilosophy，IdonotseewhytheEgoisticprincipleshouldpassunchallengedany’morethantheUniversalistic。I
　　donotsee-whytheaxiomofPrudenceshouldnotbequestioned，whenitconflictswithpresentinclination，onagroundsimilartothatonwhichEgoistsrefusetoadmittheaxiomofRationalBenevolence。IftheUtilitarianhastoanswerthequestion，`WhyshouldIsacrificemyownhappinessforthegreaterhappinessofanother？’itmustsurelybeadmissibletoasktheEgoist，`WhyshouldIsacrificeapresentpleasureforagreateroneinthefuture？WhyshouldIconcernmyselfaboutmyownfuturefeelingsanymorethanaboutthefeelingsofotherpersons？’ItundoubtedlyseemstoCommonSenseparadoxicaltoaskforareasonwhyoneshouldseekone’sownhappinessoilthewhole；butIdonotseehowthedemandcanberepudiatedasabsurdbythosewhoadopttheviewsoftheextremeempiricalschoolofpsychologists，althoughthoseviewsarecommonlysupposedtohaveacloseaffinitywithEgoisticHedonism。GrantthattheEgoismerelyasystem。
　　ofcoherentphenomena，thatthepermanentidentical`I’isnotafactbutafiction，asHumeandhisfollowersmaintain；why，then，shouldonepartoftheseriesoffeelingsintowhichtheEgoisresolvedbeconcernedwithanotherpartofthesameseries，anymorethanwithanyotherseries？
　　However，Iwillnotpressthisquestionnow；sinceIadmitthatCommonSensedoesnotthinkitworthwhiletosupplytheindividualwithreasonsforseekinghisowninterest。
　　Reasonsfordoinghisduty——accordingtothecommonlyacceptedstandardofduty——arenotheldtobeequallysuperfluous:indeedwefindthatutilitarianreasonsarecontinuallygivenforoneorotherofthecommonlyreceivedrulesofmorality。Stillthefactthatcertainrulesarecommonlyreceivedasbinding，thoughitdoesnotestablishtheirself-evidence，rendersitgenerallyunnecessarytoprovetheirauthoritytotheCommonSensethatreceivesthem:whileforthesamereasonaUtilitarianwhoclaimstosupersedethembyahigherprincipleisnaturallychallenged，byIntuitionistsnolessthanbyEgoists，todemonstratethelegitimacyofhisclaim。TothischallengesomeUtilitarianswouldreplybysayingthatitisimpossibleto``prove’’afirstprincipleandthisisofcoursetrue，ifbyproofwemeanaprocesswhichexhibitstheprincipleinquestionasaninferencefrompremisesuponwhichitremainsdependentforitscertainty；forthesepremises，andnottheinferencedrawnfromthem，wouldthenbetherealfirstprinciples。Nay，ifUtilitarianismistobeprovedtoamanwhoalreadyholdssomeothermoralprinciples，——whetherhebeanIntuitionalmoralist，whoregardsasfinaltheprinciplesofTruth，Justice，Obediencetoauthority，Purity，etc。，oranEgoistwhoregardshisowninterestastheultimatelyreasonableendofhisconduct，——itwouldseemthattheprocessmustbeonewhichestablishesaconclusionactuallysuperiorinvaliditytothepremisesfromwhichitstarts。FortheUtilitarianprescriptionsofdutyareprimafacieinconflict，atcertainpointsandundercertaincircumstances，bothwithruleswhichtheIntuitionistregardsasself-evident，andwiththedictatesofRationalEgoism；sothatUtilitarianism，ifacceptedatall，mustbeacceptedasoverrulingIntuitionismandEgoism。
　　Atthesametime，iftheotherprinciplesarenotthroughouttakenasvalid，theso-calledproofdoesnotseemtobeaddressedtotheIntuitionistorEgoistatall。Howshallwedealwiththisdilemma？Howissuchaprocess——clearlydifferentfromordinaryproof——possibleorconceivable？Yettherecertainlyseemstobeageneraldemandforit。Perhapswemaysaythatwhatisneededisalineofargumentwhichontheonehandallowsthevalidity，toacertainextent，ofthemaximsalreadyaccepted，andontheotherhandshowsthemtobenotabsolutelyvalid，butneedingtobecontrolledandcompletedbysomemorecomprehensiveprinciple。
　　Suchalineofargument，addressedtoEgoism，wasgiveninchap。xiii。oftheforegoingbook。ItshouldbeobservedthattheapplicabilityofthisargumentdependsonthemannerinwhichtheEgoisticfirstprincipleisformulated。IftheEgoiststrictlyconfineshimselftostatinghisconvictionthatheoughttotakehisownhappinessorpleasureashisultimateend，thereseemsnoopeningforanylineofreasoningtoleadhimtoUniversalisticHedonismasafirstprinciple；
　　itcannotbeprovedthatthedifferencebetweenhisownhappinessandanother’shappinessisnotforhimall-important。InthiscaseallthattheUtilitariancandoistoeffectasfaraspossibleareconciliationbetweenthetwoprinciples，byexpoundingtotheEgoistthesanctionsofrulesdeducedfromtheUniversalisticprinciple，——i。e。bypointingoutthepleasuresandpainsthatmaybeexpectedtoaccruetotheEgoisthimselffromtheobservationandviolationrespectivelyofsuchrules。
　　Itisobviousthatsuchanexpositionhasnotendencytomakehimacceptthegreatesthappinessofthegreatestnumberashisultimateend；butonlyasameanstotheendofhisownhappiness。ItisthereforetotallydifferentfromaproofasaboveexplainedofUniversalisticHedonism。
　　When，however，theEgoistputsforward，implicitlyorexplicitly，thepropositionthathishappinessorpleasureisGood，notonlyforhimbutfromthepointofviewoftheUniverse，——ase。g。bysayingthat`naturedesignedhimtoseekhisownhappiness，’——itthenbecomesrelevanttopointouttohimthathishappinesscannotbeamoreimportantpartofGood，takenuniversally，thantheequalhappinessofanyotherperson。
　　Andthus，startingwithhisownprinciple，hemaybebroughttoacceptUniversalhappinessorpleasureasthatwhichisabsolutelyandwithoutqualificationGoodorDesirable:asanend，therefore，towhichtheactionofareasonableagentassuchoughttobedirected。
　　This，itwillberemembered，isthereasoningthatIusedinchap。xiii。oftheprecedingbookinexhibitingtheprincipleofRationalBenevolenceasoneofthefewIntuitionswhichstandthetestofrigorouscriticism。Itshouldbeobserved，however，thatasaddressedtotheIntuitionist，thisreasoningonlyshowstheUtilitarianfirstprincipletobeonemoralaxiom:
　　itdoesnotprovethatitissoleorsupreme。ThepremiseswithwhichtheIntuitioniststartscommonlyincludeotherformulaeheldasindependentandself-evident。Utilitarianismhasthereforetoexhibititselfinthetwofoldrelationabovedescribed，atoncenegativeandpositive，totheseformulae。TheUtilitarianmust，inthefirstplace，endeavourtoshowtotheIntuitionistthattheprinciplesofTruth，Justice，etc。
　　haveonlyadependentandsubordinatevalidity:arguingeitherthattheprincipleisreallyonlyaffirmedbyCommonSenseasageneralruleadmittingofexceptionsandqualifications，asinthecaseofTruth，andthatwerequiresomefurtherprincipleforsystematisingtheseexceptionsandqualifications；
　　orthatthefundamentalnotionisvagueandneedsfurtherdetermination，asinthecaseofJustice；andfurther，thatthedifferentrulesareliabletoconflictwitheachother，andthatwerequiresomehigherprincipletodecidetheissuethusraised；andagain，thattherulesaredifferentlyformulatedbydifferentpersons，andthatthesedifferencesadmitofnoIntuitionalsolution，whiletheyshowthevaguenessandambiguityofthecommonmoralnotionstowhichtheIntuitionistappeals。
　　ThispartoftheargumentIhaveperhapssufficientlydevelopedintheprecedingbook。ItremainstosupplementthislineofreasoningbydevelopingthepositiverelationthatexistsbetweenUtilitarianismandtheMoralityofCommonSense:byshowinghowUtilitarianismsustainsthegeneralvalidityofthecurrentmoraljudgments，andthussupplementsthedefectswhichreflectionfindsintheintuitiverecognitionoftheirstringency；andatthesametimeaffordsaprincipleofsynthesis，andamethodforbindingtheunconnectedandoccasionallyconflictingprinciplesofcommonmoralreasoningintoacompleteandharmonioussystem。IfsystematicreflectionuponthemoralityofCommonSensethusexhibitstheUtilitarianprincipleasthattowhichCommonSensenaturallyappealsforthatfurtherdevelopmentofitssystemwhichthissamereflectionshowstobenecessary，theproofofUtilitarianismseemsascompleteasitcanbemade。Andsince，further——apartfromthequestionofproof——itisimportantinconsideringthemethodofUtilitarianismtodetermineexactlyitsrelationtothecommonlyreceivedrulesofmorality，itwillbepropertoexaminethisrelationatsomelengthinthefollowingchapter。