首页 >出版文学> Methods of Ethics>第30章
  Itdoesnotseemthatanadequateexplanationcanbefoundintheoperationofhabit。Itisnodoubttruethatactionsthroughfrequentuniformrepetitiontendtobecomeautomaticandlosetheirconsciouscounterparts,andhedonicindifferencecertainlyseemsinsomecasestobeastagethroughwhichsuchactionspassonthewaytounconsciousness。Thusevenabusinesswalkinastrangetownisnormallypleasantthroughthenoveltyofthesights:butasimilarwalkinthetownwhereonelivesisordinarilyindifferent,ornearlyso;whileifone’sattentionisstronglyabsorbedbythebusiness,itmaybeperformedtoagreatextentunconsciously。Ontheotherhand,theoperationsofhabitoftenhavetheoppositeeffectofmakingactivitiespleasantwhichwereatfirstindifferentorevendisagreeable:asinthecaseofacquiredtastes,physicalorintellectual。Indeedsuchexperienceshavelongbeen——Ithink,quitelegitimately——usedbymoralistsasanencouragementtoirksomeduties,onthegroundthattheirirksomenesswillbetransient,throughtheoperationofhabit,whilethegainoftheirperformancewillbepermanent。Mr。Spencer,indeed,regardssuchexperiencesassoimportantthatheventurestobaseonthemthepredictionthat``pleasurewilleventuallyaccompanyeverymodeofactiondemandedbysocialconditions’’。This,however,seemsundulyoptimistic,inviewnotonlyofthefirst-mentionedtendencyofhabittohedonicindifference,butalsoofathirdtendencytorenderactions,atfirstindifferentorevenpleasant,graduallymoreirksome。Thusourintellectgraduallyweariesofmonotonousactivities,andtheennuimaysometimesbecomeintense:soagaintherelishofakindofdietatfirstagreeablemayturnthroughmonotonyintodisgust。
  Somequitedifferentexplanationmustthereforebesoughtforthevaryingdegreesinwhichpleasureaccompaniesnormalactivities。CanwefindthisinasuggestionofMr。Spencer’s,developedbyMr。GrantAllen,thatthepleasurablenessofnormalorganicactivitiesdependsontheirintermittence,andthat``theamountofpleasureisprobably?intheinverseratioofthenaturalfrequencyofexcitation’’
  ofthenerve-fibresinvolved?Thistheorycertainlyfindssomesupportinthefactthatthesensualpleasuresgenerallyrecognisedasgreatestarethoseattendingtheactivitiesoforganswhicharenormallyleftunexercisedforconsiderableintervals。Still,therearemanyfactsthatitdoesnotexplain——e。g。thegreatdifferencesinthepleasuresobtainableatanygiventimebydifferentstimulationsofthesamesense;thephenomenonexpressedintheproverbialphrase``L’appé;titvientenmangeant’’;
  andthefactthattheexerciseofthevisualorgansafterapparentlydreamlesssleepdoesnotgiveappreciablykeenerpleasurethanitdoesatordinarytimes。Itwouldseemthatwemustseekforsomespecialcauseofthepleasurableeffectofintermittenceincertaincases。Andthiscannotbemerelythegreaterintensityofthenervousactionthattakesplacewhenlongunexercisedandwell-nourishednerve-centresarestimulated:forwhy,ifthatweretheexplanation,shouldthenormalconsciousnessoffullnervousactivity,graduallyattained——aswhenweareinfullswingofenergeticunweariedworkofaroutinekind——beoftennearlyorquiteindifferent?
  Amongthevariouscompetinghypothesesofferedatthispointofourinquiry——nooneofwhich,Ibelieve,hasattainedanythinglikegeneralacceptanceascoveringthewholeground——Iselectfordiscussiononethathasspecialethicalinterest。
  Accordingtothishypothesis,theorganicprocessaccompaniedbypleasureistobeconceivedasa``restorationofequilibrium’’after``disturbance’’:sothattheabsenceofappreciablepleasureinthecaseofcertainnormalactivitiesisexplainedbytheabsenceofantecedentdisturbance。Thisviewisobviouslyapplicabletocertainclassesofpleasureswhich,thoughbynomeansrareareincidentalinanormallife:——thepleasureofreliefafterphysicalpain,orafterthestrainofgreatanxiety,andthepleasureofreposeafterunusualexertions,intellectualormuscular。Butwhenweattempttoapplyittosensationalpleasuresgenerally,theindefinitenessofthenotionof``equilibrium’’,asappliedtotheprocessesofalivingorganism,becomesmanifest。Forourphysicallifeconsistsofaseriesofchanges,forthemostpartperiodicallyrecurrentwithslightmodificationaftershortintervals:anditisdifficulttoseewhyweshouldattachtheideaof``disturbance’’or``restorationofequilibrium’’toanyoneamongthesenormalprocessesratherthananother:e。g。itisdifficulttoseewhytheconditionofhavingexpendedenergyshouldberegardedasadeparturefromequilibriumanymorethantheconditionofhavingjusttakeninnutriment。Infact,torenderthehypothesisweareconsideringatallapplicabletonormalpleasuresofsense,wehavetopassfromthephysiologicaltothepsychologicalpointofview,andtakenoteofthepsychicalstateofdesire,asaconsciouslyunrestfulcondition,ofwhichtheessenceisafeltimpulsetopassoutofthisstatetowardstheattainmentofthedesiredobject。Ourhypothesis,then,maytakethisunrestfulconsciousnessasasignofwhat,fromaphysiologicalpointofview,is``disturbanceofequilibrium’’,andsimilarly,thesatisfactionofdesiremaybetakentobe,physiologically,arestorationofequilibrium。
  Onthisassumption,thetheorybecomesundeniablyapplicabletothosegratificationsofsensualappetitewhichformthemostprominentelementofthepleasuresofsense,aspopularlyconceived。
  Nowwehavealreadynotedthatbyawide-spreadconfusionofthought,desirehasoftenbeenregardedasaspeciesofpain。Accordingly,thetheorythatweareconsideringwasoriginallypromptedbytheethicalmotiveofdepreciatingthevulgarlyovervaluedpleasuresofsatisfiedbodilyappetite,bylayingstressontheirinseparableconnexionwithantecedentpain。Thedepreciation,however,failssofarastheappetitewhichisanecessaryantecedentconditionofthepleasureis——thoughanunrestfulstate——notappreciablypainful。
  Inanycase,admittingthephysicalcounterpartofconsciousdesiretobea`disturbanceofequilibrium’,oraneffectandsignofsuchdisturbance,thetheoryseemsopentoobviousobjections,ifitisextendedtocoverthewholerangeofthepleasuresofsense。Forconsciousdesireiscertainlynotanecessaryconditionofexperiencingthesimplepleasuresofthespecialsenses:normallynosenseofwanthasprecededtheexperienceofpleasantsights,sounds,odours,flavours,orofthemoreimportantpleasures,morecomplexintheirpsychicalconditions,whichwecallæ;sthetic。Nodoubtinspecialcasesantecedentprivationmayproduceaconsciouswantoftheselatterpleasureswhichmayincreasetheirintensitywhentheyareatlengthattained:orevenwithoutanyfeltprivation,theprospectofenjoyingsuchpleasuresmayproduceakeendesirefortheenjoyment,whichmayberegardedasa``disturbanceofequilibrium’’
  nolessplausiblythanabodilyappetite。Butitwouldbequiteunwarrantablethereforetosupposeasimilardisturbance,thoughunfelt,intheordinarycaseswherepleasuresofthiskindareexperiencedwithoutanyantecedentconsciousnessofdesireorwant。
  IhaveperhapssaidenoughtosupportmygeneralconclusionthatpsychophysicalspeculationastothecausesofpleasureandpaindoesnotatpresentaffordabasisforadeductivemethodofpracticalHedonism。But,beforepassingfromthistopic,Imayremarkthatthedifficultiesinthewayofanysuchtheoryseemespeciallygreatinthecaseofthecomplexpleasureswhichwedistinguishas``æ;sthetic’’。Allwouldagreethatæ;stheticgratification,whenatallhigh,dependsonasubtleharmonyofdifferentelementsinacomplexstateofconsciousness;
  andthatthepleasureresultingfromsuchharmoniouscombinationisindefinitelygreaterthanthesumofthesimplerpleasureswhichtheuncombinedelementswouldyield。Buteventhosewhoestimatemosthighlythesuccessthathassofarbeenattainedindiscoveringtheconditionsofthisharmony,inthecaseofanyparticularart,wouldadmitthatmereconformitytotheconditionsthusascertainedcannotsecuretheproductionofæ;stheticpleasureinanyconsiderabledegree。Howeversubtlywestateingeneraltermstheobjectiverelationsofelementsinadelightfulworkofart,onwhichitsdelightseeingtodepend,wemustalwaysfeelthatitwouldbepossibletoproduceoutofsimilarelementsaworkcorrespondingtoourgeneraldescriptionwhichwouldgivenodelightatall;thetouchthatgivesdelightdependsuponaninstinctforwhichnodeductivereasoningcansupplyasubstitute。Thisistrue,evenwithouttakingintoaccountthewidedivergencesthatweactuallyfindinthe,estheticsensibilitiesofindividuals:stillless,therefore,isitneedfultoarguethat,fromthepointofviewofanindividualseekinghisowngreatesthappiness,nonebutamainlyinductiveandempiricalmethodofestimatingæ;stheticpleasurescanbemadeavailable。
  Inowpasstoconsideratheorywhichmaybedistinguishedfromthosediscussedintheprecedingsectionasbeingbiologicalratherthanpsychophysical:sinceitdirectsattentionnottotheactualpresentcharacteristicsoftheorganicstatesorchangesofwhichpleasuresandpainsaretheconcomitantsorimmediateconsequents,buttotheirrelationstothelifeoftheorganismasawhole。
  Imeanthetheorythat``painsarethecorrelativesofactionsinjurioustotheorganism,whilepleasuresarethecorrelativesofactsconducivetoitswelfare。’’Mr。Spencer,fromwhomtheabovepropositionsarequoted,subsequentlyexplains``injurious’’and``conducivetowelfare’’tomeanrespectively``tendingtodecreaseorlossoflife’’,and``tendingtocontinuanceorincreaseoflife’’:butinhisdeductionbywhichtheaboveconclusionissummarilyestablished,``injurious’’and``beneficial’’areusedasequivalentsimplyto``destructive’’and``preservative’’oforganiclife:anditwillbemoreconvenienttotakethetermsfirstinthissimplersignification。
  Mr。Spencer’sargumentisasfollows:
  ``IfwesubstituteforthewordPleasuretheequivalentphrase——afeelingwhichweseektobringintoconsciousnessandretainthere;andifwesubstituteforthewordPaintheequivalentphrase——afeelingwhichweseektogetoutofconsciousnessandtokeepout;weseeatoncethat,ifthestatesofconsciousnesswhichacreatureendeavourstomaintainarethecorrelativesofinjuriousactions,andifthestatesofconsciousnesswhichitendeavourstoexpelarethecorrelativesofbeneficialactions,itmustquicklydisappearthroughpersistenceintheinjuriousandavoidanceofthebeneficial。Inotherwords,thoseracesofbeingonlycanhavesurvivedinwhich,ontheaverage,agreeableordesiredfeelingswentalongwithactivitiesconducivetothemaintenanceoflife,whiledisagreeableandhabitually-avoidedfeelingswentalongwithactivitiesdirectlyorindirectlydestructiveoflife;andtheremusteverhavebeen,otherthingsequal,themostnumerousandlong-continuedsurvivalsamongracesinwhichtheseadjustmentsoffeelingstoactionswerethebest,tendingevertobringaboutperfectadjustment。’’
  NowIamnotconcernedtodenythevalueofthissummarydeductionforcertainpurposes。Butitcaneasilybeshowntobeinadequatetoaffordabasisforadeductivemethodofseekingmaximumhappinessfortheindividual,bysubstitutingPreservationforPleasureastheenddirectlyaimedat。Inthefirstplace,Mr。Spenceronlyaffirmstheconclusiontobetrue,asherathervaguelysays,``ontheaverage’’:
  anditisobviousthatthoughthetendencytofindinjuriousactspleasantorpreservativeactspainfulmustbeadisadvantagetoanyspeciesofanimalinthestruggleforexistence,itmay——ifexistingonlytoalimitedextent——beoutweighedbyotheradvantages,sothattheorganisminwhichitexistsmaysurviveinspiteofit。This,Isay,isobviousapriori:andcommonexperience,asMr。Spenceradmits,shows``inmanyconspicuousways’’
  thatthishasbeenactuallythecasewithcivilisedmanduringthewholeperiodofhistorythatweknow:owingtothechancescausedbythecourseofcivilisation,``therehasarisenandmustlongcontinueadeepandinvolvedderangementofthenaturalconnexionsbetweenpleasuresandbeneficialactionsandbetweenpainsanddetrimentalactions。’’ThisseemstobeinitselfasufficientobjectiontofoundingadeductivemethodofHedonismonMr。Spencer’sgeneralconclusion。Itis,indeed,notoriousthatcivilisedmentakepleasureinvariousformsofunhealthyconductandfindconformitytotherulesofhealthirksome;anditisalsoimportanttonotethattheymaybe,andactuallyare,susceptibleofkeenpleasurefromactsandprocessesthathavenomaterialtendencytopreserve,life。Noristhereanydifficultyinexplainingthisontheevolutionhypothesissincewecannotargueapriorifromthishypothesisthatthedevelopmentofthenervoussysteminhumanbeingsmaynotbringwithitintensesusceptibilitiestopleasurefromnon-preservativeprocesses,ifonlythepreservationoftheindividualsinwhomsuchsusceptibilitiesaredevelopedisotherwiseadequatelyprovidedfor。Nowthislattersuppositionisobviouslyrealisedinthecaseofpersonsofleisureincivilisedsociety;whoseneedsoffood,clothing,shelter,etc。,areabundantlysuppliedthroughthecomplexsocialhabitwhichwecalltheinstitutionofprivateproperty:andIknownoempiricalgroundforsupposingthatacultivatedmantends,inconsequenceofthekeenandvariedpleasurewhichheseeksandenjoys,tolivelongerthanamanwhogoesthroughacomparativelydullroundofmonotonousroutineactivity,interspersedbyslightlypleasurableintervalsofreposeandplay。