oursoleconcernatpresentiswithobjectionstendingtoshowtheintrinsicimpracticabilityofHedonismasarationalmethod。
　　Wearemet，inthefirstplace，byanobjectionwhich，ifvalidatall，mustbeadmittedtobedecisive。IthasbeenaffirmedbyGreenthat``pleasureasfeeling，indistinctionfromitsconditionsthatarenotfeelings，cannotbeconceived’’。Ifso，RationalHedonismwouldcertainlybeimpossible:
　　butthepropositionseemsequallyopposedtocommonsense，andtotheuniversalassumptionofempiricalpsychologists；who，ininvestigatingelaboratelyandsystematicallytheconditions，mentalandphysical，ofpleasureandpain，necessarilyassumethatthesefeelingscanbedistinguishedinthoughtfromtheir``conditionswhicharenotfeelings’’。IalsofindthatthewriterhimselffromwhomIhavequoted，inalatertreatise，conductslongargumentsrespectingpleasurewhichareonlyintelligibleifthedistinctionbetweenpleasureanditsconditionsisthoroughlygraspedandsteadilycontemplated。Indeedhecarriesadistinctionofthiskindtoanextremepointofsubtlety；asberequiresustodistinguishthe``self-satisfactionsoughtinalldesirethatamountstowill’’fromthe``pleasure’’that``thereisinallself-satisfactionifattained’’:whereasothermoralistsregardself-satisfactionasaspeciesofpleasure。Tomaintainthatwecandistinguishpleasurefromself-satisfactionandcannotdistinguishitfromitsconditions，seemstometooviolentaparadoxtoneedrefutation。
　　ItispossiblethatGreenmayonlymeanthatpleasurecannotbethoughttoexistapartfromconditionswhicharenotfeelings，andthatitnecessarilyvarieswithanyvariationinitsconditions。ThestatementthusinterpretedIdonotdeny:butitisquiteirrelevanttothequestionwhetherpleasurecanbeestimatedseparatelyfromitsconditions，orwhetherpleasuresreceivedunderdifferentconditionscanbequantitativelycompared。Icannothavethepleasureofwitnessingatragedyorthepleasureofwitnessingafarce，withouthavingalongwitheitheracomplexofinnumerablethoughtsandimages，verydiverseinqualityinthetwocases:butthisdoesnotpreventmefromdecidingconfidentlywhetherthetragedyorthefarcewillaffordmemostpleasureonthewhole。
　　passtoanotherobjectionmadebythesamewritertotheHedonisticconceptionofthesupremeendofactionas``thegreatestpossiblesumofpleasures’’。
　　Itshouldbe``thegreatestpossiblesurplusofpleasureoverpain’’:
　　butthedifferenceisunimportantforthepresentargument。Thephrase，hesays，is``intrinsicallyunmeaning’’:buthisjustificationforthisstatementappearstobedifferentindifferenttreatises。Atfirstheboldlyaffirmedthat``pleasantfeelingsarenotquantitiesthatcanbeadded’’，[5]
　　apparentlybecause``eachisoverbeforetheotherbegins’’。Thelatterstatement，however，isequallytrueofthepartsoftime:butitwouldbeobviouslyabsurdtosaythathours，days，yearsare``notquantitiesthatcanbeadded’’。PossiblythisconsiderationoccurredtoGreenbeforewritingtheProlegomenatoEthics:atanyrateinthelattertreatiseheadmitsthatstates``ofpleasantfeeling’’canbeaddedtogetherin``thought’’，onlydenyingthattheycanbeadded``inenjoymentorimaginationofenjoyment’’。[6]ButthisconcedesallthatisrequiredfortheHedonisticvaluationoffuturefeelings；noHedonisteversupposedthatthehappinessheaimsatmakingasgreataspossiblewassomethingtobeenjoyedallatonce，oreverwantedtoimagineitassoenjoyed。Andunlessthetransiencyofpleasurediminishesitspleasantness——apointwhichIwillpresentlyconsider——IcannotseethatthepossibilityofrealisingtheHedonisticendisatallaffectedbythenecessityofrealisingitinsuccessiveparts。
　　Green，inanotherpassage，appearstolaydownthat``anend’’whichis``toservethepurposeofacriterion’’must``enableustodistinguishactionsthatbringmennearertoitfromthosewhichdonot’’。This，however，wouldonlybethecaseifbyan``end’’isnecessarilymeantagoalorconsummation，which，aftergraduallydrawingnearertoit，wereachallatonce:butthisisnot，Iconceive，thesenseinwhichthewordisordinarilyunderstoodbyethicalwriters:andcertainlyallthatImeanbyitisanobjectofrationalaim——whetherattainedinsuccessivepartsornot——whichisnotsoughtasameanstotheattainmentofanyulteriorobject，butforitself。Andsolongasanyone’sprospectivebalanceofpleasureoverpainadmitsofbeingmadegreaterorlessbyimmediateactioninonewayoranother，thereseemsnoreasonwhy`MaximumHappiness’shouldnotprovideasserviceableacriterionofconductasany`chiefgood’capableofbeingpossessedallatonce，orinsomewayindependentoftheconditionoftime。
　　If，however，itbemaintained，thattheconsciousnessofthetransiencyofpleasureeithermakesitlesspleasantatthetimeorcausesasubsequentpain，andthatthedeliberateandsystematicpursuitofpleasuretendstointensifythisconsciousness；theproposition，ifborneoutbyexperience，wouldcertainlyconstitutearelevantobjectiontothemethodofEgoisticHedonism。Andthisviewwouldseemtobeinthemindofthewriterabovequotedthoughitisnowhereclearlyputforward:sinceheaffirmsthatitis``impossiblethatself-satisfactionshouldbefoundinanysuccessionofpleasures’’；[1]asself-satisfactionbeing``satisfactionforaselfthatabidesandcontemplatesitselfasabiding’’mustbeatleastrelativelypermanent:[2]anditis，Isuppose，impliedthatthedisappointmentoftheHedonist，whofailstofindself-satisfactionwhereheseeksforit，isattendedwithpainorlossofpleasure。Ifthisbeso，andiftheself-satisfactionthusmissedcanbeobtainedbytheresoluteadoptionofsomeotherprincipleofaction，itwouldcertainlyseemthatthesystematicpursuitofpleasureisinsomedangerofdefeatingitself:itisthereforeimportanttoconsidercarefullyhowfarthisisreallythecase。
　　Sofarasmyownexperiencegoes，itdoesnotappeartomethatthemeretransiencyofpleasuresisaserioussourceofdiscontent，solongasonehasafairprospectofhavingasvaluablepleasuresinthefutureasinthepast——orevensolongasthelifebeforeonehasanysubstantialamountofpleasuretooffer。ButIdonotdoubtthatanimportantelementofhappiness，forallormostmen，isderivedfromtheconsciousnessofpossessing``relativelypermanent’’sourcesofpleasure——whetherexternal，aswealth，socialposition，family，friends；orinternal，asknowledge，culture，strongandlivelyinterestinthewellbeingoffairlyprosperouspersonsorinstitutions。
　　This，however，doesnot，inmyopinion，constituteanobjectiontoHedonism:
　　itratherseemsobvious，fromthehedonisticpointofview，that``assoonasintelligencediscoversthattherearefixedobjects，permanentsourcesofpleasure，andlargegroupsofenduringinterests，whichyieldavarietyofrecurringenjoyments，therationalwill，preferringthegreatertotheless，willunfailinglydevoteitsenergiestothepursuitofthese。’’[4]
　　Itmayberepliedthatifthesepermanentsourcesofpleasureareconsciouslysoughtmerelyasameanstothehedonisticend，theywillnotaffordthehappinessforwhichtheyaresought。WiththisItosomeextentagree；
　　butIthinkthatifthenormalcomplexityofourimpulsesbedulytakenintoaccount，thisstatementwillbefoundnottomilitateagainsttheadoptionofHedonism，butmerelytosignaliseadangeragainstwhichtheHedonisthastoguard。InapreviouschapterIhave，afterButler，laidstressonthedifferencebetweenimpulsesthatare，strictlyspeaking，directedtowardspleasure，and`extra-regarding’impulseswhichdonotaimatpleasure，——thoughmuch，perhapsmost，ofourpleasureconsistsinthegratificationoftheselatter，andthereforedependsupontheirexistence，Itherearguedthatinmanycasesthetwokindsofimpulsearesofarincompatiblethattheydonoteasilycoexistinthesamemomentofconsciousness。Iadded，however，thatintheordinaryconditionofouractivitytheincompatibilityisonlymomentary，anddoesnotpreventarealharmonyfrombeingattainedbyasortofalternatingrhythmofthetwoimpulsesinconsciousness。Stillitseemsundeniablethatthisharmonyisliabletobedisturbed；andthatwhileontheonehandindividualsmayanddosacrificetheirgreatestapparenthappinesstothegratificationofsomeimperiousparticulardesire，so，ontheotherhand，self-loveisliabletoengrossthemindtoadegreeincompatiblewithahealthyandvigorousoutflowofthose`disinterested’impulsestowardsparticularobjects，thepre-existenceofwhichisnecessarytotheattainment，inanyhighdegree，ofthehappinessatwhichself-loveaims。Ishouldnot，however，inferfromthisthatthepursuitofpleasureisnecessarilyself-defeatingandfutile；butmerelythattheprincipleofEgoisticHedonism，whenappliedwithadueknowledgeofthelawsofhumannature，ispracticallyself-limiting；i。e。thatarationalmethodofattainingtheendatwhichitaimsrequiresthatweshouldtosomeextentputitoutofsightandnotdirectlyaimatit。Ihavebeforespokenofthisconclusionasthe`FundamentalParadoxofEgoisticHedonism’；butthoughitpresentsitselfasaparadox，theredoesnotseemtobeanydifficultyinitspracticalrealisation，whenoncethedangerindicatedisclearlyseen。Foritisanexperienceonlytoocommonamongmen，inwhateverpursuittheymaybeengaged，thattheylettheoriginalobjectandgoaloftheireffortspassoutofview，andcometoregardthemeanstothisendasendsinthemselves:sothattheyatlastevensacrificetheoriginalendtotheattainmentofwhatisonlysecondarilyandderivativelydesirable。Andifitbethuseasyandcommontoforgettheendinthemeansovermuch，thereseemsnoreasonwhyitshouldbedifficulttodoittotheextentthatRationalEgoismprescribes:and，infact，itseemstobecontinuallydonebyordinarypersonsinthecaseofamusementsandpastimesofallkinds。
　　Itistruethat，asourdesirescannotordinarilybeproducedbyaneffortofwill——thoughtheycantosomeextentberepressedbyit——ifwestartedwithnoimpulseexceptthedesireofpleasure，itmightseemdifficulttoexecutethepracticalparadoxofattainingpleasurebyaimingatsomethingelse。Yeteveninthishypotheticalcasethedifficultyislessthanitappears。Forthereactionofouractivitiesuponouremotionalnatureissuchthatwemaycommonlybringourselvestotakeaninterestinanyendbyconcentratingoureffortsuponitsattainment。Sothat，evensupposingamantobeginwithabsoluteindifferencetoeverythingexcepthisownpleasure，itdoesnotfollowthatifhewereconvincedthatthepossessionofotherdesiresandimpulseswerenecessarytotheattainmentofthegreatestpossiblepleasure，hecouldnotsucceedinproducingthese。
　　Butthissuppositionisneveractuallyrealised。Everyman，whenhecommencesthetaskofsystematisinghisconduct，whetheronegoisticprinciplesoranyother，isconsciousofanumberofdifferentimpulsesandtendencieswithinhim，otherthanthemeredesireforpleasure，whichurgehiswillinparticulardirections，totheattainmentofparticularresults:sothathehasonlytoplacehimselfundercertainexternalinfluences，andthesedesiresandimpulseswillbegintooperatewithoutanyeffortofwill。
　　Itissometimesthought，however，thatthereisanimportantclassofrefinedandelevatedimpulseswithwhichthesupremacyofself-loveisinapeculiarwayincompatible，suchastheloveofvirtue，orpersonalaffection，orthereligiousimpulsetoloveandobeyGod。Butatanyrateinthecommonviewoftheseimpulses，thisdifficultydoesnotseemtoberecognised。NoneoftheschoolofmoraliststhatfollowedShaftesburyincontendingthatitisaman’strueinteresttofosterinhimselfstrictlydisinterestedsocialaffections，hasnotedanyinherentincompatibilitybetweentheexistenceoftheseaffectionsandthesupremacyofrationalself-love。AndsimilarlyChristianpreacherswhohavecommendedthereligiouslifeasreallythehappiest，havenotthoughtgenuinereligionirreconcilablewiththeconvictionthateachman’sownhappinessishismostnearandintimateconcern。
　　Otherpersons，however，seemtocarrythereligiousconsciousnessandthefeelingofhumanaffectiontoahigherstageofrefinement，atwhichastricterdisinterestednessisexacted。Theymaintainthattheessenceofeitherfeeling，initsbestform，isabsoluteself-renunciationandself-sacrifice。Andcertainlytheseseemincompatiblewithself-love，howevercautiouslyself-limiting。Amancannotbothwishtosecurehisownhappinessandbewillingtoloseit。Andyethowifwillingnesstoloseitisthetruemeansofsecuringit？Canself-lovenotmerelyreduceindirectlyitsprominenceinconsciousness，butdirectlyandunreservedlyannihilateitself？
　　Thisemotionalfeatdoesnotseemtomepossible:
　　andthereforeImustadmitthatamanwhoembracestheprincipleofRationalEgoismcutshimselfofffromthespecialpleasurethatattendsthisabsolutesacrificeandabnegationofself。Buthoweverexquisitethismaybe，thepitchofemotionalexaltationandrefinementnecessarytoattainitiscomparativelysorare，thatitisscarcelyincludedinmen’scommonestimateofhappiness。IdonotthereforethinkthatanimportantobjectiontoRationalEgoismcanbebaseduponitsincompatibilitywiththisparticularconsciousness:
　　northatthecommonexperienceofmankindreallysustainstheviewthatthedesireofone’sownhappiness，ifacceptedassupremeandregulative，inevitablydefeatsitsownaimthroughtheconsequentdiminutionanddesiccationoftheimpulsesandemotionalcapacitiesnecessarytotheattainmentofhappinessinahighdegree；thoughitcertainlyshowsaseriousandsubtledangerinthisdirection。