Besidesthis，evenifthegeneraareinthehighestdegree
　　principles，shouldoneregardthefirstofthegeneraasprinciples，
　　orthosewhicharepredicateddirectlyoftheindividuals？Thisalso
　　admitsofdispute。Foriftheuniversalsarealwaysmoreofthenature
　　ofprinciples，evidentlytheuppermostofthegeneraarethe
　　principles；forthesearepredicatedofallthings。Therewill，
　　then，beasmanyprinciplesofthingsasthereareprimarygenera，
　　sothatbothbeingandunitywillbeprinciplesandsubstances；for
　　thesearemostofallpredicatedofallexistingthings。Butitisnot
　　possiblethateitherunityorbeingshouldbeasinglegenusof
　　things；forthedifferentiaeofanygenusmusteachofthemboth
　　havebeingandbeone，butitisnotpossibleforthegenustaken
　　apartfromitsspeciesanymorethanforthespeciesofthegenusto
　　bepredicatedofitsproperdifferentiae；sothatifunityorbeingis
　　agenus，nodifferentiawilleitherhavebeingorbeone。Butifunity
　　andbeingarenotgenera，neitherwilltheybeprinciples，ifthe
　　generaaretheprinciples。Again，theintermediatekinds，inwhose
　　naturethedifferentiaeareincluded，willonthistheorybegenera，
　　downtotheindivisiblespecies；butasitis，somearethoughtto
　　begeneraandothersarenotthoughttobeso。Besidesthis，the
　　differentiaeareprinciplesevenmorethanthegenera；andifthese
　　alsoareprinciples，therecomestobepracticallyaninfinite
　　numberofprinciples，especiallyifwesupposethehighestgenustobe
　　aprinciple-Butagain，ifunityismoreofthenatureofaprinciple，
　　andtheindivisibleisone，andeverythingindivisibleissoeitherin
　　quantityorinspecies，andthatwhichissoinspeciesisthe
　　prior，andgeneraaredivisibleintospeciesformanisnotthe
　　genusofindividualmen，thatwhichispredicateddirectlyofthe
　　individualswillhavemoreunity-Further，inthecaseofthingsin
　　whichthedistinctionofpriorandposteriorispresent，thatwhichis
　　predicableofthesethingscannotbesomethingapartfromtheme。g。
　　iftwoisthefirstofnumbers，therewillnotbeaNumberapart
　　fromthekindsofnumbers；andsimilarlytherewillnotbeaFigure
　　apartfromthekindsoffigures；andifthegeneraofthesethings
　　donotexistapartfromthespecies，thegeneraofotherthingswill
　　scarcelydoso；forgeneraofthesethingsarethoughttoexistifany
　　do。Butamongtheindividualsoneisnotpriorandanotherposterior。
　　Further，whereonethingisbetterandanotherworse，thebetteris
　　alwaysprior；sothatofthesealsonogenuscanexist。Fromthese
　　considerations，then，thespeciespredicatedofindividualsseemtobe
　　principlesratherthanthegenera。Butagain，itisnoteasytosayin
　　whatsensethesearetobetakenasprinciples。Fortheprincipleor
　　causemustexistalongsideofthethingsofwhichitistheprinciple，
　　andmustbecapableofexistinginseparationfromthem；butfor
　　whatreasonshouldwesupposeanysuchthingtoexistalongsideofthe
　　individual，exceptthatitispredicateduniversallyandofall？But
　　ifthisisthereason，thethingsthataremoreuniversalmustbe
　　supposedtobemoreofthenatureofprinciples；sothatthehighest
　　generawouldbetheprinciples。
　　8Thereisadifficultyconnectedwiththese，thehardestofall
　　andthemostnecessarytoexamine，andofthisthediscussionnow
　　awaitsus。If，ontheonehand，thereisnothingapartfromindividual
　　things，andtheindividualsareinfiniteinnumber，howthenisit
　　possibletogetknowledgeoftheinfiniteindividuals？Forall
　　thingsthatwecometoknow，wecometoknowinsofarastheyhave
　　someunityandidentity，andinsofarassomeattributebelongsto
　　themuniversally。
　　Butifthisisnecessary，andtheremustbesomethingapartfrom
　　theindividuals，itwillbenecessarythatthegeneraexistapartfrom
　　theindividuals，eitherthelowestorthehighestgenera；butwefound
　　bydiscussionjustnowthatthisisimpossible。
　　Further，ifweadmitinthefullestsensethatsomethingexists
　　apartfromtheconcretething，wheneversomethingispredicatedofthe
　　matter，mustthere，ifthereissomethingapart，besomethingapart
　　fromeachsetofindividuals，orfromsomeandnotfromothers，or
　　fromnone？AIfthereisnothingapartfromindividuals，there
　　willbenoobjectofthought，butallthingswillbeobjectsofsense，
　　andtherewillnotbeknowledgeofanything，unlesswesaythat
　　sensationisknowledge。Further，nothingwillbeeternalorunmovable；
　　forallperceptiblethingsperishandareinmovement。Butifthereis
　　nothingeternal，neithercantherebeaprocessofcomingtobe；for
　　theremustbesomethingthatcomestobe，i。e。fromwhichsomething
　　comestobe，andtheultimateterminthisseriescannothavecome
　　tobe，sincetheserieshasalimitandsincenothingcancometobe
　　outofthatwhichisnot。Further，ifgenerationandmovementexist
　　theremustalsobealimit；fornomovementisinfinite，butevery
　　movementhasanend，andthatwhichisincapableofcompletingits
　　comingtobecannotbeinprocessofcomingtobe；andthatwhich
　　hascompleteditscomingtobemustheassoonasithascometobe。
　　Further，sincethematterexists，becauseitisungenerated，itisa
　　fortiorireasonablethatthesubstanceoressence，thatwhichthe
　　matterisatanytimecomingtobe，shouldexist；forifneither
　　essencenormatteristobe，nothingwillbeatall，andsincethisis
　　impossibletheremustbesomethingbesidestheconcretething，viz。
　　theshapeorform。
　　ButagainBifwearetosupposethis，itishardtosayin
　　whichcaseswearetosupposeitandinwhichnot。Forevidentlyitis
　　notpossibletosupposeitinallcases；wecouldnotsupposethat
　　thereisahousebesidestheparticularhouses-Besidesthis，willthe
　　substanceofalltheindividuals，e。g。ofallmen，beone？Thisis
　　paradoxical，forallthethingswhosesubstanceisoneareone。But
　　arethesubstancesmanyanddifferent？Thisalsoisunreasonable-At
　　thesametime，howdoesthematterbecomeeachoftheindividuals，and
　　howistheconcretethingthesetwoelements？
　　9Again，onemightaskthefollowingquestionalsoaboutthe
　　firstprinciples。Iftheyareoneinkindonly，nothingwillbe
　　numericallyone，notevenunity-itselfandbeing-itself；andhow
　　willknowingexist，ifthereisnottobesomethingcommontoa
　　wholesetofindividuals？
　　Butifthereisacommonelementwhichisnumericallyone，and
　　eachoftheprinciplesisone，andtheprinciplesarenotasinthe
　　caseofperceptiblethingsdifferentfordifferentthingse。g。
　　sincethisparticularsyllableisthesameinkindwheneveritoccurs，
　　theelementsitarealsothesameinkind；onlyinkind，forthese
　　also，likethesyllable，arenumericallydifferentindifferent
　　contexts，-ifitisnotlikethisbuttheprinciplesofthingsare
　　numericallyone，therewillbenothingelsebesidestheelements
　　forthereisnodifferenceofmeaningbetween’numericallyone’and
　　’individual’；forthisisjustwhatwemeanbytheindividual-the
　　numericallyone，andbytheuniversalwemeanthatwhichispredicable
　　oftheindividuals。Thereforeitwillbejustasiftheelementsof
　　articulatesoundwerelimitedinnumber；allthelanguageintheworld
　　wouldbeconfinedtotheABC，sincetherecouldnotbetwoormore
　　lettersofthesamekind。
　　10Onedifficultywhichisasgreatasanyhasbeenneglected
　　bothbymodernphilosophersandbytheirpredecessors-whetherthe
　　principlesofperishableandthoseofimperishablethingsarethesame
　　ordifferent。Iftheyarethesame，howaresomethingsperishableand
　　othersimperishable，andforwhatreason？TheschoolofHesiodandall
　　thetheologiansthoughtonlyofwhatwasplausibletothemselves，
　　andhadnoregardtous。For，assertingthefirstprinciplestobe
　　godsandbornofgods，theysaythatthebeingswhichdidnottasteof
　　nectarandambrosiabecamemortal；andclearlytheyareusingwords
　　whicharefamiliartothemselves，yetwhattheyhavesaidaboutthe
　　veryapplicationofthesecausesisaboveourcomprehension。Forif
　　thegodstasteofnectarandambrosiafortheirpleasure，thesearein
　　nowisethecausesoftheirexistence；andiftheytastethemto
　　maintaintheirexistence，howcangodswhoneedfoodbeeternal？-But
　　intothesubtletiesofthemythologistsitisnotworthourwhileto
　　inquireseriously；those，however，whousethelanguageofproofwe
　　mustcross-examineandaskwhy，afterall，thingswhichconsistofthe
　　sameelementsare，someofthem，eternalinnature，whileothers
　　perish。Sincethesephilosophersmentionnocause，anditis
　　unreasonablethatthingsshouldbeastheysay，evidentlythe
　　principlesorcausesofthingscannotbethesame。Eventhemanwhom
　　onemightsupposetospeakmostconsistently-Empedocles，evenhehas
　　madethesamemistake；forhemaintainsthatstrifeisaprinciple
　　thatcausesdestruction，butevenstrifewouldseemnolesstoproduce
　　everything，excepttheOne；forallthingsexceptingGodproceed
　　fromstrife。Atleasthesays:-
　　Fromwhichallthatwasandisandwillbehereafter-
　　Trees，andmenandwomen，tooktheirgrowth，
　　Andbeastsandbirdsandwater-nourishedfish，
　　Andlong-agedgods。
　　Theimplicationisevidentevenapartfromthesewords；forif
　　strifehadnotbeenpresentinthings，allthingswouldhavebeenone，
　　accordingtohim；forwhentheyhavecometogether，’thenstrifestood
　　outermost。’HenceitalsofollowsonhistheorythatGodmost
　　blessedislesswisethanallothers；forhedoesnotknowallthe
　　elements；forhehasinhimnostrife，andknowledgeisofthelikeby
　　thelike。’Forbyearth，’hesays，
　　weseeearth，bywaterwater，
　　Byethergodlikeether，byfirewastingfire，
　　Lovebylove，andstrifebygloomystrife。
　　But-andthisisthepointwestartedfromthisatleastis
　　evident，thatonhistheoryitfollowsthatstrifeisasmuchthe
　　causeofexistenceasofdestruction。Andsimilarlyloveisnot
　　speciallythecauseofexistence；forincollectingthingsintothe
　　Oneitdestroysallotherthings。AndatthesametimeEmpedocles
　　mentionsnocauseofthechangeitself，exceptthatthingsaresoby
　　nature。
　　Butwhenstrifeatlastwaxedgreatinthelimbsofthe
　　Sphere，
　　Andsprangtoassertitsrightsasthetimewasfulfilled
　　Whichisfixedfortheminturnbyamightyoath。
　　Thisimpliesthatchangewasnecessary；butheshowsnocauseof
　　thenecessity。Butyetsofaratleasthealonespeaksconsistently；
　　forhedoesnotmakesomethingsperishableandothersimperishable，
　　butmakesallperishableexcepttheelements。Thedifficultyweare
　　speakingofnowis，whysomethingsareperishableandothersarenot，
　　iftheyconsistofthesameprinciples。
　　Letthissufficeasproofofthefactthattheprinciplescannot
　　bethesame。Butiftherearedifferentprinciples，onedifficulty
　　iswhetherthesealsowillbeimperishableorperishable。Forif
　　theyareperishable，evidentlythesealsomustconsistofcertain
　　elementsforallthingsthatperish，perishbybeingresolvedinto
　　theelementsofwhichtheyconsist；sothatitfollowsthatprior
　　totheprinciplesthereareotherprinciples。Butthisis
　　impossible，whethertheprocesshasalimitorproceedstoinfinity。
　　Further，howwillperishablethingsexist，iftheirprinciplesare
　　tobeannulled？Butiftheprinciplesareimperishable，whywill
　　thingscomposedofsomeimperishableprinciplesbeperishable，while
　　thosecomposedoftheothersareimperishable？Thisisnotprobable，
　　butiseitherimpossibleorneedsmuchproof。Further，noonehaseven
　　triedtomaintaindifferentprinciples；theymaintainthesame
　　principlesforallthings。Buttheyswallowthedifficultywestated
　　firstasiftheytookittobesomethingtrifling。
　　11Theinquirythatisboththehardestofallandthemost
　　necessaryforknowledgeofthetruthiswhetherbeingandunityare
　　thesubstancesofthings，andwhethereachofthem，withoutbeing
　　anythingelse，isbeingorunityrespectively，orwemustinquirewhat
　　beingandunityare，withtheimplicationthattheyhavesomeother
　　underlyingnature。Forsomepeoplethinktheyareoftheformer，