conclusionwhichIanticipatedinBooki。chap。v。:thatinthisonedepartmentofourmoralconsciousnesstheideaofFreeWillseemsinvolvedinapeculiarwayinthemoralideasofCommonSense，sinceifitiseliminatedtheimportantnotionsofDesertorMeritandJusticerequirematerialmodification。[2]
　　Atthesametime，thedifferencebetweenDeterministandLibertarianJusticecanhardlyhaveanypracticaleffect。Forinanycaseitdoesnotseempossibletoseparateinpracticethatpartofaman’sachievementwhichisduestrictlytohisfreechoicefromthatpartwhichisduetotheoriginalgiftofnatureandtofavouringcircumstances:sothatwemustnecessarilyleavetoprovidencetherealisationofwhatweconceiveasthetheoreticalidealofJustice，andcontentourselveswithtryingtorewardvoluntaryactionsinproportiontotheworthoftheservicesintentionallyrenderedbythem。
　　If，then，wetakeastheprincipleofidealjustice，sofarasthiscanbepracticallyaimedatinhumansociety，therequitalofvoluntaryservicesinproportiontotheirworth，itremainsto，consideronwhatprincipleorprinciplesthecomparativeworthofdifferentservicesistoberationallyestimated。Thereisnodoubtthatwecommonlyassumesuchanestimatetobepossible；forwecontinuallyspeakofthe`fair’
　　or`proper’priceofanykindofservicesassomethinggenerallyknown，andcondemnthedemandformorethanthisasextortionate。ItmaybesaidthatthenotionofFairnessorEquitywhichweordinarilyapplyinsuchjudgmentsistobedistinguishedfromthatofJustice；EquitybeinginfactoftencontrastedwithstrictJustice，andconceivedascapableofcomingintocollisionwithit。Andthisispartlytrue:butIthinkthewiderandnolessusualsenseofthetermJustice，inwhichitincludesEquityorFairness，istheonlyonethatcanbeconvenientlyadoptedinanethicaltreatise:forinanycasewhereEquitycomesintoconflictwithstrictjustice，itsdictatesareheldtobeinahighersensejust，andwhatoughttobeultimatelycarriedintoeffectinthecaseconsidered——thoughnot，perhaps，bytheadministratorsoflaw。ItreatEquity，therefore，asaspeciesofJustice；thoughnotingthattheformertermismoreordinarilyusedincaseswherethedefinitenessattainableisrecognisedassomewhatlessthaninordinarycasesofrightfulclaimsarisingoutoflaworcontract。
　　Onwhatprinciple，then，canwedeterminethe``fair’’or``equitable’’
　　priceofservices？Whenweexaminethecommonjudgmentsofpracticalpersonsinwhichthisjudgmentoccurs，wefind，Ithink，thatthe`fair’insuchcasesisascertainedbyareferencetoanalogyandcustom，andthatanyserviceisconsideredtobe`fairlyworth’whatisusuallygivenforservicesofthekind。HencethiselementofthenotionofJusticemayseem，afterall，toresolveitselfintothatdiscussedin§；2:andinsomestatesofsocietyitcertainlyappearsthatthepaymenttobegivenforservicesisascompletelyfixedbyusageasanyothercustomaryduty，sothatitwouldbeacleardisappointmentofnormalexpectationtodeviatefromthisusage。ButprobablynooneinamoderncivilisedcommunitywouldmaintaininitsfullbreadththisidentificationoftheJustwiththeUsualpriceofservices:andsofarasthejudgmentsofpracticalpersonsmayseemtoimplythis，Ithinkitmustbeadmittedthattheyaresuperficialormerelyinadvertent，andignoretheestablishedmodeofdeterminingthemarketpricesofcommoditiesbyfreecompetitionofproducersandtraders。
　　Forwheresuchcompetitionoperatesthemarketvaluerisesandfalls，andisdifferentatdifferentplacesandtimes；sothatnoproperlyinstructedpersoncanexpectanyfixityinit，orcomplainofinjusticemerelyonaccountofthevariationsinit。
　　Canwethensaythat`marketvalue’asdeterminedbyfreecompetitioncorrespondstoournotionofwhatisideallyjust？
　　Thisisaquestionofmuchinterest，becausethisisobviouslythemodeofdeterminingtheremunerationofservicesthatwouldbeuniversalinasocietyconstructedontheprinciplepreviouslydiscussed，ofsecuringthegreatestpossibleFreedomtoallmembersofthecommunity。Itshouldbeobservedthatthis，whichwemaycalltheIndividualisticIdeal，isthetypetowhichmoderncivilisedcommunitieshave，untillately，beentendingtoapproximate:anditisthereforeveryimportanttoknowwhetheritisonewhichcompletelysatisfiesthedemandsofmorality；andwhetherFreedom，ifnotanabsoluteendorFirstPrincipleofabstractJustice，isstilltobesoughtasthebestmeanstotherealisationofajustsocialorderbythegeneralrequitalofDesert。
　　Atfirstsightitseemsplausibletourgethatthe`marketvalue’representstheestimatesetuponanythingbymankindgenerally，andthereforegivesusexactlythat`commonsense’
　　judgmentrespectingvaluewhichwearenowtryingtofind。Butonexaminationitseemslikelythatthemajorityofmenarenotproperlyqualifiedtodecideonthevalueofmanyimportantkindsofservices，fromimperfectknowledgeoftheirnatureandeffects；sothat，asfarastheseareconcerned，thetruejudgmentwillnotberepresentedinthemarket-place。Eveninthecaseofthingswhichamanisgenerallyabletoestimate，itmaybemanifestinaparticularcasethatheisignorantoftherealutilityofwhatheexchanges；andinthiscasethe`free’contracthardlyseemstobefair:thoughiftheignorancewasnotcausedbytheotherpartytotheexchange，CommonSenseishardlypreparedtocondemnthelatterasunjustfortakingadvantageofit。Forinstance，ifamanhasdiscoveredbyalegitimateuseofgeologicalknowledgeandskillthatthereisprobablyavaluablemineonlandownedbyastranger，reasonablepersonswouldnotblamehimforconcealinghisdiscoveryuntilhehadboughtthemineatitsmarketvalue:yetitcouldnotbesaidthatthesellergotwhatitwasreallyworth。InfactCommonSenseisratherperplexedonthispoint:
　　andtherationaleoftheconclusionatwhichitarrives，must，I
　　conceive，besoughtineconomicconsiderations，whichtakeusquitebeyondtheanalysisofthecommonnotionofJustice。[4]
　　Again，therearesocialservicesrecognisedashighlyimportantwhichgenerallyspeakinghavenopriceinanymarket，onaccountoftheindirectnessanduncertaintyoftheirpracticalutility:
　　as，forinstance，scientificdiscoveries。Theextenttowhichanygivendiscoverywillaidindustrialinventionissouncertain，thatevenifthesecretofitcouldbeconvenientlykept，itwouldnotusuallybeprofitabletobuyit。
　　Butevenifweconfineourattentiontoproductsandservicesgenerallymarketable，andtobargainsthoroughlyunderstoodonbothsides，therearestillseriousdifficultiesinthewayofidentifyingthenotionsof`free’and`fair’exchange。Thus，whereanindividual，orcombinationofindividuals，hasthemonopolyofacertainkindofservices，themarket-priceoftheaggregateofsuchservicescanundercertainconditionsbeincreasedbydiminishingtheirtotalamount；butitwouldseemabsurdtosaythatthesocialDesertofthoserenderingtheservicesistherebyincreased，andaplainmanhasgravedoubtswhetherthepricethusattainedisfair。Stilllessisitthoughtfairtotakeadvantageofthetransientmonopolyproducedbyemergency:thus，ifIsawCroesusdrowningandnoonenear，itwouldnotbeheldfairinmetorefusetosavehimexceptatthepriceofhalfhiswealth。Butifso，canitbefairforanyclassofpersonstogaincompetitivelybytheunfavourableeconomicsituationofanotherclasswithwhichtheydeal？Andifweadmitthatitwouldbeunfair，wherearewetodrawtheline？Foranyincreaseofthenumbersofaclassrendersitssituationforbargaininglessfavourable:sincethemarketpriceofdifferentservicesdependspartlyupontheeaseordifficultyofprocuringthem——asPoliticalEconomistssay，`ontherelationbetweenthesupplyofservicesandthedemandforthem’——anditdoesnotseemthatanyindividual’ssocialDesertcanproperlybelessenedmerelybytheincreasednumberorwillingnessofothersrenderingthesameservices。
　　Nor，indeed，doesitseemthatitcanbedecreasedbyhisownwillingness，foritisstrangetorewardamanlessbecauseheiszealousandeagerintheperformanceofhisfunction；yetinbargainingthelesswillingalwayshastheadvantage，And，finally，ithardlyappearsthatthesocialworthofaman’sserviceisnecessarilyincreasedbythefactthathisserviceisrenderedtothosewhocanpaylavishly；buthisrewardiscertainlylikelytobegreaterfromthiscause。
　　SuchconsiderationsasthesehaveledsomepoliticalthinkerstoholdthatJusticerequiresamodeofdistributingpaymentforservices，entirelydifferentfromthatatpresenteffectedbyfreecompetition:
　　andthatalllabourersoughttobepaidaccordingtotheintrinsicvalueoftheirlabourasestimatedbyenlightenedandcompetentjudges。IftheSocialisticIdeal——aswemayperhapscallit——couldberealisedwithoutcounter-balancingevils，itwouldcertainlyseemtogiveanearerapproximationtowhatweconceiveasDivineJusticethanthepresentstateofsocietyaffords。Butthissupposesthatwehavefoundtherationalmethodofdeterminingvalue:which，however，isstilltoseek。Shallwesaythatthesejudgesaretotakethevalueofaserviceasproportionatetotheamountofhappinessproducedbyit？Ifso，thecalculationis，ofcourse，exposedtoallthedifficultiesofthehedonisticmethoddiscussedinBookii。:butsupposingthesecanbeovercome，itisstillhardtosayhowwearetocomparethevalueofdifferentservicesthatmustnecessarilybecombinedtoproducehappylife。Forexample，howshallwecomparetherespectivevaluesofnecessariesandluxuries？forwemaybemoresensibleoftheenjoymentderivedfromthelatter，butwecouldnothavethisatallwithouttheformer。And，again，whendifferentkindsoflabourco-operateinthesameproduction，howarewetoestimatetheirrelativevalues？forevenifallmereunskilledlabourmaybebroughttoacommonstandard，thisseemsalmostimpossibleintheeaseofdifferentkindsofskill。Forhowshallwecomparethelabourofdesignwiththatofachievement？orthesupervisionofthewholewiththeexecutionofdetails？orthelabourofactuallyproducingwiththatofeducatingproducers？ortheserviceofthesavantwhodiscoversanewprinciple，withthatoftheinventorwhoappliesit？
　　Idonotseehowthesequestions，orthedifficultiesnoticedintheprecedingparagraph，canbemetbyanyanalysisofourcommonnotionofJustice。Todealwithsuchpointsatallsatisfactorilywehave，Iconceive，toadoptquiteadifferentlineofreasoning:wehavetoask，notwhatservicesofacertainkindareintrinsicallyworth，butwhatrewardcanprocurethemandwhethertherestofsocietygainbytheservicesmorethantheequivalentreward。Wehave，inshort，togiveupasimpracticabletheconstructionofanideallyjustsocialorder，inwhichallservicesarerewardedinexactproportiontotheirintrinsicvalue。And，forsimilarreasons，weseemforcedtoconclude，moregenerally，thatitisimpossibletoobtainclearpremisesforareasonedmethodofdeterminingexactlydifferentamountsofGoodDesert。Indeed，perhaps，CommonSensescarcelyholdssuchamethodtobepossible:forthoughitconsidersIdealJusticetoconsistinrewardingDesert，itregardsasUtopiananygeneralattempttorealisethisidealinthesocialdistributionofthemeansofhappiness。IntheactualstateofsocietyitisonlywithinaverylimitedrangethatanyendeavourismadetorewardGoodDesert。
　　Parentsattemptthistosomeextentindealingwiththeirchildren，andtheStateinrewardingremarkablepublicservicesrenderedbystatesmen，soldiers，etc。:butreflectiononthesecaseswillshowhowveryroughandimperfectarethestandardsusedindecidingtheamountdue。AndordinarilytheonlykindofJusticewhichwetrytorealiseisthatwhichconsistsinthefulfilmentofcontractsanddefiniteexpectations；leavingthegeneralfairnessofDistributionbyBargainingtotakecareofitself。
　　WhenwepasstoconsiderthecaseofCriminalJustice，wefind，inthefirstplace，difficultiescorrespondingtothosewhichwehavealreadynoticed。Wefind，tobegin，asimilarimplicationandpartialconfusionoftheideasofLawandJustice。For，aswassaid，by`bringingamantoJustice’wecommonlymean`inflictinglegalpunishment’onhim:andwethinkitrightthatneithermorenorlessthanthepenaltyprescribedbylawshouldbeexecuted，eventhoughwemayregardthelegalscaleofpunishmentasunjust。Atthesametime，wehavenosuchperplexityinrespectofchangesinthelawasoccursinthecaseofCivilJustice；forwedonotthinkthatamancanacquire，bycustom，prescriptiverightstoover-lenientpunishment，asheisthoughttodotoanunequaldistributionoflibertiesandprivileges。IfnowweinvestigatetheidealofCriminalJustice，asintuitivelydetermined，wecertainlyfindthatinsofaraspunishmentisnotregardedasmerelypreventive，itiscommonlythoughtthatitoughttobeproportionedtothegravityofcrime。[2]Still，whenweendeavourtomakethemethodofapportionmentperfectlyrationalandprecise，thedifficultiesseematleastasgreatasinthecaseofGoodDesert。For，first，theassumptionofFreeWillseemsnecessarilytocomeinherealso；
　　sinceifaman’sbaddeedsareentirelycausedbynatureandcircumstances，itcertainlyappears，asRobertOwenurged，thathedoesnotproperlydeservetobepunishedforthem；Justicewouldratherseemtorequireustotrytoaltertheconditionsunderwhichheacts。Andweactuallydopunishdeliberateoffencesmorethanimpulsive，perhapsasimplyingamorefreechoiceofevil。Again，wethinkthatoffencescommittedbypersonswhohavebadnomoraltraining，orapervertedtraining，arereallylesscriminal；
　　atthesametimeitiscommonlyagreedthatmencanhardlyremitpunishmentonthisaccount。Againthegravity——fromamoralpointofview——ofacrimeseemstobeatleastmuchreduced，ifthemotivebelaudable，aswhenamankillsavillainwhosecrimeseludelegalpunishment，orheadsahopelessrebellionforthegoodofhiscountry:stillitwouldbeparadoxicaltoaffirmthatweoughttoreducepunishmentproportionally:CommonSensewouldholdthat——whateverGodmaydo——menmust，generallyspeaking，inflictseverepunishmentforanygravelymischievousactforbiddenbylawwhichhasbeenintentionallydone，eventhoughitmayhavebeenpromptedbyagoodmotive。
　　Butevenifweneglectthemotive，andtaketheintentiononlyintoaccount，itisnoteasytostateclearprinciplesfordeterminingthegravityofcrimes。Forsometimes，asinthecaseofthepatrioticrebel，theintentionofthecriminalistodowhatisrightandgood:andinmanycases，thoughheknowsthatheisdoingwrong，hedoesnotintendtocauseanyactualharmtoanysentientbeing；aswhenathieftakeswhatbethinkswillnotbemissed。Again，wedonotcommonlythinkthatacrimeisrenderedlessgravebybeingkeptperfectlysecret；andyetagreatpartoftheharmdonebyacrimeisthe`secondaryevil’asBenthamcallsitofthealarmandinsecuritywhichitcauses；andthispartiscutoffbycompletesecrecy。Itmayberepliedthatthislatterdifficultyisnotapracticalone；becausewearenotcalledupontopunishacrimeuntilithasbeendiscovered，andthenthesecondaryevilhasbeencaused，andisallthegreaterbecauseoftheprevioussecrecy。Butitremainstruethatitwasnotdesignedfordiscovery；andthereforethatthispartoftheevilcausedbythecrimewasnotintendedbythecriminal。